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Abstract
This thesis assesses the appropriateness and effectiveness of the economic reform
and structural adjustment programme adopted by Egypt in 1991. It also examines
the main political and economic constraints of such policies. It argues that it is
unlikely to provide sustainable or equitable growth. It also argues that privatisation
programmes in Egypt have a limited effect on improving levels of investment and
growth. It stresses the need to encourage new investment to increase the productive
capacity of the Egyptian economy in order to generate sustainable growth. The
thesis examines in particular, economic reforms in the agricultural sector. It focuses
on assessing price reforms so as to enquire how evenly distributed the benefits have
been among farmers with different sizes of land holding. Those with big farms are
likely to gain more while very small farmers and the landless are likely to lose.
Within agriculture the thesis assesses the impact of structural adjustment on Egypt's
agribusiness community. This sector is economically fragmented, has limited
effectiveness and is politically weak regarding its participation and its influence on
economic policy. The thesis argues that the success Df this sector is based on the
availability of a strong and effective state to provide the legal and regulatory.
infrastructure needed for an effective market economy, to abolish administrative
obstacles and to enhance in,vestors' credibility. In short, the thesis maintains that
sustaining the economic reform is based on reviving productive investments and
enhancing state capacity and democratisation.
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1Chapter 1	 Introduction
Structural adjustment policies were introduced to developing countries in the wake
of debt crises in the early 1980s. Their main aim was to liberalise the economies,
roll back the state from economic activities and encourage private initiatives. The
policies also had the aim of changing the type of incentives available to economic
activities from reliance upon rents to reliance on market forces. Structural
adjustment was introduced with two sets of policies. They were meant to be
complementary, although at times they seemed to be contradictory. The first of
these were policies of economic stabilisation usually led by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the second was the adjustment programme sponsored by
the World Bank (WB). Stabilisation programmes were aimed at restoring internal
and external balances and their main instruments were interest rates, and the
exchange rate. Adjustment policies dealt with supply side issues and aimed to rely
on market incentives to direct resources towards better utilisation, mainly through
changing relative prices. The resistance with which such policies were met in some
developing countries and the complete or relative failures in some of them raised
considerable debate. Other contentious issues related to the negative consequences
of increasing poverty, inequality, unemployment, and declining growth rates. In
recent years such drawbacks of the programme have encouraged both the IMF and
the World Bank to review the content of their policies and conditionalities in
developing countries. They have also produced concern about the distributional
impact's of adjustment, the environment, technical assistance and governance issues.
The latter includes issues which range from improving the government's
administrative capacity, fighting corruption and improving the state's capacity in
general to express a concern regarding initiating public participation and enhancing
democratisation. Nevertheless the validity and effectiveness of their programmes
remains debatable.
Egypt embarked on a structural adjustment programme in May 1991 under
the name of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP).
It followed the conclusion of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) followed by one with the World Bank. The signing of the agreement came
after long protracted negotiations during which a previous agreement was reached in
21987 that was never fulfilled. The resistance of the government to accept the IMF
recommendations or conditions for debt relief and Mubarak's later acceptance have
raised a number of questions. Did the acceptance by the Government of Egypt
(GOE) of the ERSAP relate to changes in Egyptian economic conditions or to
changes in the content of the IMF conditionality or to both? The publics experience
with a similar agreement with the IMF in 1977 led to massive increases in the prices
of some of the main staple foods, and violent demonstrations across the country
created an antagonistic attitude from the public towards the IMF and the WB.
Furthermore the negotiations and the initiation of the programme promoted a
profound debate between academics, intellectuals and political figures about the
appropriateness and the effectiveness of the programme. Part of the debate was
ideological as the programme entailed a shift from a state-led developmental model
to a free-market model. The old model had it proponents among those who believed
in the effective role of the state, the left-wing, Nasserists and the beneficiaries of
such a regime -amongst others, bureaucrats and labourers, while the new World
Bank model of liberalisation and rolling back the state had its proponents in
investors and academia who believed in economic liberalisation and the
entrepreneurial skills of businessmen. These conflicting views and interests, and the
fact that the programme entailed gains and losses which were likely to be unevenly
distributed along the time horizon and between different socio-economic classes,
required skilful management of the reform by the government.
In this respect, the thesis is concerned with raising a number of questions and
issues. f In particular it is concerned with what was the response of the main political
forces to the ERSAP? Was the reform a result of public discussion? Did it receive
the approval of the main political parties, and political powers? Was the government
able to create a wide consensus or coalition of beneficiaries to the reform? Was the
government able to provide transparency and to create credibility in its willingness
and its ability to carry out the reform programme?
This study emphasises the notion that even an economically well-designed
programme is insufficient for success. Political factors are also crucial for a
programme's success and more importantly for sustainability in the long run. This
study argues the importance of three main economic and political factors which are
3essential for sustaining the programme. These are reviving investment; enhancing
state capacity; and promoting democratisation.
Investment is crucial as experiences of developing countries have revealed
that stabilisation measures have contractionary effects leading to sharp reductions in
both public and private-sector investments in the short-term. In the long-term the
liberalisation package does not ensure the pace during which investment can recover.
The delay of investment response exacerbates negative consequences on the
economy and hence increases political risk. This study gives particular emphasis to
the importance of increasing the productive capacity of the economy, in order to
achieve sustainable growth. High investment rates and growth rates during the
1970s proved fragile because they were biased against the commodity-producing
sectors, and the productive capacity of the economy was not increased. Growth was
derived from rent particularly from oil, tourism, and the Suez Canal which rendered
the economy fragile to external shocks. The importance of productive investment is
also clear if we consider the main challenges facing the Egyptian economy. These
include: the rapid increase in population which already score low qualities of human
resources; the following increase in labour-force with an already high rate of
unemployment and its implications on social and political arenas; the weak
productive capability as appeared from the contribution of different sectors to the
GNP and from the level and composition of foreign trade; and the expected near
depletion of oil resources which were expected to be consumed within fifteen years
and where the last report of the World Bank (1997) about Egypt estimated the annual
increase in Egypt's productive capacity to reach zero if we take into consideration
the depletion in natural resources. All these challenges facing Egypt suggest the
urgent needs for a massive increase in productive investment. Investment should be
directed to increase the productive capacity to avoid external shocks and to provide
the bases for sustainable development. Investment in human resources would be
another way to improve the quality of life of the population and to foster growth at
the same time. From this perspective, this study lays particular importance on
studying the privatisation programme in Egypt.
At the same level of importance is the argument for enhancing state capacity
during the path of the reform programme. The World Bank evaluating reports of
adjustment experiences in developing countries placed great stress on the way
4governments were managing their programme in relation to its success and found it
one of the main explanatory factors for the uneven performance of adjustment
programmes in developing countries. While this is true, it is also true that state
capacity is important for the success of the developmental effort using any
development model. At the same time that the proponents of adjustment
programmes admit the weak institutional structures and performance of developing
countries, they do not provide detailed or relevant views in this respect. The original
neo-classical view concerning rolling back the role of the state to its minimum does
not provide a suitable solution to the problem of weak state institutions and
capabilities. The increasing criticism of neo-classical thought has led to greater
realisation of the importance of the state capacity issue rather than its size.
The argument for democratisation is very diverse. However, in different
ways it is very supportive of the positive relationship between democratisation and
adjustment. Experiences of developing countries show that there is no clear
relationship between a political system and the success of structural adjustment
programmes. The initiation of structural adjustment programmes has been
successful in countries under authoritarian regimes as well as in countries under
democratic regimes. Nevertheless, Joan Nelson (1992) differentiated between the
two phases of initiating the programme and that of consolidating it and found it
essential to have a democratic regime in the consolidating phase of the programme.
The argument in favour of democratisation is related to achieving more public
conviction and support for the programme through political participation in the
decision-making process. Others see it as a compensation process for the increasing
austerity under stabilisation and adjustment measures. We can add that
democratisation is important to the process of balancing power between different
interest groups during adjustment as it can lead to a more equal distribution of gains
and losses.
This thesis gives particular attention to the effect of the ERSAP on the
agricultural sector where I assess the impact of the policy on farmers and
agribusiness. The study is concerned with the equitable distribution of benefits and
costs among farmers from different strata and about the sustainability of the
achieved growth in the agricultural sector.
5The agricultural sector in Egypt used to be subject to intensive state
intervention, however it was a leading sector for liberalisation. Before the SAP, the
agricultural sector witnessed a deteriorating performance where agricultural
production was sluggish, leading to an increasing food gap, a massive deficit in the
agricultural trade balance in addition to increasing poverty and unemployment in the
rural areas. State intervention was blamed by IFIs of being responsible for this
deteriorating performance. Liberalisation measures were initiated from the mid-
1980s and included eliminating the role of the Principal Bank for Development and
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) in the input trade and distribution and confining its
task to providing finance. Subsidies on agricultural inputs were curtailed and both
input trade and prices were freed. The Private sector was allowed to work in the
agricultural input trade and distribution. Agricultural projects and reclaimed land
came under privatisation. The reform programme in the agricultural sector also
entailed changes in land tenure arrangements where rents were increased and then
freed and rent contracts were no longer permanent. A proposed cost recovery
programme by the World Bank is still debatable. Liberalisation, it was claimed,
would achieve a better use of scarce resources and to increase agricultural
production and exports. This in turn was thought to increase the living standards of
farmers. The study investigates whether this policy was able to achieve its targets.
Have agricultural production and exports increased? Which objectives have been
achieved and which not? Why? Have the gains been equally distributed?
As liberalisation policies have meant 'rolling back' the state and relying
more on the private sector, it is important to assess the response of agribusiness to
the reform measures. Has the reform succeeded in encouraging more private
participation? What was the impact of the reforms on private business. What are
the main obstacles that the reform succeeded in overcoming? What are other
obstacles that still face this sector? How have changes in economic policy affected
investors' credibility in the government? How has it affected their political
behaviour? Has it encouraged more political participation? Have agribusiness
investors formed coalitions of beneficiaries to support state policy? Were they able
to influence state policy and the decision-making process?
6Aims and Objectives of the Study
This study has two general objectives which need to be investigated at the national,
meso, and micro levels. These are: to identify political and economic constraints to
the reform programme; and to assess the programme's ability to provide sustainable
and equitable growth. The study sets more specific objectives at the sectoral level of
agriculture and the sub-sector of agribusiness. It assesses the impact of the applied
reforms on the agricultural sector with regard to its ability to achieve sustainable and
equitable growth. The impact of reforms are discussed on the sectoral, household
and business levels. The assessment tries to investigate whether the reforms have
been relevant to the sector and farmers needs, and whether gains and losses have
been distributed equally between them, if not, who gains and who loses? and why? It
also assesses the state's ability to carry out the reform programme in this sector.
Which reforms have been carried out successfully and which delayed? The study
also assesses the agribusiness response to the reforms. While there is little data
available about this sub-sector, the study provides a descriptive and analytical profile
of it as a distinctive business group. The study then continues to demonstrate more
empirical evidence of the impact of the reforms on these activities and the
impediments to investment. It also illustrates the state-business relationship in this
sector, the ability of reforms to build credibility between investors and the state, and
the agribusinessmen's political participation and their ability to influence economic
policy.
This study has used a multi-disciplinary approach to assess the reform
programmes, investigating both the economic and political dynamics. The reform
programme has been evaluated from two different angles. Its validity and
appropriateness to developing countries in general and Egypt in particular were
assessed against its theoretical bases. This was done in chapter two and throughout
the subsequent chapters. The effectiveness of the content of the programme was
investigated with reference to the Egyptian case.
The study starts by discussing the theoretical and conceptual aspects of the
SAP. Arguments are carried out and concepts tested at the macro, meso and micro
levels. Macro policies at national level are examined and their impacts assessed.
The effect of macro policies is not limited to the national level but is extended to the
sectoral and enterprise levels, however, there are always specific sectoral policies,
7which affect sectoral performance. The deflationary effect and the effect on poverty
was an inescapable result of the programme at national and sectoral levels. While
the literature review shows that this negative effect is not limited to one country, the
macro, meso, and micro investigation proves that these impacts are penetrative and
can profoundly affect sectors and productive units. The depth analysis of these
impacts helps to assess their severity and their needed recovery time and measures.
The severity of the impact of macro-policies can also vary from one sector to another
and from one socio-economic group to another. So it is important to disaggregate
these impacts.
The macro, meso, micro approach is not only useful for assessing the severity
of the reform impacts it is also important for the development of some conceptual
issues which are debatable according to neo-classical economic thought. These
issues relate to the anticipated role of the state, changes in state capacity during the
reform and the balance of power between the state and different interest groups.
Since one of the main sources of Egyptian state power was clear in its penetrative
role in the rural areas, it is useful to assess the effect of state withdrawal from
economic life in this sector. The effect on both state power and economic activity is
vital, so is the effect on the balance of power between the state and different interest
groups, where our study focuses on the relationship with the agribusiness
community.
To assess the first two general objectives of the study, there is a need to
assess economic performance under the SAP. The impact on economic performance
can be assessed in comparison with the achievement of the programme targets;
improvements in the situation compared with the pre-reform conditions, and with the
needs of society. The first two methods provide a limited view concerning the real
impact of the programme as they take the programme targets as given, the matter
which might ignore the real needs of society. At the same time they ignore the other
negative impacts of the programme. The programme's ability to satisfy people's
needs is important for political stability and the sustainability of the programme. For
that reason there is a need to discuss the political aspects of the programme. The
study investigates the ability of the SAP to create a consensus about reform
measures; to build a coalition of beneficiaries and to keep a strong support base. It
also considers changes in state power and the ability of the state to enhance its
8capacity and to maintain the balance of power between the state and the different
interest groups in society. Thus the state-civil society relationship is discussed.
This study used a variety of data from different sources, secondary data, data
from official sources e.g. the MOP, CAPMAS and MALR. The study also used
unpublished data from the MALR and the PBDAC. Two interviews with senior
official of the MALR, with Dr. Saad Nassar, and Dr. Hassan Khedr were conducted.
A field work study was also conducted in Egypt concerning the agribusiness
community. The study selected a sample of 36 agribusiness companies.
Field Work
There was a need to survey the approximate size and characteristics of the
agribusiness community in Egypt in order to select our sample. I used three different
directories to do this: The Green Business Directory published by Ahram (1994);
Cairo Yellow Pages (1995) and the Kampass Misr Directory (1994). The last
directory was particularly useful in providing more information about the
companies' activities and size. However, its classification entails its use in
conjunction with other directories for easier access to companies. Although we
relied on recent publications of these directories the data obtained was sometimes
incorrect. During my field work one of the respondents provided me with a more
recent directory prepared for the `Shura 96' international exhibition that has been
updated. However it was less comprehensive. The EAAPA record was also useful
for obtaining names of companies working in the agro-chemical sector.
A random sample was selected that covered almost all the different activities
of the gribusiness community involved in the production of agricultural products or
products with backward links to the agricultural sector -inputs. The sample
amounted to 36 cases, which represented between 12-15 percent of the size of the
total community at that time. However, the companies approached were about 70 in
number, so I had a very low respondent rate.
Nine governorates were represented in the sample, these included Cairo,
Giza, Alexandria, Domyat, Dakhlia, Gharbia, Sharkia, Beheira, and Monofia (Sadat
City). About half of the sample were located in Greater Cairo. Upper Egypt was not
represented , however, due to the normal distribution of the agribusiness community
in Egypt which is concentrated in the Delta. The sample contained companies from
11 major investment groups, six of them practised various activities and five were
9exclusively to the agribusiness. Large companies were more responsive and co-
operative and seemed more sympathetic to the objectives of the study. One investor
who managed a group of companies returned four questionnaires. Only one was
used, however, as his answers and views were identical. Using the four
questionnaires was thought to give his answers more weight.
The study used structured questionnaires prepared for qualitative data
analysis. The intention was to apply this through interview technique, however, this
technique was applied to only about half of them. Others preferred to self-administer
their questionnaires. Investors were approached either directly by personal visits or
by telephone first. Data collection took four and a half months, from December
1995, to mid-April 1996. Companies located outside the Greater Cairo area were
approached directly or by correspondence. A pilot study was conducted at the
beginning of the field work.
The field work suffered from some limitations. The first was the absence of
complete and accurate data about the size and activities of this sub-sector. This
problem is part of the problem of data availability in Egypt in general. It is also due
to the absence of a clear definition of the agribusiness. Some activities of the
agribusiness were classified under different categories in different directories. This
study defines the agribusiness sector to include any economic unit whose main
activity provides agricultural products and/or services which are necessary for
_
agricultural production. This includes activities with which the agricultural sector
has backward linkage, i.e. activities that . provide the sector with inputs; fertilisers,
seeds, t pesticides and agricultural machinery, equipment and tools or any other
services of consultation and know-how. In this study we deal with the formal sector
where these economic units are registered as companies and working either under
private sector law or investment law. Thus it excludes farmers and small merchants
who are not registered as private companies. The study tried to build its own frame
of reference and to incorporate activity like new irrigation systems under the
definition of agribusiness, as they used to be classified under plastic (Chemical)
industries. Data obtained from the available directories were also incorrect
concerning the address and telephone numbers which wasted the time of the
researcher.
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The second main limitation was the low response-rate, which might be
explained by various factors. First of all it is partly a lack of credence in research
institutes in Egypt and the long time taken to conduct researches. It also reflects a
lack of confidence in government organisations and officials and the absence of a
positive response to these researches. Few investors thought that the results would
be published within ten years, others were hesitant about the response of the MALR
officials and expected them to add more obstacles. They were not able to criticise
them openly. Another reason was related to the crisis of political participation in
Egypt in general, where investors were reluctant to express their political views in
particular. The low response was also related to the ignorance of some investors
about the real meaning of the reform policy and its objectives and components. It
was also related to the targeted community in particular where investors found it
difficult to fit in an appropriate period of time to answer the questionnaire. Another
limitation to the study was related to some aspects of the Egyptian culture.
Agribusinessmen were reluctant to express their unwillingness to participate openly
and directly or to discuss the reasons behind this. The way they behaved to avoid
taking part in the study was time-consuming and frustrating in some cases.
However, some of them were very co-operative.
Focusing on the Agricultural Sector
There are four main reasons behind my choice to study the agricultural sector in
Egypt. The first is the importance of the sector in the economic structure of the
country, as it used to be, and still is, the main contributor to domestic production and
export's, and the main absorber of the work-force. The agricultural sector also used
to contribute to the public revenues through indirect taxation -or unfavourable terms
of trade between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Adjustment
programmes push agricultural prices to their market levels and particularly deprive
the public budget from a substantial source of finance. Meanwhile the public deficit
is the main concern on the path to reform. Increasing revenues is one of the most
debatable issues. A number of questions arise here concerning who will pay.
Should the rural sector share the burden? How viable is it to shift from indirect tax.
to direct and how relevant are the cost recovery programmes introduced in rural
areas? The second reason is that agricultural performance has deteriorated over time
as can be seen from its failure to meet the increasing needs of the growing
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population. Before the adjustment it was blamed by some economists (see Kheir
Eddin, 1989 & Abdel Khalek, 1994) for being responsible for Egypt's main
economic problems. This view was based on evidence of the responsibility for the
large food gap and for the trade and public deficits and inflation. The third reason is
that this sector was the leading sector for liberalisation efforts in Egypt, beginning as
early as 1986. And finally, because of the challenge which faces this sector in the
near future. It was estimated that the population of Egypt would reach 123 million,
almost double, after 30 years if the population growth-rate continued the same. Dr.
Wali himself warned that by that time Egypt would have to direct all its income to
import food and few resources would remain for development projects (Wali, 1998
as quoted by Ragab in Al-Ahram International 4/9/98). While the challenge is high,
the dividend of growth of this sector is wide in terms of its contribution to overall
growth and to job opportunities. A 2 percent increase in the agricultural sector
growth-rate (to 4.5 percent) would provide an estimated additional 309,123 jobs
annually (combining direct and indirect effects) with about 132,662 more jobs than
these needed to absorb the annual increase in the rural labour force (JMA, 1995: 5-
6).
Contribution and Significance of the Study
The main contribution of this study lies in the empirical evidence concerning the
practices of agribusiness sector during economic reform. While interest has recently
increased in studying the business community in Egypt, there are two main
drawbacks to these studies. The first is that they deal with businessmen as
homogeneous groups ignoring the differences in their economic and political
interests and in their political behaviour and power. The second is that these studies
focus on studying the relationship between businessmen and the political decision-
making centres and their influence on policy making. They do so by analysing the
relationship between the state and the big Businessmen's Associations (see for
Example the work of Amani Kandil, 1991, 1994; Awad, 1992; Abel Mesih, 1996).
This might be acceptable in part as these studies focus mainly on the relationship
between such associations and the political decision-making centres and their
influence on policy-making. However, this ignores the fact that small and informal
private business constitute a great part of the Egyptian economy that is not
represented in the big Business Associations or even in any other kind of association.
r>.
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Yet such studies even reveal the dominance of a few prominent businessmen to such
associations.
This study avoids these drawbacks by limiting its analysis to one particular
group: the agribusiness, realising that it represents a relatively more homogeneous
group than other sectors with regard to interests and positions in economic activity,
which differs from other activities. It also assesses state-business relations not only
through business associations, but also the direct relationship between businessmen
and the state. The scope of the study is also very rich as it discusses the economic
and political impacts of the reform. Focusing on one sector of the economy has
enriched the scope of the study as it has enabled me to discuss in greater depth some
of the economic aspects of the reform and their effect on these activities, assessed
for the first time from the view point of the investors. At the same time, this enables
an indirect assessment of some of the political outcomes of the reform, concerning
its credibility and political support.
Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one is this introduction. Chapter
two examines the theoretical and conceptual issues of structural adjustment policies
in developing countries. It assesses the appropriateness and effectiveness of such
policies. The chapter argues that these policies have inner contradictions and
inconsistencies and limited effectiveness. Chapter three examines the recent
historical foundations of Egypt's development experience. It assesses its
performance from two different experiences of economic development. The first is
state 6apitalist and the second is a partial liberalised economy. Chapter four
discusses the political economy of adjustment in Egypt. It argues that the
programme is not able to generate sustainable or equitable growth. It also argues
that the privatisation programme has a limited effect regarding increasing the levels
of investment and growth. The chapter also argues that the state was not able to
enhance its capacity during the reform and that there is a need for political reform
and more democratic space in order to sustain the economic reform. Chapter five
focuses on the impact of the economic reform on the agricultural sector. It argues
that the reform programme focused on price reforms while institutional reforms
lagged behind. It also argues that the limited gains achieved are unsustainable and
unevenly distributed. Big farmers are likely to win more while very small farmers
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and the landless are likely to lose. Chapters six and seven draw on empirical work
carried out on the agribusiness community in Egypt. Chapter six examines the
possible impacts of the SAP on the agribusiness community in Egypt. Chapter seven
discusses state business relationships. It argues that Egypt's agribusiness community
has limited economic effectiveness and is politically weak. Chapter eight is the
conclusion.
t
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Chapter 2
	
The Political Economy of Adjustment
2.1. Introduction
During the 1980s the world economy experienced a decade of crisis and weak
performance which resulted in stagnation and low growth rates. It was named the
lost development decade. The debt crisis in the early years of this decade paved the
way for the shift to a new policy agenda in the developing countries and for the
reviving of a new orthodoxy of liberalism. International Financial Institutions (IFIs),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular, revived and enhanced their
previously declining role in the developing countries. The need for urgent finance
and repayment arrangements was traded for a new type of conditionality. This was
based mainly on the monetarist view of managing the monetary and fiscal policy in
order to restore external and internal balances. It was also based on the neo-classical
idea of rolling back the state from the economic arena and allowing free market
forces to allocate resources. The main premise of this new orientation was that
restoring macroeconomic balances will allow market forces to allocate resources
efficiently by creating the needed incentives for the private sector.
The uneven nature and the limited success of these policies created a major
debate about the appropriateness and the effectiveness of such policies. The neo-
liberal agenda success was noted in Asia while it proved to be a failure, in particular
in the countries where the crisis was severe, namely Africa in general and sub-
Sahardn Africa (SSA) in particular. While growth was difficult to restore and
investment continues at low levels, the costs were high in the form of recession and
increasing unemployment and poverty with unequal distribution of losses and
limited gains. The weak performance of African countries was explained by the
nature of the states and their political structures. The experience of African
countries initiated the increasing interest and realisation of the importance of
increasing state capacity and the need for political reform in general as an important
prerequisite for successful economic reform.
The role of the state has occupied considerable space in the debate. The
earlier perspective of a minimal role for the state introduced at the earlier stages of
SAP proved a failure and has been gradually changed. The central role of the state
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in managing and leading the process of adjustment was understood and there has
been a recognition of the need for a strong state in order for markets to perform
effectively. There was also a realisation by both IFIs and academics for the need of a
state role, in developing countries in particular, to overcome the gap between the
short-term preferences of individuals and the long-term preferences of society to
achieve sustainable development. With the increasing interrelation between national
and international markets the need for selective state intervention to regulate this
relation continues or even increases (see Bromley, 1995)
This chapter explores the main causes of the economic crisis in the
developing countries and the role of both external and internal factors in the move to
the neo-Liberal' policy agenda of development. It also examines the validity and
efficiency of this policy for the developing countries. It argues that these policies
have inner contradictions and inconsistencies and are not applicable to developing
countries. Emphasis will be given to examine the two main pillars of the policy
which are liberalisation and privatisation. These two principles are at the core of the
current debate about the role of the state in development. It also assesses the
political management of the programme in the light of the changing balance of
power between the state and civil society. It argues that although the state has to
reduce its direct involvement in the process of economic production and diminish
the size of its inflated bureaucracy, it needs to augment its capacity in the legal,
regulatory and administrative areas in order to monitor markets. This in turn raises
issues of how to increase state effectiveness and how is the role of civil society to be
complemented by that of the state. Is there a need to increase democratisation? and
why? The study further argues that it is the state's capacity to manage economic life
irrespective of the type of applied developmental model which decides the outcome
of any policy. However, the current changes in the international economy cannot be
ignored and have had their impact on applied strategy.
This chapter is divided into nine parts. The following part reviews changes in
the world economy before the introduction of structural adjustment policies. Part
three examines the changing role of the IMF due to changes in the world economy
and the rise of conditionality. Part four assesses the role of internal and external
factors in reform programmes. Part five examines critically the components and
objectives of adjustment programmes. Part six discusses SAP effectiveness and
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distributional impacts. Part seven examines the role of the state in economic
activities. Part eight reviews possible political management of adjustment
programmes. Part nine is the conclusion.
2.2. Changes in the World Economy
The last few decades have witnessed many changes in the international economy
which have led in turn to parallel changes in the international institutional setting
and in the role of both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
(WB). Industrial countries experienced high growth rates after the end of WWII
with the help of the new monetary and financial arrangements of the world economy.
Many Developing countries gained their political freedom in the 1950s and early
1960s and tried to find their own strategy for growth as well. The residue of
antagonism towards the west, and the emerging success of the USSR influenced
third world choice of their economic strategy. They tried to apply independent
economic development based mainly on ISI, nationalisation and state protection and
regulation in economic life. This strategy functioned well during the 1960s with a
downward trend during the 1970s which deteriorated even further during the 1980s.
Table 2.1 summarises the main changes in the world economy.
Table 2. 1 World Economic Indicators, 1965-90 (percentage change a year)
1965-73 1973-80 1980-90
GDP Growth
Industrial countries 4.4 2.5 3.1
Developing countries
-	 6.2 5.1 3.2
per capita 3.7 3.0 1.2
Inflatioy
	 •
Industrial countries
GDP deflator 5.4 9.3 4.5
Exports (US dollars) 5.6 12.0 2.6
Developing countries
GDP deflator 9.7 24.9 61.8
Non-oil exports 4.5 12.5 0.2
Terms of Trade
Industrial countries +0.5 -1.3 +0.6
Developing countries +0.7 +7.7 +0.2
Non-oil developing countries +0.6 -0.7 -0.4
Interest Rates
U.S. Prime (nominal) 5.3 8.1 11.9
U.S. Prime (real) 2.6 1.0 7.0
Source: Little et al, 1993. Boom, Crisis, and Adjustment: The Macroeconomic Experience of Developing
countries. Washington DC: the World Bank (For GDP and Inflation); Stallings, B, 1992. International Influence
on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilisation, and Structural Reform. In Haggard and Kaufman, The Politics of
Economic Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for terms of trade and interest rates).
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Economic growth rates were high during the 1960s and early 1970s in both
the industrial and developing countries. From the mid-1970s a downward trend in
growth-rate in both worlds started and continued during the 1980s. The growth-rate
in developing countries was higher than in industrial countries however, the faster
population growth in developing countries offset this difference and the growth of
per capita income did not differ much between the two worlds (Mosley et al, 1991:
5). The high growth-rates in the first period of 1965-73 was generally matched by
relative price stability. The second period witnessed a commodity price boom and a
massive increase in oil prices in 1973, which was termed the first oil shock, and in
1979 the world was struck by a second oil shock. This led to high inflation rates
accompanied by economic recession in industrial countries and even higher inflation
rates in developing countries together, with deteriorating terms of trade for oil-
importing countries.
During the 1970s the Third World suffered from deteriorating terms of trade,
a decline in the demand for their raw materials, and consequently a decline in foreign
exchange. They tried to compensate for this by borrowing in the financial markets.
However, for the third world it was the period of cheap credit due to the availability
of oil revenues in the commercial banks with low demand from industrial countries'
investors due to northern recession. With this situation, banks were eager to lend to
Third World countries with low interest rates and little conditionality concerning the
use of the loan. Between 1973-1982, 65 percent of gross disbursement to Third
World countries came from private banks; for middle-income countries this share
was asthigh as 80 percent (Stallings, 1992: 59).
In 1980 the industrial countries suffered a serious recession and accelerated
inflation due to the second oil shock in 1979. The right-wing governments which
came to office in the major industrialised countries applied tight macroeconomic
policies, especially for monetary policies and adopted the monetarist view of cutting
back the money supply through high nominal interest rates to control inflation. This
policy succeeded in reducing inflation rateS and at the same time the growth of real
output fell dramatically. The increase in nominal interest rates and the subsequent
decrease in inflation rates had its effect on Third World countries in the form of high
real interest rates and an increase in the cost of borrowing. Those countries that had
borrowed under variable interest rates faced a considerable increase in their debt
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burdens. On the other hand, The Third World countries suffered a fall in the demand
for and the prices of their exports and a deterioration in their terms of trade. When
this combined with the high capital outflows for debt services the result was a huge
deficit in the balance of payments of these countries (Mosley eta!, 1991:7-8). These
shifts in the financial markets were most dramatic in their effect on the Third World
countries. The net receipt of average annual capital inflows of US$ 23 billion, about
1.7 percent of GDP between 1970 and 1982 turned to outflows of the order of US$
21 billion per year during the rest of the decade (Stallings, 1992:58). This change
had deep and profound effects on the economies of these countries as well as on
their social and political life. Its impact extended to threatening the international
financial system and the world economy with the emergence of a debt crisis. The rise
in international interest rates during 1980-81 sharply increased the debt service of
the highly indebted countries in Latin America. Meantime, their capacity to pay was
declining due to the reduction in their foreign exchange earning from exports
because of the global recession. In 1982, Mexico declared its failure to pay its debt
which was mainly to commercial banks. Due to the huge indebtedness of Mexico,
and the existence of similar problems in other Latin American countries, the crisis
threatened commercial banks with bankruptcy and the collapse of the whole
international financial system.
The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s had an uneven impact on Third World
countries which depended to a large extent on the economic structure of the country
concerned. The impact of changes in terms. of trade varied according to the size of
trade and its composition. The Asian economies were more able to recover from the
shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s although they are more open compared with
other countries because their economies were more diversified. Latin America and
Africa were more affected because their economies were less diversified (Stallings,
1992:47-52). During the period 1965-1990, the share of manufactured goods,
including semi-processed non-ferrous metals, increased from 26 percent of the total
exports of developing countries to 53 percent. This increase was not only due to
increases in the East Asian countries' manufactured exports but also as a result of
increases in the manufactured exports of Latin America countries where
manufactured exports have increased from 7 percent in 1965 to 32 percent in 1990.
However, sub-Saharan African countries continued to export mainly primary
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products, as did the major oil-exporting developing countries. On the other hand,
many were significant importers of primary products, mainly petroleum and staple
foods such as grains, in addition to cotton and other industrial materials. However, it
must be noted that these increases in exports did not affect the total share of
developing countries as it remained at the level of 27 percent of world exports
between 1965-1988 (Little et al, 1993: 13). This means that the industrial countries
were able to protect their share of trade, due to the increased protectionist policies
adopted by industrial countries, beginning in the mid-1970s. The gains of some
developing countries were achieved at the expense of other developing countries
which means increased disparities between developing countries themselves, never
mind the disparities between the losing developing counties and developed counties.
The East and South East Asian countries were the best able to markedly raise their
share of exports during the same period, while the share of African countries and the
Western Hemisphere declined sharply. Little draws attention to the fact that 'by
1990 Korea alone was exporting more than Africa' (ibid). Changes in the financial
markets also had a negative impact on countries with a low volume of export
revenue and/or low domestic savings rates (Stallings 1992: 47-52).
2.3. The Changing Role of the IMF and the World Bank and the Rise
of Conditionality
The changes in the world economy had a profound impact on the role of both the
IMF and the World Bank. The role of the Fund was to some extent marginalised
from the early 1970s due to several factors. The first of these was the collapse of the
fixed exchange rate in 1973. The failure to sustain the convertibility of US dollars
into gold, currency speculation, the accumulation of dollar foreign exchange reserves
abroad led some countries, starting with Canada in 1970, followed by the United
Kingdom in 1972, to float their currencies so as to insulate domestic monetary
conditions from external influences. In March 1973 floating exchange rates among
major currencies became general (Little et al, 1993:10-11, 16-17). The shift to a
generalised flexible exchange rate was followed by the privatisation of the financial
system during the 1970s after the first oil shock. The Fund responded to the rise in
the price of oil by introducing the oil facility and by expanding the Compensatory
Financing Facility in the mid-1970s. However, the Fund's credit was limited to the
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poorest countries which could not afford borrowing from commercial banks (Bird,
1995: 3-5). Table 2.2 shows the changes in the private banks' credits to developing
countries which it increased during the 1970s to reach its highest point in 1980 to
cover about half the net flows to the developing countries. The Fund's role as a
source for reserve creation was marginalised during the 1970s as well. Although the
Special Drawing Rights were introduced at the beginning of the decade the switch to
the flexible exchange rate and the private financing of payment deficits rendered the
amount of official reserves unimportant. The final factor that helped to marginalise
the role of the Fund was the increase in regional arrangements which was strongly
illustrated by the establishment of the European monetary system in 1979 (ibid,:4-5).
Table 2. 2 Net Flows of Foreign Capital to Third World Countries, 1961-1989
Year Bilateral Multilateral Banks DFI
1961 31.0% 12.2% 14.2% 42.6%
1965 35.3 11.3 11.2 42.2
1970 30.4 9.0 21.8 38.8
1975 24.1 10.6 35.6 29.7
1980 20.0 12.7 50.8 16.5
1985 15.8 30.4 37.6 16.1
1989 18.7 36.4 8.0 36.8
Source: Stallings, B. 1992. "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilisation, and
. Structural Reform". In Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R. The Politics of Economic Adjustment. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
The IMF's original responsibility was to monitor currency stability, finance
balance of payment deficits and create international reserves. However, other events
have helped to revive its role. The emergence of the debt crisis in the early 1980s
led to profound changes in the financial markets, in the relationship of the
developing countries with lending institutions and governments, and in the IMF and
World Bank's role and policies. The Mexican government's failure to pay back its
debt pushed the commercial banks to declare a general cessation of .'voluntary'
lending which extended the crisis to other nations that relied on new borrowing to
meet the increased debt services. The IMF, whose resources could not respond to
the huge financial needs of the indebted countries, played a central role, with the US
government, in preparing Rescue Packages. The Fund urged the commercial banks
to participate in these Rescue Packages by introducing what became known as
Involuntary Lending. In addition to the new money from the private banks, the
measures included rescheduling of payments, and additional finance from the
international institutions. In return, the goverment of Mexico, and other debtor
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countries with problems in servicing, were committed to a reform programme to cut
the budget deficit and produce trade surpluses in a Stand by Arrangement (El-
Naggar, 1991; Mohammed, 1987: 79 & Stallings, 1992: 59-60).
Policy changes imposed on Mexico and other debtor countries after 19$2
were not new. The use of the Fund's resources was explicitly associated with
pursuing policy changes from its early stages onwards, as the US insisted. In the
1980s the notion of conditionality was formally incorporated into the amendments of
the Articles of agreement of the Fund (Kahler, 1992:89-90). This is consistent with
the IMF's main role, which is to manage the international monetary system so as to
achieve international stability. It provides consultation and collaboration on
monetary problems to help maintain exchange stability and balance of payment
equilibrium through policy advice and short-term credit. This was thought to benefit
the expansion of international trade and then help to raise the levels of employment
and growth (Bird, 1995:1-2). However, the amendments of the Articles of
Agreement gives the Fund more flexibility to develop its conditionality and to
increase its leverage'. The subsequent international economic developments and the
increased critique of the Fund programmes to debtor countries concerning their
appropriateness and effectiveness also paved the way for an extension of its
conditionality to different areas and in different ways. Killick (1995:20) recognised
four areas where the fund developed its conditionality in one way or another: type of
provided facilities; objectives of the programmes; content of the programmes
(changing emphasis & new conditionality); and flexibility in conditionality
(negotiation of conditionality & implementation). In the next section I shall try to
assess if these changes tightened the conditionality or made it more concessional.
And what was the impact on its appropriateness to Third-World conditions and
hence on its effectiveness?
As the early experience of the Fund rendered costly and reflected
recessionary impacts with low growth rates, the US Secretary of Treasury James
Baker introduced what was then known as the Baker Plan in 1985. The plan stressed
the need for growth as well as stabilisation, hence, initiated the first shift in
conditionality as it directed the attention to two changes in conditionality. These
I However, the Fund's Articles of Agreement put a limit on the Fund's conditionality concerning the political
aspects, as I shall explain later.
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concerned its content, to encompass new measures to deal with structural aspects,
and its duration to provide medium-term finance. It also implicitly enforced the role
of the World Bank by stressing the need for longer term policies and finance. In
1986 and 1987 the Fund introduced Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF) and
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAF) respectively. Both facilities are
in support of medium-term programmes and restricted to low-income countries.
They have concessional financial terms, however, ESAF has a more 'vigorous'
programme and continuing access to it is conditional on the observance of
performance criteria. This is because ESAF is much larger in size than SAF. Still in
value terms, SAP and ESAF credits accounted for only a third of the total credit of
the Fund in 1993/94. But ESAF credit comprised a high ratio of lending to low-
income countries especially for sub-Saharan Africa (Killick, 1995: 14). In addition
to introducing medium-term facilities, the Fund allowed for repeated use of Fund
credits. Officially the fund does not encourage more than three successive
programmes, in reality, a recent study revealed that about 50 percent of a sample of
17 countries had a minimum of six programmes covering a minimum of six and a
half years during the period 1979-89 (KiHick 1995:18-22).
The Fund also developed its Compensatory Financing Facility for automatic
non-conditional lending, dealing with external shocks to the balance of payments
beyond the countries' control, to be confined to countries which already agreed on
stand-by or high conditionality facility. This means that access to such a facility was
tightened. However, its coverage was widened to include climate-induced shocks
and difficulties in implementing the Fund's programmes due to unexpected
international changes in circumstances. The facility is now called the Compensatory
and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) (ibid,:16-17).
Shifting to medium-term finance entails spontaneous changes in the content
of the conditionality and objectives of the programmes. The main objective of the
Fund's programmes was to achieve a sustainable balance of payments to enable the
country to increase growth. In the ESAF programmes growth was the main concern.
The report of the Group of Twenty-Four helped to persuade the IMF and by 1990 the
managing director of the Fund stressed that economic growth was a prime objective
(ibid,:18-19). The empirical experience of the Fund that was growing in developing
countries during the 1980s, led some elemints within it to note the reversible nature
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of the stabilisation package and the realisation that the problems may be structural in
nature. This was reflected in an IMF's member comment that the deteriorating
economic conditions of the developing countries in the 1980s with huge financial
and external imbalances, declining production and increasing inflation were not
temporary defects, but a result of deep structural problems. While the IMF as an
organisationhas not very readly pursued this characterisation, it has imposed a
challenge to the design of conditionality, curtailing demand only to achieve the
needed corrections will lead to considerable and unacceptable pressures on local
demand. Thus the supply side policies which aim to enhance growth; e.g. Limiting
the role of the state and opening the economy to external competition, became part
of the conditionality. An emphasis was directed also to the possibility of the policies
continuing for the medium-term (Schadler, 1996:14).
These changes expanded the Fund's conditionality from macroeconomic
policy areas that mainly affect the demand side through the exchange rate, interest
rate, money and credit control, to policies with a structural nature that the affect
supply side, such as initiating market incentives, changing relative prices, and the
privatisation of public enterprises. The content of the Fund's programmes continued
to be in line with monetarist views, with an increasing balance between traditional
demand management issues and supply side measures. Trade liberalisation was
given greater priority and there was also considerable concern with the detailed
components of public expenditure rather than the spending ceiling, as in the previous
phase. This was to be consistent with growth-oriented programmes and to avoid
cuts irk productive expenditure. However, recent experiences still show that due to
political considerations cuts still fall hard on government capital formation. Because
some structural measures included in the SAF/ESAF conditionality were those of the
Bank concerned. The country seeking the loan must have a policy framework paper
which claims to be the "country's own statement" but is prepared in close
collaboration with the staff of the World Bank and the Fund. It outlines a three-year
adjustment programme with greater precision for the first year of the programme
(see Mohammed 1987:82-83; El-Naggar, 1991: 214-18 & Killick, 1995:23-4).
The critics of the UNICEF report, in 1987, related to the negative impact on
the poor and the call for a more human face in the Fund programmes, drew attention
to the distributional impact of the programmes. While the Fund used to think that
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this was a matter fôr the government of the borrowing countries, it gradually
responded by discussing such issues when negotiating with the government
concerned. The Policy Framework Papers prepared in connection with SAF/ESAF
were also required to consider the distributional impacts. More areas of concern to
the Fund programme were developed including military spending 2, although this
could not be included in its formal conditionality. In general there was increased
interest in discussing the detailed composition of government expenditures. The
Fund also increased its technical assistance to improve the implementation of the
programme especially in the area of fiscal policy and showed interest in
environmental issues (Killick, 1995:20, 23-24).
2.4. External and Internal Factors in Reform Programmes
As we have seen, subsequent changes in the international economic environment in
the 1970s and 1980s led to the debt crisis. This forced the debtor countries to seek
the help of the IMF. Thereafter both the IMF and the World Bank played a pivotal
role in providing the needed finance. In return, they introduce their own
conditionality within the same ideological orientation which was based on the
monetarist doctrine in dealing with inflation and neo-classical views of the free
market and the minimal role of state. The new ideology was completely opposed to
the one prevailing in the developing countries which was based on state-led growth
and allowed the state extensive intervention in economic life. This shift in
development policy and the resistance and sometimes hostility which the EFIs
prograinmes were met with raise an extensive debate about the main impetus behind
these policy changes. Was it a result of a realisation among the governments of
developing countries of the shortcomings and irrelevancy of the adopted ideology or
was it a result of external influence and pressures to abandon the old orientation.
The analyses of the causes of the debt and economic crises in general in developing
countries and the investigation of the way in which, and the channels through which,
the shift of policy have taken place, could help to throw light on this controversy.
Both internal and external factors were recognised as being the causes of the crisis,
however, a different emphasis was given to the role of each factor. The IFIs and neo-
classical writers (see for instance, Roe et al, 1989; Corbo & Fischer, 1992; Kreuger,
2 As was negotiated in the Egyptian case.
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1993; Bates & Krueger, 1993) thought it was a result of policy errors of the previous
developmental model of state-led growth. They mainly blamed the extensive state
intervention in economic life in the form of trade and price control, and direct
involvement in production. They thought that these kinds of intervention promoted
unsustainable patterns of resource-allocation which relied on subsidies to keep large
part of the productive system in operation (Roe et al, 1989: 3-4). While they admit
that changes in the international economy exacerbated the problems of developing
countries, they think that the political and institutional weaknesses limited the
capacity of these countries to respond to the external shocks (Corbo & Fischer,
1992:7). Those with the opposite view see the crisis as intimately linked to changes
in the international economy (Ghai, 1991:1). Killick's (1995: 123) extensive
assessment stresses the mutual responsibility of both exogenous shocks and
domestic policy weaknesses where exogenous shocks uncovered these weaknesses.
Even for countries exporting primary products, who are vulnerable to changes in
terms of trade, the mismanagement of the benefits of the boom years failed to
elevate the effects of the adverse trends. Killick also highlighted the effect of natural
disasters which was generally undermined (ibid).
Stallings stressed the role of international factors and the asymmetries of
power between donors and recipients. These international factors are not limited to
what was mentioned earlier about changes in the international markets of goods and
capital. Donor countries and institutions can influence developing countries through
linkages. They build a network of interest and cultural ties between some third
world ?groups and counterpart groups in industrial counties. These ties are built
through business, academic, educational, training and travel relations. Thus the
international actors can build coalition groups inside third world countries. These
coalition groups could include businessmen, technocrats, military and middle class
who share the same interests, ideological orientations and cultural habits (Stallings,
1992:52). The final channel through which international actors influence developing
countries is leverage which is not limited to the IFIs' conditionality. It could be
exerted through bilateral Aid and Multinational Corporations practices, thus it is not
limited to the economic arena. It could be political as well. Leverage is directly
linked to the policy of reward and punishment (Stallings, 1992:55-56). However,
Stallings recognised the role of domestic policy which could have reduced the
26
vulnerability to external shocks. Stallings criticised spending priorities in developing
countries where investment booms contributed to the accumulation of debt, and
overvalued exchange rates suppressed exports and encouraged financial expectations
and capital flight (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992:15).
Haggard and Kaufman (1992:15-16) found in the cross-country variation of
the speed through with which they adopted the neo-liberal agenda and in the content
of the applied policies, a case for highlighting the role of domestic economic and
political structures. They gave example for this: "Hard-hit countries such as Korea,
Chile, Costa Rica and Ghana responded relatively early in the decade with
comprehensive programmes of stabilisation and structural adjustment; while others,
such as Argentina, Peru, and Zambia either experimented with heterodoxy or were
unable to sustain adjustment policies of any sort." In contrast to Haggard and
Kaufman's conclusions from these variations, I find it an argument supporting the
dominant role of external factors in selecting policy choice, where 'hard-hit'
countries were more in need of financial support and more vulnerable to the external
pressures of the International Financial Institutions to shift their policies. Literature
about the determinants of the tightness of the conditionality proves that the recipient
country is forced to accept tighter conditionality when it suffers severe economic
problems with serious debt and with its foreign exchange position; the amount of
help needed is large; and when the recipient country has a history of slippage over
credit. All this weakens the position of the recipient in negotiating the facility in
return for conditionality and gives the donor reasons .to tighten the conditionality.
Howemer, the political weight of the country can secure it favourable treatment in
concluding the agreement (Mosley, 1991: 74-75 & Kahler, 1992).
Mosely (1991), Kahler(1992) and Kiflick (1995) used the high slippage rate
of the IMF and World Bank programmes to argue that the coercive nature in
introducing such programme is overrated. Mosely et al found that only two
countries: Turkey and Thailand met only two thirds of the conditions attached to
their SAL and SCAL. Malawi, Ghana, the Philippines, and Jamaica implemented
between 55 and 63 percent of the conditions, and Kenya, Guyana, and Ecuador had
implemented less than 38 percent (as cited in Haggard & Kaufman, 1992:16).
Mosely believed that the World Bank allows such slippage because it has to fulfil its
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disbursement target and because of the unclear evaluation criteria in the early stages
of introducing programme loans.
While the weak performance and institutions in the third world cannot be
ignored, nor the role of external shocks, it is quite a different matter to challenge the
whole ideology upon which these policies are based, as the IFIs did. Is the state
irrelevant in undertaking the developmental role or is it incapable or both? It seems
that neo-classical orthodoxy believes in both, which entails the need for a completely
different ideological base. (See my analysis below for the role of the state). It is a
completely different argument if the belief only encompasses inability which entails
the possibility of improving and enhancing its capabilities, which could be through
the support of private efforts. We need to explain why the shift was towards
liberalisation policies. Did the state admit its failure and relate it to the irrelevant
role it undertook in the past, or did it discover its inherent limited capacity and
decided to role back? Was it the political will of interior political forces to shift to a
new ideology in order to achieve certain gains? Or was it the result of the leverage
of the international financial institutions in the wake of the debt crisis? While it
cannot be that the state chooses voluntarily to give up its power and control over
economic life, it was agreed among many researcher 'that changes in the external
economic environment have narrowed the range of policy choice' for developing
countries (see Haggard & Kaufman, 1992:9). It is important for the success of any
new policy to be initiated domestically in order to gain the political support needed
for its sustainability. When political powers or the public perceive it as the practice
of the power of external forces for their own interests, they are more likely to resist
it.
The influence of international financial institutions on the shift toward the
neo-liberal agenda finds its outlet in the debt crisis where the problem countries have
to commit themselves to reform programmes. The poor effectiveness of such
programmes ensured a continuing need among most of these countries for more
finance. In the meantime, international creditors were able to collude and arrange
among themselves a consistent lending policy through which they were able to exert
their leverage. On the other hand, the debtors have failed up till now to organise
themselves into a similar cartel. Stallings (1992:60-1) stated that between 1982-
1985 thirty four countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe needed
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to reschedule their debt with commercial banks, a stand-by arrangement with the
IMF was required first. The creditor countries who organised themselves into the
Paris Club also asked for IMF agreement first.
Conditionality as a Bargaining Process
As we have seen, conditionality is not new, it was always a dimension of IMF and
World Bank lending, however there have been changes in its scope, objectives,
content and tightness. Some writers consider conditionality as a coercive action (see
Springborg, Hayter, 1971) in the sense that it is always implemented and always
damaging to the recipient. The other contrasting view sees conditionality as in the
mutual interests of the donors and the recipients. Mosley challenged both views on
the basis of his empirical study, which revealed that around half the Bank's
conditions have not been complied with; and it is not of mutual interest as long as
the recipient countries do not apply it spontaneously. In his view it is a game or in
other words a bargaining process between the donor and the recipient where each
side has conflicting views. The recipient tries to maximise the amount of credit and
to minimise the political risk. The donor tries to induce as much policy reform as he
can, however, he has an interest in spending his budget (Mosley, 1991:68-73). In
fact, I see the process as being more coercive than of mutual interest. The recipients
would not have embarked on such policies voluntarily. However, the mutual interest
of both sides is in negotiating, in the hope of meeting half way, whereby each side
achieves part of his interest but usually the losses lie with the recipient. So it is a
coercive game which the recipient is forced to play in order to obtain the loan While
he is ttying to minimise other losses.
The influence of both the World Bank and IMF on structural adjustment
programmes is admitted even by those who do not believe in the coercive nature of
imposing the programmes. Frischtak (1996), a World Bank collaborator, when
describing the situation in developing countries after the debt crisis wrote that
"Policy makers were thus faced with an agenda of policy changes that was largely
defined abroad and lacked significant constituencies at home" (P2). Killick (1995)
wrote that "The macroeconomic policies of developing countries are strongly
influenced, not to say dominated, by the terms of the (IMF) programme" (p36). He
also refers to the fact that signing an agreement with the Fund is usually a
prerequisite to debt rescheduling. However, he describes the Fund's conditionality
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as a "toothless tiger", where conditionality does not seem to be an effective modality
in achieving policy changes. Killick also refers to the extensive slippage in
programme execution and the vitality to increase government conviction and
responsibility for the macroeconomic policies (ibid,:120-21).
2.5. Adjustment Policies: Objectives, Components, and Rationale
Adjustment programmes usually combine two sets of policies and are intended to be
complementary. Although to some extent they are, they also contain some internal
contradiction, as will be discussed later in the critiques. The first is stabilisation
which is a short-term policy, while the second is structural adjustment which is a
long-term policy. Stabilisation is a programme of demand management supported
by IMF Stand-by Arrangements, aiming at reducing external and internal imbalances
and controlling inflation rates. Due to the reversible nature of the programme
results, the IMF -under its extended fund facilities- may ask for the structural
reforms needed to sustain stabilisation (see Silva Lopes, 1989:22, Corbo & Fischer,
1992:7). Structural adjustment is usually supported by the World Bank Structural
Adjustment Loans (SAL) and is aimed at improving the mobilisation and allocation
of resources and the restoration of growth (Corbo & Fischer, 1989:7). From the neo-
classical point of view this means mobilising and allocating resources towards
tradable goods and improving the conditions of supply by creating appropriate
incentives, by correcting distortions in economic policy i.e. deregulating the
domestic goods markets, liberalising the trade regime and reforming the public
sectorl Later on they call for complete privatisation, and the removing of obstacles
to investment. It also implies some institutional changes (ibid).
Stabilisation is designed to restore the balance between the level of demand
and its composition, and the level of output and the available external financing, by
using expenditure-reducing policies to cut domestic demand and expenditure-
switching policies to shift domestic demand from tradable to non-tradable goods.
The programme relied on limited sets of policy instruments: currency devaluation,
interest rate increases, credit ceilings, and sometimes wage control and adjustment of
some key prices (Silva Lopes, 1989:22).
To achieve fast and easy cuts in expenditure in the short-term, it is easier to
cut public expenditure rather than private. Increasing taxes and administered prices
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are usually politically and socially costly. That is why in the first stages of achieving
fast stabilisation governments usually tend to cut public investment; while in the
medium-term there is more chance of introducing other measures that affect
consumption rather than investment. For demand-switching, the main instrument is
currency devaluation, however its effectiveness is usually questionable in the
developing countries.
Privatisation
The two corner stones of the structural adjustment programme are privatisation and
trade liberalisation. High Inflation is viewed by neo-classical writers as the most
important difficulty in the economies of developing countries which leads to the
perceived need for reform (Bates & Krueger, 1993:7, Krueger, 1993). They also
think that high and prolonged inflation usually results in the failure of stabilisation
programmes (Corbo & Fischer 1992). From their point of view, the main reason for
high inflation rates in developing countries is a fiscal deficit where public enterprises
are the main contributor to that deficit. High rates of inflation result in highly
overvalued exchange rates and an excessive demand on foreign exchange. The
overvalued exchange rate and the excessive demand increase imports and lead to
trade deficit. Thus public enterprise deficits are responsible for macroeconomic
imbalances ( budget deficit; balance of payment deficit and inflation).
In their views they also have repressive impacts on private investments.
Massive public borrowing also promotes high interest rates. Moreover, credit bias
towards public enterprises crowds out private investment, which they consider more
efficieht. In addition, the resulting inflation creates uncertainty about the economic
benefits of investment. It encourages a shift towards short-term, fast-return activities
and away from longer-term productive ones. They also increase the probability for
political change, due to the discontent resulting from high costs for both consumers
and producers. The measures needed to control inflation by increasing taxes and
reducing public expenditure to curtail budget deficit are also politically difficult to
sustain well (see Bates & Krueger, 1993:6, Krueger 1993:5).
Public enterprise reform and restructuring were vital in the structural
adjustment programme when it was first introduced (see World Bank, 1987; Roe et
al, 1989; and Corbo & Fischer, 1992). Later the World Bank called for the complete
privatisation of public enterprises, asking governments to withdraw from productive
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activities. The increasing emphasis on complete privatisation was also supported
from outside the two main sponsors of the reform programme -the IMF & WB.
Thus one of the main objectives of US development assistance during the 1980s was
directed towards private-sector development with strong emphasis on privatisation.
Furthermore, the US government urged the WB to embrace lending to the private
sector, including financial support for privatisation activities. The Bank's
enthusiasm for such loans increased in the late 1980s. By 1991, the number of
World Bank Loans with privatisation components had risen to 74 (Reed, 1996:12).
Privatisation was accompanied by deregulation of labour markets to allow labour
prices to be determined by markets rather than collective bargaining or other
government influence, and the elimination of "labour market rigidities" including
reducing the number of public employees and the scale and level of benefits and
other measures associated with privatisation (ibid).
Trade liberalisation
Trade liberalisation is a key component of the adjustment policy. The World
Development Report 1987, when referring to the East Asian countries, claimed that
developing countries which followed policies that promoted the integration of their
industrial sector into the international economy through trade, have fared better than
those which insulated themselves from it. In those countries where protection has
been relatively modest, the impact on exports has been offset through other
incentives (WB 1987).
The arguments against distorted trade represented by some neo-classical
econotnists, is that they generate a dislocation of resources within import-competing
sectors; they tend to express exports and contribute to socially unproductive rent-
seeking activities; and they tend to slow technical progress (Corbo & Fischer,
1992:10). Trade liberalisation aims at lowering import protection and turning from
non-tariff barriers to only tariff, with a tendency to reduce the average level of tariff
rates. The earlier view that well-designed government intervention enhanced growth
in East Asian countries, which was based on the new trade theory, has been
criticised by some neo-classical and World Bank members on the bases that it is
invoked by the pressures of interest groups rather than for efficiency considerations.
The recommended reforms were derived from the standard theory of commercial
policy (Corbo & Fischer, 1992:10).
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Structural Adjustment, Investment and Growth
Developing countries often face the problem of low saving rates. They try to remedy
this problem through foreign inflows in the form of direct foreign investment and/ or
external debt. Adequate participation of both kinds of finance is crucial to avoid the
risk of resource drain through transfers outside the country, either in the form of
transferred profit or in the form of debt service. Debt overhang was thought to
create uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment of the debtors and to crowd
out private investment. It acts as an anticipated foreign tax on current and future
income. The required amount of transfer itself could be uncertain due to changes in
international interest rates and in the terms of trade. It could also imply the need for
changes in the exchange rate of domestic currency and the demand management
policy, consistent with the level of debt service. Thus investors could face the risk
of large swings in relative prices, taxation and demand management (Serven &
Solimano, 1992:127).
It is one of the IFIs objectives to improve the countries' ability to serve their
debt through dealing with foreign imbalances and better allocation of resources.
From the neo-classical point of view private investors use resources more efficiently
than in the public sector. They are also in favour of foreign direct investment,
according to their arguments above, rather than foreign debt. In their view the
recovery of domestic investment would spur the participation of foreign direct
capital (Chhibber, Dailarni & Shafik, 1992:1).
It is difficult to deny the negative impact of adjustment in the short-term,
either pn the analytical level or empirically. However, the response and behaviour of
private investment in the medium-and long-term is the most debatable one (See
Chhibber, Dailami & Shafik, 1992; Chhibber, 1992; Shafik, 1992; Serven &
Solimano 1992; Solimano, 1992; Jayarajah, Branson & Sen, 1994). Based on
empirical evidence, one study has identified three phases in the response of private
investment to the adjustment programme: initial contraction, a long pause, and
sustained recovery (Solimano, 1992). The period needed to ensure a recovery and
the conditions for recovery are still questionable.
In the short-term, during stabilisation, cuts in public investment are the
easiest and fastest way to reduce demand. A devaluation of the currency exchange
rate often increases the cost of production, due to the increase in the price of
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imported capital and intermediary goods. Hence, it has adverse effects on
investment. Increases in interest rates raise the cost of capital and reduce investment
as well. Empirical evidence confirms this analysis in different countries.
Medium-and long-term investments need of time to revive. Neo-classical
analysis assumes that the profitability of export-oriented industries increases and so
does the demand which encourages more investment in tradable goods (see
Chhibber, Dailami & Shafik, 1992:6). Although cuts in the fiscal deficit are
important to reduce inflation and, hence uncertainty about future profits, direct cuts
in public investment can adversely affect private activity if these cuts are directed to
activities complementary to private investment. But if curtailment took place in the
activities that compete with private investment, private investment may receive a net
stimulus (Shafik, 1992; Shalaan, 1990:27).
There are a number of other questions that are important to raise: how long
does it take for private investment to revive? And what are the conditions for it?
Two important factors relate to uncertainty and credibility. Credibility can be
created by avoiding unpredictable and inconsistent changes in economic policies.
Credibility reduces uncertainty about the economic environment. Certainty and
policy predictability are also important for investment decisions due to their
irreversible nature. Once capital is installed it is difficult to put it to other use
without considerable cost (Shaalan, 1990:31). In an uncertain environment investors
often wait for new and better information, the 'wait and see approach' which affects
the desirability and the timing of investment (Solimano, 1992:13). There are
different forms of uncertainty: uncertain demand; uncertain future real interest rates
or exchange rates which may cause investors to refrain from investment even if
current conditions have proved to be profitable (Shaalan, 1990:31). Even with the
adjustment programme, uncertainty may lead investors to postpone investment
decisions until stability is affirmed. The imperfect credibility in the programme
could be the main source of uncertainty.
Non-conventional variables that can explain the behaviour of private
investment include important political factors as well. Political and social instability
is another important factor that affects investment decisions. Many empirical studies
about the relationship between social and political satiability- in the form of political
violence, social unrest, and/or propensity of government to collapse and investment
34
or growth show the adverse relationship between them (Alesina et al, 1992; Alesina
and Perottii, 1993). Other factors can be added like war and peace (see El Naggar
and El Erian, 1993). Bureaucratic red tape and administrative corruption could be
one more important factor in depressing the level of productive investment.
It is not only the size of private-sector participation in economic activity
which matters but also its type and distribution between different economic
activities. It is important to emphasise here that unregulated liberalisation, or the
absence of a legal and regulatory frame work, can crowd out high-quality productive
investment through the increase in commercial cheating and dumping on the market
of low-quality low-price merchandise. This could happen not necessarily from
foreign competitive producers, but rather from domestic ones. The absence of
administrative reform to cut out routine and red tape can promote corruption on a
large scale and favour fast profit and activities of a rent-seeking nature. Even with a
good legal and regulatory environment, market forces will encourage high-profit
activities which do not add to the productive capacity of the economy, e.g.
investment in the estate and luxury housing sector, which does not lead to
sustainable growth. In this case government redistribution of incentives between
different activities is advisable.
Critiques of the SAP
The neo-classical analysis of the justification for the adjustment programme and its
mechanism can be criticised on the following grounds:
a- It uses short-term solutions to face chronic disequilibrium resulting from
structural problems (stabilisation is reversible), and ignores the structural rigidities
of the developing countries' economies.
b- It contains inner contradictions between the different components of the
programme and its objectives.
c- trade liberalisation and export-led growth do not work for several reasons.
d- the programme is not conducive to sustainable growth, never mentioning
equitable growth.
e- Market imperfections.
While one of the main objectives of the stabilisation programme is to control
inflation, some of the adopted measures work in the opposite direction and can
increase inflation. This refers to cuts in subsidies and changes of price for some
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food items in addition to input and energy, which increase the cost of production and
the cost of living. Increasing the cost of production offsets the positive impact of
currency devaluation on export industries.
Stabilisation measures are meant to restore macroeconomic balances, with
the aim of gaining credibility with investors and reducing uncertainty. Meanwhile
the recessionary impact of the programme due to reductions in demand and credit
ceiling policy, crowds out investments and creates a state of "wait and see" between
investors waiting for improvements in the demand which in turn needs a public
investment injection to stimulate the demand and encourage private investments.
Trade liberalisation can also be criticised on the grounds that, if all
developing countries followed the same strategy of export-oriented production,
competition in the market would increase and not all countries can benefit in the
international market. The effect of currency devaluation on the prices of exports is
usually offset by the increase in the cost of production, due to cuts in subsidies and
increases in the prices of imported inputs, as the industries of most developing
countries characterised by high components of imported intermediaries. It also
ignores the rigidities of the production sector as prices are not the only barrier to the
international markets, there is the capacity of the production sector itself, quality
issues in addition to administrative barriers. Furthermore, the international market is
not a competitive market, rather it is monopolised by a few transnational companies.
Historical experience tells us that most developed countries build their industries
under a protectionist trade policy.. Introducing trade liberalisation in the early stages
of adjustment, before enabling the local environment to build a strong industrial base
increases the risk of exposing them to the full force of international competition
(Roe et al, 1989:4-5). Finally, the increase in the degree of openness of the
developing countries to the international economy make their economies more
vulnerable to external shocks.
The argument suggests that market failure and market imperfection in
developing countries is very strong here. Market imperfections appear especially in
the barriers to entry and competition, such as red tape, cronyism, corruption and risk
aversion. These are thought to be reinforced under structural adjustment since
governance reform usually lags behind (Fergany, 1997: 2).
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2.6. SAP Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts
In this section I assess programme appropriateness and effectiveness, relying on the
empirical data of previous studies. The main criteria for effectiveness is the ability
of a programme to achieve its goals. Goals can be unrealistic, or be exacerbated by
IMF staff so as to force governments to work hard. I consider the general goal is to
improve the previous situation (i.e. to reduce macroeconomic imbalances). I also
examine the efficiency of achieving these goals. By efficiency I mean that the
benefits outweigh the costs. However, it is difficult to quantify both cost and
benefits using the same measure. Therefore I study the distributional impacts of the
programme with particular emphasis on the effect on poverty and unemployment as
the main reason for political unrest. The programme's ability to increase investment
and growth is a good indication that it is sustainable and can remedy the cost in the
near future. The failure to complete the programme has two implications, it means
that either the programme is not appropriate for the country or that its cost is so high
that it outweighs the benefits.
The recent IMF review of experience under SAF/ESAF-supported
programmes in 36 countries during 1986-95 (1997) is the most recent available
review which assesses the experience in the 1990s from the prospective of IFIs. It is
useful to assess the impact of developments in programme objectives, duration, and
conditionality on the outcome of the programme. Has performance during the 1990s
been improved due to these developments? What is the implication of the
assessment on the IMF adopted strategy and the design and content of its
programmes? The report revealed two main points in this respect. First, it reflected
a conviction of the Fund's staff that the basic strategy underlying the ESAF is the
right one and is not subject to any reconsideration and that any drawbacks are due to
defects in the design and execution of the programme. However, they did not deny
that the basic strategy might need to be refined and improved (IMF, 1997:2-3).
Second, the report emphasised an earlier realisation of the structural nature of the
problems of most countries under ESAF, as appeared in the 'persistently weak
growth, the chronically high inflation and fragile external position' (ibid,:4). They
are willing to improve the design, provide technical assistance to improve execution,
but not to contradict the basic strategy of their reform programmes.
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SAF and ESAF facilities are medium-term concessional financial facilities
which were introduced in 1986 and 1987 to help low-income countries to carry out
strong macroeconomic policies as well as structural and institutional reforms
through a vigorous adjustment programme with the objective of promoting higher
economic growth and external viability (IMF, 1997b:vii,1). The IMF introduced two
review reports for this experience, the first in 1993 and the following one in 1997.
As these facilities was directed to low-income countries most of the countries were
African. African countries, as we saw earlier, were the countries most affected
during the crisis in the 1970s and 1980s and they performed badly under adjustment
programmes. It was important to assess their response to more concessional and less
short-term facilities to help them deal with their structural and chronic problems.
The first report examined the experience of 19 countries till mid-1992, all of them
except four were African. The second examined the experience of 36 countries
between 1986-1995 from which 22 were African.
The conclusions of the two reports were generally positive. SAF/ESAF
programmes strengthened macroeconomic policies and helped structural reforms.
The result was an improvement in the indicators of economic performance. The first
report referred to growth in output and export volumes in particular (as quoted in the
IMF 1997 report p 1 ). Killick, however, draws attention to the fact that the growth
rate rose from 2.1 percent prior to SAF/ESAF periods, to 4.0 percent during SAF
arrangements and scored 2.8 percent during ESAF. Growth may not be as
significant as the report indicated and the report . does not Provide sufficient data to
test this (Kiflick, 1995:78). The greatest achievement was in export volumes,
although the current account deficit actually rose from an average of 12.3 percent of
GDP in the pre-programme period to 16.8 percent in the most recent year (IMF,
1993 Table 9, as quoted in Killick, 1995:77). Nearly half the countries reviewed
failed to achieve noticeable progress towards external viability, although almost all
succeeded in halting deterioration in their debt situations (IMF, 1997:1). The
programme also succeeded in controlling inflation, but was of limited fiscal impact.
The first report also revealed little success in reforming banking systems and public
enterprises.
A study of IMF conditionality in 36 countries revealed that most
macroeconomic aspects were improved. Achievement was clear in external balance
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while limited in the controlling inflation and encouraging investment and growth
(Schadler, 1996:14). However, improvement in the external balance did not include
countries of SSA and Central Europe. Very few countries witnessed little increase in
the total investment/GDP ratio. This was justified by the low levels of savings,
constrained public investment and the time lag needed for private investment to
build credibility and to respond. The Fund's study confirms that the cuts in
expenditure were slightly higher than the target while the increase in revenues was
less than the targets and cuts in capital expenditures were higher than cuts in the
current ones (ibid,:16). This was to reduce the political risk, yet it had a negative
long-term impact on the growth rate.
Different assessments of IMF and World Bank programmes revealed the
uneven nature of the performance of different countries. African countries
especially those of SSA and Central Europe were the worst in most assessments (see
Schedler, 1996; IMF, 1997; Killick, 1995). They received very low levels of foreign
direct investment while the highest share went to East Asian countries followed by
Latin America (Shan & Bergsman, 1995: 6). African countries were less responsive
to the SAP measures because the crisis was more severe in nature and the
imbalances were larger, which made the costs higher. This is also due to the
structural characteristics and rigidities of their economies in addition to the nature of
the state and political system. The less diversified economies of SSA compared with
those of Asian countries was another reason for the weak responsiveness. The high
cost of the reform and the distributional impact of these costs suggest less political
sustainability in African countries due to the prevailing political structure (Sadoulet
& Janvry, 1994:2-5).
Distributional Impact of the Programme
The following section assesses the distributional impacts of the SAP programmes in
general. The main components of the programmes are more or less the same in
developing countries and therefore we can reach some generalisation in our analysis.
It is usually argued that the main winners of SAP are the private economic
agents who usually benefit from government withdrawal from economic activity by
selling public enterprise and ending commercial monopoly of importation and input
trade and price liberalisation. However, the impact of the new policy varies between
different categories of the private sector. Industrial producers can suffer from
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increases in costs of production in the short run due to increases in interest rates,
devaluation of local currency which increases the prices of imported inputs. Trade
liberalisation can have far-reaching impacts on local industries which are not ready
to compete in the international markets. Private agents who work in trade are more
likely to win, especially those who work in importation. However, those who used
to monopolise import licenses or import for the government are likely to lose due to
opening the market to more traders. Exporters, although currency devaluation
makes their goods cheaper in the international market, other components of the
package increase their costs (see my analysis above about the contradictions
inherited in the components of the package). Their ability to increase exports is also
a function of other things rather than the price, administrative facilities, elasticity of
demand for their goods, competition from other developing countries pursuing the
same measures.
As for the impact on government bureaucrats and employees in public
enterprises, the traditional recipe of the SAP is to cut size and salary, or at least
control the growth of this category. On the other hand, the cost of living increased
due to direct cuts in subsidies, and in spending on public services. Governments
used to be the main employer in most countries who pursued a development
ideology based on the command economy. These measures are supposed to affect a
wide range of people. And this is the main threat to the government through labour
riots of people in fear of losing their jobs.
The impact on farmers in rural areas varied according to the size of holdings.
Whether waged labour or landless, their living standards are more likely to
deteriorate drastically due to many factors. Employment opportunities decline
because of the increase in input costs which push small farmers to increase their
family labour and reduce waged labour in order to compensate for the increase in
other input costs. When economic measures are accompanied by land reform, which
frees the market of the land and increases the rent level, small holders are likely to
lose their holdings and turn to waged labour which increases the labour-force supply.
There would be an increasing tendency towards big farms which in turn need less
labour either as a result of an increase in use of mechanisation or to a shift in
cropping patterns towards horticulture and plants with less labour requirements. In
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addition to a decline in work opportunities and increased periods of unemployment,
the cost of living increases because of cuts in food subsidies and public services.
Smallholders as mentioned in the analysis above, may lose their farming
lands and suffer from increasing costs of production and cost of living. This might
be compensated for by an increase in crop prices attendant on price liberalisation.
The final effect depends on the relative change in the prices of final crops and the
prices of inputs. Even if they could achieve some benefit in the short-term this could
be endangered in the long run if private traders managed to control and manipulate
the market.
Big landlords are more likely to benefit from liberalisation. They benefit
from freeing the market of land and the increased rent. They also enjoy paying low
wages for hired labour owing to the increase in labour supply. Although the cost of
their input increases, they benefit from economies of scale and are able to introduce
modern technology and improved inputs. They can also invest in other
complementary activities such as input trading, cattle breeding and so on.
Empirical evidence from different experiences showed a general
deterioration in income distributions and there is likely to be an increase in the
number of Door. Benefiting and losing groups may vary from one country to another.
In a country like Morocco the social cost of stabilisation during 1982-1986 was high
and inequality was accentuated. The reduction in poverty and malnutrition was only
noticed in Indonesia and in Malaysia where the adjustment carried out had no
negative impact on poverty and did not compromise equity (Lafay & Lacaillon,
1993:100).
The urban working class and sections of the middle classes have suffered
significantly, as has been proved by different studies for different countries, in Sub-
. Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean (see Ghai, 1991:6) in countries
like Cote d'voire and Ecuador the urban population tended to be affected more
through cuts in employment and lower wages (Lafay & Lacaillon, 1993:100).
Lafay and Lacaillon's study concluded that the reform measures are against
the poor because they are generally the least powerful politically and can pose no
threat, at least in any predictable way. These social costs can even be higher with an
increase in the repressive forces of the country, as in the case of Chile where the per
capita consumption was reduced by 15 percent between 1982 and 1986, with a fall in
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wages of over 20 percent and an increase in unemployment of 30 percent (Lafay &
Lacaillon, 1993:100).
Changes in the level of income due to reform measures resulted in
corresponding changes in the balance of power between the different social groups.
The power and influence of some of the established groups, such as unions and co-
operatives, have declined while others have gained more power, such as business
associations. Some new ones have emerged such as neighbourhood and self-help
groups to assist the basic needs of provisioning marginal sections of the population.
(Ghai, 1991:10). Such distributional changes are to be assessed, in the Egyptian
case, in chapters four and five.
2.7. The Role of the State
Neo-classical thought is based on the assumption of rational behaviour of
individuals in pursuing their interests which ensures at the same time the Pareto-
optimal allocation at the equilibrium position. The neo-classical economist did not
find any conflict between individual interests and those of society nor a conflict
between the present individual preferences and the long term goals of maximising
the growth of total production (Leys, 1996: 87) which entails a minimum role for the
state. There is only a case for state intervention if the assigned number of
assumptions which ensures that the equilibrium is a Pareto-optimal are not satisfied.
This could be due to externalities, public goods, increasing returns to scale and any
violation to perfect competition e.g. imperfect information, or oligopolistic relations,
which can lead to market failure and to allocative inefficiencies and unemployment
(Dutt et al, 1994:4).
In the neo-classical economics markets restore their equilibrium
automatically in response to any changes in supply or demand thanks to the
assumption of perfect competition where prices of goods, services and factors of
production are determined by impersonal market conditions. Consequently the state
is exogenous to the economic process and its role is limited to solving problems that
arise (ibid). However, the new institutional economists, within the assumptions of
neo-classical economics, realised that market players do not respond automatically to
changes in prices, rather do they do so through more webbed transactions that have
costs. Markets get more complex and impersonal with the benefit of specialisation
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and economies of scale where information becomes imperfect and transactional
costs increase. The need for non-market institutions -sets of rules- arises here to
reduce the costs (Leys, 1996: 84-5). It is the role of the state to establish property
rights, provide legal and monitoring frameworks and organisations and to allocate
the costs of externalities (see, Leys, 1996; Handoussa, 1995:3). Investigating the
purpose of institutions drives us away from the pure economic neo-classical base
assumption of individual rationality to a realisation of the interests of society as a
whole and the effect of formatting such institutions and the change in their role and
nature in the long-term on polity and society. This implies that the assumptions of
the rational-choice theory must be abandoned as they fail to explain the conflicting
preferences between the short-term and the long-term goals of individuals or
between their individual preferences and the collective preferences of society (Leys,
1996: 87).
In defining the role of the state and that of the market, political economists
did not limit their analysis to the behaviour of individuals, but they analysed the
behaviour of state bureaucrats and the implication of such behaviour on individuals
and the economy. They applied microeconomic methods of analysing individual
behaviour on the state itself. The neo-utilitarian political economists believed that
the state bureaucratic apparatus was only interested in maximising its interests with
realisation that its survival is tied to the survival of its supporters. The utility
exchange relation between the incumbents and supporters was believed to be the
essence of state.action.-The state transfers resources either directly, mostly in form of
subsidies, jobs, and/or the provision of services, or indirectly by restricting the
operation of market forces allowing favoured groups to create rents. Extracting rents
is not limited to supporters. One motive for the competition of incumbents for
public services was assumed to be the extracting of rents. The neo-utilitarian
analysis assumes that exchange is a natural activity that requires only minimal
institutional underpinnings. This suggests that the state's role should be reduced to a
minimum, the same as the neo-classical, in order to free the market from rent-
seeking behaviour (Evans, 1992: 143-46).
This analysis suggests that the target function is to maximise the interests of
the bureaucratic apparatus. This cannot be valid for all countries. It is more valid
for developing countries in varying degrees subject to some political and economic
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constraints. These constraints are related to the degree of development of political
and economic institutions, and the available resources. It may be more common to
see the state trying to maximise the public welfare function (the target function)
subject to certain political constraints. These constraints contain among other
factors; that of widening and/or strengthening the support base to achieve political
stability, in addition to the individual objectives of the bureaucratic apparatus of the
state which seeks to strengthen its power and rents. Both objective functions lead, in
varying degrees, to a lop-sided development function which favours some classes at
the expense of others. However, neo-classical thought disregards this effect of
inequality if the result is a Pareto-optimal allocation. In the reality of the developing
countries there could be a pendulum swing between the two functions. New
leadership brought about by a coup d'etat to face a deteriorating economic and
political situation. However, with time in office, the tendency of the ruling elite
towards power and economic gains increases and the target function can shift from
one objective to another. Variations of the ruling elite's objectives are constrained
by the degree of development in monitoring political institutions and the space of
democratisation. Leys found the solution in pursuing "social goals through the
collective effort of the societies and the communities to which people belong" (ibid).
Empirical studies find that markets should be supported with other kinds of social
structures, formal or informal (see Evans, 1992: 144-46). This draws attention once
again to the importance of political reform in fostering economic growth.
Democratic practices and the revival of civil society, in particular, are important to
achieve by rationalising the decision-making process.
The minimalist view of the state was reviewed at the end of the 1980s with
an increased realisation of the pivotal role of the state in managing reform. This
moves us to what Evans named the third wave of thinking -the first was the state-led
growth model and the second was the neo-liberal/neo-utilitarian view of the minimal
role of state (ibid,:140). The third wave was a result of the increasing interest in
studying the success story of East Asian countries, though differently interpreted,
and the outcome of the implementation of structural adjustment policies in
developing countries. The early experience of adjustment revealed the vitality of the
role of the state and its apparatuses in implementing and managing reform;
differences in performance between different countries was attributed to the failure
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of governments to implement the reform effectively. This vitality was revealed more
with the implementation of the structural adjustment phase, which unlike the first
phase of stabilisation, needs more collaboration and effectiveness (see Nelson,
1989). Market economy relations also unveiled the weak institutional infrastructure
of the developing countries where the legal and regulatory framework proved
essential to transactions. The central role of the state was recognised even in the
reform era and the question raised was how the state which was described as the root
of the problem, turned out to be the solution. This paradoxical situation was
described by Kahler (1990) and Evans (1992). The answer was in the recognition
that it is not the state's size but rather its capacity that is important (see Evans, 1992:
141; World Bank, 1997). How to improve state capacity and to enhance its
effectiveness occupied a great deal of this third-wave thinking.
Such thinking gradually involved the World Bank. As with the increasing
criticism of the neo-classical state-market dichotomy, the World Bank Report of
1991 took one step forward in providing some flexibility concerning the role of the
state and that of the market. The report stated that it is 'not a question of
intervention versus laisez-faire' rather it is 'the interaction between governments and
markets'. The report was still biased towards markets, as it described competitive
markets as 'the best way yet found for efficiently organising the production and
distribution of goods and services'. The report introduced the concept of the market-
friendly approach which recognised the role of the state in the legal and regulatory
framework, infrastructure and essential -services to the poor, and incentives for
domesfic and international competition. This approach did not ignore state-
intervention as long as it was market-friendly, that is to intervene reluctantly, openly
and to allow for checks and balances. The report used the experience of the
successful East Asian economies, with particular emphasis on the Japanese
experience, to prove its view.
However, the World Bank interpretation seems to have been misconceived.
Economists and political scientists have different interpretations of the experiences
of these countries built on strong evidence (See Singh, 1994; Evans, 1992). Singh
investigated the experience of Japan to examine whether or not the Japanese state
intervened 'reluctantly' and how 'transparent' was the intervention. And finally,
how did the Japanese economy integrate with the world economy? Singh brings
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evidence that the government of Japan did not intervene in the markets 'reluctantly'
but rather 'aggressively' through adopting forceful and an aggressive industrial
policy. Japan, starting from a deteriorating situation, but did not follow the pattern of
light industrialisation prescribed for developing countries; neither did it follow the
narrow concept of comparative advantage. It selected heavy, chemical and
electronic industries which were thought to contribute to rapid growth in
productivity and per capita income under the 'structural policy' aimed at adaptation
and technological development. The same was the case in South Korea where its
steel company became the most successful and efficient steel producer in the world,
despite the fact that it was a state-owned company (Singh, 1994:41).
The World Bank report of 1997 while admitting the important role of the
state in the East Asian Experience drew attention to the fact that their performance
was a miracle and described them as 'miracle' economies. It also drew attention to
the idea that competition in the coming years of globalisation will be fiercer. It
warned that "even where governments have done a good job in the past, many worry
that they will not be able to adapt to the demands of a globalising world economy"
(p1). However, the report realised the importance of state effectiveness and
considered it the 'determining factor' behind the contrasting developments in
different parts of the world. To distinguish the new prospected role from that of
command and welfare economies, the report stated clearly that "the state is central to
economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as partner,
catalyst, and facilitator" (p1). The report stressed the complementary role of the
state dnd the market.
So what is this new role for the government? What is meant by state
capabilities and effectiveness? And how are they to be improved? State capability
was defined by the report as 'the ability to undertake and promote collective actions
efficiently', and effectiveness means to use these capabilities to achieve society's
interests. The report implied that the role of the state was relative to its capabilities
and varied according to each country's circumstances. When state capabilities are
limited the report suggested focusing first on the fundamentals and trying to enhance
its limited capability through partnership with the business community and civil
society, then raising its capabilities by reinvigorating public institutions, that is, by
providing the necessary rules, regulations and organisations; increasing performance
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and efficiency for such institutions via the controlling of corruption and by
improving pay and incentives; and finally to be more responsive to the needs of the
people by promoting public participation and decentralisation (ibid,:3). The report
assigned five fundamental objectives which every government should try to achieve:
"Establishing a foundation of law; maintaining a non-distortionary policy
environment, including macroeconomic stability; investing in basic social services
and infrastructure; protecting the vulnerable; and protecting the environment
(ibid,:4). The state while supplying these fundamental items does not have to do it
alone or be the sole provider of infrastructure and services. It is also to be noted that
the report stressed the need to protect vulnerable and marginalised people, not from
the point of view of equality, but rather to achieve social and political stability, the
importance of which was recognised "to make development stable and sustainable".
The emphasis given to the idea of improving state capacity, which correctly
dominated the third wave of thought about the state's role, was discussed in a
broader prospective in other World Bank studies. The early evaluation studies of the
Bank on structural adjustment policies tried to explain the uneven nature of the
programme outcomes. They tried to define the unidentified factors from a rather
limited economic point of view. The report of the World Bank in 1990, for instance,
referred to the role of the state in managing and implementing the programme and to
the importance of building credibility and providing transparency in government
policies. Gradually these issues gained more momentum in the comparative analysis
of the performance of different countries. Such issues were then conceptualised as
governance issues.
The World Development Report was not the first to emphasise the
importance of enhancing state capabilities and governance issues, but the realisation
of such issues started gradually from the bank experience in Africa and Latin
America as appeared in some reports: Sub-Saharan Africa- From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth: A Long-term Perspective Study, 1989; Accelerated
Development in Sub-Saharn Africa: an Agenda for Action, 1981. The issue of
governance was also dealt with directly as a separate issue in some World Bank
reports: Governance and Development, and more recently in its report Governance,
Leadership, and communication: Building Constituencies for Economic Reform,
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1996. This report recognised that well-functioning markets need capable state
involvement. The report emphasised the need for changes in culture, realising that
enhancing state capabilities is not limited to reshuffling or restructuring government
agencies or providing incentives, it should be accompanied by a change in the
established beliefs, expectations, and perceptions for state agents and citizens alike
(Iskander, 1996: vii). The raising of cultural issues and their impact on work habits
and ethics are very relevant in the era of free markets, as negative beliefs and
perceptions could be more dangerous in the market than in the controlled economy,
they might accelerate corruption and create new utilitarian coalitions between
bureaucrats and private business. At the same time, positive beliefs and ethics are
important for economic transactions in market economies. While cultural aspects
need a long time to change, the provision of a good legal and regulatory framework
to provide property rights and to respect contracts, the provision of a strict system of
rewards and punishment, in addition to a strict application of these laws and
regulations can help to offset the impact of negative cultural aspects and help to
change it faster.
The need to improve state capacity was raised following the weak
performance of the programmes, whose main problem areas were seen to be the
ability to increase growth, provide the relevant political and economic environment
to encourage the private sector to replace the government and the lack of skilled
labour and administrative capacity to build a competitive private sector. Problem
areas were also seen to lie with a lack of administrative skills to improve state
performance needed for both private and public sectors, the failure to address the
distributional problems and to establish social safety nets for the poor. Finally the
problem was perceived of failing to address the environmental impact of the reform.
These main issues were then reflected in the literature discussing the role of the
state. On the other hand, IFIs responded by integrating such issues in their
conditionality.
In most developing countries state capacity was weak under the old
development agenda and was further weakened by the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s
where the state even failed to deliver public services and ultimately failed to provide
sources of finance. The performance of such states under the reform agenda even for
those states that were committed to adopting reform programmes in the 1990s was
48
uneven. Short-term successes could not continue because of long-term difficulties
and political conflict about the distribution of costs and benefits (Frischtalc, 1996:2).
In the long-term, the political sustainability of the reform programmes started as a
major theme in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s. State management of the
reform programme was seen in the early stages as a form of coalition management to
marginalise the opposition and mobilise the winner to build new coalitions. The
failure to build wide constituencies for the reform was due to the weak outcome of
the reforms which revealed the importance of an effective performance of the state in
the programme and raised the question of how to improve its capacity to implement
programmes and the governance issues were the main concern.
The recent report of the Fund Executive Board emphasised that good
governance is closely linked to many issues of central concern to the Fund. They
thought that the IMF contribution to good governance through "reducing the scope
for generalised rent seeking, discretionary and ad hoc decision-making and
preferential treatment on taxes and subsidies, and enhancing capacity to design and
implement economic policies and improve public sector accountability.., promoting
transparency in financial transactions.." would help in ".. using public resources
efficiently, creating environment conductive to private sector activity, and bolstering
public support for economic reforms" (IMF, 1997:41). To argue for a close link
between the above-mentioned issues of good governance and economic performance
is valid. However, the disagreement is related to the legitimacy of the Fund to
interfere in such aspects especially when the concept of good governance could
encompass other aspects with a close relation to the sovereignty of the state, such as
corruption, democracy and human-rights. Even among the Directors, some still
think that it is difficult to differentiate between economic aspects of good
governance and political aspects. They were concerned that the Fund might go
beyond its mandate. The board realised that it was a sensitive issue and more
clarification of the fund role and the governance issues that were within its mandate
and expertise was needed and how to use it in an even-handed way among its
members (IMF, 1997:41-42).
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2.8. Political Management of the Reform
The political management of the reform is a continuing process which started before
initiating the reform and continues during the different phases of the reform. The
state may need to develop different types of techniques to cope with different phases
of the reform. We can distinguish four different phases: negotiating the reform,
initiating the reform, the move from stabilisation to structural change; and sustaining
the reform. The state has to manage the reform at two levels one with the creditors
institutions and the other internal. Both levels entail high levels of political skill and
state capacity. The state has to negotiate the programme with creditors institutions
to obtain the highest amount of finance with less conditionality bearing in mind the
possible internal response of different pressure groups. It has to use all available
technical and political resources to achieve a better bargain. (See Section 2.4. for
more details about the bargaining process.) On the internal level, the early writings
considered the process of political management of the reform as one of coalition
management, as a result of the quick response of social discontent in the stabilisation
phase and the expected change in the support base of the state. With the move from
the stage of stabilisation to structural change more emphasis was directed towards
the efficiency of the state to implement the programme and to smooth the change
and more attention was directed to the issue of state capacity concerning timing,
phasing and implementing the programme. The process of coalition management
continues through the different phases of the reform, so should the process of
enhancing state capacity. However, a capable state is needed more in managing
structural adjustment than stabilisation measures. The later phase of sustaining the
reform needs more democratic transformation, as will be clear in the following
elaboration.
The process of coalition management of the reform is a process of balance of
power between the state and the different socio-economic groups. Both the state and
the various civil and political groups are subject to fundamental changes in their role
and power during the period of adjustment. The leadership may have to shed some
coalition partners during SAP. This could be risky in the long run and threaten
isolation and loss of power for those who are pushed out of the coalition (Waterbury,
1989:41). The state tries not to affect major members of the coalition
simultaneously, to eliminate the negative impacts on the most politically powerful
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groups and to contain their response to such impacts in order to avoid political
instability and to maintain a strong support base. As the SAP entails a distribution
of gains and losses it entails a reformation of the support base. Developing countries
are usually dominated by pro-urban coalitions which encompass the military, public
sector managers, organised labour, and urban white-collar interests (ibid,:46). The
state has to choose the right time for initiating the reform; the sooner the measures
introduce to deal with the crisis the better the results. However, due to the
contractionary impacts of the programme and the sequence effect on the level of
living it usually provokes social discontent and sometimes unrest. The political
leadership tries to postpone in order to avoid political risk, as the resistance is
expected to be more severe if programme was implemented in the early years of
crisis. The public and different interest groups are more likely to accept it when the
crisis is severe and the situation is deteriorating massively. However, the more
severe is the crisis the more severe are the taken measures and the less likely it is for
the measures to succeed (Barkey, 1992:3). It seems that many countries prefer the
second choice. Egypt is one of them.
Before launching the programme, the state tries to neutralise opposition and
motivate the supporters through varies techniques. Previous experience of similar
programmes shape its methodology. It assesses public response in the light of its
previous experience or other countries' experiences. In many countries the public
show antagonism towards IFIs, considering them as imperialistic powers and their
policies are usually associated with austerity measures and increases in prices. The
publicrcan pass these feelings to their governments and accuse them of being allied
to or subject to the will of such institutions. While trying to use these pressures to
achieve better conditionalities, the government seeks to convince the public about its
autonomy in order to maintain its prestige and political popularity among its
constituencies. It could share some of the hostile attitudes towards IFIs in official
political addresses and seek to convince the public of the national ownership of the
programme.
Since the early stages of negotiating and designing the programme and
during its passage the state faces a difficult trade-off between different measures. For
example, when the state chooses between different alternatives to restore balance to
the public budget, it has to strike a balance between increasing revenues and cutting
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public expenditure. Increasing revenues entails increasing taxes which in turn
should not add a greater burden on the most economically suppressed groups and
should, from technical economic point of view, be directed to big businesses which
are politically powerful and whose support the state do not wish to lose in the early
stages of reform. With many experiences there was more success in the area of
curtailing public expenditure than in increasing revenues. This could be also
attributed to the weak capacity of the governments. The same problem exists when
choosing between the different alternatives, whether to cut capital or current
expenditure. In the short-term cutting capital expenditure is less politically painful,
but more economically painful. This increases the contractionary impact and
political cost in the long run. In cutting current expenditure there is a similar trade-
off, whether to cut subsidies on agricultural inputs, which is more likely due to the
common political weakness of farmers, or on food and energy. Here the influence of
IFIs could affect the choice and the government has to add another technique such as
gradualism.
This means that it is better for the government to assess the impact of
different measures and the responses of different groups and to use a sequencing
technique. It tries not to affect major coalitions simultaneously and whenever
possible, to introduce first, measures with less impact on the powerful groups. It
could also use gradualism and phasing by cutting the subsidies or wage bills of
different tranches. In many cases the burden of the reform falls on the most
politically weak groups. The political strength of each group depends on its size,
degree of organisation, the degree of influence on national production and political
linkages and ties with decision-making centres. The second and the fourth factors
seem to be the more influential ones. In the case of farmers, in spite of their
numbers and their high share in domestic production, they lack political influence
due to lack of defending organisations, in contrast to Trade Unions who are more
organised. Business Associations usually have more influence because of good
organisation and tight linkages with decision-making centres. However, Nelson
(1989:5, 1992:113) draws attention to the fact that gradualism is easier to use in the
launching of structural changes than macro-economic stabilisation programmes. The
relatively short time-frame of stabilisation and the need for some measures to be
effectively implemented to apply simultaneously, limit the possibilities of phasing.
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At the same time, during stabilisation the costs are obvious and immediate while
benefits lag behind. This would suggest that it is better for a stabilisation package to
be implemented in the shortest time possible to shorten the austerity period.
However, the state has to be sure that it has other things right to receive the right
response to structural measures.
The state tries to neutralise, limit or control opposition and, in the meantime,
to keep its coalition partners using various techniques which could start before
launching the programme and continue through different phases. This could be
through persuasion and the disclosure of the severity of the economic problems,
emphasising the need for a rescue programme and promising that austerity will be
short and followed by prosperity. The media could play a vital role in addressing the
public, special groups might be addressed via direct meetings or seminars. In
addition to persuasion, partial compensation, obfuscation, or social pacts, the same
techniques are useful for retaining coalition partners. The donors may push to use
compensatory or social safety nets to protect the poor. Nevertheless the poor are not
strong political opponents. The Bolivian social fund was thought to serve both
political and equity targets by offering benefits to laid-off miners in addition to
social projects. Evaluation revealed that the fund benefited very few miners and
many of the jobs went to others than the poorer (Nelson, 1992:113-14). In the case
of Egypt's social fund political goals also affected the allocation of loans. The loans
went mostly to help jobless university graduates who were not necessarily the
poorest. Compensation also went to redundant labour in the public sector. Social
'pacts i can be negotiated with unions and other interest groups, who trade co-
operation for partial compensation (ibid). Again, there is a similar case in Egypt
where the government urged businessmen and leaders of Trade Unions to sign a
Business-Labour Accord shortly before launching reform officially. However, the
unions could not discipline the behaviour of their own members. Some specialised
unions considered the accord a betrayal of their interests and some had to act
individually when measures directly affected there interests. And finally the
government could act to weaken opposition directly by encouraging rival groups and
splits, or by using oppression.
It should be noted that all approaches to neutralise or suppressing opposition
are either temporary, costly or both (ibid,:112). It is also expensive to maintain large
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coalitions with incompatible interests. The policy of using sequential rewards and
punishments entails considerable discretionary control over resource allocation.
This is difficult as donors usually oppose some sorts of expenditure especially those
directed to rents and spoils (Waterbury, 1989: 40-41). It is better for the state to
focus its effort on better design and implementation of the programme, to limit the
period of austerity and encourage early recovery, this would pacify opposition and at
the same time facilitate the implementation of the following phases of the package.
Consolidating the reforms is as important as initiating them or even more.
As the techniques used during the early stages prove temporary and costly the actual
government performance and capacity during implementation is crucial in building
credibility for the reform and in activating potential winners. It assures them that
benefits are real and near. The phase of structural reforms entails fundamental
changes in both the role and power of the state and that of different interest groups.
Although the initial change means a relative decline in state power, since a vital part
of the economic decision-making has been transferred from the government to
international financial institutions, initiating and pursuing the programme needs
strong centralised authority (Nelson, 1992:111). The Adjustment phase entails cuts
in the size and function of the state and of state bureaucrats. This directly affects its
relative power unless fundamental improvements in state performance and capacity
have been achieved. Unlike the stabilisation period, where measures of the kind that
could be set by central economic agencies, structural adjustment measures are not
under the control of these central agencies. They often require the co-operation of a
number of state agencies and private groups some of whom do not understand and/or
fundamentally oppose the changes. On the other hand, the power of civil and
political groups is related directly to the process of distribution of economic benefits
and loses of the programme and with the degree of political freedom available for
them to organise and participate in the decision-making process.
The political management of the reform is not only a management of balance
of power between the losers and the winners or opponents and proponents of the
reform, but a change in the composition of government constituencies to achieve the
balance of power between the state and the different interest groups. It is also a
management for conflict and rivalry for power between government members and
government bureaucrats. Governments could face self-initiated obstacles from
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inside conflicts about the content of the reform or its pace, from the performance of
its bureaucratic team which could impede rather than facilitate the performance.
Three main conditions are needed to be created and strengthened during the reform
path: desirability; capacity; and credibility. The bureaucratic elite could be the main
source of resistance inside the government when there is a threat to dismantle their
power. In a corrupt regime the political power of this group is usually associated
with economic gains, so any curtailing of their power means the loss of these gains.
Those losing most among the government bureaucrats are the public enterprises
managers and those who are involved in the planning process and in the control of
internal trade. These groups could be main stratum in the government support-base
affecting the government's autonomy to undertake certain reforms. A World Bank
report defines political desirability as the state when benefit to the leadership and its
constituencies must outweigh the costs. This only happens if there is a change in the
leadership and its constituencies or in case of severe economic shock or crisis
(World Bank, 1995:178). If there is no change in leadership the government has to
carefully change its constituency composition during reform, so as not to jeopardise
the interests of the existing dominant social forces before creating the new ; a matter
which relates to the sequencing of the reform.
The second condition relates to the government capacity. The government
has to build its capability during the reform and to enhance it gradually. Even if
government bureaucrats did not lack the will of reform they could lack the ability.
Overstaffed bureaucrats are usually characterised by weak performarice. The
existertce of routine and complicated legislation and administrative steps could be a
fundamental impediment to reform and to private investment in particular. The
suppressed wages during the stabilisation period and the deterioration in living
standards together with these administrative impediments, could be one of the causes
of corruption. While corruption was considered one of the results of excessive state
intervention or the concentration of power, it could spread among the bureaucrats
during the liberalisation period, just as in the state-led period especially with the
absence of administrative reforms. The change in the role of the government from
direct involvement in production to monitoring the markets and the lack of
experience of its staff in this respect could result in private-sector corruption in the
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form of monopolising the market and in commercial cheating, by using bribes and
illegal ways to escape weak monitoring systems.
The third condition is credibility which is usually created in the light of
goverment performance and commitment, and the outcome of the applied package.
Credibility could change during the reform process, according to the development in
the state performance and the outcome of this performance. The outcome depends
on the content and effectiveness of the applied economic package and on the
political management of the reform which, which we explained earlier. As the
government has to change its coalition management tactics during the reform it has
to change its performance and capacity to improve the outcome. On the other hand,
credibility can enhance the supply side response and speed growth, providing more
momentum for the reform process.
2.9. Conclusions
External factors have played a vital role in the process of change in the adopted
development agenda, from one based on state-led growth to a more market-oriented
one. The external changes in the international markets of goods and capital during
the 1970s and 1980s were crucial for the performance of developing countries and
helped to exacerbate the crisis. While internal factors cannot be ignored when
discussing the causes of the crisis, the external factors were dominant in selecting
the type of policy reform used. New private sources of finance in the international
market could gradually reappear again to provide an outlet for developing countries
to obtain unconditional finance. At present, the main challenge for developing
e
countries in order to sustain the reforms is to restructure the state's tasks and
improve its capacity, which has proved to be a difficult task. Political reform and
democratisation are urgently needed.
56
Chapter 3	 Egypt's Development Experience
before the Structural Adjustment
3.1. Introduction
The 1952 revolution was a turning point in Egypt recent history. It produced among
other things the country's second attempt at achieving independent development.
The free officers under Nasser's presidency sought to promote a nationalist
developmentalist state; shift the regime gradually to state capitalism with the state
controlling the production process and running a fast-growing public sector.
Import-substitution industrialisation was adopted, and comprehensive central
planning was introduced for the first time. Nasser's experience achieved great
success until the mid-1960s, when it started to face problems exacerbated by the
1967 defeat. The outcome of Nasser's experience continued to shape the Egyptian
economy and polity into the 1990s. In the political arena Nasser replaced
incomplete democracy with an autocratic regime that long continued in one form or
another into the contemporary period. In the economic arena, the public sector
continued to lead the economy during Sadat's infitah. Sadat tried to liberalise the
economy and increase the role of the private sector, however public enterprises
remained significant. While import substitution was not successful, neither was
Sadat's export-oriented strategy.
This chapter examines the recent historical foundations of Egypt's
development experience. It explores how each of the two experiences, that of
Nasser and Sadat dealt with resource allocation and the process of capital
accumulation. It examines the main impetus to Egypt shift in the adopted economic
ideology. Particular emphasis is given to the role of external factors and how they
influenced the process of resource allocation. I also examine the interaction between
political and economic change and how economic policies were used to serve
political goals. I examine the state structure in the different periods and the role of
economic policy in achieving legitimacy. And finally this chapter investigates why
the incomplete attempt to liberalise the economy and polity failed to overcome
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Egypt's economic problems, and what lessons can be drawn for the contemporary
liberalisation process.
3.2. Nasser 's Experience
When the free officers took over in 1952, they did not have a clear political and
economic ideology, only their patriotic feelings. They had a deep interest in building
national independence not only from foreign imperialistic powers but also from their
alliances and the domestic elite who controlled the corrupt political life. In March
1955, Nasser's public address announced six main objectives: ending imperialism;
eradicating feudalism; breaking the political and economic domination of capital;
establishing social justice; founding a truly democratic polity; and creating a
powerful army (Barnett, 1992:82). These basic six principles were restated in the
1962 Charter of National Action (Abdel-Fadil, 1980:1).
In order to achieve their broad goals the free officers sought to consolidate
political power and to enhance the legitimacy of the regime. They sought to
eliminate the old regime's political figures and to destroy its coalition. The old
regimes coalition was narrow-based and encompassed mainly big landlords and
industrial and commercial capitalists. Nasser and his colleague aimed to replace it
with a wide-based cross-class coalition. A mix of political and economic steps were
adopted. The first government action in September 1952 was the immediate
suspension of the Constitution and all party activities (Barnett 1992:82), and the
enacting of a land reform law, putting an upper limit to land ownership of 200
feddan. Big landlords were known to control political life through their stranglehold
on political parties and their membership in parliament. The main purpose was to
eliminate the political power of these most influential and representative groups of
the old regime, and to remove a dangerous source of opposition to the new regimes
(Mabro, 1976:5). Parliament was dissolved and organised groups such as the
Federation of Industry, the Labour Unions, and the Professional Syndicates were
denied their political arms. To fill the political vacuum a single national party
"Liberation Rally" was established in 1953 and operated by Nasser -replaced in 1957
by the National Union (NU), which in turn was replaced in 1961 by the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU) (Hansen, 1991:110-12). More authoritarian characteristics of
the regime appeared in the state's strict control over the media and political
opposition. Expropriations were used to punish political suspects. Travel abroad was
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extremely restricted and communications were censored (Abdei-kahman & Abou-
Ali, 1991:152).
The regime soon characterised itself as an autocratic military regime with
Nasser at the top surrounded by a narrow ruling elite comprised of the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC), joined gradually by some technocrats and bureaucrats.
The new ruling elite belonged to the middle class and some of the RCC members
were members of the main political organisations of that time, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Misr El-Fatah, and the left (Harb, 1991:89). Nasser himself used
to be a member of all such organisations at different times of his life. This mixed
experience and thought and the similar roots and national feelings of the members of
the RCC shaped their later policy choices. However, Nasser's personality and
charisma had prior influence on these policies. One analyst described the
relationship between Nasser and the RCC members thus: "Nasser was raised above
the rest of his colleagues turning them, in effect, into his 'staff'." (Hinnebusch,
1989:189). The only rival member was Amer whose influence was limited to the
army. The regime gradually increased its reliance on bureaucratic instruments of
power in implementing its policies. The size and influence of the bureaucracy
increased with the policy of the employment guarantee and with increased state
intervention in economic life. The bureaucratic nature of the state continued and was
strengthened during the following years.
Nasser's personality and charisma played a crucial role in gaining popular
support. He was able to touch genuine national anti-British sentiment among the
people and to build a strong sense of Arab nationalism. Nasser was considered not
only as a leader for the Egyptians and the Arab World but also as a supporter of anti-
colonialist revolutions in the Arab World and Africa as well. The events
surrounding the financing of the High Dam, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal
and the Suez War elevated Nasser to the status of a hero in the eyes of the masses.
Even after the defeat of 1967, people poured into the streets refusing to accept his
resignation, and asking him to resume power.
Neither Nasser's charisma nor the antagonistic attitudes of the masses toward
the old ruling elite was sufficient to provide the required public support and political
acquiescence to give the regime the legitimacy it sought. A distributive economic
policy and direct political oppression were used to achieve political stability. The
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new regime was keen to eliminate the power and privilege of the old elite and to
defend the rights of the middle class and the poor. Nevertheless, because the free
officers belonged to the middle class and were aware of its ability to organise and to
provide active opposition, they were cautious of any independent organising
initiatives of labourers or farmers which were quickly contained (Harb, 1991:91).
Thus the regime was ready to defend its economic rights while denying political
rights. Economic gains were traded for political acquiescence. The regime provided
a wide range of distributive policies to guarantee the provision of basic needs and
social welfare. These included subsidies for basic foods and services, the setting of
a minimum wage, an employment guarantee in addition to direct distribution of
assets, as in the case of land reform and later on in the nationalisation procedures.
These distributive policies referred to an unwritten social compact between the
government and the citizens where the public won economic gains and the regime
achieved stability and legitimacy.
3.2.1. Development Strategies
The revolutionary government sought to achieve economic diversification, with
particular emphasis directed towards industrialisation. There was also a deep belief
in the importance of increasing per-capita income and the standard of living. Some
organisational and institutional changes were introduced to enhance development
and to enable the state to achieve its targets. There was a tendency to copy the
Eastern model of heavy industrialisation with an import-substitution
industrialisation-oriented strategy. Industrialisation in general, was thought to solve
the pr@blem of increasing manpower and import substitution was thought to improve
the balance of payments and increase state autonomy. The centrepiece of the
agricultural development strategy of the new regime was the Aswan High Darn
whose electrical power station was thought to contribute to industrial development.
In agriculture both export promotion . (cotton and rice) and import substitution
(cereals and meat) were involved (Hansen, 1991:129). Free trade was also replaced
by controlled protected trade by the state as the main importer through bilateral
agreements and a quota system.
In the early stages of the new regime, the new leadership did not challenge
the industrial capitalists, in contrast to its position with the big landlords. Both
Nasser's public addresses and new legislation were used to attract private
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entrepreneurs and to gain their confidence in order to encourage them to participate
in the development efforts. On many occasions Nasser assured them that the
revolution's government was not biased towards any single class "it is the
government of the entire nation; the government of the labourers and the farmers;
the government of the civil servants and the students; the government of the
capitalist and businessman; the government of the poor and the rich; the government
of the young beginners and the government of the very successful." There was
another parallel attitude against exploitation and capital monopoly; however, the
government thought that it could regulate and direct its activity, as it needed its
cooperation. In another public address in 1954 to the workers of Suez and
Alexandria, Nasser made it clear that "the government does not have enough capital
for industrial development, therefore we have to encourage all who need to invest
their money to benefit the country and the labourers in succession" (as quoted in
Harb, 1991:93-4). During the 1953-1954 period, a number of laws were issued to
encourage both foreign and domestic private investment. Law 26 of 1954, for
example, eased regulations for the repatriation of earnings and revised a 1947 law so
that foreign investors could hold up to 51 percent of a firm's shares, as opposed to
the previous 49 percent. The 1953 Mining and Quarrying law revised that of 1948
and allowed foreign interests to undertake new petroleum concessions. Law 430 of
1953 and 25 of 1954 extended tax holidays for seven years to new industrial
ventures and for five years for existing companies that undertook capital expansion
(Waterbury 1983:63).
e The private sector response was not as it was hoped. All incentives offered
by the government proved not to be sufficient to increase private capital
participation. On the contrary private gross fixed investment fell from LE 87
million in 1952 to LE 72 million in 1956 (Hanson & Marsouk 1965:321 as quoted in
Waterbury, 1983:165) and the private share of total gross fixed investment fell from
75.6 percent in 1952 to 59 percent in 1956. At the same time public investment
increased to fulfil development objectives. While Tax rates on undistributed profits
were reduced (Issawi, 1963:53 as quoted in Waterbury, 1983:63) private industrial
companies paid ever larger proportions of their earnings out as dividends rather than
reinvesting them. The dividends share of profits rose steadily from 59 percent in
1954 to 80 percent in 1958 (Mead, 1967:121 as quoted in Waterbury, 1983:62). In
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general, the private sector investment in industry was very low compared with other
fast profit activities. During 1954 and 1955 private investment in industry was only
LE 17 million, while LE 83 million went into urban housing (Da'ad, 1973:69 as
quoted in Waterbury, 1983:165).
Uncertainty about government policy and the distrust between the
government and the private sector were the main causes of the reluctant response of
the private sector. The early steps of land reform from 1952 provoked private-sector
scepticism of government intentions towards private property. Before the
revolution, most Egyptian capitalists had aristocratic agricultural roots, the families
with big estates were the same that ran big factories and companies. This can be
seen from the members who established the Bank Misr Group, as most of them were
big landlords. Moreover, most of this capitalist class attempted to strengthen their
economic power through political power, hence sought to increase their participation
in public policy via their membership of the political parties, professional syndicates,
and parliament (Said, 1987:43-44). After 1953, with the political parties officially
dissolved, parliament disbanded, and the constitution was suspended (Waterbury,
1983:62) and this class's interests were severely shackled.
Moreover, private-sector scepticism was accelerated by the setting up of a
national planning committee in 1955. This issue of national planning was also
embodied in the 1956 Constitution and in the same year the Egyptian Sugar
Company (and its subsidiary for distillation) was reorganised, with 51 percent public
ownership. Other factors that could have affected investment in this period were the
dwindling sterling reserves, which were released annually, after accumulating in
London during the World War II (Abdel-Rahman & Abou-Ali 1989:145-146).
Figures prove that gross and private investment started a downward trend in 1950.
In 1950, gross fixed investment was LE 141 million compared with LE 121 million
in 1956, while private investment fell from LE 122 million to LE 72 million in the
same period (Hanson & Marsouk, 1965:321 as quoted in Waterbury, 1983:165).
Industrial planning was initiated in 1957 and comprehensive planning was
introduced in 1960 in the form of a five-year plan for the years 1960/61-1964/65.
Egyptianisation, nationalisation, sequestration and price policy were the main
instruments for the government to control the economy, raise revenues and build
state capitalism. State control of production was intended to enable it to produce its
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own source of revenue, decrease its dependence on private actors and hence increase
its autonomy. State capitalism was also considered as one of the sources of state
power (Barnett, 1992:95). By the early 1960s the system was recognised as a
controlled mixed economy, with a large modern public enterprise sector under an
autocratic ruler, or what Ataturk called 'etatism' (Hansen 1991:110). In the political
arena was a highly centralised, military-bureaucratic regime, parliament and the
single party being nothing but cosmetic devices (Hansen, 1991:110).
During 1957-1960 there was a new political set-up in Egypt which changed
the investment path during this period and thereafter. The main feature was the
increasing state intervention in the economy. The main changes in Egypt's political
economy started at the end of Suez war. The Egyptian government began its initial
steps towards nationalisation by sequestering the British and French assets largely
concentrated in banking and insurance. A special state organisation- in a form
almost equal to a holding company was established to manage these and other assets
in which the government already had a share. Other foreign banks and insurance
companies, and commercial agencies which did not suffer the sequestration were
required to be converted into domestically-owned joint stock companies within five
years (Ikram 1980:19).
During 1960-65 more procedures leading to nationalisation were adopted.
Nationalisation reached Egyptian firms, while it had been earlier limited to foreign
firms. Early in 1960 the two leading banks, namely Bank Misr and the National
Bank were taken into public ownership. The National Bank played the role of
Central Bank while Bank Misr was the largest commercial bank and the largest
holding company made up of about twenty nine companies controlling about 20
percent of Egypt's industrial output including half of all textile production (Icram,
1980:20). The biggest wave of nationalisation occurred in 1961,
"starting with the Egyptianisation of all companies dealing with the cotton trade....then
the remaining banks and insurance companies were taken over in addition to 44
companies in basic industries (such as cement, electricity, and copper); half the capital
of 86 firms, mainly in commerce and light manufacturing, was expropriated; and the
share holders of another 146 firms were dispossessed of a large part of their assets by a
law that limited individual holdings to a market value of LE 10,000.- all shares in
excess of that amount passed into public ownership. The nominal capital of the
companies affected by the nationalisation laws of 1961 was put at LE 258 million, about
two-thirds of the total share capital of companies then registered in Egypt."(Ilcram,
1980:21).
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After nationalisation the private sector was completely marginalised. The
National Charter presented in May 1962 made it clear that economic development
could not be left to individual efforts motivated by private profit, but must be based
on socialism. According to the Charter, private sector activity was limited to
internal trade and light industries (ibid,:22) in addition to agriculture within the
ambit of a new land reform law for the year 1961.
While the revolution did not seem to have a clear economic philosophy at the
beginning, it appeared that it was more formalised by the early sixties as socialist or
state capitalist. In the early fifties foreign institutions and the big landlords were
excluded from economic life and so were the national capitalists in the sixties. With
this restriction of private-sector participation in economic activity no new capitalist
class was allowed to appear, which affected economic life thereafter.
By 1968 the political economy of Egypt leaned in a new direction. The
economic reform brought in on 30 March (1968) was considered by some analyst's
to be the jumping off point for economic liberalisation in 1973 (Cooper, 1982: 79).
The state was faced with two choices either to "deepen" its experience by extracting
savings from the middle classes, or turn away to seek a closer integration with the
world capitalist system. The latter path ensures that the state can retain support from
the middle classes. Nasser sought support from these middle classes through
liberalisation measures and by a gradual relaxation of import and foreign exchange
controls (Springborg, 1991:146). There were clear efforts to recoup the foreign
-currencies held abroad by Egyptians. .Foreign currency deposits could be used to buy
consuffier goods domestically and to finance export transactions. This policy
allowed for an increase in the consumption of the upper middle-classes in spite of
the call for a doubling of the war effort.
During the period of defeat Egypt also experienced a bureaucratic
transformation. Tensions emerged between the military and the technocratic elite.
Technocrats saw themselves as having considerable professional skills, while
criticism increased about the performance of the military- rooted elite. Nasser began
to purge the cabinet of military men and insert in their places many civilians and
academics who were thought to be "professionals" and able to implement Nasser's
economic policies. These technocrats placed greater controls over the public sector
and asserted greater market discipline over its operations (Barnett, 1992:104-105).
	 .
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3.2.2. Resource Allocation
From a resource-allocation point of view, there were three main objectives during
the Nasser years competing together namely, development, welfare, and defence. Or
in other words investment, which was directed to present and future generations,
consumption which was directed to present generations and defence. Nasser did not
want to sacrifice one generation for the other and went along with building a
developmentalist, populist state. However, the main challenge for resource
allocation came from external factors which affected the available funds and the
amount of those funds that could be directed to development and welfare. In the
early period of the regime Nasser tried to solve the dilemma of resource allocation
by encouraging domestic and foreign investors to increase their participation in
economic activity. The other possible solution was to increase the tax burden,
however given the meagre living standards of the masses, this solution was out of
the question. With the increase in the defence budget which rose by 75 percent as a
result of the border tension with Israel and the delivery of the first Soviet-made
weapons, the choice was formalised from an early stage, as that of borrowing from
domestic and international lending agencies (ibid,:88).
The general tendency towards economic planning started to be formalised in
1957 in the form of a three-year industrialisation programme. The total investment
required by the programme reached LE 250 million, which meant LE 50 million per
annum -compared with LE 9 million per annum during 1952-1956, 60 percent of it
to be in foreign currency (Abdel-Rahman & Abou-Ali 1989:147). The key question
was about the sources of finance. Starting from 1957, Egyptian investment relied
more and more on foreign finance. This tendency, as will be clear later, continued
until the contemporary period with changeable sources of finance according to the
change in political alignment in the different periods of peace and war. After the
Suez canal war in 1956, as Egypt started to have a closer relationship with the
Eastern bloc countries and away from the western powers, the USSR offered a loan
of 700 million roubles early in 1958, with an interest rate of 2.5 percent a year. This
was followed by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan offering facilities
totalling DM 545 million and Y 1700 million respectively. The total sources
available accounted for LE 125 million in foreign currencies and about 50 percent of
the total required investment (Abdel-Rahman & Abou-Ali, 1989:146-147).
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The first half of the sixties was characterised by the adoption of a
comprehensive planning. The first five-year plan was designed before the
nationalisation procedures and about 40 percent of the total required finance (total
planned gross investment in the five years was LE 1.7 million) or 70 percent of all
locally-financed investment was expected to be financed by the private sector
(Waterbury, 1983:85). Whether or not the private sector failed to fulfil its role in the
first three-year industrialisation programme its role was changed after
nationalisation. The government was able to secure finance for the plan through the
retrained profits of the nationalised corporations. By 1963 the state was responsible
for 45 percent of domestic savings and 90 percent of gross domestic capital
formation (Radwan, 1974:707 as quoted in Waterbury 1983:85). The second area of
domestic finance was generated by allowing the terms of trade between agriculture
and industry to deteriorate. The third source was foreign, to cover about one third
of the total finance needed for the plan. It came mainly from Soviet loans for
industrial projects and for the Aswan Dam; US food-for-peace grain shipments; and
from a range of countries in both the socialist and capitalist world (Waterbury,
1983:85-86).
Actual investment during the five years of the plan reached about LE 1.5
million, accounting for 83 percent of planned investment at fixed prices. According
to the official estimates the annual growth rate during the plan reached about 6.4
percent, while Mabro agrees with Hanson's estimate of 5.5 percent per annum.
Whatever the estimate the growth rate in the period of.the plan was unprecedented,
compared with the growth rate of 3.3 percent per annum during 1950-60 (Ikram,
1980:31). It was also quite fair if we look at the ratio of total investment to GNP.
This ratio rose from about 11.9 percent in 1950 to 15.6 percent in 1960 and to 16.9
percent in 1965 (Waterbury, 1983:38, calculated from table 2.4).
How far was investment able to build new productive capacity to help in
achieving sustainable growth in the future? A close look at the investment
composition may help to answer this question. The main characteristic of the
investment pattern was the substantial increase in the share of commodity sectors
from about 41.2 percent of total investment on average of 1952/53-1956-57, and
44.6 percent in 1957/58-1959//60, to 57.4 in 1960/61-1964/65. This increase was at
the expense of the housing sector whose share in total investment decreased
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drastically from 32.5 percent in 1952/3- 1956/7, to 10.7 percent in the five-year plan
period (Mabro, 1974:187). Diversification of economic activity was one of the main
targets of the Egyptian government, so as to increase the productive capacity of the
economy and reduce the independence on the foreign markets. Due to the limited
resources available, priority was given to both the industrial and agricultural sectors.
It was realised that housing provided less employment opportunities and it probably
generated less external economies and a smaller reinvestable surplus than the other
sectors. The increased tendency towards industrialisation, with a strategy for import-
substitution industrialisation, continued during the five-year plan. The industrial
share in total investment during the plan was the highest among different sectors,
accounting for 26.6 percent. However it was not the fastest growing sector, as its
share increased from 23.8 percent of the total investment in 1952/3-1956/7. In fact
the increase in the agricultural and transport sectors was faster than that in industry.
The share of the total investment of agricultural and transport increased from 11.4
percent and 14.7 percent respectively in 1952/3-1956/7 to 23.4 percent and 19.3
percent respectively in 1960/61-1964/5 (ibid,:186-87).
If we look at the outcome of the sectoral investment we find that the products
of industry and electricity increased by about 9 percent per annum during the five-
year plan (El-Graitly, 1977:19), and its share in GDP increased from 17.2 percent in
1956/7 to 23.1 percent in 1964/5 (Mabro, 1977:189). The expansion of the
industrial sector was biased towards consumer goods. Investment in consumer
goods accounted for 40.6 percent of the total industrial investment, while it was
planndd to reach only 24 percent. This expansion of consumer goods was at the
expense of capital and intermediate goods whose share reached 24 percent and 35.4
percent of total investment respectively. It was planned to reach 35.9 percent and
40.1 percent of total investment respectively (ibid,:89).
The expansion of the industrial sector resulted in an increase in manufactured
exports from LE 34.1 m in 1959-60 to 65.4m in 1964-65 with an increased share in
GNP from 2.4 percent to 3 percent. It should be noted that this period experienced a
major devaluation of the Egyptian currency. Apart from this modest increase in
exports, the strategy of import-substitution industrialisation could not reduce the
import bill as was planned. On the contrary, imports increased from LE 229 m at the
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beginning of the plan (15 percent of GDP) to 413 m by the end of it (20 percent of
GDP), and the current account deficit reached LE 166 m (Waterbury, 1983:89-91).
The ambitious first five-year plan resulted in high inflation rates in addition
to a large deficit in the balance of payments. The crisis in cotton production in 1961,
in addition to the increased military expenditure and the involvement of Egypt in the
Yemen war, was considered partly responsible for these difficulties. While in fact
the problem was inherent in the nature of the regime in general. As it sought to
create a wide-base coalition, it constructed a regime which was a combination of
semi-populist, state-capitalist, and developmental nationalism, with the aim of
distributing gains to most groups. The contradiction between the investment policy
which was aggressively developmentalist aiming at achieving a rapid and broad-
based industrialisation, and consumption policy which was aggressively populist,
granting a rapid expansion in living standards (Cooper, 19), resulted in partial failure
in the investment policy.
The first five-year plan which was supposed to start in 1965/66 has faced
with economic difficulties with achieving the planned investment. These difficulties
were complicated by the 1967 war, and after 1966 investment plans could not be
achieved. The per-capita national income did not increase because of the increased
defence burden, the increased population and the increased subsidies (El-Graitly,
1977:21). After the defeat of 1967, more sources were needed while fewer were
available. Egypt lost three major sources of revenue: a total of $400-500 million
annually, from the Suez Canal ($230-250), the Sinai oil fields ($100), and. tourisrn
MOO. The government had a limited chance to increase its domestic revenues
through direct methods, as it could not promote forced savings, or cut subsidies.
The government, on the contrary, allowed consumption to grow even faster in order
to compensate the people for the moral pain. On the other hand the nationalisation
of 1961 had effectively rid the country of any corporate sector, a potentially
important source of income (Barnett, 1992:110-111).
3.2.3. The Redistributive Policies
If we look at the economic policies that were directed to maintain adequate
consumption levels, we are faced by a variety of policies, some of which can be
defined as direct ones, such as the price control policy, and the subsidising of
subsistence goods. The others are indirect, like the employment guarantee policy
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which meant an income guarantee, the minimum wage policy, and the import
substitution industrialisation policy. During the 1960s, the management of prices
affected all major sectors of the economy including, agriculture, housing and
industry. Subsidies were used extensively to check possible rises in the cost of
living (Ilcram 1980: 23). The price policy was not limited to food items. It was also
used to provide electricity, water, and transport (Hansen, 1991:165). By subsidising
basic subsistence goods, the state reached the poorer segments of society, the
peasantry and more importantly the private-sector working class whose gains,
judging by income levels were limited (Cooper, 1982:28).
The adoption of import-substitution industrialisation and the expansion of
consumer goods manufacturing, especially for consumer durable, increased the
demands of the new emerging class which was composed of the administrative and
military elite, and senior civil servants, whose consumption patterns have larger
components related to services and manufactured goods than the rest of the
population (Abdel-Fadil, 1982:69). The price control policy and the instalment sales
policy of these goods encouraged demand from the middle-income groups.
Policies for direct improvement in income both in rural and urban areas took
the form of setting a minimum wage for both agricultural and industrial workers in
order to improve the living standard of the lowest-paid wage-earners. A study for
the period 1952-72 showed that the minimum wage rose at a much faster rate than
did the cost of living index. In addition to the monetary increase there was a rapid
. build-Up in fringe benefits for wage-earners in the organised urban sector. Pension
schem'es formed the core of such fringe benefits (Abdel-Fadil, 1980: 47). In the
meantime, distributive polices were adopted to improve the relative income of the
low and middle-income classes. An upper limit on income was set at LE 5000 per
annum.
3.3. Sadat's Experience
Although there were some major changes in the state's structure, system, and
orientation during Sadat's regime, some of the main features of Nasser's era
continued to dominate. One of the major changes was the departure from a one-
party to a multiparty system, however, the regime continued to be authoritarian with
unlimited authority in the hands of the president. There was also a shift from
moderate alignment with the USSR to a strong alignment with the USA. The
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development strategy was directed towards economic liberalism under the banner of
economic opening the infitah' . Nevertheless the economy continued to be managed
by strong bureaucratic controls, and the public sector continued to play a leading role
in the economy. Furthermore, the public sector became more involved in economic
activities under the new investment law which allowed it to participate with capital
in the private sector. The government continued to exercise control over public-
sector earnings, the marketing of agricultural-sector commodities, petroleum
exports, and a substantial part of the banking system (Waterbury, 1985:69). The
populist nature of the regime continued or even deepened and Sadat could not
completely deprive the masses of the revolutionary gains of the Nasser's period. So
what initiated changes in some policies and what required continuity in others? This
will become clear in the following analysis.
When Sadat became president, he was confronted by two challenges: to
consolidate his power and to recover the Sinai from the Israeli occupation. After the
first important step towards recovery of the Sinai, the 1973 October war,
development and welfare goals came to the fore, together with a further
consolidation of power. When Sadat took-over the presidency he lacked the wide
public support enjoyed by his predecessor. His main characteristics were hardly
known by the public. Nasser never allowed his colleagues to enjoy outstanding
recognition. Sadat also had rivals among the main leftist figures of the Nasser
regime, but he succeeded forming a countercoalition with the right-wing. He was
able to gain the support of the military by loosening the ties with the USSR and
seekirtg assistance from Saudi Arabia and then from the United States (Sadowski,
1991: 103). The military also enjoyed preferential treatment under Sadat where, in
addition to well-paid salaries, they enjoyed other facilities such as special shops for
cheap food-items, imported consumer goods, and the provision of special housing
units. Sadat still needed to consolidate his power among the masses and to build a
wide constituency. He maintained Nasser's gains with the masses and even
extended them by expanding higher education and the employment guarantees policy
for high school and university graduates and widened the subsidy system. After the
October war Sadat acquired some legitimacy for his regime, However, he worked to
gain more legitimacy to sustain it. He sought to 'traditionalise' and to
'institutionalise' his regime (Hinnebush, 1991). In addition, while events since the
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early stages of his presidency directed him to the right, the October war convinced
Sadat of the vital role the United States could play in the peace process. This turn to
the right entailed some economic and political liberalisation. Sadat managed to use
this reorientation to enrich the financial resources of the state through foreign
economic assistance, which increased to unprecedented levels during his era, to
distribute wide economic gains to the masses in the form of subsidies. Sadat also
with this reorientation of economic policy, and by allowing labour migration, opened
new opportunities for individuals to improve their economic conditions and/or to
accumulate wealth.
3.3.1. The Economic Opening, the Infitah'
The October paper issued in April 1974 by President Sadat introduced the new
policy of economic openness. The rationale behind the policy was the need for
external finance to support the limited domestic resources, which had been
exhausted by military spending, and to restore the pre-1965 high growth rates. The
paper also referred to the positive changes in international circumstances, which
made external finance available. The attraction of Western technology was also
emphasised. So the main argument about the rationale behind the opening was
finance and technology which was expected to combine with Egyptian labour to
stimulate the Egyptian private sector and promote exports (Abdel-Khalek, 1982:260
& Waterbury, 1982:70). Many internal and external factors led to the economic
openings. At the domestic level, there were three main factors: first, Nasser's
socialist regime had not managed to entrench his ideology very well and his junta
did not have a profound socialist philosophy. They adopted socialism as a means to
achieve social justice, but did not consider it as an end. The old capitalist class was
not completely eliminated.. Some of the old capitalists found in their way into the
state apparatus as the state sought their expertise to manage the nationalised
enterprises (Issawi, 1982:75-76). While others encouraged their children to be part
of the bureaucratic apparatus of the regime, and the final section of the old capitalist
class still existed in trade and construction.
Second, the expansion of the public sector and the centrally controlled
economy created new elite groups of senior bureaucrats and public enterprise
managers. Some of them were interested in the survival of the regime as the source
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of their power, while others preferred to invest their expertise and connections they
gained in the public sector in private sector activities.
Third, after the defeat of June 1967, there was a need to direct resources to
rebuild the army and open the door again for private domestic companies to increase
their participation in economic activity, as the government realised that it could not
afford the burden of development by itself. Since then attitudes towards private
activity and its role in economic development started to change. The government
started to relax its control over imports and foreign exchange (ibid,:79).
At the international level, both the IFIs and the US tried to put an end to the
Egyptian experience and to direct it towards economic liberalisation. It started in
1965, when the US stopped its food-grains aid shipment to Egypt, and was enforced
by the 1967 defeat which pushed the Egyptian regime to reconsider its Arab-
relations -especially with conservative governments such as Saudi-Arabia- and its
relation with both of the two international powers, the USA and the USSR. The
development in the relations between the US and the USSR affected Egyptian
relations with both these countries. Under pressure of the economic situation in the
USSR, the country sought American technology and goods. In this situation the
USSR played the Egyptian card, when Breshnev announced in May 1972, that the
USSR cared much more about improving its relations with the USA than its military
or political obligations to Arab Countries, especially Egypt (Stephens, 1973:3-12 as
quoted in Amin, 1982:102).
The process of opening the Egyptian economy relied on the following
measures:
A-Investment Legislation and Incentives:
The first attempt to attract non-Egyptian investors during Sadat's era started in 1971
with law 65 for Arab investment and free zones. In 1974, after the fear of war had
diminished, a new law of investment was issued. Law 43 of 1974 was introduced as
part of a broader policy for economic liberalisation, the "infitah", of which law 43
was one of the main pillars. A special authority to deal with investment under this
law called The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones-GAIFZ was
established. While the old law 65 of 1971 was limited to Arab capital, the new law
opened up more economic activity -almost all economic activity except petroleum
which was regulated by a special law- to both Arab and Foreign capital.
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Law 43 of 1974 offered a wide range of incentives and provided more
guarantees against expropriation and nationalisation. Projects operating under this
law enjoyed income tax holidays of between 5 and 15 years, depending on the type
of activity. The main attraction of the law was exemption from labour laws,
exchange control regulations, and from the need to obtain licences for importing and
exporting (Handoussa, 1990:148).
Law 43 of 1974 was amended by law 32 of 1977. The main addition was
that it offered Egyptian investors the same opportunities and incentives, with the
criterion for a project's eligibility was the use of foreign currency rather than foreign
nationality. Moreover it allowed investors to buy foreign currencies from the local
market, removing the condition of having foreign currency accounts fed by export-
earning or transfers from abroad (ibid).
B- Import and export regulations:
A new import system of 1974 enabled anybody who had access to foreign exchange
resources from sources other than the banking system to use them for importation.
This process opened the door for speculations about the Egyptian pound. A new
import export law of 1974 was issued to support the previous facility. This law
dismantled the state monopoly and control of foreign trade. It entitled individuals,
both Egyptians and foreigners, to import anything except for eighteen strategic
commodities. In addition foreign exchange transactions outside Egypt was
liberalised by law no. 97 of 1976. It affirms the freedom of every legal entity -
except for government bodies, public authorities and public enterprises- to keep the
foreigA exchange acquired from any source - except from merchandise exports and
tourism- and to make transactions in foreign exchange through the officially
authorised banks. The last supporting measure was phasing out of the existing
bilateral trade agreements (Abdel-Khalek, 1992: 265:270).
Investment Performance
I examine here the impact of the infitah measures. How affective was the infitah in
attracting investment? From where was it able to attract capital? What sectors were
more attractive to capital and why?
1- Size of investment, by the end of 1979, the total approved inland projects from
1974 were LE 4,190, of which equity capital represented only 54.4 percent.
However, the total investment in projects starting production was only LE 804.2
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million. If investment in financial capital was excluded, this gave an annual rate of
about LE 8.6. This represented only 7.6 percent of average annual gross fixed
investment for the period from 1975 to 1979 (Abdel-Khalek, 1982 :270) which is
quite modest contribution.
2- Sectoral allocation of investment. If we examine the sectoral breakdown of
investment which started production, we find that by the end of 1979, investment
companies, accounted for one third of the total investment. If we add banking
projects which accounted for 13 percent the total share of the financial sectors, it
amounts to almost one half of total investment. Industrial investment accounted for
22 percent, followed by agriculture accounting for 15 percent, tourism for 8 percent,
While the remaining was directed to other services (ibid,:272-73).
3- The share of National and foreign Capital. By the end of 1978, about 54 percent
of authorised capital was Egyptian (Handoussa, 1991:162). By the end of 1983 this
share rose to 64.21 percent and about 38 percent of total authorised capital belonged
to public enterprises. Arab capital accounted for 22.9 percent and foreign capital
accounted for only 12.6 percent (Abdel-Moula, 1985:108). Thus we could say that
the investment laws were mainly able to attract Egyptian capital and that Egyptian
investors are willing to contribute to development efforts if they found an adequate
environment and incentives. It also proved to be more effective and sustainable to
try to attract Egyptian capital.
National Response, Who Invests?
While Nasser's regime succeeded in curtailing the economic and political power of
the national capitalists, it did not create a new class of entrepreneurs or a new
generation of businessmen. The main beneficiaries of that policy were the middle
and the lower classes in addition to the bureaucratic elite, as the ambitious Egyptian
programme for national development relied heavily on bureaucracy. The large
public sector which emerged, resulted partly from the nationalisation of the late
fifties and the early sixties and partly from the new industrial and economic
expansion. This bureaucratic system was headed and controlled by a militocracy and
then increasingly, by a growing technocracy. The performance of this bureaucracy
was not satisfying at any level. Complaints about routine and red-tape continued.
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Public services and enterprises were increasingly over-staffed, with devastating
results upon rational organisations and management, financial rewards and morale.
However the bureaucratic elite gained political power from the monopolistic control
of the public sector, nevertheless they were the only possible emerging business
class. The movement of socio-economic events from the late sixties put the
bureaucratic elite at the cross roads. Some of them were interested in the survival of
the order which brought them into a position of eminence and power and for the
benefits which were to be gained from it. At the same time an increasing group
thought of the public sector as a stepping-stone to the private sector (Ayubi, 1991:5-
10). They thought of utilising either the experience they had gained in their work as
managers or experts in the private sector, or the experience and the money some of
them gained through commissions or bribes, to establish their own business.
Although in the late sixties old capitalist class was reluctant to promote
investment, it was tempted by the change in the political regime, the new incentives
and the new liberalised direction after 1974. One of the main incentives to bring
back the old traditional capitalist elements was the restoration of their expropriated
estates and agriculture land which was still held by the state. This provided more
sources of capital for this class (Said, 1986:57).
The open door policy provided a good opportunity for the traditional
capitalist to participate with the bureaucratic elements of the sixties and become the
new political coalition of the new policy. Said's study proved that the first corporate
companies established in the early years of the new "infitah" policy Were mostly
financed by old traditional capitalists. Some of the old capitalist class had joined the
bureaucratic and the public sector staff during the sixties, and had continued their
work as businessmen after the open door policy. In addition to this group, Said's
study highlighted that the old capitalist group had allied with the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie and elite to formulate different forms of investment (ibid.
One question raised was whether the infitah allowed for a new class of
capitalists in addition to the old one and the bureaucratic elite? What we can
conclude is that the new policy as a whole gave the opportunity for some groups to
accumulate wealth but it was unable to create a strong national bourgeoisie from
them. We can basically discern between two classes or groups that had the
opportunity to accumulate wealth. The first includes the various groups that had the
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chance to work in Arab countries. According to the Ministry of Manpower and
Training, as many as 1,890,000. Egyptians were working abroad in 1978 (as quoted
in Ayubi, 1991:73). Although their remittances provided the country with a vital
source of foreign exchange, most of the savings of this group were directed either to
luxury consumption or to small commercial projects. Another substantial group
preferred to invest in money companies with the option of gaining a fixed amount of
money every so often rather than take the risk of investment. The behaviour of this
group was characteristic of the new national attitude and work ethic developed
during the infitah which promoted the commercialisation of the economy.
The second group was what some have termed parasitic elements. The
parasitic activity, although not specifically defined, was composed of mainly
unproductive operations dependent on transactions and the circulation of money. It
related to capital growth not to capital accumulation. It also relied on the
exploitation of others and it might use illegal ways to achieve its objectives (Said,
19.86:123). Some examples of parasitic activities which grew during the "infitah"
were those concentrated in the sub-contractor business, the illegal trade in foreign
currencies, black-market activities, smuggling imported goods from free zones,
housing associations, dealing with customs, and travel agencies (Abdel-Fadil,
1984:192).
Foreign Response
In the first few years of the "infitah" the policy appeared to catch the imagination of
numerous potential investors; one US businessman was quoted as saying, "It is like
the California gold rush" (Gillespie, 1988:27). But initial interest did not
automatically produce investment. Some foreign investors' interests were turned
down through a lengthy process of project approval and bureaucratic red-tape, while
others did not meet the Egyptian targets. In January 1975, Prime Minister Abdel-
Aziz Higazzi reported to President Sadat that apparently foreign companies'
proposals did not meet the government's criteria: 552 projects had been proposed
after the liberalisation had been announced, but only 196 of these had been accepted.
In 1978 Herman Bits, the US Ambassador to Egypt, noted that over 3,500 American
businessmen had visited Cairo to investigate the Economic Opening; almost 1000
had spoken with the Ambassador himself; but in the end "almost nothing" had
materialised from this initial interest (Gillespie & Stever, 1988:27-33). The foreign
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share in the total authorised capital invested under law 43 of 1974 accounted for
26.5 for by the end of 1979 (Abdel-Moula, 1985:108). If we look at other countries'
contribution (including foreign loans and aid) and these in favour of investment we
find that Arab capital, which accounted to LE 270 m by the end of 1978, represented
16 percent of the total value of investments. It was directed to the following areas:
investment companies (28.5 percent of Arab capital); housing (16 percent); chemical
industries (9 percent); banking (8.5 percent); tourism (8 percent); engineering
industries (6 percent). Over 40 percent of all capital investment in metallic
industries and of all investments in "investment companies" were provided by Arab
sources.
The American capital committed up to the end of 1978 amounted to £E168.6
m, representing about 10 percent of total investment. It was directed to the following
areas: education, training and services (72 percent of total American investments,
and 92 percent of all capital allocated for education, training and services); banking
(7 percent); agriculture and husbandery (6 percent); engineering industries (3
percent); weaving and textile industries (37 percent).
The Western European (EEC) countries had committed LE 100 million
which represented 6 percent of total investments. It was directed to: engineering
industries (24 percent); tourism (20 percent); banks (13 percent); investment
companies (6 percent); and chemical industries (6 percent). In addition to 66 percent
of all funds allocated to the petroleum industries.
Other countries not included in the previous categories (Japan and Greece
being of particular important) had, until the end of 1978, committed £E223 million
representing 13 percent of all investments. The main areas were tourism (67 percent
of capital committed by these countries); weaving and textile industries (10 percent);
banking (3.5 percent); construction materials (3.5 percent); and health services (0.5
percent) (Ayubi 1981:39-40).
Although the previous estimates did not distinguish between foreign loans
and foreign direct investment, a different study for the period 1974-1980, estimated
that total foreign investment spending on direct investment under law 43 of 1974,
was about LE 533 million, accounting for only 7.9 percent of the total foreign
resources used to finance investment. In the same period the capital utilised from
foreign loans was LE 5,950.3 million (88.3 percent of total foreign finance) and the
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grants utilised, with the exception of Arab support grants, accounted for LE 255.3
million (3.8 percent) (Abdel-Moula, 1985:110-111). This explained that foreign
direct investment was very low compared with other sources of foreign finance.
Foreign investors had been tentative in their approach to Egypt as they wanted to
minimise their risk by riding the wave of Arab and Western public financing that has
poured into Egypt after 1974. The IBRD had been a tacit ally in this process. It has
already been noted that the IBRD had made loans to public sector companies
contingent on their entering joint ventures under law 43, and the USAID supplied
the foreign exchange component of at least one law 43 project, the Egyptian Cement
Company. In essence foreign investors sought to limit their equity commitments by
taking advantage of abundant public and private financing, or by assigning equity
value to their technology and know-how (Waterbury, 1983:155-156).
On the other hand not all approved projects had actually been implemented.
Only 32 percent of all projects approved had started operations by the end of 1978.
Their investment spending represented only 116 percent of the total for all approved
projects, they employed only 11 percent of the manpower that was supposed to be
employed by the approved firms. A sizeable number of projects, however, were
reported to be in process or under construction. By the end of 1978, these
represented 44 percent of the capital committed, 66 percent of the employment
envisaged (Ayubi, 1991:49). If, however, all approved projects were actually
implemented, within five years the law 43 sector could dwarf the public sector in
terms of productivity and sophisticated technology (Waterbury, 1983:155).
Main Determinant of Investment
Many factors had affected the inflow of Arab and Foreign investment to Egypt. One
of them was the conflict and peace with Israel. The October War of 1973 led to the
inflow of Arab aid and private investments, while moving forward with the peace
process and the signing of the Camp David Accord in 1979 were the main reasons
for the Arab boycott of Egypt and the curtailment of both aid and Arab private
capital. Anther related effect was the increasing distance between the USSR and the
Eastern bloc, as Sadat decided to terminate the role of USSR experts and wanted the
war decisions to be fully Egyptian. The relations between the two countries soured
further after the second Sinai disengagement agreement. The trade between the two
countries was sharply curtailed. While the trade agreements with the USSR and the
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Eastern bloc encouraged the establishment of hundreds of private sector firms, the
USSR and the Eastern bloc's careless attitude about the quality of products did not
help these firms to survive after the cutting of the trade agreement (Waterbury,
1983:171).
On the other hand, there was a rapproachement with the United states after
the war, as Sadat saw what the massive role the United States could play to advance
the peace process and the leverage that it could have on Israel. Sadat announced on
many occasions that 99 percent of the game cards were in the hands of the USA.
The rapproachement with the US opened the gates for US aid flows in addition to
the prospect of the inflow of private investment. The US and other Western
countries actively encouraged private investment in order to consolidate Egypt's
return to the Western camp and to underwrite Sadat's Peace (ibid,:156).
The financial incentives proved ineffective in the face of the political
situation of the country. The continuing possibility of war with Israel discouraged
potential investors. Although law 43 was amended by law 32, and more incentives
were given, foreign companies remained nervous about the country's political
situation, both external and internal. A survey revealed that political uncertainties
were perhaps the most important deterrent to investors entering Egypt. This concern
was among others that prompted Sadat to take initiatives to hasten the peace process
with Israel (Gillespie & Stoever, 1988:30-32). The Arab boycott of Israel also
discouraged some multinational companies with profitable operations in Israel from
approaching Egypt. Ironically, when Sadat went forward with the peace process and
signed the Camp David Accord in 1979, almost all Arab countries curtailed their
political and economic relation with Egypt. Many joint ventures which were
premised on access to the domestic market and the Arab markets, especially among
the oil-rich. Access to these markets became uncertain, and the lure of the Egyptian
market might not prove sufficient to hold investors' interests (Waterbury, 1983:155).
Political stability had also a great bearing on investment in 1977. The riots in
that year because of the reduction of subsidies was one of the reasons that
encouraged the government to hasten the rate of investment inflow and the benefits
envisioned in the economic opening. For example in a single day- March 27, 1977- .
the board of directors of the Investment Authority approved 65 investment projects
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valued at EE404 million (approximately $577 million at the official free rate)
(Gillespie & Stoever, 1988:31).
The inefficient administration and the lengthy process of project approvals
was one of the usual complaints of investors. Investors complained about the stifling
bureaucracy, noting that applicants could be kept waiting for weeks trying to see the
appropriate government official. Approval by the Investment Authority, however
was often the first step in a lengthy process. Investors had to obtain authorisation
from other Ministries responsible for the various activities of their project.
Negotiations with these different government departments could initiate
considerable duplication of effort (Gillespie 8c Stoever, 1988:29). The bureaucratic
routine was complicated by a lack of clear criteria for project selection, and often
inconsistent changes in the regulations and requirements. The large degree of
discretion given to the lower-level bureaucratic staff sometimes caused much
confusion through their arbitrary judgements rather than facilitating the process. It
also opened the door for corruption through bribes and commissions.
Corruption grew considerably during the "infitah". It took various forms. In
public enterprises, there wase the phenomenon of theft and embezzlement. The rate
of public officials accepting bribes and securing illicit gains was on the increase
(Ayubi, 1991:65-66).
Other related themes were the growing inter-relationships between the public
and the private sectors, developed since the seventies, which led to the growth of the
latter at the expense of the former . Public officials sought to establish private
enterrkises of the same nature as their public office (i.e. competing with) under the
name of one of the family members. They benefited from the networks of contacts
and affiliations acquired in public office, they exploited the facilities and personnel
of the public sector for the promotion of their private activities (Ayubi, 1991:14-15).
We can recognise the following factors as responsible for corruption:
- "El-Tasayoub", or the relaxation of government control not only in economic life,
but in all aspects of political and social life as well. There was new legislation, but
little of it was effective. Even though there were plenty of control agencies, few of
the corrupt actors were brought to justice. Moreover justice became very slow and
special lawyers emerged to manipulate the law. It became quite common to refuse
cases due to improper arresting procedures. The state changed to become a soft state
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that legislated laws. However, it was unable or sometimes unwilling to implement
them. All this created a situation of distrust or disrespect between the government
and the clients. The war period could partly be responsible for this situation, as there
was a tendency to ignore small cases of disorder or corruption, in an unwillingness
to increase the consequences of defeat.
- Consumption policy, both Nasser and Sadat encouraged extrovert consumption
polices. While Nasser relied mainly on price controls and subsidies, import policy
was an additional factor in Sadat's era. It provided different substitutes in addition to
new varieties of luxury goods. Consumption became one of the determinants of
social prestige. This prompted people to seek fast and easy earning sources.
-The rapid increase in cost of living due to inflation, and both the real and relative
deterioration in wages following the increasing disparities between income levels
during the infitah, created a feeling of inequality, and promoted corruption.
- The continued bureaucratic control over economic activity give more opportunities
to civil servants to find ways of seeking commission.
3.4. Conclusions
The main dilemma of Nasser's era was how to manage the limited domestic
resources to achieve three main competing goals:
The first was extracting resources for investment to achieve development, the second
was to finance the semi-populist nature of the state to achieve political stability, and
the third was building a strong army to face the regional threat. Unwilling to
sacrifice any of the three goals, Nasser found the solution in foreign finance via the
assistance of outside patrons. Although the tendency towards fixed finance gave
little cause fo alarm at that time due to its modest rates, it established a pattern that
would prove difficult to correct in the future (Barnett, 1992:89). Since then, Egypt
has relied heavily on foreign assistance to finance its investment expenditure.
Two main factors dominating Nasser's era continued to affect resource
allocation and the capital accumulation process in Sadat's era. The first was the war
and international policies, the second was the semi-populist nature of the state. War
preparations were one of the factors competing for resources which forced Nasser to
sacrifice, though unwillingly, his investment objectives after the 1967 defeat. The
Suez war was a turning point in Egypt's political economy and it induced Nasser's
decision to Egyptianise foreign assets and paved the way for nationalisation in 1961
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which built the state's capitalist system. The war had also diverted Egypt's
international relations and economic affairs from the Western bloc to the Eastern
after the Suez war in 1956 and the other way round after the October war in 1973.
On the other hand, while Nasser promoted economic policies aiming at distributing
economic gains to almost all groups of society, Sadat followed the same line but on
the other hand he distributed more gains in return for political acquiescence.
If we look at the other economic features of the regime in Nasser's era: state
capitalism was one of the sources of power in both the economic and political arena.
It enabled the state to create its own source of revenue, hence, to increase its
autonomy. It also allowed the rapid growth of a powerful bureaucratic apparatus
which comprised the main part of its coalition. In Sadat's experience, the
deteriorating performance of public enterprises and public bureaucracy in addition to
the relaxation of government control over both public and private activity, negatively
affected state power. However, we can not relate changes in state power to the type
of economic system, rather is it related to state performance in controlling and
managing the public or private sectors.
The incomplete democratic experience of Sadat's era was not effective in
enhancing development. The weak opposition parties were not able to effectively
rationalise the government performance. The relatively free press which was able
frequently to criticise and refer to corruption cases, did not guarantee effective
actions against them.
The main features that -characterised the political and economic systems built
during the Nasser era were difficult to abandon and deeply influenced the later
regimes. This was the bureaucratic and populist nature of the state. Lacking
Nasser's charisma especially at the beginning and trying to fulfil his promises of
providing welfare to the Egyptian citizens, Sadat enhanced the populist nature of the
state in the sense that he was more committed to free education and employment
guarantee policies, as well as to increased food subsidies. In addition to the effect of
such policies on the public budget, the policy of employment had profound effects
on the policy and the economy. This policy created bureaucracy and increased the
bureaucratic influence over the economy, with the application of the infitah' it was
more suitable for promoting corruption and rent seeking. Another important issue
was that such a policy created an increased reliance on the state as a 'first' not 'last'
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resort for recruiting, but not job creating, as the state failed to create real
employment opportunities and simply added the new graduates to its bureaucracy.
The restrictions on the private sector during Nasser's era and the continuing
provision of easy recruitment during the `infitah' partly impeded the growth of a real
entrepreneurial class, as the new generations were averse to risk and preferred stable
jobs. That was clear from the nature of the new investors where most of whom came
from the old entrepreneurial class, with a few opportunists who sought fast and easy
profits.
While Nasser's regime failed to institutionalise its system which was mainly
personal by nature, Sadat laid the foundations for a new institutional system built on
pluralism in spite of the controls imposed on it.
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Chapter 4	 The Political Economy of
Adjustment in Egypt
4.1. Introduction
Unlike the second half of the 1970s, which witnessed high rates of growth for the
Egyptian economy, the 1980s experienced declining trends unveiling the fragile
economy and structural imbalances and problems. The growth of the 1970s
depended highly on rents while the share of the commodity sectors was declining
and the productive capacities of the economy were not developed. The economic
crisis promoted several critiques notably against the applied liberalisation policy
launched under the name of the Infitah -the open door policy. This criticism was at
two levels, economic and ideological which led a debate discussing the causes of the
crisis and the ways out of it. Two major approaches or scenarios were crystallised.
The first was the socialist, Nasserist, which believed in government regulations, the
role of planning and in the public sector as a leading sector for development (Abdel-
Khalek, 1982; El Essawy, 1989; Zaki, 1989; El-Emam, 1995). The second was a
policy of liberalisation similar to the IMF scenario. Liberalism thought that the open
door policy was only partially successful because it was seen to have been
incomplete (El-Naggar, 1991). Others thought the Infitah was the only available
alternative to the failure of the past experience of socialism. Between the two main
scenarios were those who supported a mixed economy (Montasser, 1991). The
mixed economy had been implemented for several years but the government was
also accused of failing to achieve any progress during the period of negotiations with
the international agencies and the earlier refusal of IMF proposals. The political
choice was made in favour of liberalisation as the socialist scenario was invalid
politically due to changes in the domestic and international environment, however
the government did not consider it an ideological choice.
This study argues that there was no political consensus during the early phase
of initiating the new policy. Until the late 1990s there was little change in support.
base of the state for economic liberalisation. Little has also been achieved in the
area of enhancing state capacity.
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As regards the economic content of the programme this study challenges the
effectiveness of two main measures considered by neo-liberalism as the cornerstone
for successful adjustment in Egypt (World Bank, 1997), that is, to accelerate both the
process of privatising public enterprises and trade liberalisation. This chapter argues
that what Egypt really needs is to increase its productive capacity in order to achieve
sustainable growth and if that growth is to benefit the Egyptian economy, it must
emanate from a new private-sector activity rather than by simply privatising the
public sector. Privatising public enterprises in Egypt does not seem to achieve the
declared objectives of improving efficiency, productivity and increasing investment.
Bearing in mind the method applied in privatisation, as will be discussed below in
detail, privatisation proved costly and time-consuming and has also crowded out
new investment in the private sector by absorbing private savings. The result of
privatisation is more a change in the type of ownership rather than the introduction
of new investment. As for trade liberalisation, it is unhelpful to talk about increased
gains for the economy from increased liberalisation, at least in the mid-1990s, as the
productive capacity of tradable goods has to be increased.
While sound economic performance is important to enhance credibility and
make changes more feasible, the distribution consequences of the reform and its
social cost have important implications for the balance of political power and the
composition of the support base. It is equally important for social and political
stability and furthermore for equity issues. This study argues that the social cost of
adjustment was high in terms of unemployment, increased poverty and availability
of sbcial services. There are few indications that these negative costs will be
remedied in the near future. While macroeconomic performance has shown some
improvements in recent years the challenges remain high.
Finally the study argues in favour of political liberalisation as an important
requisite during the reform consolidation phase. An increased pace of
democratisation and more consolidation in civil society organisations are important
to guarantee public participation in the decision-making process, to reflect public
preferences and in monitoring the process of redistribution of gains and losses.
This chapter contains three main sections after the introduction. I review the
SAP measures and their macroeconomic and distributional impacts. Secondly I
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review the political debate about reform and thirdly I assess the effect on state-civil
society relations.
4.2. ERSAP in Egypt
Egypt's first agreement with the IMF in 1987 was terminated due to the slowness
and partial nature of the measures undertaken. Accumulated problems, however,
pushed her to resume negotiations with the IMF in the early 1990s. This time, Egypt
was willing to accelerate reforms and to undertake more comprehensive measures
with the simultaneous use of all instruments of the monetary, fiscal and exchange
adjustment. A stand-by agreement wa's concluded in May 1991 and the
implementation of the stabilisation programme started even earlier on January 1st
(Handoussa, 1993:89). While Egypt resumed negotiations with the IMF under
pressure of its economic crisis, some favourable events on the external front during
negotiations encouraged it to pursue the agreement and to carry on with the
comprehensive reforms which it refused to undertake earlier. The Gulf crisis
revived Egypt's regional role and Egypt was compensated for both its losses and
vital role in the war to liberate Kuwait by direct transfers ($ 3.5 billion as emergency
aid) and by debt forgiveness ($7.2 billion represent all of Egypt's debt to the Gulf
countries and $ 7.5 million represents the outstanding military debt to the USA)
(Handoussa, 1993:5). Another incentive for Egypt to conclude the agreement was the
promise of the Paris Club to write off part of the external debt when the agreement
was signed. Handoussa (1993) noted that the IMF was ready to accept a somewhat
more 'gradual' implementation for a number of key components of .thb programme
due to Egypt's regional role.
The reform programme was planned to be implemented in different phases
supported mainly with the IMF and the World Bank. Two phases were completed
by the mid-1990s while the third was in progress. The first signing with the IMF
was that of May 1991 under Stand-by Arrangement for 18 months, May 1991- Nov.
1992, but this had to be extended to March 1993 with a 278 million SDR ($ 390
million) credit. The second was the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement, July
1993-June 1996 (see Galbis, 1995:2 & Nakamura, 1993:53). The signing of a
Stand-by Agreement with the IMF was shortly followed by a Sttuctural Adjustment
Loan (SAL) with the World Bank in June of the same year, which was formally
signed in November 1991. The SAL was equivalent to $ 300 million. In addition,
86
an IDA credit of SDR 105 million for the Social Fund project was approved. The
second phase was also supported by the Bank through a three-year Structural
Adjustment Monitoring Programme (SAMP) (EAP, 1993 & World Bank, 1993).
The reform programme was also supported by other foreign creditors and their
conditionality was related to performance criteria agreed to as part of the Fund stand-
by arrangement. The African Development Bank would provide co-financing of a
sum equivalent to $130 million and the European Economic co-financing of ECU
60-100 million. USAID also introduced the Sector Policy Reform Programme
(SPR) to complement and reinforce the reform programme was agreed to with the
IMF and the World Bank. The SPR focuses on macroeconomic stabilisation and
medium-term structural adjustment. It establishes specific policy reform measures,
supported by technical assistant where necessary in four sectors: Financial, Fiscal,
Trade, and Enterprise. The cash transfer is a two-year $400 million grant divided
equally between the two years in addition to $ 10 million technical support (EAP,
1993).
The signing of the agreement with the IMF was conditional on the pre-
implementation of some liberalisation measures. Price liberalisation was completed
for half the industrial production, energy prices were increased by 43 percent in the
mid-1990s, food subsidies were sharply reduced, a number of taxes were raised and
tariff rates on most utilities were also increased. Draft legislation for public
enterprises which gave autonomy and allowed their privatisation was prepared.
Measures were taken to deregulate and simplify investment licensing and abolish
some public monopolies in agricultural distribution and foreign trade (Handoussa,
1993:6-7).
• In the case of Egypt, the use of cross conditionality was clear and the role of
the Stand-by agreement as a 'seal of approval' by other creditors was played and all
other credit agreements and the debt write-off for the Paris club was a result of the
agreement with the IMF. In turn the IMF put a stricter conditionality on Egypt's
implementation of the agreement this time. Both the IMF and the World Bank
divided the disbursement of their credit into two tranches and related the release of
each with the fulfilment of certain reform measures. Before each disbursement a
World Bank and/or IMF mission would visit Egypt to review with the GOB the
fulfilment in the previous phase and to set performance criteria for the following
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phase. This could be in a joint IMF/ Bank mission as in Nov. 1991 when the first
supervision of the macroeconomic framework components was carried out. The
World Bank's SAL for instance, would be disbursed in two equal tranches of $150
million each. The first tranche was even released in two disbursements. On Feb. 1st
to 14, 1992 a World Bank mission reviewed with the GOE's representatives, the
areas related to the SAL effectiveness, and the second tranche release conditions and
the monitoring arrangements for releasing the SAL second tranche. On February 22,
1992, the first disbursement (first tranche) released $60 million. A team from the
World Bank arrived Cairo in July 1992 to discuss the measures that were executed
for releasing the second tranche. In Sept. 1992, the GOE received the second
disbursement of the first tranche release amounting to $90 million.
This extensive monitoring by the World Bank was followed by even more
strict members of the IMF. The IMF stand-by credit was also divided into two
tranches. Disbursement of credit depended on Egypt meeting the criteria of the
programme agreed upon with the IMF. The second tranche of SDR 130.8 million ($
183 million) which was due in November 1992 was not released till May 1993
(Nakamura, 1993:53). The amount itself was not enormous, however, it was the
credit conditionality which related other credits and debt write-off to the fulfilment
of the IMF Stand-by Agreement. In addition, the implementation of the whole
reform programme would collapse for the second time and Egypt would loose its
creditworthiness. The delay was because the pace of reform was too slow from the
IMF's point of view and some criteria could not be achieved in the scheduled time.
The IMF believed that the criterion on public credit was not observed and its main
demands centred on the promotion of public enterprises, wide-ranging trade
liberalisation and the amendment of labour law (Nakamura, 1993:54, EAP, 1993).
The dissatisfaction with the progress of the privatisation programme was shared by
the World Bank as well as being a matter which the GOE tried to correct by
announcing the first substantial privatisation programme in Feb. 1993 (Handoussa,
1993). The implementation of such a programme was behind schedule as well and
privatisation was always the most criticised area by both institutions. The
privatisation programme only gained momentum in 1996 with the new cabinet, since
then the international institutions' reports have been more optimistic about Egypt's
situation (see details of privatisation below).
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4.2.1. The ERSAP: Objectives and Rationale
The development strategy under the ERSAP in Egypt aims at moving away from a
public-sector led and inward-looking development to one based on exports and the
private sector by eliminating state intervention and freeing market forces. To achieve
this the ERSAP had three main declared objectives related to three major policy
areas:
a- to restore the macroeconomic balances of the economy; mainly in the Balance of
Payment and Government Budget, and to control inflation through the stabilisation
Programme;
b- to achieve more efficient use of resources, to enhance the capabilities of the
financial and productive sectors and to improve the regulatory and administrative
framework of the economy through the Structural Adjustment Programme; and
c- to alleviate the negative impacts of the Tlograrnme on limited income categories
through the establishment of the Social Fund for Development (SFD) (Mustafa,
1994:15).
Stabilisation is a short term programme supported by the IMF stand-by
agreement. It aims to restore internal and external balances by applying a demand
management policy, which includes expenditure reduction and expenditure
switching, using mainly monetary and fiscal policies. The programme assumes that
imbalances were caused by excess aggregate domestic demand which is created by
excess money supply (Soliman & Kheir El-din, 1992:7) also by distorted prices.
Structural adjustment is a medium-term programme supported mainly by the World
Bank whiCh deals with the supply side. It contains three main policy areas: price
liberalisation, trade liberalisation, and investment reform. Investment reform
includes public-sector restructuring and privatisation and improving the investment
environment for private activities. Stability was thought to be a prerequisite for
market forces to work which also require prices to reflect the real values of goods
and factors of production in order to guarantee efficient resource allocation and
specialisation in goods with competitive advantage. This argument is built on the
assumption that economic structures are flexible enough to allow for supply and
demand to respond promptly to market forces (ibid) an assumption which should be
taken cautiously due to the fact that markets could be incomplete and/or segmented.
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The macroeconomic objectives of the programme were to reduce inflation
gradually so as to reach 5 percent by 94/95 and thereafter. The investment ratio was
expected to rise from 19.5 percent of GDP in 1990/91 to 24.6 percent in 1995/96
with an emphasis on efficient private sector investment. Public investment outlays
were to fall from about 15 percent of GDP in 1990/91 to less than 8.5 percent in
1996/97. The saving rate was targeted to rise from an average of 9.4 percent of GDP
1990/91-1991/92 to 16.9 in 19955/9 (the large factor of this increase being higher
transfers from abroad). As a result of the reform programme real output growth was
expected to gradually recover, reaching 3 percent or more by 1994/95 (EAP, 1993).
4.2.2. Economic Impacts of the Programme
In this part we evaluate the outcome of the programme in relation to its objective.
Different components of the programme will be reviewed before discussing the
impacts. This analysis will be followed by a general assessment of its impact on and
relevance to the economy.
4.2.2.1. Stabilisation
The stabilisation programme was meant to restore equilibrium in the government
budget, balance of payment and to curtail inflation.
The Governmental Budget
To curtail budget deficits some policies were adopted to reduce expenditure on the
one hand and to increase revenues on the other. On the side of expenditure, direct
cuts in subsidies and public investment, in addition to the constraint on the growth of
wage bills were the main measures adopted. • Government investment as a
percentage of GDP was decreased from 13.45 in 1990/91 to only 5.5 in 1995/96, and
the explicit subsidy burden as a percentage of GDP was reduced from 5.9 to 1.9
during the same period (see Table 4.1).
On the other hand, measures to increase revenues focused mainly on the
increase in taxes which succeeded to a large extent by increasing indirect taxes,
imposing a new sales tax instead of the consumption tax, stamp taxes in addition to a
unified income tax. By increasing revenues and decreasing expenditure the
government succeeded in curtailing the deficit from 18.1 percent of GDP in 1990/91
to only 1.3 percent in 1995/96. The government managed as well to stop financing
its deficit through borrowing from the central bank (printing money) which was
effective in controlling inflation, instead the government relied mainly on the issuing
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of treasury bills. The worrying issue concerning the budget deficit in the mid-1990s'
Egypt was the increase in domestic lending which in turn led to an increase in the
debt service and government expenditure. Due to increases in the interest rate and
the placement of treasury bills, interest payment doubled in one year between
1989/90 and 1990/91 (Abdel-Khalek, 1994:46).
Table 4. 1 Selected Economic Indicators, 1990/91-1995/96 (% GDP, unless otherwise noted)
1990/9
1
1991/92 1992/9
3
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96*
Real GDP growth rate (%) 3.5 1.9 2.5 3.9 4.7 4.9**
Inflation (% change in CPI) 14.7 21.1 11.1 9.0 9.4 7.2
Consumption 85.9 83.0 83.3 84.9 83.1 86.0
Investment 23.3 18.2 16.2 16.6 16.3 16.7
Government Investment 13.4 8.5 7.0 6.1 5.5 5.5
Domestic saving 16.0 17.0 16.7 15.1 16.9 13.9
Overall Fiscal Balance (excl -18.1 -5.4 -3.4 -2.1 -1.2 -1.3
Grants)
Current	 Account	 Balance
(including transfers)
5.2 4.1 5.1 0.2 0.6 0.2
Official Reserves $ billions 6.1 10.6 14.9 17.0 17.9 18.4
External Debt/GDP 107.7 89.5 69.2 58.0 55.7 49.2
Explicit Subsidy Burden 6.3 5.2 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9
* Estimated
** Real figure
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Egypt as quoted in WB:
Arab Republic of Egypt, County Economic Memorandum; Egypt : Issues in Sustaining
Economic Growth, Report No. 16207-EGT, except for GDP growth-rate, calculated directly
from MOP figures with a growth-rate 2.5% in 1992/93 different from that mentioned in the WB
report (2.9%), and for Subsidy: Ministry of Economics: Egypt Economic Profile, Cairo 1996:12.
Balance of Payments
The main policies in relation to the Balance of Payment were currency exchange,
trade and interest rate reform. The currency exchange reform unified the previous
..r
multiple price system and established a free foreign exchange market. The reform
also involved a devaluation of the Egyptian pound. The devaluation was meant to
reflect the real value of the currency, provide more competitiveness for Egyptian
exports and reduce demand on imports. Trade reform involved trade liberalisation
with most non-tariff barriers were eliminated and the tariff rate reduced (for more
detail about reductions in the tariff rate and trade liberalisation, see Abdel-Khalek
1993:26-33, 40-42). Trade reform also included facilitation of administrative
measures for exportation and importation, however it seemed that trade liberalisation
was more effective on the import side rather than the export (ibid,:32). While the
current account deficit turned to surplus starting from 1990/91 onwards, this surplus
witnessed a continuing deterioration and if we exclude transfers it becomes a deficit.
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It was the same for the trade balance which continued in deficit, while exports
increased imports increased more rapidly. The improvement in the current account
balance was not mainly due to the devaluation of the currencies, as it was not the
first time that the Egyptian pound experienced devaluation. The previous
devaluation did not witness that much improvement in the balance. That was due to
the increase in the interest rate of the Egyptian pound, the decline of foreign
currency and the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market which encouraged
cash inflows (see Korayem 1996:13-14).
Inflation
The programme aimed at controlling the growth of the money supply. It did so by
using treasury bills to finance the public deficit instead of borrowing from the
Central Bank, and by constraining credit through credit ceilings. It also aimed at
reducing total demand through direct cuts in expenditure and currency devaluation.
While these measures were to some extent effective, the programme contained
different sets of measures which led to an increase in inflation. This included the
direct rise in prices and other measures caused an increase in the cost of production.
Such measures were, an increase in the indirect tax and the increase in interest rate.
In addition currency devaluation led to an increase in the cost of imports of
intermediate goods due to the high intermediate import content of domestic
production and food imports. This had its impact on the cost of living (see Abdel-
Khalek, 1993 & Korayem, 1996).
As a result of the reform programme the inflation rate was reduced according
to official figures from 21.1 in 1991/92 to 7.2 in 1995/96. Many estimates were
introduced to calculate the inflation rate and most of them did indicate a decreasing
trend. Many economists still think that the usual way of calculating the inflation rate
in Egypt needs some updating as regards the component of the basket of goods and
the estimated cost to some services in particular, such as housing, health and
education (See Fergany 1995, Korayem 1996). While the estimated rate for 1994/95
was 9.4 another study estimated the figure would reach not less than 15 percent (The
National Council for Production and Economic Affairs 1995).
4.2.2.2. Adjustment Programme
At the core of the structural adjustment measures were price liberalisation,
privatisation and trade liberalisation. The aim of this phase was to stimulate market
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forces and to improve the environment for private sector participation. It was
thought that these together would achieve a better allocation of resources and
stimulate growth.
Price Liberalisation
The policy of price liberalisation aimed at gradually increasing prices and removing
subsidies to reflect international prices. Agricultural crops were the first goods to
have their prices liberalised, shortly after the subsidies on agricultural inputs were
gradually phased out. Energy prices -petroleum products and electricity- were
increased gradually to reflect international prices and to eliminate what was
considered an implicit subsidy. Subsidies for most food items were eliminated as
well, except for one kind of bread considered as a staple food for the poor.
Investment Reform and Privatisation
Investment strategy in Egypt since 1974 aimed at increasing private sector
participation in economic activities. This policy gained more momentum under the
ERSAP with two fundamental changes recognising the new strategy starting from
1991. The first was that the increase in the role of the private sector would be
supported by a more liberalised economy where government intervention in
economic activity was drastically reduced compared with previous eras. The second
was the announced policy of privatising public enterprises, in contrast with the era of
infitah when public sector participation was even increased through its participation
in joint venture companies. Two main components of the investment strategies
during the 1990s can be recognised, the first was the restructuring and privatising of
public' sector companies, which will be discussed below under the term
"privatisation". The second was the providing of an enabling environment for the
private sector based mainly on market incentives, where state participation in
production and trade has being reduced providing the legal and regulatory
institutions.
Privatisation
Public-sector restructuring was the first step to qualify the PEs for privatisation.
They had lost the privilege of cheap credit and subsidies and were allowed to operate
under similar conditions as those of the private sector. A new law to organise public
enterprises was issued - Law 203 of 1991- which reorganised them into 17 holding
companies affiliated to 314 companies. The holding companies were responsible for
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managing the portfolio of equity shares of their affiliated companies and for
preparing financial and productive policies. The law gave the holding companies the
right to partly or entirely privatise them or even to liquidate them (Handoussa, 1993:
7-8, Samak, 1996: 98). The early stages of privatisation were led by tourism and
land reclamation.
Privatisation- the Strategy
The privatisation programme in Egypt covers small local government owned
enterprises, government share in joint-ventures and public enterprises operating
under law 203 of 1991, except companies viewed as strategic. Privatisation started
in 1990/91 by selling 2000 small local government-owned enterprises and the selling
of one large hotel. In the following years privatisation continued by selling the
remaining local government owned enterprises, selling the public sector share in
companies law 203, and increasing the private sector share in companies law 97
which had private shareholders (Mohieldin & Nasr, 1996: 68). According to the
Public Enterprise Office action plan issued in 1993, companies under public sector
law no. 203 who were eligible for privatisation were those of small or medium size,
profit makers, commercially viable, operating in competitive markets and with a
limited number of redundant workers (as quoted in Samak, 1996: 100). Late in 1995
the Minister of Public Enterprises emphasised that only profit-making companies
would be privatised. Loss-making companies would be restructured to be sold when
achieving profit level of 10 percent (Mohieldin & Nasr, 1996: 44). In 1996, only
fifty-nine companies were considered profitable and were candidates for share
offeririg (ibid). Another study revealed that the main percentage of companies in
different sectors needed a comprehensive restructuring which in turn needed a long
period of time (Samak, 1996: 104). These companies were not eligible for
privatisation by private sale or stock flotation and needed a detailed study, according
to their financial or technical problems and the type of product. This meant that
these companies would absorb a high percentage of the privatisation proceeds which
limited the proposed positive impact on the government budget.
In the early stages of privatisation the government adopted a strategy to sell
the entire company to an anchor investor. Three companies were sold by this
method: El-Nasr for Bottling- Coca Cola; the Egyptian bottling Company- Pepsi
Cola; and El-Nasr Boilers and Steam Vessels, while the total sale to anchor investor
94
was more likely to achieve the privatisation objectives of improving efficiency and
productivity through new management and technology. The process was subject to
criticism concerning the value of the companies and the sale to foreign investors.
The selling of Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola were the most debatable. The two
companies enjoyed oligopolistic positions where the first controlled 40 percent of
the market and the other 30 percent. Their chances of increasing their oligopolistic
position after privatisation was high, which endangered other smaller companies in
the market. This oligopolistic position was also claimed not to be calculated in the
price. Selling the trade mark of the two companies was not included in the
government package, the buyers had to negotiate with the mother company for it
who intended not to sell it and to compete themselves to buy the companies. This
situation raised the question about other companies enjoying similar positions of
keeping the trade mark for themselves. It posed the threat that similar companies
would be sold to foreign investors at a low price. These companies were those that
had the right to trade marks, or monopoly rights over technology or input materials,
as in soft drinks and medical drugs companies (Wahba, 1994: 35-37).
At the following stage the government changed its strategy in favour of
minor sales in the stock market. The Egyptian Federation of Industries, which was
headed by a private investor, played an active role in this shift in the privatisation
strategy. The head of the federation claimed that selling in the stock market was
important to revive it and to attract small and medium savings. In his opinion a total
sale would destroy the economy (Khamees' comments in siminar discusstion of the
social sand political aspects of the reform, June 1995). Private sector fears from
foreign competition could be the undeclared reason. The minor sale strategy was to
release a small percentage of the shares in order to test the price and market
response. Nevertheless it was a slow process which did not allow major changes in
management.
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Table 4. 2 Privatisation Status to the End of 1996
Company Name Sector % Sold Method of Privatisation
Nasr for Bottling (coca Cola) Industry 100.0 Private Sale
Egyptian Bottling Industry 100.0 Private Sale
Nasr Boilers & Stem Vessel Industry 100.0 Private Sale
Egyptian Electra Cables Industry 70.0 Mixed
Wadi Kom Ombo for Land Reclamation Agriculture 95.0 ESA
Egyptian Akkaria Agriculture 95.0 ESA
General Mechanical Excavation Construction 95.0 ESA
Egyptian Dredging Construction 95.0 ESA
General Co. for Land Reclamation Agriculture 95.0 ESA
Arab Co. for Land Reclamation Agriculture 95.0 ESA
REGWA Agriculture 95.0 ESA
Upper Egypt Dredging Construction 95.0 ESA
Engineering Design & Irrigation Projects Service 95.0 ESA
Behera Agriculture 95.0 ESA
Alex. Pharmaceutical & Chemical Industry Industry 21.0 Stock Flotation
Alex. Portland Cement Industry 20.5 Stock Flotation
Alex. Spinning & Weaving Industry 45.6 Stock Flotation
Eastern Tobacco & Cigarettes Industry 20.0 Stock Flotation
Extract oils Industry 20.0 Stock Flotation
Middle Egypt Flour Mills 20.0 Stock Flotation
Misr Chemical Industries Industry 34.2 Stock Flotation
Nasr Clothing & Textiles (KABO) Industry 37.7 Stock Flotation
Nile Pharmaceutical & Chemical Industries Industry 20.0 Stock Flotation
North Cairo Flour Mills Trade 20.0 Stock Flotation
Paints & Chemical Industries Industry 12.5 Stock Flotation
South Cairo & Giza Flour Mills Trade 40.0 Stock Flotation
Torah Portland Cement Industry 32.5 Stock Flotation
ELMACO* Industry 89.0 Private Sale
Madinet Nasr Housing & Development* 75.0 Stock Flotation
Egyptian Financial & Industrial (EFIC)* Industry 75.0 Stock Flotation
Egyptian Starch & Glucose* Industry 59.0 Stock Flotation
United Housing* 8.8 Stock Flotation
Abou Quir Fertilisers* Industry 2.8 Stock Flotation
Kafer El-Zayat Insecticides Chemicals* Industry 74.4 Stock Flotation
The Nile Match* Industry 54.5 Stock Flotation
Miser Oil and Soup* 61.1 Stock Flotation
El-Nasr Dehydrating Agricultural Products* 61.0 Stock Flotation
West and Middle Delta flour Mills* 61.0 Stock Flotation
TeleMisr* 66.2 Stock Flotation
Upper Egypt Flour Mills* 60.9 Stock Flotation
East Delta Flour Mills* 60.7 Stock Flotation
Development and Popular Houses* 65.6 Stock Flotation
Arab Cotton Ginning* 62.6 Stock Flotation
El Nasr Utilities* 90.0 Stock Flotation
El Ahram Beverages* 90.0 Stock Flotation
Helwan Portland Cement* Industry 29.6 Stock Flotation
Ameria Cement* Industry 35.0 Stock Flotation
Misr Free Shop* Trade 61.0 Stock Flotation
United Arab Spinning & Weaving* Industry 61.0 Stock Flotation
El Nanda Agricultural Co.* Agriculture 100.0 Stock Flotation
West Nobaria Agricultural Co.* Agriculture 100.0 Stock Flotation
El Nile Cotton and Ginning* Industry 61.0 Stock Flotation
Note	 : * = companies subscribed for the first time within the privatisation programme during 1996. ESA =
Employee Stockholders Association
Source: for the year 1996, INP. 1996. Egypt Human Development Report 1996, others from Ministry of
Economy and International Cooperation, 1996. Egypt Economic Profile.
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Selling to employees was another method of privatisation. This was applied
in 10 companies affiliated to the holding company for public works and land
reclamation where 95 percent of their shares were sold to employee shareholders
associations. According to Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992, employee
shareholder associations were entitled to buy 10 percent of the shares of their
companies. The Association could acquire this percentage, or less, with a 20 percent
reduction, and its value could be divided into 8 interest-free annual instalments.
During 1996, 5 percent of 10 companies' shares were sold to the Workers
Associations. Another 10 companies sold 10 percent of their shares to workers. The
total value of these shares was estimated at EE 290 million ([NP, 1996: 62).
Sales proceeds
When comparing the use of sales proceeds with regard to the privatisation objective
- increasing efficiency, hence productivity and investment and to reduce the burden
on public budget - the result is rather contradictory. The sales from all transfers of
assets to private ownership during the period of 1994 to May 1996 were estimated at
EL 5.37 billion. 34 percent of which was uncollected instalments, 23 percent
directed to financial restructuring, 13 percent to re-investment, 17 percent to bank
deposits and 13 percent to transaction fees and tax, none of the proceeds was
directed to debt reduction ( World Bank, 1997: 30). The largest share was used to
restructure public enterprises and to finance its deficits. In this sense privatisation
proved to be very costly as it absorbed private savings just to finance the public
enterptise deficit. This method replaced the traditional bank credit and still crowded
out private investment. The Share of re-investment was rather low, and data
revealed that one of the holding companies that used the proceeds of the capital
increase- Metallurgical Holding Company - to increase capital in the same company
that realised the sales proceeds, while another - the Mining and Refractors Holding
Company, utilised the money with several of its affiliates. The use of "cross-
subsidies" to prop up ailing firms dragged down the entire performance of public
enterprises (Mohieldin & Nasr, 1996:48-49).
Privatisation Assessment
Any assessment of the privatisation programme in Egypt should be made in the light
of its objective and of its costs compared to its benefits. Would privatisation
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increase efficiency i.e. productivity, investment, and employment opportunities?
Would it reduce the burden on the public budget? Would benefits overvalue the
losses? This depends to a certain extent on the method of privatisation, the sequence
of privatisation and the use of privatisation proceeds.
There have bccn acceptable agreements between commentators, as appeared
earlier, on the importance of increasing the macro efficiency of PEs. Some activities
have no strategic importance for the Public sector to participate in it, especially after
removing subsidies, and where the private sector can undertake these activities
effectively. In front of these activities are those related to the trading in different
kinds of food, hotels and restaurants, local enterprises, where the government
replaces farmers and the private sector in producing poultry and providing local
transportation. Considering efficiency on a micro level, the list could also include
the loss-making companies which were used as an excuse for privatisation in the
early stages of the debate about privatisation. It is the companies which the
government failed for several years to reform and which have been a burden on the
public budget and have cost society some lost opportunities for investing the money
in other rewarding activities. However, a further investigation of the technical and
financial situation is needed to decide which of these companies could cope with the
new regulation for PEs according to law 203.
A study on the feasibility of the privatisation of PEs on the manufacturing
sector grouped the companies into 6 categories:
1- Those that do not need any restructuring and are feasible financially, technically
and operationally which turned out. to be only three companies in food
manufacturing.
2- Those that need complete restructuring and which could be done in the short-
term.
3- Those that need financial restructuring but are feasible technically and
operationally.
4- Those that need technical and operational restructuring and are feasible
financially.
5-Those that need complete restructuring over a long period of time due to severe
deterioration in financial and productivity indicators and which include a high
percentage of companies inside every sector.
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6- Those that face more complicated problems and could not be restructured easily.
These also encompass a high percentage inside each sector.
The study concluded that companies eligible for privatisation were those in
groups 1, 2 and 4 respectively (Samak, 1996: 103-04). This view is based on the
same argument used by the government for the sequence of privatisation. According
to this view, profit-making companies should be given priority for privatisation
while others should be restructured in preparation for selling. This was to allow fair
prices and to find buyers for their shares in the stocks market.
One would argue against this strategy however on several fronts, it deprived
the government of the revenues achieved by the profitable companies while still
burdening it financially by keeping unfeasible companies especially those in groups
5 and 6 which represented the majority. It postponed facing the problems of these
companies which would probably be left to the end of the privatisation process in the
hope of reducing the social cost. The main problem of privatising or liquidating
these companies would be with employment because the low value of these
companies had to be accepted. Postponing privatising or liquidating these
companies would not improve the value if we consider the long period of time for
restructuring these companies, or the more feasible ones, depending on the sequence
followed, and the money used for restructuring, in addition to the losses which the
government had to cope with during that period.
An important issue in this respect was the use of proceeds and the expected
time horizon for the whole privatisation. process. There was no declared plan for the
different phases of privatisation to assess the progress in the programme. However,
short-term plans were recently declared for the prospects of privatisation during the
year. Meantime there was no public monitoring for privatisation as it was not
represented in the Peoples Assembly and there had been no detailed information
about the use of proceeds since the privatisation started. The only evidence we
obtained were estimates from the World Bank for a specific period of time while it
did not provide information about the restructured companies whose groups of
companies were given priority for restructuring. It also did not provide figures about
the amount used for employment compensations. The declared strategy now was
that main targets for the use of proceeds were those for restructuring and
employment compensation, but no more information was provided.
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If we accept that the sales proceeds of the profitable companies would be
wasted over the long term needed for restructuring other companies, in addition to
the unfeasibility of a high percentage of companies to continue or to be privatised,
one would suggest some reverse in the sequence of privatisation. The government
for example might get rid of these unfeasible companies while keeping profit-
making companies for later stages, with minor sales of their shares in the stock
market. While the contemporary sequence of privatisation is meant to increase
credibility in the programme and to reduce the risk of job loses, the proceeds of the
minor sale of profit-making companies can be mainly used for labour compensation.
The slowness of the privatisation programme has one advantage of making private
savings available in the market to finance the establishing of new private activities
rather than directing it to restructuring PEs. It also increases competition between
public and private activity which encourage PEs to improve their efficiency or
crowds them out. Meanwhile it reduces the burden on the public budget.
The announced goals and rationale beyond the public enterprise restructure
according to law 203 of 1991 imply a decline in the need for privatisation of the PE
as it allows them to operate according to private sector conditions, curtail their
privileges (e.g. access to cheap credit, subsides & monopoly) then any difference in
performance should be due to management and level of technology. A World Bank
study (1994) suggested that bureaucratic managers of the public sector are no less
efficient than those of the private sector and it is the system through they work which
is responsible for bad performance. Improving the system should improve
performance, but changing the system in their view means bringing private
businessmen not a private system of management. However, in the Egyptian case it
is fair to refer to the subjectivity of selecting public sector managers which drives
them away from efficient performance. Corruption, and embezzlement among
public managers is there due to the lack of effective an monitoring system.
However, there are some examples of successful management in the PEs, among
which is the case of the Naga Hamadi Aluminium Company. The Performance of
public managers in Egypt varies considerably because of some factors related to
personal variations in competence and experience and others related to the system.
The improvement of the system in the late 1980s proved to have a positive impact on
performance, as Handoussa pointed out above. The new law 203 provides a more
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favourable economic environment which should be supported with improved
political conditions concerning the criteria for selecting the managers and a
monitoring system concerning the way they use their power.
Meantime some of the methods used for privatisation used do not bring about
substantial changes in management, such as a minor sale in the stock market. The
same happens in the case of selling the companies to employees, as the management
team is unlikely to change and changes in performance in this case would relate to
changes in the incentive system and the abolishing of the central control rather than
changes in the ownership type (Abdel-Fadil, 1996:39). However, based on the
experience of other countries, it is claimed that commercialisation-increased
competition, hard budget constraints, regulation of monopolies, financial market
reforms, and incentives for managers to perform efficiently- is not bound to bring
changes in investment behaviour and only leads to an improvement in productivity.
While privatisation increases both productivity and investment, the improvements in
productivity would be higher than in the case of commercialisation. The reason that
commercialisation does not change investment behaviour is that the PEs continue to
face the same financial constraints they faced before reform. They remain subject to
the fiscal constraints imposed by governments, as well as the credit ceiling imposed
on the public sector in general. It is also justified by the increased government
dividends due to increased profitability, which reduces available retained earnings
for expansion (Galal, 1996:8-10). This argument would not be valid if the
government left all the constraints on the public sector, allowing it to perform
according to the same constraints and regulations as the private sector, and providing
its management with more autonomy. Tax system could also neutralise the effect of
paying more dividends to the government.
In the case of Egypt, a study based on the assumption that privatisation
would increase productivity and investment by 1.5 and 20 percent respectively per
annum, and commercialisation would only increase only productivity by 1 percent
annually, assuming that 50 percent would be privatised while the other 50 percent
woudl be commercialised in a sample representing only one third of the PE sector in
Egypt, it concluded that there would be additional expected savings of about 2.4
percent of GDP (Table 4.3).
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Table 4. 3 Estimated Increases in Savings from Reforming the PEs
Total Increase in Savings 	 Annual Increase in Savings
(Millions of 1995 LE)	 (Percentage of 1995 GDP)
GOE Private sector Total GOE Private sector Total
50% privatisation -17751 59967 42216 -0.9% 2.9% 2.1%
50% commercialisation 7937 0 7937 0.4% 0.0% 0.4%
50 % privatisation &
50% commercialisation -9814 59967 50153 -0.5% 2.9% 2.4%
Source: Galal, A. 1996. Savings and Privatisation. Cairo: The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies. Working
Paper No. 8.
Although the study promises more, the savings rate could be up to 7 percent
if we consider the total PEs. Based on the following comments, these results must be
taken with cautions.
- Not all the PEs are eligible for privatisation, most of them need financial and/or
technical restructuring. Privatisation does not happen at the same point in time.
- The assumption that commercialisation will not increase investment while it
increases productivity can be challenged using the same argument, mentioned in the
study, that productivity will generate more resources that can be used for investment.
Increase in investment can also happen in an indirect way if the proceeds of
privatising part of the PEs is used to increase investment in the commercialised
companies.
- The assumption that the level of increase in productivity in both privatisation and
commercialisation is built on single cases related to a certain activity and cannot be
generalised for a group of companies with different activities.
- Most gains go to the private sector and if the price paid to the government for the
privatised companies is less than LE 17 billion, privatisation impacts negatively on
the treasury (ibid,:12).
- Privatisation has a negative impact on government savings, while
commercialisation has a positive impact. It is a matter of preference for the
government and whether it is able to provide other sources of revenue or not. It also
depends on the way both the government and private sector utilise these savings.
- Sensitivity analysis proves that savings are most sensitive to changes in investment.
This means that gains from increases in investment can be huge and the government
must assure that privatisation will lead to increases in investment (ibid,:13). This is
more likely when the PEs are sold to an anchor investor where it is conditioned to
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increase investment a certain amount and where there is a particular mechanism to
assure the realisation of such a condition.
Private Sector Investment Environment
Empirical studies have proved that private investment in Egypt is a function of
public investment, interest rate, debit ratio and the real exchange rate. In addition to
these economic variables there are other important conditions to stimulate private
sector responses- see chapter two above. Much legislation has been introduced in
this respect, although we cannot investigate in detail the contents of each law. It is
to be noted that there have been many amendments in these laws, taxes, and in the
capital market which reduce the credibility and predictability in the investment
environment. However, the GOE has failed to enact many important laws e.g. the
law to regulate the market against the monopoly, labour law, and unified companies
law.
It seems that Egyptians lack of entrepreneurial skills. The total sale of
private enterprises was won by foreign entrepreneurs. The stock market attracts
small household savings, foreign capital and companies working in the security
market. The GOE is still taking the initiative in establishing big companies with
considerable contribution of capital by public banks. Egyptian entrepreneurs are risk
avoiders and seem to avoid involvement in big deals. Nasser's era created
generations of bureaucrats who lacked experience and were not risk takers. This was
evident from the youth projects introduced by the SFD, where they failed to pay their
debt instalments. The crisis in the agency for industrial craft loans which was
financed by the SFD to the tune of about LE 60.32 million, where the young
investors failed to repay 60 percent of the loan revealed their lack of vocational
training and managerial abilities. The loans were disbursed to projects in the
absence of visibility studies. Practice revealed the multiplicity of problems
concerning the high price of equipment and inputs, lack of infrastructure, high
administrative fees and marketing problems (Abram 13/3/98). While the
governmental organisations helped in marketing by organising regional and central
local markets for their production, supply could not match the demand needs, due to
excess production of some bad quality products. Technical advice and support were
greatly needed at production, financial and managerial levels.
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Investment Responses
The share of both public and private investment as a percentage of gross national
income decreased in the SAP era compared with the previous period of the second
half of the 1980s as can be seen in table 4.4. 'While the public investment share
continued to decline during the reform period, private investment recovered slowly
starting from 1993/94. However it did not reach pre-reform levels. This meant that
the reform measures failed to increase private sector participation and the fall in
public investment was not replaced by private investment which suggests that the
crowding out hypothesis does not apply in the Egyptian case. Two empirical studies
on private investment in Egypt proved the complementary relationship between
public investment, especially in infrastructure, and private investment (Shafik, 1992;
El-Khawaga, 1995: 144). This low response of private investment in Egypt raises
question about the determinants of private-sector investment in Egypt. Shafik's
study (1992) revealed that the factors with a positive relationship with investment in
Egypt are those of public investment in infrastructure, available credit for the private
sector, growth in total demand, and the profit rate. A more recent study by El-
Khawaga (1995) revealed that the main economic variables that affect private
investment are public investment in infrastructure, its share of credit, the real
exchange rate, and the level of external debt.
Table 4. 4 Investment and Savings during 1986/87-1995/6
198
6/87
198
7/88
1988/
89
1989/
90
1990/
91
1991/
92
1992/
93
1993
/94
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4/95
1995
/96*
% of GDP%
Gross	 Domestic 26.1 35.9 32.6 29.1 21.9 18.2 16.2 16.6 16.3 16.6
Investment
GN Savings 19.9 31.8 27.4 24.9 20.7 24.7 23.0 15.4 15.9 15.5
Foreign Savings 6.2 4.1 5.2 4.3 1.1 -6.5 -6.8 1.2 0.5 1.1
% of GNY
GD Investment 23.4 31.9 29.3 26.7 20.1 17.0 14.8 15.8 15.5 16.0
Public 15.5 20.7 13.6 13.6 12.5 10.0 8.2 7.5 6.6 6.5
Investment**
Private 8.8 11.3 15.7 13.0 7.6 7.1 6.6 8.3 8.9 9.4
Investment
GN Savings 17.8 28.3 24.6 22.7 19.1 23.1 20.9 14.7 15.1 14.9
Public Savings -0.7 -2.9 -0.8 -0.2 -1.3 3.1 2.5 3.3 3.7 3.7
Private savings 18.5 31.1 25.4 22.9 20.3 20.0 18.4 11.4 11.4 11.2
Foreign Savings 5.5 3.6 4.7 3.9 1.1 -6.1 -6.2 1.1 0.5 1.1
* Estimates
** The Public Sector includes central and local government, public authorities and public enterprises.
Source: World Bank, 1997. Arab Republic of Egypt; Country Economic Memorandum. Egypt: Issues
In Sustaining Economic Growth. Main Report. Report No. 16207-EGT.
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Growth rate
Cuts in public investment outlays in addition to the increase in the interest rate and
the assigning ceiling on credits led to contractionary effects on the economy, hence
on the growth-rate. Government reduction in investment expenditure was assumed
to crowd in the private sector, however with the increase in the interest rate, the tight
credit policy, and weak improvement in the investment environment, the private
sector response could not compensate for the decline in public investment. Total
investment as a percentage of GDP continued declining from 23.3 in 1990/91 to 16.7
in 1995/6. As a result the real growth rate declined to 1.9 percent in the first year of
the reform, 1991/92, and recovered gradually to reach 4.9 percent in 1995/96 and
was estimated to reach 5.3 percent in 1996/97, according to the figures of the MOP.
The recent report of the World Bank adopted the same high figures of the MOP (WB
1997:1) in spite of a debate between the IFIs and the Ministry concerning the real
rate of growth. The IMF's earlier estimation of real GDP growth were 2.3 percent
and 2.8 percent for the years 1991 and 1992 respectively, then the fund provided a
revised estimation of 1.1 and 4.4 percent for the two mentioned years respectively.
According to the World Bank (1993), the real GDP growth rates were 2.3 percent
(1.990/91), and 0.3 percent (1991/92). The EIU estimate for 1992/93 was 0.5 percent
(as cited in Ibrahim & Lofgren, 1996:171-72). The World Bank report for 1996
estimated the GDP growth during 1990-94 was only 1.1 percent.
The ability of the programme to enhance growth on a sustainable basis is in
question as it lacks a clear mechanism for growth. There is no evidence on the direct
relatiohship between outward directed policies and trade openness and growth.
Even if trade openness could increase the flexibility of the economy and provide a
greater ability to absorb external shocks, financial openness could considerably
reduce this ability to adjust to such shocks (Bromley, 1996:63).
Estimates of the final effect of the reform measures on per capita income
varied and in the best estimates improved slightly. However, these improvements
were not evenly distributed between different socio-economic categories, as I discuss
below.
4.2.3. The Distributional Impact of Economic Reform
Structural adjustment has distributional impacts upon various socio-economic
groups. It can affect their cost of living, their incomes or both. As a result some
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The characteristics of the poor confirm our above analysis about the most
affected groups under the reform measures. The poverty of the head of the
household was more wide spread in some occupational categories than others. An
analysis of the survey data regarding income and expenditure research shows that the
"unclassified" category, the marginalised, if taken into account, represents the
majority of the poor in both the urban and rural areas (INP, 1995: 63). This group is
followed by those whose household heads are "outside the labour force" in both
areas. Then in the urban areas, come those who are engaged in services, if we are
considering both the incidence and intensity of poverty. However, the contribution
of the production and transport workers to overall poverty is high because of the
relatively large number of households in this occupation. Meanwhile in rural areas,
households designated as headed by "self-employed" (mainly small land owners)
come next. Both those "outside the labour force and those who are self employed"
contribute more to national poverty than their share of the total number of
household, which means that these categories suffer severe poverty problems. The
category of agricultural workers, ranks third in terms of the incidence of poverty,
however it is the largest group in terms of its share in the number of households in
the sample (El-Liathy & Kheir El-Deen, 1996:494-5).
Distribution of income deteriorated between 1981/82 and 1991/92 as the
Ginni coefficient increased from 0.32 to 0.38 in urban areas, and from 0.29 to 0.32
in rural' areas. In the following years there is evidence that the gap between the poor
and the rich had widened. It is clear from the above that cuts in subsidies mainly
affect t the poor as they spend more on subsidised goods, the burden of
unemployment falls more on low-income groups and so does the cut in government
expenditure on social services. Data based on a survey by CAPMAS and the Social
Fund for Development (SFD), revealed that the income shares of the poorest 20
percent of the population and that of the lowest 40 percent, declined from 7.4 and
19.5 to 5.9 and 17.0 percent of total income respectively between 1991 and 1993
([NP, 1995:63-4).
4.3. The Debate about Economic Reform
This part analyses different views, perceptions and attitudes about the Egyptian main
political actors, political parties and academics towards the reform policies, their
nature, pace and components. It illustrates what were the different views concerning
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the main cause of Egypt economic problems? What were the different available
alternatives of the different ideological and political attitudes? How did these views
change over time? How far were representatives of different views and parties able
to influence goverment policy?
4.3.1. Characterisation of the Problem
There has been a wide consensus on the main problems of the Egyptian economy,
yet different explanations have been expressed to clarify the causes behind these
problems. In the early 1990s a new trend was crystallised with the World Bank
explanation of the problem. This trend which consists of some liberal as well as
more conservative academic with intellectual ties to the USA or the World Bank (see
EL-Naggar 1991, 1997; Shihata 1993, 1995; Handoussa 1993, Soliman & Kheir El-
deen 1992) put government intervention in a central place in their analyses of the
causes of the problems. The liberal economist El-Naggar (1991) blamed the
economic system adopted which was based on central planning and state control
over a considerable part of economic activity in addition to massive bureaucratic
control over the economic decisions. He thought that this system had not changed
even during the period of infitah. He criticised those who saw infitah as responsible
for the problems and thought that it was not successful due to the partial nature of
liberalisation and the continuity of bureaucratic control. He also refused to blame
external shocks or population growth as responsible fEl-Naggar, 1991:16-24). El-
Naggar blamed the public sector for most of the structural problems of the economy.
He argued that public-sector losses led to budget deficits which in turn were covered
by printing money leading to inflation. He also argued that while public investments
received 70 percent of total investment, their efficiency was very low and this failed
to generate job opportunities, hence deepening unemployment. As the public sector
was responsible for 80 percent of Egyptian exports and imports, exports were falling
drastically and imports increasing, resulting in an increasing deficit in the balance of
payment. As a result he considered the public sector responsible for 40 percent of
Egypt's external debt (ibid,:38-42).
Handoussa (1993:4) argued that "the sources of failure can be found in the
nature and scope of state intervention, in the set of closed economy macro policies
pursued (albeit in a diluted form after the infitah), and in the poor management of
state institutions and planning." Soliman & Kher El-Deen (1992) believed that
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"Experience has shown that distortions can result from government interventions as
much as from market failures. A system of deliberate intervention in resource
allocation through direct control and commands may conceivably create more
inefficiency in production, investment and growth than would result from a given
economic policy under a market system."
El-Naggar's views were fully adopted by the Wafd party and officially
reiterated in the party's political report considering the public sector the main entity
responsible for all economic ills (Mossaad, 1996:83). The National Progressive
Unionist Party (NPUP) thought that the problem was structural in nature rather than
a trade-off between public and private. Abdel-Khalek argued that profit was
theoretically independent of the ownership type. As evidence for this the NPUP
stated that until 1990 the number of loss-making companies in the private sector was
600. The NPUP also refers to the experience of private sector in the open door
policy as they use their capital in speculations, financial and commercial activities
and light consumer industries (ibid,:86,94). Abdel-Khalek diagnosed the crisis as a
Dutch disease. This was where the tertiary sector has grown massively while
production sectors had diminished. This situation had implications on the economy
as it complicated economic management, affected the equal distribution of income
and wealth, employment generation, and on economic relations with the foreign
world. Abdel-Khalek blamed the adopted policies for their failure to deal with the
crisis. From his point of view, they weakened the productive capabilities while
developing consumer posibilities and attitudes. He emphasised the importance of
expanding the commodity-producing sectors and blamed the food deficit for
structural imbalances in the economy (Abdel-Khalek, 1987:18; 1997: 138-39).
The labour party agreed to a large extent with the NPUP views and accused
the government of lacking "a clear vision" in assigning strategic national goals and
methods of implementing them (Mossaad 1996:83). Hussein also stressed the
dependent relationship between the Egyptian economy and international economy
developed during the past and which continued to prevail and which hindered any
• attempt to achieve real development. In addition to this views concerning the
relationship between the Egyptian and the international economy, he argued that
corruption . and waste in the internal arena were responsible (Hussein 1993 as quoted
in Ibrahim, & Lofgren 1996:186). The national feeling regarding the need for a
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national vision or project that united public hopes ,
 and through which they could
tolerate the immediate costs of the reform for future gains was increasing. This
vision which the government failed to provide was one of the shortcomings of the
reform (see Ibrahim & Lofgren 1996:160). The Muslim Brotherhood stressed the
mismanagement of the economy and the socio-political environment. They thought
that all the factors needed for production were available to the Egyptian Economy;
land, finance (as proven from the experience of the so-called Companies of Islamic
Employment of Money) and the labour-force. In their opinion, people needed
freedom merely to stimulate them to produce and participate in political life, hence
in the economic decision-making process, and to abandon negative behaviour of
participation (EL-Ghazali, 1991:72-73).
Shihata itemised five main causes for Egypt's problems. First, the massive
increase in population with limited arable land, and spontaneous growth in urban
areas. • Second, the poor strategy for human resource development. Third, the
irrelevant economic policies which encouraged consumption and importation while
discouraging production and exportation; expanded the public enterprises units and
constrained private sector expanding; where subsidies were unlimited to the poor
and where the exchange rate and interest rates were unrealistic and discouraged
savings in favour of capital-intensive investments; and which showed increasing
dependence on unsustainable sources of foreign currencies. Fourth, inefficient
resource allocation where little attention was given to the protection of agricultural
land and the environment. And finally, due to some negative cultural aspects of the
public concerning consumption habits and the work ethic. In general, Shihata argues
that most economic policies were issued to satisfy people- for political
considertions- than for economic rationality which considered the medium and long-
term effects (Shihata: 1993: 44-7, 104-6).
In my opnion state intervention in the economic policy is not the only factor
to blame. Some aspects of the policy of state intervention were harmful. The setting
of mandatory prices for instance for the agricultural sector resulted in negative
internal terms of trade between the agricultural and the industrial sector. In this case
the need to correct the prices was for economic and equity reasons as well. Other
aspects, such as subsidies and the public sector, played a social role in supporting the
poor. However, as Shihata pointed out the problem with subsidies was that they did
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Egypt's experience with state-led development and the different results of the
assessment of this experience shaped the views of the debaters for its anticipated role
in the new era of liberalisation. The increasing dominance of the ideology of
liberalisation and globalisation in the international arena has its effect in shaping
these views as well. A general area of agreement in discussing the role of the state is
the effect of the type and nature of the current socio-economic system and its relative
level of development compared with the developed countries; and the direction and
speed of change in the developed countries concerning liberalisation, globalisation,
and technological change and innovation, a point which has been noted by most
debaters, however, with different degrees of emphasis (see for instance, Abdalla,
1989; Beblawi, 1989, 1996; & Handoussa, 1994).
Abdalla (1989) stresses the variations in the state's role according to: the
resource base of society -e.g. oil, irrigated agriculture- ; the socio-economic system
which varies at different historical stages; the position in the international system, as
the role of the state in the advanced core countries differs from that in developing
countries; and variations in cultural characteristics and the attitude of the ruling elite.
His analysis is valid for Arab countries in general and is not exclusive to Egypt. He
thinks that the state in Arab countries played a dominant role in the pre-colonisation
era as a tool for recovering resources from foreign control. He develops his
arguement by relating the role of the state to the targeted type of development in the
Arab countries which, in his view, should be independent development dominated
by a coalition of labour, farmers, intellectuals and national capitalists. He delineates
seven eareas where the government should have an effective role: controlling and
exploiting the mining resources; mobilising and allocating resources; developing
human resources; supporting technological development; building an infrastructure;
redistributing wealth; and economic management of the economy. I will elaborate
on the most debatable issues which are the role of the state in resource mobilisation
and the allocation and the distribution of wealth. He argues that as the state controls
a considerable part of the revenues of oil rents, it is responsible for converting these
resources from depleted resources or wealth to sustainable productive assets. He
further argues that the behaviour of the Arab capitalist is biased towards investment
in housing, in the commercial, financial, and tourism areas more than in manufacture
and agriculture. These two considerations apply, to some extent, for the first and to
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large extent for the second, in the Egyptian case. He thinks that market forces
cannot be used to decide the investment size or components. It is the state that
should play the fundamental role in resource mobilisation and allocation. Productive
public investment is important to balanced development and for society to control
the strategic industries, in addition to Arab national security. At the same time he
accepts the participation of the private sector and realises that the state is responsible
for providing stability in the economic environment, and for safety and incentives for
private capital. While Abdalla is in favour of central planning he realises that it
should be indicative of prospective growth and its components. It represents the
economic policy of the state which regulates economic activity through market
forces. In his view, public enterprises should have a financial and administrative
independence, where the market is the tool to check the validity of decisions and
plans and the efficiency of management. The opinion of Abdallah reflects the
realisation of the drawbacks of intensive government intervention in economic
activity, which impedes efficient management. However, the notion of using central
planning - even in an indicative way- with market forces, raises many questions
about their compatibility, and indifference to the notion of the participation of public
and private enterprises in economic activity. Abdalla encourages an effective role
for the state in the distribution of wealth and income as he sees the income and
wealth gap increasing. He believes that market forces cannot achieve equitable
distribution. Nevertheless he is against nationalisation and public ownership, except
in extreme cases of reducing the power of big monopolies. Rather he believes in
coherence policies of production and resource allocation, technological choice,
taxes, subsidies, providing public goods and distributing them equally, distributing
economic activity between different areas and regions, a targeted programme for
backward and poor areas, and social insurance networks. It is the responsibility of
the state to provide the legal framework which enables the establishment of civil
organisations to advocate the interests of vulnerable groups. The most important
point is that Abdallah realises the dynamic role of the state which could change
according to the needs of society. In the case of the availability of mature public
organisations which can defend the interests of the poor and vulnerable groups the
state can give up its responsibility, or part of it towards these groups (ibid,:316-3 17).
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El-Emam (1995) the former Minister of Planning is still the main supporter
of the government's intervention in economic activity. His view is related to "social
efficiency". When the private sector increases the polarisation of wealth and
unemployment he does not consider it an efficient system at all. El-Emam explains
that capitalist states developed the societal system under which the market operates.
He conceives the state as responsible for two main issues: continuos management of
the economy- whatever the management method- and long term development.
Where the market fails to direct decisions for long-term development, he refuses the
notion of indicative planning, and favours comprehensive planning, as the market
could move in the opposite direction, then the plan would be useless, and he argues
that the market should not be the leader, rather than an effective indicator. Using the
same argument of El-Emam one would ask here about the conditions necessary for
the private sector to work in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Would this
require more regulations and intervention in private activities which in turn would
suppress the private sector. The main question is related to the extent of state
intervention needed and the form of intervention, how the state manages economic
activity in a way so as to achieve suitable mix between public and private.
Nevertheless, the debate about the role of comprehensive central planning
would not be valid if we accepted the arguement of the former Minister of Planning
Dr. Abdel-Rahman (as quoted by El-Said & Othman, 1993) that planning was not
used effectively and was mainly concerned with the distribution of investment for
certain projects and provided some estimation about macroeconomic variables,
whichi implied that the planning did not include detailed economic policies. The
Ministry of Planning was also not allowed to deal with the public budget which
meant that it dealt with financial resources without having control over them. EL-
Naggar (1993) suggested that planning and planning institutions should be replaced
by economic policy and economic policy institutions. While these views were partly
acceptable for some academics and planning experts in the light of the already
existent limitations of the planning process, they added still more needed functions
under the market economy. Abdel-Khalek (1993) asked for a restructuring of the
state to reduce its size and increase effectiveness. In addition to the macroeconomic
policies, he believed in the need for a role to deal with the long-term aspects. This
could be by estimating the prospective developments in the economic and political
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spheres, deciding areas of potential competitive advantage and then deciding
according to them the targeted change. Otlunan (1993) added the supervision of the
investment programmes both public and private.
The above discussion reveals that there was more acceptance of the need for
the state to reduce its intervention in economic activity, more acceptance of the role
of the market in resource allocation. However, there was still no agreement on the
distribution of roles between the state and the market, but there is a realisation that
they were not absolute alternatives rather they complemented each other.
In defining the role of the state, El-Beblawi (1996) distinguished between
three actors: the state, individuals, and society. He related each actor to a certain
tool, state/politics, individuals/economy, and society/ethics. The state had the
political power, the individuals were the main users of the market, while society
contained values and ethics. These three groups were complementary, the state had
to use its power, which was legal power, to provide the institutional framework to
arrange between politics, economy and ethics in order to support the market system.
According to Beblawi, state power was important to maintain the market economy
and not to replace the market or ethics. He was biased towards the market economy
which he saw as a part of a globalisation trend, however, he realised that
globalisation should consider the national interest. In the economic sphere he
conceived state role as responsible for providing public goods as markets work
according to the rule of exclusion and did not accept free riders. Public goods
included a wide range of public services as well as institutions: justice, defence,
communications, transportation, education, health and scientific research. However,
providing public goods should not be limited to public companies. The second
economic job was to achieve social justice by providing decent living conditions to
vulnerable groups and to reduce inequality. The problem of whether or not free
competition provided social justice as claimed by liberalism and the limit of state
intervention to achieve social justice could be solved, from his point of view by a
democratic regime. The third job was to plan and apply macroeconomic policy in
order to achieve stability, provide conditions for economic development, free
competition, and employment opportunities.
Handoussa (1994) believed that the state's role exceeded the neo-classical
views of stabilisation, regulation, redistribution and correcting market failure in
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order to maintain the incentive structure for resource allocation. Based on her
reassessment of the competitive nature of global markets, the dynamic implications
of growth and the increasing importance of knowledge and organisational
dimensions of development she concluded that the state had a vital role to play in the
process of catching up. This role was to promote innovation and change through
education, science and industrial policies. This emphasised the previous views
concerning the role of the state in long-term development.
Eliwa (1998) believed that the fast technical, economic and social changes
which distinguish this era effected morals and human values and increased public
tension, conflict between the masses and the elite and between the political elite and
the ruling elite. New characteristics which appeared in modern states were
responsible for these tensions. Excessive privatisation and bureaucratic dismantling,
dismantled the state while competition and market values created consumption
ambition and the desire for possession so as to be conspicuous, which increased
conflict between different social groups. Meantime the increasing transparency
which uncovered the luxurious life of the ruling elite increased the feeling of
deprivation for the middle-class and the poor. In his view, the state had a role in
public tension management which was part of the crisis management depended on
an early warning mechanism (Eliwa, 1998).
What Eliwa mentioned applied to the Egyptian case to some extent, when the
income gap between different groups increased and consumption of luxuries was the
subject of comment in some national newspapers, which urged some social scientists
to discuss it in the newspapers. The role of the state here was protective of the social
coherence by monitoring the income gap between different groups and by using the
media to encourage productive values and a work ethic.
The above discussions about the role of the state and that of the market
emphasises the need for an effective state. However, there is an increasing
acceptance of the role of the market and the complementary nature of the role of the
market and that of the state. While there is no consensus about the appropriate mix
between state and market we can conclude several themes. As central planning was
not applied effectively in the past we can not ask for it now, but the long-term
perspective of development should be considered. This should not prevent the state
from planning and implementing macroeconomic policy for stability, free
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competition, and fair distribution. It should be concerned with setting long-term
strategies for education, science and technology, and the environment, as well as in
their implementing (as part of the process of catching up referred to by Handoussa).
This does not exclude the private sector from participation. For the market economy
to work under frcc competition conditions and from long term perspective of
development the state is responsible for providing the necessary information and
directing activities to areas of competitive advantage. The state has to enhance its
capacity concerning the provision of the legal, regulatory, and organisational
framework, as well as in implementing them. The role of the state could change
with progress in both the economic and political arenas. With the increasing pace of
democratisation and development of civil society organisations the state can
relinquish some of its tasks to civil society organisations which can defend the
interests of various groups. This matter will be related to the degree of
democratisation and the morals of society, which determine the social role of the
new emerging capitalist class.
4.3.3. Privatisation Debate
The argument to justify the need for privatisation in Egypt is based on the efficiency
issues and the international orientation towards privatisation. While there is nothing
intrinsic in the public sector that makes it less efficient, experience tells that the
private sector is more efficient using financial criteria. This was also true for the
Egyptian public sector (see Abdel Rahman and Abu Ali, 1989). Moreover, it was
also argued that the increase in the size of the public sector was the cause of the
deterioration in its management. This is the same as in the case of the small projects
which they benefited from the economies of scale which increases with the increase
in their size but beyond a certain size their efficiency decreases (Abu Ali, 1989:377).
This could be true to a certain extent from the fact that it is centrally controlled while
the increase in the varieties of activities needs more flexibility in response to
changes in market conditions. It has recently been argued that it can increase
savings either because of an increase in productivity, as claimed with the experience
of privatisation in developing countries, or by attracting savings from abroad, which
may not be possible without privatisation (Galal, 1996:1). For this justification the
question might be how much savings? and is it possible to achieve this without
privatisation? Is there other ways to attract savings from abroad rather than from
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privatisation especially for the flight savings? Ayubi's (1995) view of privatisation
is that it is "not a result of careful evaluation of either the contribution of public
sector to development, or the managerial efficiency of the public enterprises. Rather
it is a response to the fiscal crisis of the state, reinforced by pressures from agencies
of the international capitalist order and encouraged, to some extent, by international
fashion" (p4).
The argument of Ayubi is true to a large extent as the effect of the global
orientation towards privatisation and of the financial crisis drived from the
development of the argument about privatisation. In the early 1980s many
academics and politicians still thought that the public sector, in spite of its losses,
had a strategic and crucial importance for the Egyptian economy. In the late 1980s
there was a realisation of the need for a partial privatisation or liquidation of public
sector in order to increase its macro efficiency and to reduce financial constraints.
During the 1990s there was a greater orientation towards privatisation of most public
sector units. We can say that privatisation was treated as a goal rather than as a
means because the criteria for privatisation put greater emphasis on profit-making
companies as they seemed more feasible for privatisation. This criterion is at odds
with the justification of the privatisation process, which is that of improving
efficiency.
In 1989, Abdel-Rahman and Abu Ali wrote "Privatisation does not mean the
abolition of the public sector. It is one of the facts of life that the public sector is
here to stay, regardless of ideology and the prevailing social system" (p13). The
contribution of the public sector to the economy even under the policy of infitah was
significant. Handoussa estimated in 1990 that the public sector contribution to law
no. 43 concerning joint ventures was a share of about one third of the total
investment cost of the projects approved. This significant contribution prompted
Handoussa to comment that "...the large public sector that had spread its weight
across the economy was here to stay.." (Handoussa, 1990:146). Handoussa blamed
the high degree of centralisation and rigid legislation regarding finance, pricing, and
wage determination as responsible for making investment decisions of low priority
for the economy. To relieve financial constraints on public enterprises and to attract
savings into high priority public investment Handoussa suggested that they should
be allowed to sell their shares on the stock market (ibid,:172). In a different study
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Handoussa (1991) praised the increased autonomy given to public enterprises in the
late 1980s which in her view led to significant improvements in their financial and
economic performance. Handoussa called for the selective privatising or liquidating
of some areas where the PEs operated. At the same time, she realised the
importance of productive enterprises in the development process and asked for
financial support from foreign donors and creditors (Handoussa, 1991:15).
Abdallah (1989) agreed about the privatisation of loss-making companies.
He agreed with reorganising, incorporating or liquidating public units if keeping
them would lead to a loss in wealth and income instead of an increase. He was
driven by public interest which conditioned the privatisation by using the proceeds to
provide public investment in other needed activities (Abdallah, 1989: 317).
During the 1980s, the official political discourse also assured the continuity
of the public sector and the emphasis on its central role in the development process.
However, this does not mean that there was a consensus in the ruling party or even
the government. The decision for major changes in economic policy seems to have
been taken at the presidential level. President Mubarak's speech to the Fourth
Conference of Egyptians' Working Abroad in 1987 referred to the losses in the
public sector (about 11 percent of its companies were loss making). However he
asserted that this did not mean that it should be sold. The president confirmed that
he would not allow any violation of the public sector because it was the only grantee
for the poor. Meantime the president refused the idea of the public sector opening
restaurants or even managing hotels (as quoted in Issawi, 1989:326). In 1988, the
Prime Minister Dr. Sedqi insisted that the Public sector was the balancing factor in
economic and social life, so it could not be given up (ibid. The Minister of
Industry, Mr. Abdel-Wahab also confirmed that encouraging the private sector did
not mean the sale of the public one. It meant only an increase in the share of the
private sector in economic activity and the public sector had to intervene when the
private sector gave up a certain strategic activity. On the other hand, Dr. Sultan
adopted the idea of selling part of the public sector's successful units either in the
Egyptian, Arab or the foreign stock market (ibid,:326-37). However, in May of
1990, President Mubarak for the first time announced that privatisation was to be
undertaken on a significant scale, including state-owned shares in 200 joint-ventures.
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Emphasis was given to the privatisation of local enterprises (as quoted in
Handoussa, 1993:6).
For the political actors privatisation was one of the most controversial issues
and the debate took an ideological turn, which the goverment tried to use against
those opposing the SAP. The Wafd party was the main supporter of privatisation
among the different parties. El-Wafd was "in favour of the monarchy more than the
king" as it accused the government of bias against the private sector and constraining
it by restrictions. They took an antagonistic attitude towards the January 1985
decrees, for instance (see Mossaad, 1996:93). El-Wafd went further and thought that
the existence of the public sector limited the opportunities for the private sector to
expand. They thus repeated the neo-classical view that the public sector crowded
out the private sector (ibid). It was the same thought emphasised by El-Naggar that
monetary policy with a low (negative, due to inflation) interest rate and credit policy
enabled the public sector to have access to credit which crowded out an efficient
private sector (El-Naggar 1991:130). On the other hand, the NPUP was the
strongest defender of the public sector and the right of its employees. Opponents of
privatisation based their argument on three grounds. First, that the public sector had
an important social and economic role. Second, that the public sector had a role in
national security especially for large strategic companies. Third, that profit was
theoretically independent of ownership type. As evidence of this the NPUP stated
that until 1990 the number of loss-making companies in the private sector was 600
(Mossaad, 1996:86). The NPUP also referred to the experience of private sector in
the open door policy, as they used their capital in speculation, financial and
commercial activities and light consumer industries rather than productive activities
(ibid,:94).
The way that privatisation took place was also subject to criticism even by
those who favoured the process. They thought that the programme was launched
without public or even parliamentary participation and that there was no public
censorship. It was forgotten that the sales were a means rather than an end in
themselves (Wahba, 1994). Wahba also warned that the Egyptian economy was a
monopolistic rather than a competitive economy and warned the decision-takers not
to hand over this monopolistic structure to the private sector, especially if it was
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foreign (ibid). Sales to foreigners were one main criticism of those who opposed
privatisation and some of its proponents as well.
4.3.4. Debating Structural Adjustment
In 1990, while negotiations with the IMF were at a critical stage some economist and
political actors with different political perspectives explained their caution
concerning the effectiveness of the IMF package and its ability to solve Egypt's
economic problems. They thought that it was only an emergency, short-term remedy
and that while its effect was also limited it is very harmful as proved in some
African countries (see Abou-Ali; Basheer; Hussein 1991:28-31). Meanwhile they
agreed on the need for fundamental changes to increase production and improve
productivity, changes that could lead to long-term development. They also realised
the need for other measures rather than the pure economic ones such as improving
the education system, adopting and developing new technologies, in addition to
political reform (ibid).
In searching for a suitable economic strategy or alternative to the proposed
policy some accused the opposition of not having any real alternatives and that their
suggestion did not in fact differ fundamentally from those proposed by the IMF.
They only attacked the reform because it was proposed by the IMF which they saw
as an instrument of imperialist power (Abu-Ali 1991:28). The Muslim Brotherhood,
the most active opposition, for instance was accused by some writers of not
providing a clear economic vision concerning economic reform and that their views
were limited to some aspects of banning usury or usury and liquor; substituting
Zakat for the current taxation system and internalising the Islamic work ethic and
value of compassionate mutual help "Takafur' throughout society (Mossaad, 1996;
Ibrahim & Lofgren, 1996:187). These views were limited to scattered articles in the
Labour Party newspaper "El-Shaab". However a review of the writings on Islamic
thought about economic activities provides more views about the role of the state
and whether it has the right to interfere or not, and the state's role in regulating
markets against monopoly, cheating, and unfair pricing. The role of the state and
society was to provide a level of "Kfaya" that is one that provides the needs of
people to live at an average common standard which is above the level of basic
needs. It also regulates the relation between the employers and the employees (Saker
1990). The Muslim Brotherhood emphasised that they had a vision to deal with all
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aspects of economic problems including inflation, unemployment, debt, subsidies
and so on, and that the Islamic economy was not only established to prohibit usury
and that some investing companies of employing money had misleadingly used the
Islamic banner. They thought that the Islamic method was comprehensive and had
only been implemented in the era of Khalifa Omer ben Abdel Aziz (EL-Gazali,
1991). The activity of the Muslim Brotherhood was legally banned. It was logical
for them to stress political reform in order to gain their political legitimacy and to be
able to explain their economic views. They suggested some practical actions to deal
with Egypt's economic and political problems. They called on the intellectuals to
agree upon a clear programme with clear and necessary changes during a specific
time-frame to be submitted to the decision-takers. To force the government to
respond positively they called on all parties to withdraw from the People's Assembly
as its legitimacy was questioned by many political actors. The need to call for civil
protest was suggested not in the cause of anarchy but to force the government to
respect the people's will (ibid). However, in 1994, the request for a national debate
was initiated again and the Muslim Brotherhood was set aside. In order to gain
legitimacy and in a search for legitimate channels to express their views some
members declared their separation from the group and tried to form a political party
in coalition with some Christian members. Those who initiated the call for
establishing a political party were arrested and imprisoned after a trial accusing them
of forming an illigal organisation.
In the search for a suitable political and economic strategy many forces
emphasised the need for a development strategy with an Egyptian, or Arab, identity
(Abase, 1991:39) which does not exclude the need to benefit from the experience of
other countries (Shihata, 1993:21,48). The notion of independent development was
conceived and completely adopted by many parties and thinkers that opposed the
liberalisation and openness of the economy. In this respect both the labour party, the
NPUP, and the Muslim Brotherhood shared almost the same views (see for instance
the writings of Hussein, 1981 and El-Essawy, 1989, 1996). Their critics were
directed mainly at the increasing dependence on foreign aid and its implications in
both the economic and political arenas and on the selling of public enterprises and
some joint venture banks to foreigners during the privatisation process.
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Among the authors who argued for a completely different view of reform
was Abdel-Khalek. He was the economic spokesman of the NPUP. He expressed
his views concerning three main issues which were the core of the Orthodox recipe.
These issues related to the role of the state; price mechanism versus planning; and
the relationship between the national and the international. Abdel-Khalek called for
the activation of the state's role, not by enlarging it, as he saw that the debate should
not be about its minimum or maximum size, but its optimum role. He also asked for
a balanced combination of market forces and a price mechanism, versus planning
and direct control. He warned not to depend on international prices as these did not
reflect the competitive market because competition did not exist in reality in the
international market. In the relation between the domestic and international
economy he added to the issues of pricing and economic blocking the importance of
having certain measures to deal with external shocks, and with international
commitment in this respect. Abdel-Khalek also drew attention to important
elements which should be considered in the reform process; first the need to use
more policy instruments than were already being used to allow better achievements
and to have balanced measures to deal with both the increasing of supply and the
controlling of demand. The sequencing of reform measures was also another
important issue. He argued it was harmful to start with trade liberalisation before
restructuring and developing both the public and private sectors. Finally he
emphasised the need for regional reform measures which enhanced Arab integration
(Abdel-Khalek, 1996:54-56, 1997:144-47). The view introduced by Abdel-Khalek
balanded between the role of market and the role of the state and represented a
development in Egyptian socialist thought.
• Further analysis of reform came from Shihata (1993) and El-Naggar (1991,
1997) while they supported the liberalisation policy they were dissatisfied with
government performance. Shihata was able to provide a comprehensive view of the
total reforms needed not only in the economic arena but he also stressed the need for
political reform; for legal, judicial and administrative reforms; and the need for
reforms in the area of human development (Shihata 1993).
4.3.5. The Political Reform
One of the areas of debate was the role of political reform that might accompany
economic adjustment. The need for political reform was the only fact that all
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political actors from different attitudes and ideologies agreed upon. The Muslim
Brotherhood asked for a comprehensive political reform primarily to provide the
right environment for the economic reform. They asked to abolish what they called
"bad reputation" laws like the continuing state of emergency. They also asked for
real democratic life.
The new liberal trend led by El-Naggar which advocated more liberalisation
both in the economic and political spheres resulted in the establishment of the new
civic forum that emphasised the political reform in five main areas: more freedom in
forming political parties; an end to the emergency law; abolition of the job of social
prosecutor; an end to the combination of public employment and parliamentary
membership; and finally the removal of the statement that 50 percent of parliament
members should come from farmers and workers. From their point of view, the
necessary political reform was a constitutional one that removed what they called the
old concepts of the socialist era that the public sector was the main stance of
development, and the reference to the united forces of working groups.
The Wafd Party stressed changes on four main issues: taking decisions on
individual bases; the public expenditure behaviour; bad economic choices; and
corruption and administrative weaknesses (Abase, 1991:39).
In relation to the policy environment, many economists and intellectuals
stressed the need for transparency in policy formation. Sunbul - referred to the
absence of public awareness of the real dimension of the economic problems. He
indicated that before 18/19 of January 1977, the public knew nothing about the
problem, and after the riots the reform issues were not for open discussion. The
reform file only reopened with President Mubarak's first speech in the presence of
the People's Assembly, people still did not understand the real meaning of reform
and thought of it as an increase in prices. He asked the government to abandon the
policy of silence (Sunbul, 1991:27). This silent policy of the government was
subject to much criticism from different quarters especially to answer the
accusations of corruption relating to some senior public-sector managers and even to
some current and former ministers.
The government ignored the calls for constitutional reform for a number of
reasons. The change of constitution favouring liberalisation might have meant that
the government could not retreat from a policy of liberalisation. The government for
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example might have wanted to intervene if political stability was challenged or
economic development seriously damaged, as in the case of the fertiliser problem
where the government had to become involved to confront the severe shortage which
threatened the entire agricultural production. While the probability of reversing the
liberalisation policy decreased over time it was still valid. The state needed room for
manoeuvre in case this had severe effects on social and political stability. The state
really thought that a change in the constitution in the way that was claimed by liberal
forces would threaten social and political stability, if it matched the economic losses
of farmers and labourers by overt political losses. Another important point was that
the debate about constitutional change needed open and comprehensive discussion
between different levels of political power in society. Such debate required an
increase in the democratic space available for them. The debate also raised very
sensitive questions between those in favour of Islamic legislation and those who
were opposed even to the mention of Islam as a source of legislation as in the old
constitution which was not really implemented. The expected public response
would be in favour of Islam as a source of legislation and the liberal powers in
society who made up the main support for the government would lose their
credibility among the public.
The government ignored the constitutional reform and found it completely
out of question at this stage. It also believed that there was enough political
openness available and any further openness would harm the economic reform
process. We can say that the state saw the public as ignorant with little political
awarefiess and unable to understand the complexity of the negotiations concerning
the reform measures. As Tobar commented in a seminar held to discuss the reform
issues in response to those asking for a reform programme to arrive at a political
consensus and to implement political liberalisation, the political consensus does not
mean the freedom to form parties, political liberalisation should cope with and be
balanced by political awareness, something which is difficult in Egypt because of the
high illiteracy rate. He confirmed that the political consensus does not mean
political liberalisation (Tobar, 1991:43).
The debate about the reform measures revealed three important facts: first,
the lack of political consensus about the reform. Second, the severe shortage of
governance in both the economic and political arenas. In addition to the absence of
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the debate about social reform. While this was not on the agenda of the state, only
few of the debaters mentioned it. However they recieved a very weak response.
The absence of a political consensus about the reform was clear from the
views discussed above. This absence of a majority view was not exclusive to the
opposition. In the early stages of the reform the rivalry between members of the
NDP and inside government itself was clear. As Tobar mentioned, the debate
among the NDP's economic committee was fierce and there was only a few chances
that the committee's views would be implemented due to the weak channels of
communicationsbetween the ruling party and the government, on one hand, and the
weak channels between the ruling party and other parties, on the other (ibid).
Differences in views, concerning reform and privatisation in particular, between the
cabinet ministers were very clear in the early stages of the reform. Dr. E1-Ganzuri
himself, when he was a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning, was
considered by some reporters as one of the opponents of liberalisation. This was
then thought to undermine his power. There was a tendency at a certain stage of the
reform to abolish the Ministry of Planning, reducing its administrative level, hence
power, to a High Council of Planning. It was even reported in the newspapers, but
never implemented. Ibrahim and Lofgren compared two sets of statements from four
Ministers in 1993 and the two previous years, when the Minister of Industry
Mohammed Abdel Wahab, and the Minister of Labour Assem Abdel-Haq at that
time argued that only losing (lame duck!) companies would be privatised and none
would be liquidated. Two others, Ahmed Sultan the Minister of Tourism and Atef
Ebeid t the Minister of Administrative Development advocated the adoption of
privatisation as a strategy for all public sector companies (Ibrahim & Lofgren,
1996:183). Ahmed Sultan the former Minister of Tourism was the main proponent
of privatisation in the cabinet, together with Dr. Wali the Minister of Agriculture.
He led the privatisation process in the Tourism sector mainly by privatising the
administration and renting it to foreign companies. This was met by severe criticism
as these used to be the most profitable public companies. After he left the cabinet,
Sultan criticised the process of privatisation by the selling small shares to the public.
He considered it as a way of publicising the process rather than privatising it, which
meant he was in favour of a total sale and fast privatisation. It was not the party's
policy that guided the government, it was more the government's response to
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changes in the internal and external environment which was later adopted as the
party's policy.
There have been two attempts to achieve consensus about suitable reforms.
The first was the economic conference at the early stage of president Mubarak's
regime. The second was the national dialogue in 1994. Both attempts failed because
they focused only on economic matters and ignored any talk of political reform and
in addition some political actors were put aside. Moreover, the ideological choice
was already chosen from the beginning. In the first case, the economic conference,
there was a tendency to keep the mixed economy with cautious steps towards
liberalisation. At that time there was no political will to make fundamental changes
in the economic system and the new regime was anxious to retain its constituencies,
while some analysts thought that that was the right time to adopt reform measures. In
the second case the liberalisation policy had already started earlier.
In addition to the call for political reform, legal and administrative reforms
were initiated as well. However, the need for social reform has been completely
ignored until very recently. The social impacts of reforms were also limited to the
economic effects on the poor. However, the consequences of these social impacts,
in view of urban violence and terrorism, were frequently mentioned by some
analysts yet the state did not implement any policy to avoid their dangerous
consequences.
In reviewing the debate about the reform the missing actors were the public.
- There is no sound evidence about how people accepted the reform programme. No
surveys have addressed this issue directly, but in a national survey which was
conducted in 1993 more than half of the respondents felt that their life had
deteriorated during the previous year; two thirds said that it had worsened compared
with five years earlier (Ibrahim & Lofgren, 1996:159). Although there was no doubt
that the standard of living of the majority had deteriorated and the number of the
poor has increased, little public protest was witnessed, except on a limited scale,
among the directly affected classes (e.g. public sector workers & tenant farmers).
The ruling party interpreted the overwhelming majority that they managed to obtain
in the 1995 People's Assembly election as an indicator of the people's satisfaction
with government policies and took it as a reflection of the success achieved in the
economic sphere (although over 200 of the NDP's seats in parliament -about half of
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the total seats- were disputed in court and the administrative court nullified the
results of the election in these areas. However the Assembly maintained the right to
keep its seats). On the other hand, if we follow the previously explained view of the
state concerning the ability of the public to understand the complexity of the
programme, or to enjoy enough political awareness, we can say that the vast majority
believed the official promises of expected gains in the long run. One could say that
the official media was to some extent successful in promoting the policy at least to
the illiterate half of population, and it seems that the NDP was quite aware of the
fact in formatting his policies. We can say that Egyptians were used to the
protracted austerity in thier economic lives, they were busy looking for second part-
time jobs and satisfied with the limited scale of freedom of speech which they
exercised by making jokes, responding to jokes about the economic situation in
some movies and plays or even just by reading opposition newspapers. Public
protest about the public policies implemented in Egypt took the negative turn and
was clearly reflected in the extremely low level of participation in political life, as
has been widely confirmed by many studies.
4.4. The Impact of Economic Reform on the State-Society
Relationship
Although the Egyptian state is based on a central authority supported by a large
bureaucratic apparatus where interventions and regulations permeate many aspects
of political and economic life, it has been described as a soft state (see Waterbury,
1985; Ayubi, 1995) due to its limited capacity to implement its laws and regu. lations
and because of weak political and societal institutions. Mubaralc was faced with
both a political and economic crisis in the early 1980s and showed his early concern
to deal with the economic crisis, considering it responsible for most of the ills in
social and political life. However, the early years of his presidency witnessed
gradual, but limited, political openings with increased credibility in the regime,
while economic problems continued to intensify. At the time the economic reform
was implemented both political and economic capabilities were deteriorating.
Changes in the economic function of the state, in addition to changes resulting from
the redistribution of gains and losses between different groups, entailed a
corresponding change in the state's capacity and role and were related to a new role
for civil society.. These changes were to differ during the phases of initiation and
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consolidation of the reform. We can now examine how the state managed to
undertake the reforms in a way that was able to reduce social and political instability.
Was it able to change its support base successfully during the reform? Was the state
able to increase its power during the course of economic reform? and What was the
effect on the balance of power between the state and civil society?
4.4.1. Civil Society
This part reviews the impact on civil society. Was economic liberalisation able to
enhance civil society in the form of initiating new associations, and solving the
existing ones? Particular emphasis was directed on the Businessmen's Associations
and the General Federation of Labour Unions as they represent the two main actor
groups in economic acitivy and the most influenced by the reform programme. The
debate about the increasing role of the Business Associations and their influence on
the government was one of importance during the reform process. Labour Unions'
reaction to privatisation was considered by the government in the early stages. Were
they able to protect the right of their members? All these were issues and questions
that need to be discussed.
Business Associations
Many business associations were established as a result of the economic open-door
policy in the 19970s. As the main beneficiaries of liberalisation policies they were
the main constituency for the free market and privatisation policies. Businessmen
were in favour of the liberalisation policies as a main policy. However, they were
very critical of the government's minor policies and they opposed some measure and
policits when they clashed with their interests. In the meantime they were quite
convinced that there interests were linked to the survival of the government. While
the Egyptian Businessmen's Association (EBA), one of the most prominent BAs,
declared that they did not practise or were not involved in political activities, they
worked actively to strengthen their links with the government. The association,
which comprises the business elite, seeks the membership of ex-Ministers and
national bank managers. The EBA tried to project a neutral political attitude and to
gain autonomy and not to be part of the ruling party, yet later some of its members
became members of the NDP. Another prominent business association was clearer
in its desire for government support. They were established through a semi-official
organisation, the Chamber of Commerce of Alexandria, and this was thought to give
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them more legitimacy. Their members were quick to join the NDP and in 1987 17
of them were members of the ruling party. Two prominent BAs tries to strenghten
their links with the government in other ways. The first was careful to appear as a
autonomous association and tightened its unofficial links through friendship, thereby
attracting government officials not the opposite. This gave it more leverage in
negotiations with the government. The ability of such associations to influence
government policy was debatable. It was common to hear about meetings between
the President, the Prime Minister and /or the Ministers and Businessmen.
Businessmen became part of the official delegations which accompanied the
president or the ministers on their visits abroad. Yet only a limited number of the
business elite enjoyed these privileges. This should not be generalised to the broad
and varied categories under the term businessmen. Their influence were limited to
facilitating some measures related to exportation, importation and so on.
Businessmen tried to strenghten their links to achieve personal gains in their
transactions or for some protection. The impression of their increasing role was also
arose from the increased tendency of businessmen to join or nominate themselves to
the People's Assembly. But in total we can say that they were only able toinfluence
minor policies while the major policies was still dominated by the IFIs.
Businessmen also showed an increased interest in taking part in the People's
Assemblies in particular. The number of businessmen who nominated themselves
during the election of November 1995 was higher compared to previous ones and
reached 50 nominations. The increased interest in the membership of the Assembly
was related to different reasons, the leading on being that of the economic benefit
they could gain for their business. It also meant an increased role for them in the
process of decision making and an increase in their power. However, businessmen
did not represent a homogeneous independent group with a clear agenda to promote
productive values and the positive morals of the competitive market economy,
instead the campaign witnessed the utilisation of money in a primitive way (Menisi,
1995:83). Most businessmen nominated themselves either through the NDP, 18
persons, or as independents but related to a particular section or elite in the state, 21
persons. Other opposition parties which were in favour of the liberalisation policy
made fewer nominatious, 10 for El-Wafd and 1 for the liberals, due to the already
small number of their members. The result was the in favour of 36 businessmen, in
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addition the ten appointed members, including one businessman, Mohammed Abou
El-Enean (ibid,:85). While the number of businessmen represented only 8.15
percent of the total seats, there influence increased far greater than this suggests.
This was the case if we consider their participation in specialised committees inside
the Assembly which were concerned with discussing economic laws regulating the
private sector and the market economy. The economic committee involved 14
businessmen out of a total number of 39, an increase of 8 businessmen compared
with the last parliamentary session. The planning and budgeting committee included
11 businessmen out of a total of 27 members. The committee of industry and energy
had 11 businessmen from a total of 46 members.
Labour Unions
The Egyptian General Federation of Labour Unions (EGFLU) is the umbrella under
which about 22 general unions of different types are gathered. It has between 3 to
4.5 million members according to different estimates. However these numbers
represent only one fourth of the total number of labourers (Awad 1991:278, Kandil
1994:263). During Nasser's era the EGFLU made unprecedented gains. The
constitution of the unions requires the government to obtain their views on all draft
laws, regulations and decisions related to labour and workers. Their views are also
considered for laws with relation to their living standards and conditions ( Awad
1991:278). In the early 1960s, a separate Ministry of Labour was created and from
then up to 1987 the head of the EGFLU became the Minister (Khandil 1994:263;
Ibrahim & Lofgren 1996:184). With the system of political pluralism many
memb6rs of the EGFLU boards and its distinguished figures were drawn to the NDP
and through it they became members of parliament (Awad 1991: 278). This might
give the impression that labour unions have great leverage on government policies
which is not true, as Labour unions and their leaders have always been tied to the
state. Restrictive laws on the political activities of labour unions have never been
lifted. Both concessions and restrictions were used to grantee their political
acquiescence and obedience.
The EGFLU gains in the socialist era seemed to be endangered by the
launching of the open door policy in the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, the head of the
union at that time Mr. Saad Mohammed Ahmed expressed his support for the policy
on condition that "it should be a productive policy, that might provide new job
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opportunities." They gave assurance that both the public and private sectors should
be treated equally. On another occasion they pledged that the public sector was not
for sale and should not be open to private participation (See Kandil 1994 :263;
Gomaa 1996:155-56).
Before officially launching the SAP, the government facilitated the passing
of the Labour-Business accord, trying to achieve a conciliation between both views
and interests. The accord included the acceptance from both sides of the role of both
the public and the private sectors and a recognition of the need to develop both
sectors and to free them from bureaucracy. The agreement did not discuss the details
of privatisation and ignored this controversial issue. Individual unions rejected
privatisation and considered the agreement a betrayal of the interests of the labourers
(Kandil 1994:264). Since then and during the course of the economic reform the
conflict of views between the leaders of the EGFLU and individual unions increased.
The ways of expressing their oppositions and defending their rights were different at
the leadership level, compared to the individual union level. The EGFLU leaders
continued to defend the workers' rights, keeping them however in line with state
policy. They could not challenge the state shift to a liberal economy and
privatisation. Their strategy was to try to minimise or reduce the workers' losses in
a peaceful way.
The issue of law no. 203 of 1991, though id did not mention privatisation
explicitly, raised fears among the workers and tensions in their relations with the
authorities. The leaders of the EGFLU conducted intensive meetings with high
officials to discuss the law and its implications for the workers. Attention was given
to workers' rights, policies of vocational training, and retraining to gaurantee
stability and the provision of new work opportunities. The individual general unions
had other thoughts, as 1991 witnessed an increased number of strikes, sit-ins, and
demonstrations compared with previous years. These forms of rejection continued
during the following years of the programme and were usually carried out by
individual unions as a response to direct encroachment on the workers' rights. In
general the labourers' demands included the right to be represented on the boards of
their companies, the rights of workers concerning wages, and hiring conditions
under the new labour law, the right to peaceful strikes and a support fund for the
striking workers (see Gomaa 1996:168; Ibrahim & Lofgren 1996: 184). In addition,
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there were some individual demands related to the interruption of their wages and
rewards. Were these different kinds of protests effective? The state's direct response
to strikes and demonstrations was the use of police oppression and the Central
Security Forces were used with increasing frequency. No-one was killed however,
many were wounded (Ibrahim & Lofgren 1996: 185). However, on some occasions
the authorities had to accede to the workers, demands. In the case of the mining
workers' strike in 1994, which was organised by the mining workers' syndicate, the
persistence of the workers in continuing the strike forced the Prime Minster and
Ministers of Interior, Labour Force, Finance and Public Sector to meet to discuss the
problem. The problem was concerned with the suspension of the workers' rewards
and allowances due the cut in subsidies to that industry by the Minister of Finance so
as to cope with the privatisation programme. The Holding company for Mining had
to provide the mining companies with a loan to pay the workers' allowances. In the
same year the state has to respond positively as well to the strike of the Kafr El-
Dawar workers. The strike was a series of stoppages organised by the workers in the
preceding years, this time they were directed against the new regulations which
imposed severe punishments on the workers. The head of the company claimed it
was at the behest of the Ministry of the Public Business Sector, while the
investigating committee accused the company of making the wrong decision and
avoiding the real problems. The event resulted in three committees to discuss and
confront the problems.
On a macro basis the state had to adapt its privatisatioh policy to reduce the
laboufers' protests. The contracts of companies that was sold obliged the new
owners to keep the work force for at least three years. Workers were given the right
to buy ten percent of the shares with concessions, some companies were sold
completely to the workers and workers who wished to leave the company were
compensated. However, public sector could do much more if all its leverage were
used. No collective action was taken by the EGFLU. Strikes were called on in
individual basis.'
In the 1990s the state succeeded completely in neutralising the leaders of the
general trades union, on the sense that they accepted privatisation as an ongoing
process, though they were not convinced with it. The current situation of the
EGFLU was made clear by Dr. Nassar, the secretary for the economic affairs of the
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EGFLU. In a seminar of 25/5/95 discussing the effect of the reform in, he confirmed
that they disagreed before with the selling of the PEs and that there was nothing in
Law 203 about the selling. It only referred to incorporation or liquidation. He
mentioned that it was not an issue of ownership, public or private, it was concerned
how to increase efficiency. In his opinion, the problem of management was not
limited to the public sector. It was in both the public and private sectors. But in the
public sector those who destroyed the PEs were back again to reform it. This
statement reflected the lack of credibility of the labourers in the reform process
which resulted from the previous failures of several attempts to reform. If corruption
and patronage were there in an explicit form, the labourers could not be expected to
cooperate, nor the reform to succeed. He referred also to the constitution where it
stated that the public controls tools of the production and that employees share the
administration of the companies where they work. However, he was very negative
about defending what he thought the were labourers' rights. He refused to offer a
case for the non-constitutionality of the privatisation process. Even if he had, the
public sector would have been sold off before decision was reached because of the
long and protracted legal procedures in Egypt. He also mentioned they were realistic
in this era of change and that they confronted the risks by "thought"( corrected to
"reflection"!). They arranged seminars and tried to educate labourers about these
changes through the workers' university. Although he did not mention the nature of
the educational programmes, were they to increase the labourers's awareness of their
rights? or to convince them that these changes were happening all over the world so
they were inevitable? or both?
What Nassar stressed was that through the unified labour law they tried to
guarantee-the rights of labourers by making them a third partner with the government
and the employers. The principle they fought for now was that they were working in
the national interest and they had to be the main pillar of the reform process. He
referred to the lost rights of workers in the private sector in the new industrial city
the Tenth of Ramadan where the worker had to sign a resignation form before he
even signed his contract. Khamees, a prominent businessman -the head of The
Industrial Federation who used to be the head of the Investors' Association in the
Tenth of Ramadan- thought that workers in the private sector in the Tenth of
Ramadan were well paid, on average LE 1200.00 per month, and some companies
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gave allowances from 12 to 16 months in addition to the social security system. He
added that they tried to build an understanding of the mutual interests of the workers
and the factory (Khamees, 1995). At the same time Tobar, secretary of economic
affairs in the NDP, defended the private sector saying that labourers in the private
sector were subject to Labour Law no. 137 which provided every guarantees to the
workers. He believed that the higher income of private sector workers replaced
other grantees provided by the public sectors (Tobar, 1995).
The New Civil Society under SAP
The most distinguishing feature of the new civic society associations act up in the
1990s was theirs academic nature. Several associations were established and
directed by university academics mostly to defend the political and civil rights of the
citizens and/or to promote for liberal views -The New Civic Forum, the Ibn-
Khaldoun Centre, the Egyptian Human Rights Association and The Egyptian Centre
for Economic Studies (ECES). Most of these associations were established in spite
of the National Association Law no 32 of 1961 which limited their ability to
participate in political activity as they set themselves up as corporate companies.
Their academic nature was also clear from their periodical publications and
organised seminars. These new types of civil society associations attempted to fill
the vacuum in political life where the political parties failed to do so. They also
reflected the increased interest of the Egyptian intelligentsia in participating in the
process of reshaping the future of Egypt's new political and economic system. The
external finance of most of these associations was one of the sources of criticism as -
their thinking was believed to be shaped by foreign interests rather than real national
concerns, while, in fact they contributed to both foreign and national thought. In the
case of the New Civic Forum, its director occupied a senior position in The World
Bank where he aquired liberal views and could be considered the representative of
the move progressive view of liberalisation in the Arab countries. This again
reflects the role of linkages between liberal developed countries and the intellectual
elite who gain their knowledge and form their thought through such foreign
associations.
El-Naggar's views contributed to the basic manifesto of the Wafd party.
While the Wafd party is the main advocate for liberalised thought among the
Egyptian parties, it can not represent a comprehensive, well-articulated, liberal
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policy. As a political party the Wafd competes for political power and tries to widen
its support base it can not openly represent extreme liberal views which threaten the
gains of the masses represented by the labourers and ;armers rather do they call for
some liberal reforms in certain areas. El-Wafd party programme was prepared in
1984 and could not contadict the main principles of the constitution. It refers to the
Islamic Sharie'a as the main source of legislation, meantime stressing the
importance of national unity and the equal rights of Muslims and Christians. They
support the importance of a strong public sector to participate in financing
development but they call for it to be managed in the right way in the right economic
environment. They review the relative size and role of the public and private
sectors, while the public should rid itself of some irrelevant activities, the private
sector's role should be increased. El-Naggar's views arre more progressive than
that. He calls for fundamental changes in both the economic and political systems.
He would like to deprive the workers and farmers of the fifty percent of People's
Assembly seats, which are divided among them. He also rejects the participation of
the public sector in production and trade and sees overall control of the economy by
the central government as the main cause of the failure of the open-door economic
policy of the infitah.
The Ibn Khaldoun Centre calls for a strengthening of civil society
organisations and the activation of their role and as part of the democratic
transformation. They issue monthly reviews to promote their views. They also
organise seminars and conferences. One of their conferences about the rights of the
minority had to be called off because it was criticised on the basis that the Egyptian
Copts could not be considered a minority. This raises questions about what kind of
civil organisation is needed and who can assess their views ? How personal or
foreign views can direct national work? Who should supervise their work? Are the
ethics of the work of these civil organisations is it civil or private associations?
While financial independance is good from one point of view as it provides
autonomy from the state, how much autonomy is needed?
One interesting event was the establishment of The Egyptian Centre for
Economic Studies in 1992 by members of Egypt's private sector. The centre
conducts economic studies of an academic nature and does not target public opinion
in a direct way as do the two other organisations. It is rather more concerned to
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influence the decision-making process through its studies. The declared objectives
of the centre are to promote the economic development in Egypt by assisting policy
makers and the business community in identifying and implementing reform. From
the founders of the centre and its declared objectives it is not difficult to conclude
that the centre adopts neo-liberal thought and promotes a freer economy. The
executive director and the director of research -Dr. Ahmad Galal- is a close
collaborator with the World Bank, and the deputy director of the Middle East
Department in the IMF is one of the members of the centre too. Prominent
neoliberal economists contribute to the working papers of the centre - Jeffrey Sachs
for instance- and these papers in turn contribute to the World Bank's official reports
of Egypt's economy (see the World Bank Country Economic Memorandum for
Egypt, 1997). The foundation of the centre by members of the private sector, while
it reflects their support for a liberalisation policy, is one step forward to contributing
to a think tank in Egypt as part of its social commitment. However, the studies of
the centre can go further than the private sector expects as it is in favour of more free
trade (Sachs, 1996) the issue which the private sector is most reluctant to accept in
the liberalisation programme. This raises questions about the influence of World
Bank ideology by way of the centre's research director and the contributors to the
studies. The role of private sector members in selecting the required areas of study
is unclear. They should try to play a more effective role in directing studies towards
empirical areas where they need assistance. One of the major contributions to such a
centre might be to investigate new profitable areas for investment, areas of
competitive advantage and studies for the external market. In brief, it should assist
the private sector to expand its participation to economic activity and promote export
rather than assisting its decision-making process in the direction chosen by the
World Bank.
In contrast to the previous organisations, which were set up under the
umbrella of liberal thought, there is the case of the Land Centre "Makaz El-Arc!", a
centre which was founded in 1996 to defend the human rights of farmers in rural
areas by creating awareness and providing legal support and assistance to tenants in
the Egyptian villages. It also conducts studies concerning agricultural land and
employment conditions in the agricultural sector. The centre played an active role in
defending farmers' right to access land during the period the new land tenure law
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was implemented under which the tenant farmers had to leave their lands to the
landlords. The centre publicises the drawbacks of the law and tries to create public
opinion to support the farmers in order to urge the government to find reasonable
solutions for the farmers' problems.
4.4.2. The Political Management of the Reform and State Capacity
This part assesses the state's management of the reform and how it managed to
improve its capacity during the reform. Was it able to keep the balance of power
with civil society. I assess in brief the three authorities: the executive (government),
the legislative (the People's Assembly) and the judiciary. Then I evaluate the
performance of the state as complementary unit.
The Reform Team
The GOE was criticised on the basis that it is controlled by some old bureaucrats
who continued in office for many years. Performance was slow and routine. When
the new cabinet came to power in 1996 the public was more optimistic. The new
government expected to push forward the reform programme. Although criticised
for the limited changes in personnel the new cabinet was praised for the new
rearrangement of the Ministries. The new setup was thought to facilitate
performance and provide more co-ordination. The main changes related to foreign
trade which was combined with internal trade in one Ministry which was thought to
have better control over the supply side of the economy and the Ministry of Foreign
Cooperation was joined with the Ministry .
 of Economics. The rationale for joining
Foreign Cooperation with the Ministry of Economics was not clear, at least to the
public! In the following reshuffle the Ministry of Foreign Cooperation was separated
again from the Ministry of Economics although the new Economic Minister was
well acquainted with it as he used to work as Minister of State for Foreign
Cooperation in the previous Cabinet of Dr. Atef Sedki. The Ministry of Foreign
Cooperation was put directly under the supervision of the Prime Minister.
The new Prime Minister was responsible for the Ministry of Planning for a
long time and resisted the dismantling of the Ministry or reducing its status. As a
person responsible for planning in Egypt, he believed in central control, as appeared
in his later actions. The new Prime Minister continued his control over the Ministry
of Planning, however, and appointed a State Minister for planning. The Prime
Minister showed an increased interest in the concentration of his power, as we can
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be seen from several examples. According to law, the Prime Minister of Egypt is
responsible for the Higher Council of Youth. The ex-Prime Minister because of his
responsibilities rarely intervened leaving the executive responsibility to the
executive Manager. On the contrary, the new Prime Minster exerted his power over
the Council as soon as he received his authority. Moreover, the new Prime Minister
gave himself new powers with almost every new law. In the new law of Investment
Incentive he arrogated to himself the right of final approval on activities not
mentioned by name in the law, ignoring the executive head of the GAOI who used to
have this authority. The same was yje case with with the new Companies Law
which regulates the issue of newspapers where approval should be obtained from the
Prime Minister himself despite there being a High Council for the Press. The Suez
Canal Authority was independent for several decades, however, the Prime Minister
eventually assumed authority over it. This reflects his belief in central control over
the economy and/or lack of trust in the competence of his team. This concentration
of power is unable to cope with this stage of the reform which requires a greater
distribution of power and participation in the decision-making process. If rivalry for
power still exists among government bureaucrats at the higher level, there is little
hope for a greater share of power with other political powers or civil society groups
which defend the interests of the public.
The People's Assembly
The People's Assembly is the second authority of the state which is concerned with
legislation and monitoring the cabinet's performance, yet its effectiveness is subject
to mah criticism. Critics start with the credibility of the election process itself, then
the credibility of its members on a personal level, finally on its performance and the
limits of its authority. The last election of the Assembly in November, 1995 was
considered by the government as a massive victory due to the overwhelming
majority, 409 seats, for the ruling party while the opposition won only thirteen seats
from a total of 443. The opposition had a different view. It represented 950 appeals,
about double the number of seats, to the Court of Cessation. The court's decision
implies that the appointment of 250 deputies will be invalidated. The People's
Assembly did not accept any on them on the basis that the Assembly is the only
entity responsible for their membership. This view is based on Articles 93, 96 of the
Constitution, Art. 20 of the People's Assembly law, and Arts. 347-355 of the
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internal regulation of the Assembly. The matter is debatable between legal
specialists whose argument is based on other articles of the Constitution as well. In
addition, the administrative courts issued writs to overturn the results in 109
constituencies, the matter which created a dispute between the Ministry of the
Interior and the courts, which seemed to be left to the Assembly's decision as well
(the Arab Strategic Report, 1996:290-92). These violations of the election process
are not a new phenomenon. The previous elections of 1987 and 1990 were followed
by 200 and 260 appeals to the court respectively. The low participation rate in
elections is a sign of low credibility and has its justification. A study conducted by
the Democracy Development Group in Egypt in seven constituencies revealed that
only 42 percent of the sample participated in the election process. The non-
participants justify this by expressing their belief in the futility of their participation,
as the government did what it liked and they expressed their distrust in the election
process (as quoted in the New Civic Forum, 1997:10). Another study of a limited
number of Egyptian postgraduate students in one of the British Universities revealed
that only 37.5 percent of them had an election card. However not all of them
participated continuously in the process. The low rate was related mainly to the low
participation of women as none of the female students had an election card or ever
took part in the election process. Participation was also considerably higher among
those who lived outside Cairo compared to those living near the decision-making
process in Cairo. This also relates to family relationships which are more effective
in small towns and villages (El-Gaafarawi, forthcoming).
t Members of the People's Assembly were subject to criticism mainly for
using their power to achieve personal advantages, especially in business. Criticisms
and accusations were not limited to the opposition. The national newspapers were
part of it as well. From their point of view the elections facilitated the entrance of
the so-called members of the loans and drugs, in addition to other practices of taking
over state and public land (Addle Hashish, Ahram, 21/2/98). El-Bad wrote in the
Abram International (11/7/98) describing members of both the People's Assembly
and the Shoura Council as opportunists. He wondered .
 if it was right that some
members of the People's Assembly have mediated between the construction
authorities and some landlords who violated the law, to be forgiven. Others attend
the Assembly merely to use it as pass-word for business and have succeeded in
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accumulating massive wealth though they never did business before. While the
Shoura Council election of witnessed those who nominated themselves with great
enthusthiasm, then suddenly withdrew. They were accused of receiving benefit from
this and probably bribes. Such accusations in the national papers must have at least
some truth, which reduces the credibility of such councils and legislative and
monitoring authorities.
The weak performance of the People's Assembly as a controlling mechanism
of the government was evident and tended to deteriorate over time. The hegemony
of the ruling party over the Assembly was the main cause of the decline in
effectiveness. The new legislation gained majority approval whenever it was
introduced. However, to avoid public reaction important legislation was launched at
the end of the parliamentary year when there was insufficient time to discuss it.
Others which needed to be consulted about by the institutions concerned were
introduced by stealth, as was the case with the decision to appoint the deans to the
different schools in the universities instead of electing them, as was formerly the
case. The last contraction in the monitoring function of the People's Assembly was
the elimination of its authority over the Central Agency for Auditing. The reports of
the Agency are not available to or discussed by the Assembly.
Judicial Authority
The only authority that remained independent was the fudiciary The higher
constitutional court together with the administrative court has played a particularly
vital role in Egyptian political life. With the increasing encroachment of the
Constitution much legislation was denied its constitutional basis by the
Constitutional Court. Its role was vital regarding the People's Assembly elections,
as referred to above. While the Assembly did not apply the court's decisions, it
made the election violations clear to the public and reduced the credibility of the
state. The judicial system also played another important role in the development of
pluralism in political life as all parties which were created 'after the first phase of
pluralism were established by court decisions.
Yet, the judicial system has also had its limitations which were responsible
for its low public credibility. These limitations related mainly to the available set of
laws, the slow and complicated judicial procedures and corruption, especially among
low-level bureaucrats. The legal system in Egypt is crowded with thousands of laws
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which are estimated by the head of the lawyers's syndicate to amount to 60,000 laws.
Some of these laws were enacted to confront emergency crises or temporary
situations (as in case of the law of money utilisation which was promologated to
meet the crisis in what was called the Islamic Money Employment Companies)
while it should have been proclaimed for long-term needs (Shihata, 1996:165).
Every new batch of legislation brings new constraints and results in a restricted legal
system. This made the investment climate in Egypt non-competitive and averse to
the spread of new ideas until very recently. These numerous laws were not matched
by an institutional capability to implement them or the financial resources to apply
them in the right way. The result was a partial or distorted application which
reduced respect for the law and increased the role of personal and/or corrupt
relationships (ibid). Recent improvements have been introduced in the judiciary
system, yet it still lacks efficiency and suffers from protracted measures, as it needs
3-6 years to deal with a civil or commercial case. It is also expensive and includes
exhaustive measures on account of the wide range of administrative personnel who
may lack efficiency and/ or honesty (ibid,:168-69).
In the late 1990s few years as other tools became limited and restricted by the
state, the decisions of the High Institutional Court have become central for
opposition political parties and civil society groups to fight against the encroachment
on economic and political rights. The state has directed its attention to limit it. In
1997 an NDP member of parliament proposed its abolition to the People's
Assembly. This suggestion was attacked by many members, political - and public
figures and intellectuals. The Assembly threw out the suggestion and the NDP
declared that it was not responsible for the proposal, claiming that it was introduced
on an individual basis. A year later another amendment was announced which
restrict the validity of its decisions. Change by stealth is still the policy of the state
to control both economic and political life.
State Performance and Capacity
The state's role and performance changed throughout the course of the reform. In
the early stages of the reform the state had to reduce or neutralise the opposition,
whereas when the reform went ahead the state has to build up a coalition of
beneficiaries and to carefully manage changes in its support base. In the period of
reform consolidation the state had to give up its control over political life so as to
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allow more participation in the decision making. Civil society should grow to fill
the gaps in political and social life where the state has withdrawn and to defend the
interests of different groups, especially the vulnerable ones.
The Political Management of Reform
The state used different techniques to persuade the public about the necessity and the
effectiveness of the reform. Direct persuasion was used by the higher level of the
presidency in official speeches of President Mubarak. An awareness of the serious
situation and the real dimensions of the crisis was the first step. In analysing the
causes for such a crisis the blame was placed on the public itself because of its bad
consumption habits, matched by excess consumption. Examples were given about
the consumption of sugar and meat. The public was blamed for the rapid increase in
the population and the efforts expended by governments to provide cheap food and
public services: schools, hospitals, transportation and communications, etc. The
feeling of guilt was thought to be one of the motives for accepting the impending
austerity. Marginalising the opposition was another method, as the government had
failed to neutralise the opposition. It sought to marginalise their role in political life
by restricting the democratic margin available for them. Professional syndicates law
was changed so as to control the influence of the Islamists who represented the main
source of criticism. These managed in the meantime to enlarge their constituencies
through their social services and were able to provide for society and they started to
gain increased credibility which was evident from their control of some major
professional syndicates. The marginalisation of the Islamic movement was sought in
many Ways. Their efforts in several major social events like the earthquake were
ignored by the official media. The participation of individuals and the PV0s in
efforts to help those injured by the earthquake had to be diverted through official
channels or they had to withdraw. The Muslem Brotherhood had also been excluded
from the national dialogue in 1994. Some terrorist events were blamed on the
Islamists without distinguishing between different groups or thought. The Muslim
Brotherhood, the more effective group, was accused of playing a role in the terrorist
attacks. Their candidates in the last People's Assembly elections were thought to be
discriminated. Finally, there was the arrest of some Muslim Brotherhood members.
There was a noticeable retreat from the previous trend to increase the political
freedom available to opposition parties, to intellectuals and to the public in general.
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Famous examples are the decrees appointing the Umda in rural areas and Deans of
Universities. The committee responsible for approving new parties did not grant this
right to any of the proposed new parties and the few who did manage to establish
themselves had to go to court to obtain approval.
State Capacity
Aggregate capacity is measured by the state's ability to achieve its declared
development goals (Ayubi, 1995:450) and to pursue its role effectivily according to
the needs of the developmental phase. As is clear from the above, the state was able
to achieve the short-term objectives of the reform programme of stabilisation.
However, for social and economic goals which were envisaged as long-term goals,
performance was weak and slow. As the long-term goals were not related to
timetable performance, this gave the state some area of manoeuvre regarding this
long-term time-span.
Another approach for ascertaining the state's capacity was the analytical
approach to its components which included according to Ayubi (1995) the allocative,
regulatory, and extractive capacity. We can add political capacity as an important
area related to managing the reform. At the beginning of the reform the state
improved its extractive capacity in a few ways. By liberalising the prices of
agricultural crops the state gave up the semi-coercive method whereby it used to
expropriate economic surpluses from rural areas. This semi-coercive method was
considered to be a characteristic of a "fierce" state by Ayubi (ibid,:453). The state
also succeeded in reducing the foreign debt at difference phases, the last of which
was delayed. In addition the state managed to attract flight capital through changes
in the interest rate. Yet it was unable to direct it to investment channels, which
reflected feeble allocative and regulative capacities. The extractive capacity of the
state also remained weak in other important areas. The state's ability to collect taxes
did not improve as most of the increases in taxes were achieved through rises in
indirect taxes, which do not distinguish between rich and poor and could still be
considered a semi-coercive method. The state's capacity to collect direct taxes had
even deteriorated, due to lack of qualified personnel. Some private-sector
companies complained about the late estimation of taxes on their activities which
was to be calculated every three years instead of every year, which disturb their
accountancy.
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The state's ability in collecting taxes was of most importance in the era of
liberalisation as the state lacked other sources which it used to have in state-led
development where it used to control resources through nationalisation and the
manipulation of prices. In a liberal economy taxes become the main source of
government revenues, where state failure to collect it effectively forces it to shift to
indirect taxes which are socialy costly. State extravagance in granting tax
concessions to attract new investment reflected another weakness of the state where
it failed to provide the appropriate regulatory framework to attract investment.
An increasing competence in direct tax collection with an enlarging of
national income needs a sophisticated system with a greater tendency towards
democracy. Where semi-coercive means are not valid in a strong state, there is a
bargaining for power between society's representatives and the state. This needs
state involvement in civil society on the basis of integration rather than coercion. It
is also argued that increasing direct taxes requires compliance and cannot co-exist in
the long run with authoritarian rule which in turn requires more public participation
and control over public policy. This process of bargaining between the state and
civil society is more feasible in a market economy than in controlled economy where
the tax base is less elastic. The elasticity of the tax base expands with the increase in
the role of the market where it is easier to avoid tax. Thus the greater the elasticity
of tax payment the greater the need for bargaining (see different arguments in Ayubi,
1995:454:55). In Egypt different tax concessions, valid for five, ten and sometimes
twenty years, were offered by the government for new investment without direct
bargaining with the civil society. However, bargaining applied with different
degrees to other kinds of taxes, such as sales tax, and the level of tax on commercial
and industrial activities. This was done mainly through business associations which
represented the interests of the investor elite and was more likely to be biased
towards big business. Small business were not representative in the bargaining
process between the state and civil society in many other matters because of the
incomplete democratisation process in Egypt. The analysis above indicates that the
greater the percentage of direct tax to total revenue the greater the state penetration
in society. If we examine the tax composition in Egypt, we find that indirect taxes
had the highest percentage, a matter which continued during the reform. Indirect
taxes accounted . for more than 60 percent during the 1970s and most of the 1980s,
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while income tax improved only temporarily during the 1988/89-1990/91 period
from 39.8 tO 48.8 percent respectively, to fall again in the two following years to
41.2 and 40.7 percent, respectively (El-Samalouti, 1995:255). The composition of
the direct taxes reflected the uneven nature of distributing the tax burden between
different groups. While corporations contributed to the highest percentage of direct
tax, most of it came from the contributions of public economic corporations
(especially the Suez Canal and the Public Authority of Petroleum) as they
contributed about 55-60 percent to direct taxes during 1982/83-87/88. Taxes on
individual incomes refers to an increase in the contribution of the fixed salary group
compared with those of free professionals during the 1982-1990/91 period. It is clear
that was because of the low administrative capacity of the tax authority, where it was
easier to identify those on fixed incomes. The result of this low administrative
ability was a bias against the low-income strata (ibid,:234).
The political capacity of the state can be assessed by the state's ability to
consolidate the reform in different ways, among which: building a coalition of
beneficiaries and managing change in the support base, distributing power and
increasing public participation in the decision-making process, providing
transparency in state policy, and fighting corruption and the patronage networks.
The state achieved a limited sucess in managing its support base. While it
failed to add substanial groups of winners, it suceeded to a certain extent in
neutralising the opposition of the losers. The main direct losers who were organised
and able to take collective action was the public sector employees, as we explained
earlier t The state managed to neutralise the leaders, while responding to the
pressures from differnt individual unions which was limited and did not oppose the
privatisation policy as a whole. However, the state was unable to build a new strong
' support base and was due to lose another part of its old one. This came as a result of
the economic outcome of the reform which had achieved very limited gains up till
then. Potential winners were not certain about their gains till then. Egypt built a
new coalition of elite businessmen. However, this group was limited in size and was
still costly to manage. The government had to induce them to participate in the
compensation of the social cost of privatisation. The state still relaied on the silent
majority which it tried to approach through the media to turn them into supporters.
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The state failed to distribute power and maintained its political centrality till
then in both the economic and political arenas. In the economic area, state
responsibility for managing the reform and the slow building up of the necessary
institutions in addition to weak response of the private sector kept the central role of
the state. This centrality did not mean that the state was able to strengthen its
capacity to the necessary level. The institutional power of the state was still limited
if we realise that it failed to provide the legal and regulatory framework for the
market economy. While the state enacted many laws and regulations. These laws
needed change to overcome their short-comings. The state failed to promologate
two key laws to regulate the market economy: that of a unified labour law, which
was still disputed by Business Associations and Trade Unions and that of a law to
protect the market against monopoly, in contrast to rural areas where state control
over economic life had considerably declined due to the diminished role of the
cooperatives and village banks in providing agricultural inputs and crop marketing.
The state tried to replace this economic control with direct political control by new
regulations which allowed the government to appoint the "Umda" which used to be
elected, it thus bureaucratised a part of civil society in rural areas.
The state could not provide transparency in the decision-making process or
build credibility in the government's ability to guide fair competition in the market.
An example of the way the laws were introduced and the lack of transparency and
consistency in government decisions was that of the introduction of new Law of
Investment Incentive. Following changes in the economic environment, the turn to a
market economy and the encouragment of private activity, a need for unified law to
regulate private companies' activities emerged. As private companies were working
under different laws, regulations, and dealing with different authorities. A
committee was assigned for this purpose, however the committee was surprised that
the government has introduced a new and completely different law which dealt with
incentives and guarantees for private companies. The committee prepared a unified
law which combined the legal system with an incentive system. The government
wanted to introduce a new law quickly in order to improve its image and encourage
more investment. While it was meant to improve the credability of the government
and investment environment, the way the law was introduced and the content of the
new law undermined credability in the decision-making process. The new law
148
dismantled the General Authority of Investment stating that the administrative
authorities of the governorates would replace it. However, under a certain amount
of pressure, the GAI remained, a decree was issued to establish the GAL Although it
existed, the people and the investors wondered about it, as it had not been announced
clearly that it was abolished. The new law gave the Prime Minster the powers which
used to be assigned to the head of the Authority, which undermine his authority.
Above all, a specialist accused the law having many deficiencies. While the new
law only has four new articles, compared with the old on, law 230, 6 or 7 articles
were modified. The new law also curtailed 18 positive aspects and incentives in the
old law, the worst being that the new law contained 14 violations of the
constitutional articles (Fahmy, Seminar about the law in the Association of Political
Economy, Statistics and Legislation, 3/11/1997). These violations against the
constitution allowed any person to call on the court to abolish it. The matter which
undermine credibility of the new law.
The state also failed to deal with corruption cases in a way that kept its
credibility among the public. The labour party's newspaper El-Shaab led a
campaign against corruption for many years. The the government's best response to
this was silence. The way in which the accusations against the former Minister of
the Interior's sons were treated reduced the creditability of the government even, if
we assume that they were innocent. The two sons, together with senior officials of
their father's Ministry, were subject to different kinds of accusations of corruption
for more than a year. Only then did their father, and not them, start to take legal
actione against the newspaper. Later on, all newspapers were denied the right to
follow up the investigation.. The court imprisoned the editor of the compaign in
respect to some accusations, while others were still under investigation by the courts.
During this period there were calls for conciliation and it was explicitly published
that the higher levels of the decision-making appratus gave the order for a
reconciliation. Many prominent writers, including Heikel, were in favour of this
reconciliation. Later, the editor was set free and the court continued investigating
some accusations against the former Minister.
4.4.3. State versus Civil Society
State-society relations can be assessed in the light of changes in performance, power
and credibility.. The main civil society associations that gained momentum during
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the reform were those of Businessmen's Associations. They increased their links
with the decision-making centres using various devices many of them made
available by the state itself, which used political gains as incentives. Many joint
meetings and committees were held between Businessmen's Associations and high
officials, including the President himself, the Prime Minister, Ministers and
Members of People's Assembly to discuss economic policy. They were only able to
influence minor policies related to the implementation of the reform measures, while
the major policies continued to be influenced by the IFIs. The Businessmen's
Associations were unable to emerge as a strong pressure group because most gains
were granted by the state. As we mentioned, these gains were showen by appointing
representatives in the People's Assembly, the Shoura Council and to some joint
committees. The purpose of these gains were incentives more than to seek their
acquiescence.
The Credibility of the businessmen was rather low. The negative view of the
private sector who seek to maximise its profit through speculations and parasitic
activities which was created during Infitah is still there however with less extent.
Their view in the press was rather negative, they have been criticised in several
occasions as in the people assembly election where money were spent in primary
way. They have been criticised for their way of spending in their private life which
was challenged to the poor. The illegal ways of accumulating wealth is also subject
to comments by famous writers in the newspapers. Most recently Ussef Gouhar
wrote in El-Abram (11/7/98) an article under the title: Businessmen and thieves. The
article mentioned an incident of two businessmen who imported four Mercedes cars
using the names of some foreign diplomat in Egypt to avoid paying the customs
which were estimated with four million Egyptian pounds. They have been convicted
as the cars were found in the Villa of one of them. The writer wonder how they steel
they own country just to satisfy their luxury habits or did they intend to sell them in
other illegal ways to gain more money without paying taxes? How these
businessmen could be trusted to provide their workers with fair wages or to produce
non-cheated products with fair prices. The writer asked for strict punishment as a
forgery case where the sentence could reach 3-15 years. Although this exciting title
Gouhar emphasis at the end of the article that the majority of businessmen are
straight. Such stories affect the public opinion towards businessmen. The absent of
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social insurance for workers in private sector in the new industrial cities which
referred to by the Trade Union representative is another reason for the lack of
credibility.
The social commitment of private sector businessmen was limited to those
donations stimulated by high public authorities or as a respond to appeal from the
wife of the president as in the case of the project of the one hundred schools or to
rebuild the villages who have been damaged by floods. These initiatives also limited
certain prominent businessmen with contacts with decision makings authorities
where they can gain more privilege from it. Some other businessmen refrain to join
businessmen associations as they think that they force them to donate in such
occasions while the privilege goes to the board members who dominate the
association and use it for their interest. The straggle over power between
businessmen themselves is also new phenomenon which reduce their credibility,
which the president himself draw their attention to the importance of reconciliation.
4.5. Conclusions
While the state succeeded in stabilising the economy, as the reform goes forward it
failed to achieve real economic progress. The productive capacity of the reform has
not been increased. Private sector response was weak and could not even reach the
precedent levels before reform. Private activities were biased towards housing and
luxury goods against productive and tradable goods. The challenge to socio-
economic problems is still there; high unemployment rate, increased poverty and low
domestic saving rates.
The state kept it centrality in managing the economic activity, however it
extractive, and institutional capacity are still limited. The political capacity is
deteriorating, the democratic margin is diminishing rather than increasing, the
control over civil society associations in increasing rather than decreasing. Minor
changes has occurred to the support base, with limited advances in building new
coalition of beneficiaries which was limited to businessmen elite.
The analyses above proved the importance of some cultural and political
aspects which need to be revived. The ethical and moral aspects in human
development was stemmed again as important factors. Productive human resources
do not only need high education, training and health care, they need self dignity and
respect, freedom and to have feelings of national belonging and a positive value
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system. This could only achieved through democracy which allow them to express
their view freely; participate in decision making and provide respect to human rights.
It also entails the existence of a national project to revive national feeling which
seems to be eroded under the feeling of oppression. In case the state fail to promote
democracy, protect human rights and provide national project to unify the masses
and revive the national feeling, the alternative is possible increased activity and
support to the Islamic tendency where the public replaces religious values with
political ideologies. It must be realised that some of the Islamic movements have
different interpretations of Islam and they pursue a range of different interests, some
of them are far from Islam.
152
Chapter 5	 Egyptian Agriculture and
Structural Adjustment
5.1. Introduction
The agricultural sector has played a historical role as an engine for growth for the
Egyptian economy. It used to provide the main share of GDP, to absorb a high share
of the labour force and to contribute greatly to exports. During the 1970s and 1980s,
its performance has deteriorated considerably in comparison to its historical
contribution and with the increased needs of the economy. There has been increased
recognition of the need to improve its performance and to increase its average annual
growth-rate from around 2.5 percent achieved throughout the 1980s, compared with
the population growth-rate of 2.6 percent, to reach around 3.0 percent per annum in
the 1990s (World Bank, 1993:11). The need to accelerate its growth rate to around
4-4.5 percent in order to contribute to a higher growth-rate at the national level was
recognised later (JMA, 1995). As the agricultural sector used to be subject to
intensive government intervention and control, government policies and control over
the sector was considered by IFIs as the main source of its weak performance. A
massive shift in development strategy was launched in the middle of the 1980s.
Structural adjustment policies were first introduced to the Egyptian economy
through this sector and since 1987 liberalisation of the agricultural sector has started
gradually.
e The cornerstone of such policies emphasised during the experience of
Egypt's agricultural history, is that eliminating price distortion and 'getting the
prices right' will rationalise the utilisation of resources and ,
 will lead to increases in
production and income in rural areas on an equitable basis. The main argument in
this chapter and the following two chapters, is that on the one hand such a strategy is •
irrelevant to the Egyptian rural situation and on the other, it is not conducive to
sustainable growth nor to an equitable one. In the short run, the benefits which are
witnessed seem to be limited to individual crops as they are from the "once for all"
type and have not been on an equitable basis (Richards, 1995; Bush, 1996). This
study further argues that the full effect from the policy of "getting the prices right",
as set by the World Bank, might not be achieved because of other factors. First,
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there is no direct relation between international prices, which are set as a standard
and domestic production costs. Thus changes in prices will change the way in which
resources are allocated, however, it does not ensure changes in the same direction
and/or level as proposed by the strategy makers. In the Egyptian case there are other
factors rather than the level of profit, which affect the way in which resources are
used at the farm level. This study also argues that big farmers benefited more from
the reforms, while small farmers and agricultural labourers have suffered, or
achieved limited benefits according to their farm size, crop pattern and sources of
income. To enhance and sustain development in the long run, more attention should
be directed to the role of investment and technological change (Sarris, 1994;
Richards, 1995) and socio-political conditions should be reconsidered. Although the
proposed strategy from the World Bank covered some of the other necessary
complementary measures it seems to be a mere 'lip service', as stated by Bush
(1996), and the Egyptian view has completely overlooked the importance of socio-
political conditions in rural areas in shaping the outcome of liberalisation.
This chapter examines the impact of structural adjustment policies on the
agricultural sector. The first part discusses the experience before SAP. It sheds light
on the institutional set up, the applied policies and the developments in the role of
public and private sectors. It then assesses the outcome on resource allocation,
productivity and income. The second part reviews the proposed and the
implemented reforms and discusses their rationale. The third part assesses to what
extent the proposed reforms were successful in achieving the objectives of the
reform Was it able to improve resource allocation and to increase production? Has
this increase been achieved on a sustainable basis? Who has lost and who has
benefited from the reforms? Were benefits distributed on an equitable basis? The
analysis has been conducted at both national and household levels in order to
account for the deferential impact between different categories of rural areas.
5.2. Egyptian Agriculture: Policies, Institutions and Performance
before SAP
The government of the 1952 revolution showed great concern towards rural areas.
During first few months in power the RCC issued the first land reform. While the
main goal was to eliminate the power of the old political elite, equality issues in
rural areas were not far from consideration. The land reform was not limited to the
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redistribution of land; it also set the basis for fair relationships between landlords,
and tenants and established a minimum wage for wage labour. Their policies also
aimed at increasing agricultural production and the welfare of the rural population.
Policies adopted in Nasser's era also established the bases for the relationship
between farmers and the government of Egypt. These policies have continued to
have a profound impact on productivity, production relations and the living
conditions of the rural households into the 1990s. The main policies adopted were:
land reform to achieve more equal access to resources; government intervention in
agricultural production (through defining cropping areas, crop mix and crop rotation,
providing agricultural inputs, pricing, marketing); introducing co-operatives to
assess both farmers and the government; building the High Dam in Aswan and the
expansion of perennial irrigation; land reclamation; and providing basic health,
education, water supply and electricity services.
After Nasser no substantial changes were made. Land reform laws continued
to be valid and the rent was fixed to seven times the land tax, however, periodical
assessment of the value of the rent was undertaken every ten years. The official
value of rent increased from LE 23.3 a feddan per annum in 1971/72 to LE 73.7 in
1981/82 and LE 250 in 1989. The relationship between farmers and the government
continued on the same bases. Farmers were subject to the same regulations,
government continued to regulate production by controlling cropping patterns,
marketing of inputs and outputs and prices. The aim was to extract surplus so as to
finance development in other sectors and to provide cheap food for the urban sector. -
The discrimination against rural areas through control of terms of trade increased.
The agricultural sector's share in public investment declined considerably. During
the period of infitah the private sector was allowed to participate on a larger scale in
the form of private companies, however, its participation and contribution to total
production was limited. In the following part I describe the set of policies and
regulations affecting the agricultural sector before SAP and to the outcome of these
policies.
With the elimination of the big landlords in the rural areas, this class was
replaced after the land reform by the upper class, the middle-size landowners who
tended to dominate the local committees of both the NU and ASU in the countryside
during the 1960s (Binder, 1978 as cited in Hansen, 1991:111). The influence of the
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rural middle class was limited to the countryside and the Egyptian elite did not
originate from them or represent their interests. The urban bias and the price
policies discriminating against agriculture are strong evidence that in rural areas the
middle class did not have even a small influence at the national level either under
Nasser or Sadat. On the contrary at local level their influence was seen in some
aspects of agrarian life such as the distribution of irrigation water and some
agricultural inputs (Binder, 1978:207,372 as cited in Hansen, 1991: 112).
5.2.1. Policies and Regulations
Land and Land tenure
After the 1952 revolution three land reform laws were launched in 1952, 1961 and
1969. The main objective of these laws was to reduce the unequal distribution of
land and to correct tenancy relations. They put an upper limit on individual land
ownership at 200 feddans, reduced to 100 then to 50 feddans respectively. Meantime
family ownership was restricted to 300 feddans by the first law, and reduced to 100
feddans by the third law.
The land reforms introduced extended to tenancy regulations, as 60 percent
of Egypt agricultural land was cultivated by tenants (Radwan, 1977:15). According
to these laws leases had to be in writing and for a period of not less than three years.
Cash rents were fixed at seven times the land tax. In the case of share cropping, both
costs and crops were shared equally by the tenant and the owner (Richards
1982:179).
Although Egypt's arable land is very fertile; its area is limited. Effective
reclanIation of new land started as early as the first five-year plan of 1960/61-
1964/65. The average amount of reclaimed land during this period was about 107.28
thousand feddan per annum. This rate deteriorated gradually to reach 49.45
thousands feddan per annum during 1965/66-1969/1970, while the following years
of the seventies experienced an even slower rate, as during year 1970/71 only 21
thousands feddan were reclaimed and in the following years up till 1979 only 1.99
thousand feddan per annum were reclaimed. With the increase in population growth
and the food gap the GOE accelerated the reclamation rate during the five-year plan
of 1982/83-1986/87 where the rate reached 127.43 thousand feddan per annum (INP,
1992: 44-47). These lands used to be managed mostly by the state with small areas
allocated to individual farmers. Starting from 1976 there has been a plan to expand
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private ownership of reclaimed land which was distributed to university graduates
and the families of the victims of the war, then a few agricultural projects were
established on some of the land, such as that for a company for improved seeds,
another for sugar beet and animal production. In the 1980s the state started to limit
its role to reclamation and left plantation to the private sector (ibid,:48-50). All
reclaimed land was subject to privatisation, while during the early years, land was
distributed free. Starting from 1980 this was no longer the case. About 40 percent
of reclaimed land was allocated to peasants and graduates while the remainder was
auctioned or sold to private companies. Nevertheless, the price of reclaimed land
was extremely cheap compared with the prices of old land. While the price for the
old land was about $22,000 per an acre, the reclaimed land could be bought at an
auction for 3,500 an acre. Areas allocated for graduates were even cheaper. This
policy of low pricing continued to the late 1980s, where the price of the feddan was
not allowed to be higher than LE 400 (Sadowski, 1991:110).
Although land was made available at low cost, the high cost for reclamation
and plantation of new land, in addition to the needed technology, urged the
government to introduce more facilities to encourage the private sector to participate
on a large scale. This was by providing concessionary loans, tax exemptions and
custom facilities for imported agricultural equipment (INP, 1992:58) and a new law
to regulate land ownership in desert areas. Law 143 of 1981 increased the upper
limit for land ownership in these areas according to sources and methods of
irrigation. In the case of using ground water or advanced irrigation like drip pipes or
sprinkling irrigation the upper limit of land ownership is as follow:
a- 200 feddans for individuals, 300 for the family, including the wife and young
unmarried children.
b- 10,000 feddans for co-operatives with a limit of 30 feddans per member.
c- 10,000 feddans to individual and companies of partnership by shares with an
upper limit of 150 feddans per person.
d- 50,000 feddans for joint-stock companies.
In case of surface irrigation and/or dried land from lakes, the upper limit of
ownership is half the above-mentioned cases (Mustafa, 1994:10). The same law also
entitled farmers and investors to concessionary loans. The PBDAC provides loans
up to 80 percent of the cost of reclamation and farming at an interest rate of only 3
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percent. Investments enjoyed tax exemption for five years, extended in 1984 to ten
years. Poor farmers were intended to enjoy more concessions, while farms with
more than five hundred feddans were not supposed to enjoy the tax holiday and
some other facilities. However, large investments enjoyed more political influence
and were able to extract more rents (Sadowski, 1991:112).
Small farm size has dominated agricultural land in Egypt. This is due to two
main factors: old land reform laws and the inheritance law. In 1987, 22.25 percent
of landholders held less than one feddan, more than half of them, 57.51 percent, held
less than 2 feddans and 97.11 percent held less than 5 feddans. In addition farmers
usually had spread holdings, which contained more than one plot scattered in
different locations. This was due to the multiple sources of holdings and also to
avoid cultivating all the land with the same crop according to the compulsory crop
pattern.
Land use regulations
The government of Egypt's policy towards the agricultural sector aimed at using
indirect taxes to extract the surplus from this sector and use it in financing other
sectors especially industry. The GOE aimed as well to provide cheap food for the
urban sector as part of its policy to build wide constituencies. To acbieNt these two
goals, full control of the agriculture sector was imposed. First of all it imposed a
compulsory crop mix and rotation, requiring farmers to grow certain crops to insure
their availability in the needed amounts. This meant that small farmers had to plant
all their land with cotton one year, with clover the next, and cereals the next, rather
than have a little cash crop, fodder crop, and food crop each year, which increased
their need for credit. A fine system was imposed on those who violated these rules.
Farmers with less than five feddans were prohibited from planting highly profitable
fruit trees, unless they were able to co-operate with their small holding neighbours.
Only those with more than fifteen feddans could acquire selected seeds. Thus the
law was biased towards big farmers. At the same time they were able to avoid the
regulations concerning area restriction as they were better able to pay the fine
(Richards, 1982: 182-184).
Price mechanism and market controls were the government tools for
extracting agricultural surpluses. Imposed prices and control of böth input and
output trade were used. The government subsidised the prices of inputs and
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distributed them on a quantitative bases. On the output side, a system of compulsory
delivery with low prices was developed in the early 1960s. The required amount to
be delivered varied from one crop to another. Cotton, sugarcane and soybeans were
required to be delivered in full. Peanuts and sesame were required to deliver in full
except for seeds. Each crop of rice, wheat, onion, beans and lentils was required to
deliver a certain quota per feddan. Compulsory delivery of wheat was abolished
during the 1976-1984 period and was imposed again in 1985. Maize became subject
to compulsory delivery only after 1985. Fines of varying sizes were imposed on
farmers who violated these rules and it was forbidden for crops to be transferred
between governorates. Due to the low prices imposed on the delivered quotas,
farmers tried to escape planting these crops, preferring to plant other more profitable
crops, or escape delivering the required quotas preferring to pay the fine (Nassar,
1992: 3-4). The compulsory delivery quotas with mandatory prices continued in
force until 1986/87. Then they started to be phased out under SAP.
The control of input and output prices resulted in net transfers from the
agricultural sector to the non-agricultural sector. These transfers were estimated to
reach about 5-7 percent of total agricultural income during the period from 1952-
1970. Although the revolutionary government was responsible for launching such
policies, its other contribution in the provision of social services, such as education
and health balanced the situation. Hank thinks that "the revolution was positively
inclined toward the peasantry and contributed more to it than had any other regime
during the entire history of Egypt." (Hank, 1997: 62). This is true if we also
consider the benefits of land reform laws that increased farmers' access to
agricultural land and provided them with stable tenancy relations. Table 5.2 below,
which indicates changes in both farm and international prices, shows an increased
gap between farm prices and international prices over time which suggests that
transfers out of the agricultural sector increased during the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Role of Co-operatives
The co-operatives were the government's instrument in implementing its policy and
in delivering its services. The co-operative controlled crop patterns and rotations,
provided subsidised inputs on credit bases and controlled quota delivery of different
crops. It was responsible for transferring new technology and extension works in
addition to the . maintenance of irrigation and drainage. The efficiency of the co-
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operative in operating such functions was under clear debate. Lack of resources, and
poor wages to the supervising personnel were some of the reasons behind the initial
debate.
Three different types of co-operatives were available:
a. Agricultural co-operatives for land reform: all beneficiaries of land reform area,
which represent 10 percent of the cultivated area, were required to join.
b. Agricultural credit co-operatives: The co-operative system was extended to the
non- land reform areas in 1963 (Richards 1982:180) and all farmers all over the
country (owners, renters and sharecroppers) became members. This is the most
prevalent type. In 1991, the number of co-operatives reached 5,319, almost one co-
operative for each village, and the number of total members reached three million.
c. Agricultural co-operatives for land reclamation: served farmers in the reclaimed
land. In 1986 there were 465 of them at village level, and 23 at both district and
governorate level (Abdel Aal, 1996: 3-4).
The co-operative is run by an elected council of five to seven members
assisted by a supervisor (Mushrifi who is usually an agricultural engineer appointed
by the MALR. In many co-operatives the government provides a clerk and an
accountant (Hansen, 1977: 58). Before 1969, 80 percent of the board members were
supposed to be owners of less than five feddans. In 1969, the ceiling for board
members was raised to 15 feddan and illiterates were excluded. Such regulations
ensured rich peasants the dominance of the board (Richards, 1982: 182).
In 1976, the Principle Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) was
established and the credit function was transferred to it from co-operatives.
The Role of PBDAC
The PBDAC was not the first formal organisation for agricultural credit. In 1931 the
Agricultural Credit Bank was founded as a response to the world depression. Its
capital was shared between the government and commercial banks. The main
purpose was to provide short-term credit, to eliminate selling agricultural land to
foreigners as a form of loan payment, to moderate fluctuations in farm prices and to
provide soft finance to co-operatives (Abdel-Fatah, 1994:6). The bank was renamed
and organised in 1948 and again in 1964. In 1964, it was named the General
Organisation for Agricultural and Co-operative Credit and the governorate Banks for
Agricultural Co-operative Credit became share holders in the general organisation,
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and farmers obtained bank credit through the co-operative. A main advantage
achieved at that time was that crops were considered as collateral enabling tenant
farmers to deal directly with the bank, something which it was limited before to
landowners. The overlapping between co-operative activities and bank activities
initiated conflicts and a lack of confidence among farmers and led to severe loan-
recovery problems (ibid; Adams & Kamel, 1996:254-55).
In 1976, the PBDAC was founded and all credit functions were transferred to
it. The PBDAC, which encompasses 17 governorate banks, expanded its coverage
to enhance farmer accessibility. In 1996 it had 164 branches all over the country and
806 village banks with more than 4000 mandoubia (retail outlets) (Khedr, 1997:7).
While the bank expanded its lending to cover all agricultural activities, its role was
not limited to financial intermediation. The bank used to play an active role in
providing agricultural inputs, including managing importation, sale and distribution;
and receiving mandatory crops from farmers. Therefore, the bank owns and operates
agricultural warehouses in almost every village and employs large numbers of
employees (Adams & Kamel, 1996:255).
5.2.2. Agricultural Investment
Agriculture's share in total investments has been deteriorating over time. In the first
five-year plan in the Nasser era, 1960/61-1964/65, investment directed to agriculture
and irrigation accounted for about one fourth of the total investment. Most of these
investments were directed to the High Dam in Aswan and to land reclamation. Most
investment directed towards agriculture used to be public. During 1970/71-1975
investment in agriculture and irrigation accounted for 9.9 percent of total investment
and public investment contributed 96 percent of total agricultural and irrigation
investment. During 1976/77- 1981/82 its share was 9.2 percent of total investment
and public investment contributed about 71 percent (INP, 1990:57). During the first
five-year plan of 1982/83-1986/87 the agricultural and irrigation share of total
investment dropped to 5.6 percent of total investment and public investment
accounted for 69.3 percent of total investment, about two thirds of it directed to
irrigation (MOP, 1992).
Public investment in agriculture proved ineffective in managing to promote
sustained agricultural growth. Public agricultural investment is usually divided
between the administrative apparatus and the servicing and economic authorities,
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and agricultural economic units (40 units), which include agricultural development
companies (15 units), poultry and animal production companies (7 units), fishing &
a fishing equipment company (1 unit) and agricultural development and credit banks
in different governorates (17 units), in addition to two public-sector authorities for
agriculture development and animal and poultry. It is to be noted that most
economic units are mainly located in the Nile Delta (Lower Egypt). During the first
plan of 1982/83-1986/87, 67.7 percent of investment in agriculture was directed to
economic units and the rest went to administrative and economic authorities (Hafez,
1992:8-14). The performance of economic units was weak; they were characterised
by high levels of non-productive capacity, especially for agricultural development
companies, and high reliance on long-term loans. Some companies achieved low
nominal profits through accountancy measures by reducing the level of reserves or
capital by the rate of real deficit. While others, especially those working in poultry
and animal production, suffered massive deficits. The policy of mandatory prices
that forced the companies to sell for low prices was always the first to claim
responsibility (ibid,:29-31). In fact the economic units suffered technical and
managerial inefficiencies, in addition to corruption and some questionable deals
between public officials and private importers and dealers.
During the infitah private national and foreign capital was encouraged to
participate in private projects according to a new investment law. However,
investment projects in agriculture were the least attractive projects for investors in
spite of the fact that they require.d low capital and investment costs compared with
other activities.
The investment authority divided agricultural activities under the investment
law projects into four main areas: Land reclamation and plantation; Livestock and
poultry; integrated agro-industry Projects and Fisheries. During the 1974 to 30/6/91
period total agreed agricultural projects reached 153 representing 9 percent of total
investment projects. About one half of these projects were introduced during the
1974-1981 period and the high ratio of agricultural investments continued till 1984.
(El-Saadani, 1992:44)
In spite of this classification, projects can have diversified activities. For
example, the law used to oblige land reclamation projects to produce crops for
industrial purposes, and they were able to have integrated agro-industrial activities,
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seed production and animal production. Also livestock and poultry can participate in
activities for producing animal food or veterinary materials. The most preferred
agricultural projects were those of livestock and poultry as they represented about
63% of the total agreed projects. Land reclamation projects scored second and
accounted for 16% of the total agreed projects, followed by integrated agro-industry
projects and then fisheries with about 15% and 6% of the total respectively. (ibid,:
36-37).
It can be seen that projects of livestock and poultry achieved the highest
capital and investment costs LE 190.6 million and 139.8 million respectively.
However, due to the high return rate on investment and the short capital cycle
investors prefer it more than the others. The capital needed for land reclamation and
plantation projects was rather low compared with other types of activity, as the
required capital reached LE 38.0 million and investment costs reached about LE 22.3
million. However, this project needs a long capital cycle and received low returns for
invested capital, in addition to the problems of obtaining land. The unpopularity of
projects of integrated agro-industrial activities was due to its high needed capital and
investment cost which reached LE 129.9 million and £E101.6 million respectively.
While for fisheries projects, a main problem was in acquiring the required land for
its expansion.
5.2.3. Sector Performance
The Effect on Resource Allocation
The total cultivated area in Egypt is estimated at 6 million feddans. The increase in
land through reclamation was matched by land encroachments on the most fertile
land .
 in the Delta and Valley. After building the High Dam in Aswan in the 1960s
the use of perennial irrigation increased and land was used for two and some parts
for three seasons. The cropped area increased from 10.7 million feddan on average
for the period 1960-1966 to 11.7 million in 1987-1990 due to the increased
intensification of land use. The intensification ratio increased from 1.85 to 1.95
during the two mentioned periods respectively (INP, 1992).
Government intervention in the agricultural sector affects the process of
resource allocations. The low prices of some crops encouraged farmers to violate
the crop pattern imposed by the government. They preferred to pay the fine if they
were caught-usually around LE 20 per feddan (Hank, 1997: 66). The cereals group
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dominates the crop area of Egypt. During 1960-1966 the total cultivated area of
cereals accounted for 43.2 percent of total area and decreased to 40.8 percent in
1981-1986. Areas of clover, vegetables and fruits increased between the two periods
from 24.4, 6.0 and 1.5 percent to 27.2 and 10.8 and 4.0 percent respectively ([NP,
1992:11). Table 5.1 represents changes in the cultivated area of main crops during
the two periods. The changes indicate that there has been a continuous increase in
the cultivated areas of fruits, vegetables and clover which are not subject to
government mandatory pricing, while areas for rice and cotton have diminished.
Cultivated areas for wheat showed a slight increase only during the 1970s 4 . Cotton
and rice areas decreased gradually due to the unfair prices for these crops, as shown
in table 5.2, the gap between the farm prices and the export prices was increasing.
Changes in the crop pattern starting from the second half of the 1970s were also
related to a decreased supply of agricultural labour force where the emigration rate
of farmers increased. This created an increased preference for crops with a low
requirement of labour, especially berseem, which at the same time generates high
returns through livestock production which in turn is related to women's work.
Table 5. 1 Average Annual Cultivated Areas of Main Crops 	 (thousand feddans)
Main Crops 1960-1966 1967-1973 1974-1979 1981-1986
Wheat 1334 1353 1404 1330
Maize 1689 1620 1866 1944
Rice 810 1213 1110 1087
Cotton 1784 1577 1309 1060
Sugar Cane 123 185 248 268
Clover 2523 2996 3100 3289
Vegetables 563 765 1030 1247
Fruits 156 264 344 .	 481
Source:
t
 INP. 1992. Etaharer E1-Eqtisadi wa Qita' Asera'a. "Economic Liberalisation and the
Agricultural Sector" (Qadaya Atalchteet wa Tanmya fi Misr, No.77). Cairo: 1NP.
The result of these changes in cultivated areas with a sluggish increase in
productivity and a rapid increase in population resulted in an increasing food gap in
some main food commodities, as shown in Table 5.4 . Food imports increased while
exports of agricultural products declined, this resulted in an increasing deficit in the
agricultural trade balance, starting from 1975, of US $ 1299.6 million, reaching
about US $ 4427.5 million in 1985 from a total deficit in the trade balance of US $
4	 •	 •This increase was due to the increased demand on hay as fodder, the price of which was higher than
for grains.
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2532.3 million and 6237.3 million respectively, thus the agricultural sector was
mainly responsible for the persistent trade deficit.
Table 5. 2 Farm Prices and International Prices for Main Crops 	 (Egyptian pounds)
Crop Cotton (Qantar) Wheat (Ardeb) Rice (Ton) Sugar Cane
(Ton)
Onion (Ton)
FP EP FP IP FP EP FP EP FP IP
1971 18.24 26.08 5.00 na 34.67 na 2.57 5.60 19.00 na
1976 32.00 46.55 7.00 9.09 50.00 99.25 8.00 25.60 33.00 89.19
1981 58.09 90.10 11.50 24.46 85.00 332.2 16.00 61.50 52.00 236.3
0 6
1986 96.86 173.87 25.00 19.23 165.0 na 30.50 65.60 100.0 222.2
0	 0	 2
na = not available
Figures for Cotton prices are for the year 1985 not 1986
Source: MARL, Central Agency for Agricultural Statistics as cited in INP. 1992. Etaharer E1-Eqtisadi
wa Qita' Asera'a. (Qadaya Atalchteet wa Tarunya fi Misr, No.77). Cairo: IN?.
It should be noted that the policy of state control over the agricultural sector
was problematic because it was biased towards big farmers. Big farmers were more
able to violate the crop pattern and to pay the fine. They also had better access to
selected seeds and credit. Farmers with holdings of less than one feddan were only
entitled to short-term credit (for agricultural inputs) not medium and long term. On
the other hand, subsidy inputs were available to all farmers regardless of their farm
size. That meant that a high percentage of subsidies went to big farmers who
allowed the amount of subsidies to inflate and burden the public budget. Area,price
and trade control were not the only obstacles for the agricultural sector. Extensive
intervention was applied through poorly-trained and too many bureaucrats.
The Effect on the Macroeconomy
As a result of the applied policies and the low investment levels, agricultural growth
was sluggish. While the average annual growth rate in the 1960s was 2.7 percent, it
rose to 3.5 percent during the 1970s and fell to its lowest in the 1980s to reach 2.5
percent (World Bank, 1993:5). Other estimates for the agricultural growth rate
during the 1970s and early 1980s thought that it was below 2 percent (Hank,
1997:74). These low rates of growth affected the sector's historical contribution to
the economy (See Table 5.3). Its share in GDP fell from around 30 percent in 1974
to about 19.3 percent in the mid-1980s. Employment in this sector declined from 47
percent of total employment to 35.8 percent in 1985. The sector's share from exports
declined as well from 25 percent in 1974 to 17.7 percent in 1985. In spite of this
deteriorating performance, transfers out of the agricultural sector in the form of
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indirect taxes continued. Net
 transfers out of agriculture tended to be at their highest
during the 1970s, while they reached 6.6 percent of GDP in 1965, jumped to 19.2 in
1975, then showed a decreasing trend to reach 6.3, 3.8 percent in 1980 and 1985
respectively (Dethier, 1989, as cited in Sarris, 1994:84). This decreasing trend was
still high in absolute terms. In 1980, transfers out of agriculture due to price
differentials were LE 987 million and net transfers after conducting subsidies
reached LE 580 million (Nassar & Mansour, as cited in Hank, 1997:63).
Table 5. 3 Share of Agriculture in the Economy
1974
Share of Agriculture in GDP a/	 30
Share of Agriculture in Exports b/	 25
Share of Agriculture in Employment 	 47
a/ in 1987 constant prices, at factor cost.
1980 1985 1990 1991/92
25.4
22.5
36.7
19.3
17.7
35.8
19.9
20.3
na.
16.5
33
b/ Data relates to 1981, 1985 and 1989, respectively
source: World Bank, 1993, p. 5. Data for 1991/92 from Egyptian National Third Plan.
The weak performance in the agriculture sector resulted in a severe food
deficit. Total domestic production of food commodities were not only much less
than domestic consumption, but also food exports were much below food imports.
This meant that the agricultural sector could not provide self-finance to cover
domestic food needs, to achieve the proposed new concept of food security which
replaced the old self-sufficiency notion. Table 5.4 explains the development in self-
sufficiency of the main food commodities. 	 •
e
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Table 5. 4 Self-Sufficiency for Main Food Commodities 	 (percent)
Crops 1960 1974 1980 1985/86 1987/88
Wheat 53.0 40.0 24.0 21.0 29.0
Maize 99.0 87.0 74.0 60.2 68.4
Rice 138.0 112.0 107.0 103.8 105.8
Broad Beans 97.0 73.0 69.0 94.8 109.5
Lentils 100.0 73.0 70.0 51.8 19.3
Red Meet 100.0 84.0 71.0 73.9 81.8
Poultry 95.0 85.0 64.0 90.6 91.4
Fish 93.0 92.0 62.0 66.8 68.7*
Edible Oil na na na 21.6 27.6
Sugar 97.0 83.0 52.0 49.8 62.5
* Figures for the year 1989/90
Sources: For 1960, 1974 & 1980 INP, 199
For 1985/86, 1987/88: Mustafa, M. S. 1994. Esyasat E1-Eslahya le-Qita' Asyra'a wa El-
Ghesa' wa Atharaha ala El-Awda' El-Ma'shaya lel-Sukan fi Misr. Cairo: INP. p4.
The food gap was covered by imports. The massive dependence on food
imports increased the economy's vulnerablity to changes in international prices. It
also helped to push food prices up, a matter which increased the food subsidies given
•by the government. This in turn increased the burden on the budget. Because of the
massive increase in food imports compared with food exports, the agricultural trade
balance suffered an increased deficit from US $ 360 million in 1975 to US $ 2,091
in 1985/86. Thus Food deficit was in turn claimed responsible of many macro
imbalances, and had sensitive results on social equity, national security and price
stability. Table 5.5 shows some indicators for the relation between food security and
macro balances. It shows that the food deficit features are very much in evidence in
both the fiscal deficit and the trade balance. It is also a crucial factor in the cost of
livingo hence price stability (Abdel-Khalek, 1994:51).
Table 5. 5 Food Deficit and Macro Balances (US $ billion)
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 Period Average
1- Food Imports(FI) 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.3
2- Commodity Imports (CI) 10.6 11.4 11.4 11.1
3- Commodity Exports (CE) 3.2 3.1 3.9 3.4
4- Trade Balance (TB) 7.4 8.3 7.5 7.7
5- FL/CE (%) 77 80 49 69
6- Fl/TB (%) 34 30 25 30
7-	 Food	 subsidy	 as	 %	 of	 Gov. 20
Expenditure
8- Share of household food expend (%) 56
9-Wheat self sufficiency ratio (%)* 29
* Average for the period 1985/86 - 1989/90.
Source: Abdel-Khalek.1994. "Egypt's ERSAP: The Orthodox Recipe and the Alternative."
In Abdel-Khalek & Kheir El-Din (eds) Economic Reform and its Distributive Impact. Cairo:
Dar El-Mustakbal El 7 Arabi. p50.
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An econometric study of the structural causes of inflation in Egypt illustrated
as well that the main structural cause of inflation during the studied period of 1974-
1987/88 was the slow growth-rate in the agricultural sector. This was through the
direct impact of the deficit in the food supply and the indirect impact on the
insufficient supply of raw materials of agricultural origin and its effect on the slow
growth of other sectors. This was explained by the increased demand on agricultural
products due to an increase in the population and in income during this period which
led to a massive increase in the price of some food commodities (e.g. vegetables,
fruits and meat). Insufficient agricultural raw materials lead to unused capacity in
some industries, which led in turn to a shortage in its supply. On the other hand,
unused capacity increases production cost hence increased prices. The sluggish
performance of the agricultural export led to a decline in the export of food
commodities such as rice and sugar and in agricultural commodities in general,
while food imports increased. However, did the decrease in exports and the increase
in imports help in controlling the price increase? In fact it led to a massive increase
in the balance of payments deficit and to a reduction in non-food imports which led
to an increase in their prices. Food subsidies helped to limit the increase in food
prices, however the increased amount of subsidies accelerated the budget deficit.
This in turn led to a more inflationary pressure on the general price level. In addition,
both the compulsory delivery system and the pricing system limited the increase in
prices though it led to increased supply bottlenecks in agricultural goods. In sum, as
proved by the econometric results too, the -slow growth of agricultural sector was the
main cause for inflation (Kheir El-Din, 1991:79-83).
5.3. Policies and Performance of the Agricultural Sector during SAP
5.3.1. The Strategy of the Reform.. -
Agriculture reform was introduced to the agricultural sector as early as 1987 with the
encouragement of the World Bank and USAID. Detailed measures and different
phases of the reform were agreed between the two international financial
organisations and the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the main outline of the
strategy is the same, there are few differences according to each partner's views and
interests.
The official national reform strategy, official publications provide us with the main
outlines. The third national plan, 1992/1993-1996/1997, delineated four main goals
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for the agricultural sector: to modernise Egyptian Agriculture; to achieve the most
possible level of self sufficiency for staple crops; to increase the efficiency of
resource use in such a way as to help increase agricultural production, income and
pre-capita share; to increase agricultural exports of goods with comparative
advantage in order to restore the balance of agricultural trade (MOP, 1992:252).
The main strategy to achieve these goals, which started in the late 1980s, was
built on freeing market forces; increasing private-sector participation in economic
activity and the decision-making process; limiting the role of the state to prepare
plans and programmes to increase and enforce private-sector participation in the
agricultural development process in addition to its role in agricultural research and
extension, economic studies and providing information and statistics (ibid). Some
more detailed, though still general, policies were stated in the national plan which
were more focusing on general goals without clear explanations as to the way to
achieve them, their priorities, or time-span.
The agricultural strategy for the 1990s developed by the MALR with the
consultation with IBRD, UNDP, FAO, WEP and UNEP, was discussed by the Shura
Council, and claims to have been discussed by the political parties. The main
objectives of the strategy are:
• Ensuring the optimum allocation and utilisation of agricultural resources
(particularly land and water) together with conserving, improving and developing
these resources to achieve sustainable agricultural development, i.e., increasing
production and income (efficiency or growth) as well as with attaining equity and
combining with environmental aspects.
• Better Utilisation of comparative advantages to increase exports and to contribute to
the overall food security of the country.
ID Creating new opportunities for gainful employment in rural areas (Nassar, undated:
2-3).
The above strategy highlights three main themes: growth in the agricultural
sector should be built on efficient resource allocation, resource use should be
sustainable and equitable; and food security is achieved by enhancing exports of
crops of comparative advantage to finance the import of other deficit crops (as was
stressed in the National Plan as well); finally employment creation is stressed.
The new proposed strategy for the period 1997/98 up to 2016/2017, indicated
imperatives of achieving an annual growth-rate of 4 percent. It puts more emphasis
on sustaining cereals production through price policy and using high yielding
varieties. At the same time, it aims to maintain rice acreage around 900,000 feddans
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a year. This is to cope with the World Bank recommendation to constrain crops with
high water-usage. Within the same line the strategy encourages the expansion of
sugar-beet crop and projects to promote efficient use of irrigation water. It also
encourages soil improvement and maintenance projects. Improving the efficiency of
horticultural crops marketing and post harvest treatment to increase exports.
Encouraging cotton production for domestic needs and exports main factor in this
concern is providing mechanism to safeguards producers against the risk of price
fluctuation. Allowing recent graduates to own part of the reclaimed land and
allocate the rest to small farmers and investors. While encouraging the production
of animal production, providing support for agricultural research and marketing
extension, mobilising role of women, creating conductive environment for private
investment, Egyptian, Arab and foreign (See Nassar, undated: 8-10).
Although the declared strategy tried to cover most aspects of the agricultural
sector, it reflects a static and unintegrated view. It does not identify the sources of
growth within the agricultural sector, how this increase will be achieved and what
the policy impact will be on equity in rural areas. It does not delineate the role for
the public and private sectors, or explain how to create a favourable environment for
the private sector and what is its expected role. The need for institutional reform is
absent. A targeted strategy for the new lands is also needed. In the broader sense, it
fails to integrate the dynamics of rural areas, the social structure, distribution of
power and the political role. It ignores the relationship between land and population,
between big farmers and small farmers, between farmers and labourers and finally
between traditional farmers and new investors. In general it is important to
emphasise again that equity issues were referred to without any real concern about
how the dynamics of the reform would really affect farmers differentially. This is
because in some cases the means for reform were considered a target while real
objectives were neglected. Emphasis was directed to increasing prices, cutting
subsidies and limiting the role of the PBDAC in distributing inputs, thus making
way for private merchants. The new reform of land tenure was rarely mentioned
within the dynamics of the reform especially in the early writings about this subject
(see for example objectives of the reform programme as quoted in Khedr, 1992).
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The World Bank and USAID, The World Bank reports on agricultural strategies for
the 1990s represent a comprehensive strategy for the rural sector. The strategy
targeted a growth rate for the agricultural sector of 3 percent during the 1990s (WB,
1993:11). Then by the middle of the decade it was realised that a 4 percent growth
rate in the agricultural sector was needed to raise the national rate to 5 percent per
annum (USAID, 1995:i). Other estimates for USAID, based on the experience of
low and middle-income countries, estimated the needed growth rate in the
agricultural sector to be between 4-5 percent per annum, that is a more than 2
percent per capita of the total population (JMA, 1995:5). It was thought by both the
World Bank and USAID that Egyptian resources, land and water, are not efficiently
used and that there is a potential to accelerate growth through the reallocation of
resources in favour of the highest value crops, taking into consideration the
utilisation cost of land and water and ecological sustainability. This means to
'increase the productivity of the unit of land and water, reduce unit cost of
production, and thereby increase national output and farmers' incomes' (WB,
1993:11). Although it is agreed between the two agencies that better utilisation of
resources is needed there is a slight difference about the most efficient use of
resources, as we will see later. The World Bank referred to equity issues and poverty
alleviation through the growth process. There is also a belief that although crop
yields are high there is more potential to increase them, considering the quality of the
available resources (JMA, 1995:6). In addition, an export-led strategy was thought
to help in accelerating the growth and achieve national and food security. The
propdsed strategy of the World Bank was built upon five main principals as follows;
. • The need for measures to ensure efficient use of important natural resources, i.e.
water and arable land;
• The use of the free market, and the promotion of the private sector, in resource
allocation;
• A comprehensive look at rural development including better involvement of women,
diversification of rural activities, and provision of essential social programmes for
health and education;
• The recognition of social and political issues;
• The initiation of institutional reforms (WB, 1993:xii).
The proposed strategy by the World Bank is more integrated and
comprehensive than that of the GOE and the USAID and reflects an awareness of
rural needs. However, the real implemented policies failed to a large extent to
encompass some of the objectives or to achieve the relevant results. In this respect
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Bush (1996) considered the expression of concern with issues of equity, the position
of women and the landless as not being seriously pursued. Bush also pointed out
that the characterisation of the Egyptian countryside employed by both the agencies
failed to integrate the dynamics underpinning the relations of power and politics and
the issues which are currently affecting the rural poor during the period of
adjustment (Bush 1996:76).
Rationale and Dynamics of the Reform in Agriculture
The World Bank strategy aims to achieve a more efficient use of Egypt's limited
resources, land and water, through increasing agricultural productivity per unit of
land and water, and reducing the unit costs of production. This will lead to other
objectives to be directly achieved, as it will increase national output and farmers
incomes. It will lead as well to divergence of resources to the production of more
competitive crops, increase exports and achieve national food security goals. This
could be achieved from the World Bank point of view through three main policies:
the free market economy (an increased role for the private sector); cost recovery; and
land tenure changes.
Both GOB and USAID agreed to the above policies with only a few
differences: The main dispute between the GOE and the World Bank concerns the
cost recovery programme. On the other hand, all partners agree upon the need to
adopt an export led strategy to achieve food security from its broader context and to
improve the balance of payment deficit. It was thought that the three main policies
above wolild lead to divergence of resources and to the production of more
competitive crops and increased exports. In addition, there was a recognition of the
need . to improve technology, and to undertake administrative and institutional
reforms; yet the reform programme did not provide practical policies in this respect.
Free Market Mechanism and Private Initiative
The orthodox view of Egypt's agricultural decline was blamed on state intervention,
and price control in particular, for working as a disincentive to farmers to grow
certain crops and for creating deficiencies in resource use. Price liberalisation was
seen to provide more incentives to farmers to grow and invest in crops with real high
value added i.e. in competitive crops. International prices were used to compare the
distortion in prices at the national level and the target was set to increase prices at
• there international levels. Analyses done by the World Bank which take into
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account the value added and the resource use of different crops, show that Egypt has
the greatest advantage in cultivating horticulture products (fruits and vegetables),
cotton and wheat, a disadvantage in producing water-intensive crops, rice and
sugarcanc, and is moderately competitive in some relatively low water-consuming
crops such as maize, beans, potatoes, long berseem and oil seeds (World Bank,
1993:37-38). The study is not in favour of expanding the cultivation of long
berseem and suggests the substitution of some of its present demand by non-
traditional feeds. It is also not in favour of expanding the production of livestock
and prefers to expand the production of poultry and fish, as they are less resource
demanding (ibid,:42). This strategy an involves increasing importation of non-
traditional fodder, which places a greater burden on the balance of payment. On the
one hand, the study recognises the other benefits of growing livestock as in
maintaining soil fertility through the provision of manure, and in providing proteins
in the local diet. It was also unable to ignore the social and economic consequences
of the division of labour inside the family. Livestock production, which accounts for
one-third of the gross agricultural production, relies heavily on women's work (ibid).
As for the cultural aspects, it must be noted that the reduction of livestock
production does not mean that all women work force will be diverted to other
activities. This is because livestock activities can be carried out inside the house,
working in the field even on the family farm is constrained by many social factors
and is relatively correlated to the economic and /or the social level of the family. On
the other hand, it is true that fishery resources are under utilised in Egypt and need
further consideration especially with the increase in population.
In contrast to the World Bank's view, an expert house working for the
USAID suggested the importance of giving priority to horticulture, cotton and
livestock and that these three subsectors need to grow at a level of 6.5 percent, while
maintaining a growth rate equal to population growth level for the basic food staples
in order to achieve growth rate of 4.5 percent per annum for the agricultural sector
(JMA, 1995:5-6). The three sub-sectors were selected because they contribute over
half the value added to the sector; a substantial increase in their growth rate will
contribute greatly to the growth rate of the sector. Both cotton and horticulture are
export crops, while livestock depends on domestic demand. Such an expansion in
livestock production will entail an increase in the import of fodder. It must be noted
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that the proposed strategy of the JMA considers the commercial interests of US,
which explain the replacement of wheat with livestock. The Egyptian government
view concerning crop patterns and the priority of the sub-sectors is not completely
clear, however, it agrees with what is proposed by the World Bank concerning
increasing wheat production. In general it is concerned with rationalising the use of
irrigation water, and not expanding the areas of rice and sugarcane and in
maintaining their high level of yields; raising the self-sufficiency of cereals,
especially wheat, and planting corn to support the poultry industry; improving
productivity of cotton and horticulture without increasing its area (Nassar & Khedr,
1997:14-15).
The validity of more than one strategy to accelerate the growth rate in the
agricultural sector refers to the limitation of the price policy alone to achieve the
efficient use of resources and that there is a need for a more targeted policy to
provide incentives for farmers. On the one hand, there is no direct relation between
international prices and real domestic cost, so there is no guarantee that the provision
of international prices will direct production toward crops of high value for unit of
land and water at the lowest production cost. On the other hand, there are factors
other than profit which direct the allocation of resources and the choice of crop
pattern at farm level, which render the price policy not completely effective in
achieving its target. An empirical study of an Egyptian village that was not subject
to a compulsory crop pattern proved that other factors such as the availability of
family labour, size of farm, availability of off-farm activity and household self-
sufficiency consideration have impact on the choice of crop pattern (El-Gaafarawi,
1990.. There is also the effect of the habit of growing traditional crops, which are
expected to be more responsive to the increase in prices as farmers become more
aware of the farming techniques. This point will be examined further in the study on
the impact of the reforms.
The increase in prices affects production 'once for all' as it reallocates the
resources towards the most profitable, and it is unlikely that the profits achieved will
be sustained. This is because the withdrawal of the PBDAC from distributing inputs
increases the levels of middlemen and increases the transaction costs and creates
uncertainty about prices and a state of asymmetric information. Big producers will
have better access to market information, know-how and technology as well. There
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is the risk of a further increase in agricultural inputs with the withdrawal of the bank,
especially with the absence of a relevant legal infrastructure to regulate the market,
which Egypt's market still urgently needs. While merchants used to sell at similar
prices to those of the bank and give concessions to farmers in payment to compete
with the bank (see El-Gaafarawi, 1991; Abou Mandour & Siyam 1995) the
complete withdrawal of the PBDAC will deprive farmers of sources of information
about price levels and will give merchants more control over prices. There is also
the potential for further increases in the cost of production with the increase of rent
after the full application of law 896 of 1992 in the relationship between landowners
and tenants.
In a liberalised economic environment market signals are supposed to direct
farmers to investment in these competitive crops. This encourages exports and
enables them to achieve food security targets on the basis of external trading of high
value foodstuffs with staple deficit foods. In addition to the direct effect of the
liberalisation of agricultural prices, the liberalisation of exchange rates and initial
devaluation are expected to have some impact on agricultural production as well.
The prices of export decrease and the prices of import increase, this is expected to
increase demand on exports and reduce it for imports. However, this is related to
elasticity of demand for imports which is low for cereals as a staple food. USAID
anticipated a shift towards production of these high-value foodstuffs such as:
strawberries, fine green beans, peppers and tomatoes, as well as grapes, peaches and
other citrus crops to yield as much as US $ 100-150 million a year up to 1996 (as
cited ii Bush, 1996:83).
Other issues need to be considered when discussing exports. First, there is
the increasing competition in the global market, and the willingness of importing
countries to open their markets to Egyptian exports. Egyptian Agricultural 'exports
have their biggest market in the Arab countries which are completely free markets
open to different countries, with increasing competition in the world market,
Egyptian exports will suffer more competition there. The European market is the
second market for Egyptian exports as Egypt has a joint economic co-operation
agreement with EC countries since 1977. According to this agreement some
Egyptian exports are custom free, others have low custom rates compared with other
countries. According to the GATT agreement these countries are obliged to reduce
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their customs on agricultural products by 36 percent during six years. This will lead
to the elimination of the Egyptian exports privilege (Kheir El-Din, 1997:7). A new
economic co-operation with the EC has been under negotiation for years.
Agricultural aspects remain the principal obstacle to the concluding of an agreement,
as Egypt cannot reach an agreement that compensates her for the GATT losses.
Studying the effects of free trade on Egyptian crops after the Uruguay Round reveals
increases in the international demand and price of rice, which encourages Egyptian
exports. The failure of Egypt to satisfy its quotas in the quota system of the EC of
some food products like potatoes, oranges, onion and green beans is due to its
inability to meet EC goods standards. This underlines the internal constraints on
Egyptian exports and the need to improve product quality, packing, and preserving
facilities (ibid,:17-18).
The direct effect of reducing custom duties on Egyptian imports is a decline
in the prices of imported goods, which increases their competition with local goods.
However, with the elimination of subsidies on agricultural goods in the international
markets, this increases their price and reduces their penetration in the local market.
However this does depend on the elasticity of demand which is high for staple food
where the substitutes are limited. In this case, the effect of a rise in the international
markets will increase the burden on the balance of payments. Consequently it is in
Egypt's interests to increase the production of such import-substitute goods such as
wheat - a matter .which Egypt is already considering. Another aim of price
correction is to reduce the tax burden on farming, hence improving incomes and
stimulating the supply-side response. Ending such transfers is only
macroeconomically sustainable if either government expenditure is reduced or an
alternative source of revenue is found (Richards, 1994:19). However, although the
"right prices" and the elimination of indirect tax can achieve efficiency gains in
reallocating land from lower to higher value crops, these gains are what Richards
calls a 'once for all' type (Richards, 1994: 3 & Bush, 1996: 116). It is also argued
that price liberalisation of agricultural crops would improve terms of trade between
agricultural and non-agricultural goods which in turn would encourage more
investment in agricultural projects (Abou Mandour, 1996:185).
Another element of market economy in agriculture is privatising input
marketing, which is claimed to promote more timely delivery of farm inputs
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(Richards, 1994:19). The Egyptian case reflects a clear failure in this respect and
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. With the withdrawal of the
PBDAC from marketing and with liberalisation, the PBDAC intends to convert
completely to a commercial bank. As the role of the bank in distributing agricultural
inputs is eliminated, so is the in-kind credit, and subsidy on interest rates. The new
policy aims at the bank providing its own finance and reducing its reliance on loans
from the banking system. This needs an active policy from the bank to collect
deposits and to offer a near market interest rate. Lending within the deposit range is
thought to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation among rural firms and
households (Adams & Kamel, 1996:257). Although the bank's deposits increased
substantially between 1984/85 and 1993/94 from LE 574 million to LE 2949 million
(ibid) it covers less than two thirds of the bank's loans and its possibility to
accelerate its growth-rate is limited, given the low income levels and saving rates in
rural areas. To achieve this policy the bank needs to absorb savings from urban
areas, which in turn need the bank to be competitive with commercial banks as
regards its deposits and lending incentives. The fact that PBDAC is a government
bank constrains its lending policy as it relies heavily on collateral.
Cost Recovery Programme
Water resources seem to be a major limitation on agricultural expansion in the
future. The shortage of water is estimated to be in the range of 2 to 6 percent of total
requirements if the proposed land reclamation programme is to be implemented at
the presently proposed scale of about 1.4 million feddans; the shortage would be
more severe under drought conditions. The availability of water could be increased
through the completion of the Jonglai canal, more effective in farm irrigation
practices, changes in cropping patterns in the direction of less water consuming
crops and the introduction of an improved irrigation system in the old lands (World
Bank, 1993:24-25). While the completion of the Jonglai canal is related to the
external factor of the civil war in Sudan, the World Bank and the USAID thought the
other goals could be achieved through a cost recovery programme which would
allow for the recovery of O&M costs and if possible recover a contribution towards
investment costs. In justification of such a programme, the World Bank pointed out
that indirect taxes in the agricultural sector, which could be argued as a source of
finance, has been-removed, in addition to the need to increase the current level of
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spending in order to ensure the required adequate levels of maintenance. The World
Bank thought that the necessary charges to recover O&M costs would not have a
significant impact on net farm incomes. The fee covering present O&M would only
be in equivalent to 3 percent of net farm revenue for representative farms of 3.5 and
2.2 feddans in the Delta and Upper Egypt respectively, while a fee covering present
O&M and capital costs would be equivalent to 5-6 percent of net revenues. This
seemed to be bearable considering that real net farm incomes have risen by about
40% since 1984, according to the World Bank estimation (World Bank, 1996:26-
29). This says nothing about the non-representative farms, those of less than one
feddan. It also ignores the unequal effect• of the reforms on income according to
farm size and crop mix. It overlooked its own recognition of the steep fall in
agricultural wages since 1985 which shifted income towards land holders and
reduced it for those without access .to land and the near landless (Bush, 1996:82).
From the World Bank's point of view the cost-recovery programme would
rationalise the farmers' decision concerning crop mix and would shift the crop
pattern towards crops with low water requirements. According to their studies, the
value added per m3 water, excluding the cost of water, is high for tomatoes and
wheat, cotton, beans, and oranges respectively, while it reaches its lowest for
sugarcane and rice respectively. It is estimated that about 35 percent of water is used
by sugarcane and rice which together account for 13 percent of agricultural value
added (World Bank, 1993:28).
While the government of Egypt agreed to apply cost recovery programmes on
the now reclaimed land, on the old land there are social and political difficulties
surrounding the implementation. The national plan referred to the need to encourage
crop patterns that achieve the highest possible level of food security taking water
into consideration in the economic accountancy, without giving in-depth view of this
matter. On the other hand, one of the Egyptian academics and a prominent actor in
the reform programme in agriculture announced in an interview that there is no
intention to implement this part of the programme (Bush, 1996:81). This suggests
that the Egyptian government manipulates the World Bank and the farmers and it
can change its decision in case of severe pressure from the Bank.
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Land Tenure Arrangements
Under the old land tenure-law, tenants enjoyed land rents with tenancy contracts in
perpetuating the ability to pass them on to their heirs. This meant that tenants
enjoyed legal protection against being dismissed from the land. Rent was equal to
seven times the land tax, re-valued every ten years and reached around LE 250 per
feddan in 1989. In 1992, a new law was revised (law 96), which provided a
transition period of five years during which rents were increased to 22 times the land
tax and the owners were able to buy back the tenancy contracts. At the end of the
five years, rents were to be determined freely on market bases; in addition, owners
are now able to terminate current contracts.
When the new land reform was launched it was justified on equity issues,
improved productivity and land property rights (see National Plan; Mustafa,
1994:11). Mustafa drew attention to the relative stability at the amount of rent in the
same time of increasing land productivity, crop prices, hence land returns. In
addition, due to many socio-economic changes many beneficiaries of the tenancy
contracts moved to other occupations while keeping the rented land or rented it in
turn to others which led to inefficient or weak utilisation of these lands (Mustafa,
1994:11).
The World Bank emphasises the importance of land tenure issues to
maximise the returns from land. They believe that the low level of rents acted as a
disincentive to rent out land and in combination with law 116, which prohibits the
leaving of land fallow for more than a year, encouraged insufficient use of resources.
This i because they are forced to cultivate it in a suboptimal manner in order to
retain their ownership rights (World Bank, 1993:33). The World Bank still
expresses dissatisfaction at the current levels of taxes, and calls for more frequent
. reassessments. They also call for bringing farmers owing less than 3 feddans within
the purview of the land tax system. This is at odds with the equality issues which
the Bank called for earlier. Holding of three feddans for farm size indicates a
minimum holding of land for average family size to avoid poverty (see Kishk, as
cited in Bush, 1996).
When the time to implement the law was due, the government had to face an
increasing number of violent acts in many governorates where there were high levels
of tenancy, namely Dakhalia and Kalubia. Initial government response was the use
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of oppression by the police force. While the law tried to secure some fairness for the
owners it created an unfair situation for the tenants. In fact the government had done
nothing during the transition period of the law to find a solution for the tenants who
rent all the land they cultivate. Even data about the exact number and the total area
that is rented is not available and certainly equity issues not addressed. Any
assessment of the problem of the relationship between tenants and owners should
integrate the long-term dimensions of the problem. These are the long term
relationship between resources (land and water in particular) and population as
stressed by Abdel-Fatah (1997:32) and the resulting problem of land fragmentation.
The relationship between the population and resources is important and
begins with several issues. The relationship between land and population is not
balanced and the average size of holdings is diminishing. In the meantime, there is
an increasing challenge facing the agricultural sector in the near future to increase its
production to meet increases in population. On the other hand, land and water are
the main constraints on agricultural expansion and the fact that the new land has low
productivity compared with the old land that is still the main contributor to
agricultural production. Bearing this in mind, it is important to point out that due to
the small size of farms and with the large size of households in rural areas, the
relative importance of agricultural assets has changed considerably. Land is no
longer the main source of income, as farmers have developed different types of
investment, the most important is in agricultural machinery where the income from
renting them out exceeds the revenue on. land, - in addition to the increasing
importance of non-farm income (see Abdel-Fatah, 1996:32; El-Gaafarawi, 1991;
CACS, 1994). While land fragmentation had a negative impact on the efficient use
of resources, since could affect productivity, increase in water wastage, in some
cases it encourages the use of agricultural lands for urban purposes, which is more
profitable (El-Gaafarawi, 1991). Thus land consolidation may prove useful if equity
issues had been taken into consideration.
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Table 5. 6 Number and Areas of Holdings by Feddans in 1989/1990
Total Holding Areas
	 Completely Rented Areas
Number of
	 Holding Areas
	 Number of	 Holding Areas
Holdings	 Holdings
F	 Q
Less than Fed 1050900
	 508144	 17	 173130 87335 16
1- 1215869
	 2078541	 8	 170969 279095 19
3- 350222	 1250949
	
17	 29632 103509 8
5- 198926
	 1250038
	
23	 9147 57078 11
10- 60932	 793707	 13	 2470 31288 13
20- 27288
	 770403	 3	 1135 31552 23
50- 4520	 287585	 4	 371 23128 2
100+ 1622	 909803	 4	 316 65080 16
Total 2910279
	 7849173
	 17	 387160 677069 13
F = Feddan Q = Qirat
Source: MALR, 1989/90 Agricultural Census, Volume of Total Republic p 15.
It is important to study the holding structure in rural areas to assess the
impact of the law on equity on the one hand and productivity and efficiency on the
other. Table 5.6 shows the last available data on the distribution of land holdings.
There are different kinds of holdings: those who own the whole area of their
holding; those who rent for cash the whole area of their holdings; those who rent the
whole area as share cropping; and those whose holding is a combination of two sorts
or more of the above-mentioned. There are also different kinds of landowners, those
who hold their whole land, those who rent out all their land, and those who hold part
and rent an other part. The problematic categories of tenants are those who rent all
their lands and who are threatened with landlessness. These amount to 387,160
tenants, who represent 13.3 percent of the total number of holders and hold 8.6
percent of the total area. There are also those who own part of their land and rent
anoth& part. They account for 16.2 percent of the total holders and rent 7.6 percent
of the total area. Most of those with mixed holdings are concentrated in the
smallholdings: 66.6 percent hold less than three feddans, and 26.8 percent hold five
feddans and less than seven. It is also of note that in these two categories about half
the holdings are owned and the other rented. Losing the rented part increases the
suffering of those who own less than three feddans, which moves the holders in the
second category to the edge of poverty. Another group are land owners who rent out
their land, partly or completely, and do not get a fair rent, especially those small
owners whose standards of living is low and some of whom work in agriculture but
cannot obtain access to their land.
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The last year of the transition period of the land reform witnessed some
violence and the police force was used to control the antagonists. In some cases the
police clearly supported the interests of the landlords. To contain the situation, the
government offered three suggestions:
a- to establish a land fund to provide soft credit for farmers who want to buy the
land.
b- to give reclaimed land to farmers who have to leave the land.
c- to postpone the implementation of the law in land owned by the state (Abdel-
Fatah, 1997:34). The provision of finance is subject to many conditions which are
completely irrelevant to the small farmers. Among these is that in which the upper
limit to a loan is 70 percent of the land value repaid over 7 years at an annual interest
rate of 13 percent. Abdel Fatah compares this to housing loans for university
professors which are repaid over 40 years at an interest rate of 5 percent; while some
farmers who obtained contracts for reclaimed land discovered that the same piece of
land was allocated to more than one fanner. This is a false solution merely to calm
the farmers during the transition period (for more detailed discussion of the validity
of the solutions offered see Abdel-Fatah, 1997: 33-7).
5.3.2 The Actual Reform Measures in Egyptian Agriculture
The reform programme was divided into two phases. The first phase, 1987-89,
reduced price and marketing controls and delivery quotas for 10 major crops,
reduced subsidies on inputs and increased farm-gate prices of fertiliser by 75
percent, (See Table 5.7 for changes in the direct subsidy for agricultural inputs). The
PBDAC reduced its involvement in input marketing and private sector participation
was encouraged.
During the second phase, 1990-94, a complete liberalisation of the sector was
brought about. This included increasing cotton procurement prices to 66 percent of
the economic price in the early 1990s and complete liberalisation of its prices were
achieved in 1994. Government control of prices for different crops was completely
abolished. Procurement quotas for all crops including rice were removed, except for
sugarcane, as the government still controls this industry. The compulsory cropping
pattern was removed. In addition, there was the limiting of the role of the PBDAC to
providing credit for agricultural activities; the elimination of all subsidies on inputs
and the restricting of subsidised credit; liberating of seed production and marketing;
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the introduction of a new law to regulate the relationship between landlord and
tenants -Law 96 for 1992 ( Khedr, 1994: 52; Kheir El-Din, 1997: 3-4).
Table 5. 7 Changes in Subsidies for Agricultural inputs during 1988/89-1991/92
Years Fertilisers	 Insecticides Seeds foddor Interst rate Total
1988/89 182.60 114.70 3.60 na na na
1989/90 175.80 118.90 1.70 229.70 112.00 638.1
1990/91 193.80 116.70 3.50 170.60 92.00 576.6
1991/92 62.10 131.70 4.00 104.40 65.00 367.20
Source: Othman, M. A. 1993. El-Athar El-Mutarateba Ala Elgha' Eda'm Esyra'i fi Itar Bamameg
Etakayouf El-Haykali fi Esira'a El-Misrya.
Privatisation programmes in agriculture were also encouraged. This took
two forms; first, to limit state ownership of assets and second to encourage private
initiative in new activities which used to be the monopoly of the public sector.
One of the aims of the privatisation programme was to encourage the private
sector to replace government ownership to land both in agrarian reform and
reclaimed land. The agrarian reform authority planned to sell 10,000 feddan to the
private sector at current market prices. It also planned to sell 84.2 thousand feddans
of rented land to tenants and holders. 36.5 thousand feddans have already been sold
(Khedr, 1993:53).
The GOE encourages private sector participation in land reclamation and
plantation on the new land. The role of the state in the reform era will be limited to
the infrastructure, exploratory studies to choose the most suitable areas for
reclamation and to provide finance and the needed facilities for the plantation
process. The state is encouraging private sector ownership for reclaimed land and
trying to limit public ownership through three kinds of policies:
Selling land under the control of public agricultural companies to investors, workers,
and graduates. The revenues are planned to be used to finance the reclamation of
new land. About 384 thousands feddan have already been sold and have been
planted.
Selling land after providing the infrastructure, This is the policy since 83/84. The
plots sold to the private sector's investors were between 3 and 10 thousand feddans.
Selling or renting land suitable for reclamation to the private sector and encouraging
it to participate in land reclamation. This policy started in 1987.
In all, the total area under privatisation, according to the three types mentioned
above, is about 808 thousand feddans. In addition, the private sector is investing
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about LE 700 million to reclaim and develop J50 thous'ind feddans of non-reclaimed
land. The total amount under private sector effort for reclamation is about one
million feddans (Khedr, 1993:56).
5.3.3. Reform Imp act
In this section we study the impact of reform at the national level, then particular
emphasis is given to the effect on farmers, as this is the most debatable part. I study
the effect on fanners' access to resources (ability to invest) and utilisation of
resources (investment type) then the farmers' welfare and living conditions. Those
in the agribusiness will be assessed in the following chapter.
Utilisation of Resources
Several changes have occurred in the crop pattern during the reform. These changes
cannot all be attributed to changes in prices alone. Other factors affected these
variations, among them changes in productivity. Table 5 shows changes in both
crop areas and productivity during the reform.
Table 5. 8 Cultivated Areas and Productivity of Main Crops (1985-1995) (area=thousands offeddans)
Crop
1985
Cultivated Area
1990	 1992 1995 1985
Productivity*
1990	 1992 1995
Wheat 1186 1955 2092 2512 10.53 14.56 14.72 15.19
Maize 1914 1975 1967 2133 14.92 17.40 18.41 17.79
Rice 926 1037 1216 1401 na 3.01 3.40 3.60
Cotton 1081 993 840 710 6.79 5.21 7.15 7.27
Sugarcane 250 274 267 301 na 902.40 967.75 1020.93
Clover 1865 2620 2542 2430
Vegetables 1018 945 904 1043
Fruits 429 866 907 954
* Productivity per feddan: Ardeb for wheat and maize, M.Qantar for cotton, Dariba for rice,
and Qantar for sugarcane.
Source: For 1985 CAPMAS as cited in Kheir El-Din, 1997:9, For 1990-1995, CAPMAS.
1996. Statistical Year Book 1990-1995. Cairo.
While changes in prices, hence in the incentive structure, aimed to increase
the areas of wheat, cotton, and horticulture, only wheat and fruit areas have •
increased. While cotton and vegetable areas showed a downward trend and only the
vegetable area revived in 1995. Changes in prices aimed also to reduce or maintain
the area of rice as a crop consuming high quantities of water. The areas of rice were
increased. The figures show that the highest response was for wheat. This was high
due to the coincidence of increasing prices and productivity. The increase in
productivity cannot be wholly attributed to the effect of better incentives for farmers
as it is related mostly to research efforts in previous years. On the other hand, there
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is a belief that part of the increase in the cultivated areas is only statistical as before
SAP farmers used to underscore their wheat areas to avoid compulsory delivery.
There are also indications that the increase in the acreage of wheat was not part of
the increasing role of the market rather it was a response to the self-provisioning
needs in the market era where access to flour in the market was becoming more
expensive (see Mitchell, 1998: 22-23). Mitchell uses evidence for the farmers'
behaviour in one of Qina's villages where small farmers were the ones who
responded by increaiing their cultivated areas of wheat (ibid).
Figures for berseem show a decreasing area during the adjustment. Cotton
followed a decreasing trend in area and yields in the pre-reform period, although the
increase in productivity starting from 1990 which was related to an increase in
prices. Area response was negative. Land was taken from berseem-cotton rotation
and used for wheat and rice rotations (Nassar, 1996). This reveals that an increase in
price does not always lead to increases in the area cultivated and that there are other
factors that affect the crop area. In the case of cotton, the increase in productivity
compensates for area reduction, as cotton is a relatively risky crop which can be
subject to severe pest attacks in some years, and with the increasing trend towards
preferring self-provisioning crops, especially by small farmers, reduces the area of
cotton in favour of staple crops, including rice.
Crop production responses. We can now ask how these changes in crop
patterns and productivity affect production. A study of the reform impact on 23
major crops on old land revealed that significant changes in production did not occur
at the same time for all crops (Nassar et al 1996). Also many policy initiatives that
were .crop-specific occurred at different times. The years 1980-1986 are considered
the pre-reform period and 1987-1993 the years of reform. Overall production grew
at 2.7 percent a year from 1987 to 1993, compared with 1.1 percent before the major
reforms began (ibid,:90). The data shows a major increase in tomato production
after 1984, which the authors related to non-policy factors. The four main crops:
wheat and maize production increased massively after 1986, rice production
increased after 1988 and cotton only shows increase after 1991. The writers relate
the changes in these four main crops to changes in policies, particularly price
policies (Nassar et al, 1996:86). However, the increase in production cannot be
attributed to increases in price alone. It was clear that great improvements in
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productivity happened especially for wheat due to investing in improving new
varieties. The increase in productivity per unit, in addition to an increase in prices,
was the main incentive for increasing the cultivated area from wheat, hence an
increase in total production. The result of these increases in self-sufficiency was
positive. Self-sufficiency from all major crops increased except for lentils, as can be
seen in table 5.9 below.
Table 5. 9 Self-Sufficiency from Main Crops
Commodity	 Self-Sufficiency Ratio
1990 1995
Wheat 43 53
Maize 76 74
Rice 113 118
Broad Beans 91 96
Lintels 17 11
Edible Oil 14 18
Sugar 59 83
Source: MALR, Central Agency for Agricultural Economics, as cited in Kheir Eddin, H. 1997:11.
How did these changes in crop patterns, productivity and production affect
tradable goods in the agricultural sector? Was it able to the competitiveness of the
agricultural crops? Figures refer to the fluctuating performance of the agricultural
exports during the period 1991/92 to 1995/96. It reached its lowest in 1992/93, LE
976.7 million, and it highest in 1994/95, reaching LE 2088.4 million (MOP,
1997:59). These variations in the value of exports are related to the usability of the
exported crops. It was mainly affected by fluctuations in the exports of cotton,
which was still the major agricultural export. Its export value dropped to its lowest
point ill 1992 and 1993 at LE 175.2 million and LE 146.7 million respectively and
increased in 1994 at LE 691 million. It was affected also by variations in rice, the
second major crop. In general, most exported crops, potatoes, refined sugarcane, and
oranges, experienced major fluctuations during that period though in different
directions (see CAPMAS, 1996: Table 11.13). The impact on the agricultural trade
in general was positive, as its deficit decreased due to the decline in imports,
especially those of wheat (Kheir El-Din, 1997:12).
Utilisation of resources at farm level; It is important to understand which
classes of farmers increased the areas of which crops and why, and what were the
other determinants of resource allocation other than nominal profit. This will enable
us to assess the effect on income distribution and equity issues. An empirical study
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conducted in five governorates: three in the Delta (Sharqya, Daqahlya and
Munifiya); one in Middle Egypt (Bani-Suef); and one in Upper Egypt (Aswan) (see
Abou-Mandour & Siyam, 1995) examined the relationship between structural
adjustment and agriculture. The study revealed that farm size and crop pattern were
related and that middle-size and big farms (2-less than 5 feddans, and more than five
feddans respectively) had a more diversified crop pattern. Their study recorded that
small farms allocate a higher percentage of their land to growing cereals (wheat,
maize and rice) compared with the two other groups. As the study considered those
crops that benefited from the policy of reform, it concluded that SAP has a positive
sign concerning equity, provided that small farmers have better chances to access
agricultural machinery, high-quality seeds and credit to enhance their benefits. The
study also revealed that rental contracts discourage the cultivation of cereals and that
ownership of tractors is an important factor in encouraging the cultivation of such
crops (ibid,:132-34).
Meanwhile horticultural cultivation increased considerably with the increase
in holding areas. Big and middle-size farmers were able to benefit more from these
crops which used to be associated with big farms because of the need of large
investment and to the difficulties in accessing the markets. High percentages of
farmers in the three different groups show a preference for cultivating berseem,
which is related in turn to the ownership of livestock. Ownership of livestock
increases with increase in farm size but not by the same portion. The differences
were significant between the small and middle-size farmers but not between the
middle and big farmers. Potatoes achieved minor advantages during SAP, and
cultivated areas were independent of farm size and holding type. Nevertheless
sugarcane cultivation were related to large holdings and ownership of land in
particular, and the availability of agricultural credit played a vital role as well, while
it had a negative relationship with rental contracts due to its long duration on the
land. As for cotton, which was still under control when the study was conducted, its
area expanded with the increase in farm size and was more related to rented land
(ibid,:134-38). Findings at farm level confirm Mitchell's view mentioned above that
small farmers are motivated by self-provisioning in selecting their crop patterns.
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Access to Resources
A recent empirical study in two Delta villages revealed uneven access to resources,
land and input production, in addition to the spread of poverty. The study admits
that poverty is not new and can not be attributed to SAP alone, however, the strategy
introduced does not address the problems of the majority of the poor. In fact it
concentrates attention, and resources, upon peasants with more than 5 feddans of
land holding and owners rather than tenants (Bush, 1996: 121-122).
There is no definite data at the national level about how SAP affected
farmers' access to resources. However, there is some indication about the direction
of change. While there is no recent and comparable data about changes in land
during SAP, the last two agricultural censuses of 1981/82 and 1989/1990 show that
the number and percentage of tenants who rent all the area they hold compared to the
total holders has declined from 18 percent in the former census to only 13.3 percent
in the later one; so did the area they hold and its relative importance to the total area,
which declined from 11.9 percent in the former census to 8.6 in the later one
(Hassan, 1997:23). While this happened before the introduction of the law of
relationship between the landowners and tenants, it is important to note that the
debate about it started earlier and some tenants searched eagerly for solutions before
the introduction of the law which was thought to be in favour of the landowners,
hence more harmful to them. It also emphasises that landowners were keen to
recover their land and were trying hard to do so. There is no data to explain whether
this shift from tenancy to ownership was in favour of the old tenants or not.
Howeyer, if we know that most of this category of tenants are small farmers, of
whom 95.6 percent in 1981/82 and 96.6 percent in 1989/90 held less than five
feddan, it is more likely that they could not afford to buy the land. Furthermore, the
increased percentage of tenants of smallholdings suggests that the big tenants were
more able to buy the land.
There is empirical evidence that during the transitional period of the land-
reform law some small tenants had give up their tenancy contracts. In one village
about five or six farmers had to leave the land due to the new law (see Bush,
1996:143). The last year of the transition period witnessed more confrontation
between tenants and farmers due to the landlords' attempts to recover their land and
the failure of the government to provide real solutions. As I discussed earlier, credit
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terms to buy land were difficult, and those who received reclaimed land had
problems of access, as it was allocated to more than one person.
Access to credit, total short-term credit for crop production increased in
nominal terms from LE 676.6 million in 1986/87 to LE 2204.9 million in 1995/96
(PBDAC, unpublished data). However, in real terms, if we consider the inflation
rate, this amount did not undergo any real change as the real amount for 1995/96 was
equal to LE 679.5 million. In the meantime, the interest rate subsidy was reduced
from LE 111.1 million in 1989/90 to LE 7.4 million in 1995/96 in nominal terms.
The decline is much greater in real terms. As a result, the interest rate increased by
about 50 percent over two years starting from 1991 (Khedr, 1997:22, 23, 29).
The farmers' accessibility to credit has decreased considerably due to the new
land tenure system. Local banks refrain from giving credit to tenants due to lack of
guarantees as they might be dismissed from the land according to this law within
five years. Their access to credit reached its minimum during the last year of the
transition period. The privatisation of the input markets reduced the farmers'
accessibility to credit as well. Farmers complained that in addition to the increase in
input prices, there was a lack of flexibility in credit terms and repayment methods
(Bush, 1996:134).
So far water for irrigation is still under the same rules, and except for the
usual complaints from some of the old and new land owners about the unavailability
of water. Trade liberalisation and a decrease in custom duties on capital goods
might provide more advanced technologies at a cheaper price. On the other hand,
there might be more restrictions on the transfer of technology.
As for input accessibility, input markets were liberalised, subsidies were
eliminated and prices allowed to rise to reflect market levels. The prices of
fertilisers, which represent 50 percent of the input costs, have increased three-fold,
while the prices of crops have not increased by the same proportion (Khcdr,
1997:22).
In the empirical study quoted, farmers complained not only about the
increase in fertiliser prices but also about the inflexible credit terms. Some of them
developed their own ways of coping with the new situation. Some of them increased
the use of organic fertilisers and reduced the use of chemical fertilisers. Other used
nets with hormones instead of chemicals. Nevertheless most of them referred to the
189
increase in the use of fertilisers and chemicals in spite of the increase in prices. One
farmer mentions that there is an increased tendency to use chemicals for all crops
while it was restricted to vegetables before (Bush, 1996:134,137). However, it
seems that this farmer was referring to a general trend before SAP or to personal
experience. Official figures show continuing declining trends in the use of fertilisers
and insecticides at national level. Insecticides used in agriculture decreased from
15,099 tons in 1989/90 to 5,835 tons in 1994/95. This rate was even worse in the
previous two years reaching just 4,360 ton in 1992/93 and 3,298 in 1993/94.
Between 1989/90 and 1994/95 azot and amonia fertiliser use decreased from 5,007
tons to 552 tons, for phosphate fertilisers from 1,101 tons to 46 tons, and for
potassium fertilisers from 44,142 tons to 25,706 tons (CAPMAS, 1996, Table 2.12).
The decreasing trend in the use of fertilisers was not only because of the
increase in prices; it was sometimes due to lack of availability. The privatisation of
marketing channels was responsible for this, as fertiliser exports increased. There
was a severe shortage of fertiliser in the summer of 1995, which became a crisis in
some areas and threatened the production of some of the main crops. A clear
example is an empirical study in 335 villages in the two Upper Egyptian
governorates of Qena and Aswan from April to September 1995. As a result of the
severe shortage, the prices went up from LE 26.00 to 50.00 per sack (190% increase)
and continued to increase until it reached LE 80.00 per sack (350% increase) around
the end of September 1995 (Abdel Aal, 1996:6-7). The more dangerous effect was
on the productivity of the main crop in this sugarcane region; farmers had to start
planting and irrigating the crop without adding any fertiliser, as it required. Many
farmers expected a considerable drop in production; the most desperate farmers
expressed their intention to remove the crop (ibid).
The other possible effect of liberalisation on the input trade is that on the
availability of better quality inputs, which means the provision of improved varieties
of seed, there may be the more effective use of less environmentally-harming
fertilisers and chemicals. In this respect it is difficult to separate the private effort
from the public. There were considerable improvements in the yields of many crops.
For wheat for instance the massive increase in productivity was due to the protracted
efforts of research institutes. Private sector efforts may be seen in the production of
vegetables, where it was responsible for providing seeds. Tomato production
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increased massively however this was not sustainable as there were dramatic falls as
well. This refers to the importance of the complementary services needed in the
agricultural sector, namely, the need for better extension work to explain the right
way to use it. In case of tomatoes, the new hybrid varieties of seeds introduced were
highly productive, however, this character does not have the ability to pass from one
generation to another. This means that farmers can not use the new product to grow
their seeds, the seeds they received do not possess the same qualities. This was the
cause of a massive drop in production for some farmers (interview with input
distributor in early 1996). Trade liberalisation could help to provide more advanced
farm machinery either through importing new technologies or through the
combination of foreign technology and capital to produce machinery (see below in
the empirical study, examples of importing advanced technologies for water
treatment, and the production of farm tractors)
Effect on farm Income
Income from crop production: Prices of inputs increased during the reform because
of subsidy elimination. At the same time crop prices increased as well. What was
the total result on income? The cost of production for the main crops doubled many
times over during the reform. This was mainly due to an increase in input prices as
the cost of input as a percentage of total cost increased during the reform (Nassar,
1993:27-32).
To assess the total impact of the changes on the input and production prices,
a percentage was calculated for the unit production costs for the farm-gate price of
the major food crops under investigation over the 1975-1992 period. The value of
by-products per feddan was deducted from the total costs in order to obtain the total
cost of the major products (Nassar, 1993:32). In the second half of the 1970s,. the
percentage was relatively high while it tended to fall throughout the 1980s.
Following the application of the reform, the percentage increased for most crops
with indicates that income decreased. During 1989-1992, the percentage increased
from 15 percent to 30 percent for wheat, from 39 percent to 58 percent for faba
beans, from 19 percent to 28 percent for summer rice and from 54 percent to 60
percent for sugarcane. It was only for cotton that the percentage fell from 60 percent
to 34 percent, which meant an increase in income generated by this crop (Nassar et
al, 1993:32-33). These results are consistent with what another study referred to as a
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decrease in the income of the different mixes of a three-crop rotation during the
agricultural year, except for the one including cotton. It also drew attention to the
fact that the increase in income was not because of price liberalisation but the
administered price for cotton (Abou Mandour, 1996).
Another study estimated the agricultural resource income (ART) for 11 main
crops. The ART is defined as the difference between the gross value of agricultural
crop production and the costs of current inputs purchased from outside the
agricultural sector. It concluded that the real ART value in the reform period (1987-
1994) was 19 percent higher than its average value in the pre-reform years (1980-86)
(Rady et al 1996:145-55). These estimated increase is modest, and part of it is
attributed to an increase in yields, as referred to earlier. The costs were also
underestimated as they were calculated only for inputs only from outside the
agricultural sector. Examining the figures in the same study, the annual estimate of
real ART (ibid, Table 7.2, p115) reveals that it reached its highest in 1989, 1990,
then there was a general downward trend between 1991 to 1994. This proves that
the increases were not sustainable.
Income from crops is only one source of income for rural families; it is also
differentiated according to farm size and hence crops pattern. From the above
discussion concerning crop patterns and farm size it is noticeable that big farms
allow farmers to adopt crop patterns that allow them to increase their benefits. Big
farmers receive many more benefits from the increased revenues of some crops, such
as cereals, horticulture, sugarcane, and dairy products; in contrast to small farmers,
who are likely to achieve their highest benefits from cereals. However, the benefits
achieved by middle and big farmers from the same crops are higher. This is because
the previous study revealed that big and middle farmers had the same and higher
preferences respectively towards cultivating these crops, if we consider the
percentage of farmers who cultivated them in each holding group. Although small
farmers cultivate a higher proportion of their total area. In absolute terms, the
cultivated areas of these crops by middle and big farmers are likely to be higher (see
Abou-Mandour & Siyam, 1996: Tables 4/7, 4/8 pp.128,130). If we consider that
small farmers usually devote an even higher percentages of their products for self-
provisioning, this means that their benefits are limited to part of the marketed
produce. The empirical study of Abou-Mandour and Siyam (1995:147-50) revealed
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that small farmers sell only 13.7 percent of their wheat, 19.1 percent of maize, 50.7
percent of rice, 7.0 percent of fine maize, 87.0 of potatoes, and 26.5 percent of
berseem. These ratios rose with the increase in farm size and recorded 58.6, 42.0,
85.2, 11.9, 96.4, and 66.3 percent for the aforementioned crops respectively. This
supports Mitchell's view (1998) that market reforms supported self-provisioning of
staple foods.
It was also observed that livestock products contribute a relatively high
percentage of income to small holders, as demonstrated by other empirical studies
(see Richards, 1995: 41). As livestock products were protected until recently the
impact of removing such protection on livestock products during SAP was
anticipated to reduce prices and the attractiveness of cultivating berseem (see ibid;
WB, 1993:42). Richards expected that in the short-term small farmers who relied
heavily on sales of dairy products were likely to lose (ibid). Abou-Mandour and
Siyam's study (1995:135) refers to a loss relating to livestock but not for dairy the
products. Abou-Mandour and Siyam's view is more likely as dairy products face
less competition from imported goods and have less near substitutes compared with
red meat. This means that small farmers are likely to achieve minor benefits from
dairy products.
It is noticeable that the rural poor- the landless and small holders- rely on
their labour force as a main source of income. It is estimated that even for farmers
with between 3 and 5 feddan the income raised from the labour market is about one
third of their income; this percent for smaller farmers is even higher. In all cases
off-farm wages are higher than agricultural wages. Both agricultural and non-
agricultural wages are likely to decline. Agricultural wages declined by 40 percent in
the late 1980s. As 2/3 of rural off-farm employment is in non-traded goods,
devaluation reduces the prices of such goods, which in turn reduce the demands for
their labour in the short run (Richards, 1995:39-41). On the other hand, the decline
in agricultural waged labour means that the cost of production for big farmers has
declined as they rely more on waged labour.
The same study for 11 crops showed an increase in hired labour per feddan in
the reform period (Rady, 1996:156), this was due to a decrease in the hired labour
wage as shown below, which encouraged the hire of more labour. The study drew
attention to the .role that can be played by the agriculture sector in creating
193
employment through linkages between agriculture production and non-farm
employment. The increase in production increases employment arises from
manufacture and distribution of agricultural inputs and the processing and
distribution of agricultural output (ibid). Although this is true in general, it should
be noted that the ability of the agribusiness to create employment is low, as proven
from the empirical study (see next chapter)
Another empirical study proved that working days in agricultural decreased
in 1991/92 compared with 1986/87, while increased for non-farm work (Abou
Mandour, 1996: 195)
There was general agreement that real wages for agricultural workers
decreased during reform (see, Rady et al, 1996; World Bank 1993; Abou Mandour,
1996). This refers to the uneven effect of reform on rural people; waged labour is
usually one of the categories that lies below the poverty line (see Kuraim, 1994). The
World Bank's report in 1993 referred to the decline in real wages in 1991 by 60
percent compared with the 1985 level. Official data reveals that real wages
decreased in 1992 by 50.8 percent compared with 1986 (Abou Mandour, 1996: 195).
An empirical study estimated a 50.5 percent decline between 1991/92 and 1986/87.
The study revealed that there was a greater decrease in the wages for women than for
men, which meant that the programme harmed the opportunities for women in work
(ibid).
Structural adjustment increases the cost of production because of increased
prices of inputs; An empirical study revealed the undifferential rates of using
fertilisers among different farm-size classes. This means that any increase in the
prices.
 of fertilisers will lead to equals effect on different farms, however, the relative
increase in cost compared to the small farmers' income will be higher (Abou-
Mandour & Siyam, 1995:140).
The differential effect on income in rural areas related not only to farm size
and hence crop pattern, it also related to the different sources of income. In
conclusion, we can say that wage labour and farmers with less than two feddan stand
to lose, while with those having 2-5 feddan the effect is indeterminate, those with
more than five feddans are likely to gain.
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5.4. Conclusions
While state intervention was blamed for the poor performance of the sector, one
major drawback of the policies of state intervention was that it was not differentiated
between the poor small farmers and the big farmers. This resulted in the rich
benefiting more than the poor and the burden on the state budget increasing.
The reform policies were biased in favour of big farmers as well. At the
national level, changes in crop patterns were not consistent with the intended policy
changes. Increases in wheat and cotton for example cannot be attributed to changes
in prices only. Food security was improved, but agricultural exports did not
increase as expected, and individual crops did not follow a consistent trend.
At the farm level the landless and small farmers stood to lose while big
farmers obtained gains. The type of changes in farmers' access to resources and
utilisation of resources undermined their ability to invest at farm level and the
sustainability of resources for the future. As their access to agricultural inputs and
credit was undermined, the poor experienced greater impoverishment. Increases in
crop areas were achieved through greater intensification in the cultivated areas. The
crop patterns increased from 11.2 million feddan in 1982 to 14.4 million in 1995 due
to an increase in intensification (Nassar & Khedr, 1997:9). While this was
considered a positive indicator it overlooked two facts. First, that the intensification
was a result of changes in relative prices where big farmers won and small farmers
lost. The big farmers intensified their production to increase their profits while
small farmers increased their intensification as a survival strategy. The overall
impact on the environment and the sustainability of resources were overlooked.
The effect of privatising marketing channels of input distribution failed to
provide inputs at the right time, as was anticipated, and fertiliser prices increased
massively. The reinvolvement of the PBDAC in the distribution of fertilisers
undermined the credibility of the government programme.
While the state withdrew from some areas of production and trade, it did not
enhance its capacity in other areas; co-operatives stood idle. The institutional reform
also lagged behind.
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Chapter 6	 Agribusiness and Liberalisation
:Assessing the Evidence
6.1. Introduction
This chapter examines some of the possible impacts that SAP has had on the
agribusiness community in Egypt. I also assess the relationship between the
declared intentions of the reforms and the actual outcome of the policies on
agribusiness. I ask how successful have been the reforms in encouraging private
sector participation? How successful was SAP so far in overcoming obstacles facing
agribusiness? And to what extent has the state succeeded in providing policy
transparency and credibility in SAP? In this chapter I use empirical evidence to
examine some of the theoretical and conceptual issues raised in chapter two
concerning the role of the state and that of the market. Was the intensive
intervention of the state the only constraint on private sector revival? And does
rolling back the state mean that the private sector will automatically take over?
What are the other constraints that impede private sector revival? This chapter
argues that reforms were incomplete and inconsistent and that institutional reforms
lagged behind stabilisation liberalisation measures of exchange rate, interest rates,
and reducing state intervention. The state also failed to perform its new role in the
free market economy.
This chapter and chapter 7 drew on empirical work conducted on the
agribusiness community in Egypt. The study used structured questionnaires
prepared for qualitative analysis.. The valid responses represent 36 companies
typifying most agribusiness activity in Egypt. The responses indicate a prevailing
view of investors in the agribusiness community between December 1995 and mid-
April 1996. Most major business groups were represented in this sample, six of
them being businessmen not restricted to agricultural activities. Data is
supplemented with other evidence from secondary sources. The data available
provides good indicative views, assessment, and policy implications rather than
anything definitive.
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6.2. Sample Profile
The sample covered companies from different activities, it included those who were
involved directly in the process of production and exports, lond reclamation, and
those with backward links with the agricultural sector i.e. those who undertake
manufacturing or trading activities in agricultural inputs. Table 6.1 provides a
distribution of the sample's companies according to their main activity. There were
no strict boundaries between activities. Most companies practice complementary
activities simultaneously the most common shared activity was consultation
services. The two land reclamation companies had different types of activities in
addition to land reclamation; these were firstly, well drilling services and equipment
provision, and secondly agro-industry and livestock production. One of those
trading in irrigation systems also designed the networks involved. The reason for
diversifying the activities was the high competition and/or the lack of experience. It
was observed that more experienced well-established companies in the market had
complementary activities in separate companies rather than in the same company.
For instance, it was seen that some traders had their own farms to experiment with
new types of seeds, fertilisers and/or pesticides. This was of the benefit to their
clients as they were able to give the right advice to them. Some of them started in
different sector(s) and found a good expanding opportunity in the agricultural sector.
Agricultural activities were sometimes complementary to industrial activities as in
the case of chemical industries or completely different to them. Nine of the sample,
one fourth, belong to investment groups, four of them practised varied activities and
five were only restricted to agricultural activities. Another example of
complementary activities was that of one of the respondents who managed to set up
four companies between 1977 and 1988. He succeeded in attracting finance by
seeking a foreign partner for the third company and by establishing a joint stock
company for his last one. He was experienced to select new kinds of activities with
a high demand and low competitiveness. While he started with input trading his last
two companies dealt in the shipment and unloading of cereals in two Egyptian ports.
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Table 6.1 Distribution of the Sample's Companies According to their Main Activities
Activity Number Percentage
Agro-machinery 4 11.1
Well Drilling 2 5.6
Poultry 2 5.6
Animal feed 2 5.6
Animal feed and poultry 2 5.6
Agricultural producers and exporters 3 8.3
Bio-Plantation 1 2.8
Manufacturing Irrigation systems 3 8.3
Trade of agricultural inputs & irrigation systems 2 5.6
Trade of agricultural inputs 4 11.1
Manufacturing & trading in fertilisers 3 8.3
Manufacturing bio-fertilisers & pesticides 1 2.8
Land reclamation & others 2 5.6
Agro-industry & input trade 1 2.8
Producing seeds, herbs, trees nurseries 3 8.3
Fighting pests & seed production 1 2.8
Total sample 36 100
Companies in this sample were established between 1936 and 1994 and none
of the companies were established between 1967 and 1976. This is because of the
low participation rate of the private sector at that time, during the war period from
1967 to 1973. The types of activities were not strictly related to certain dates,
however, we can say that activities like poultry, animal feed and well drilling started
during the infitah period. This period was one of technology transfer, as was clear
from the inception of bio-plantation activity in 1979, yet this activity does not spread
to the following period. Activities related to the SAP period are more related to
trading in agriculture materials, drip pipes irrigation systems, bio-fertilisers and
pesticides and plant growth regulators. It should be noted that the last two activities
were related to new technology introduced into Egyptian agriculture, while the first
related to the new regulation of free marketing of agriculture inputs.
Private sector companies in Egypt work under different laws: law number
159 of 1981 5 known as the private sector law; the investment law number 230 of
19896 ; and the new communities' law number 59 of 1979. It should also be noted
that during the infitah period companies preferred working under the investment law
than working under the private sector law. This was due to the greater number of
5 To encourage Egyptian investors law 159 of 1981 replaced law 26 of 1954.
6 Law 230 of 1989 replaced the investment law 43 of 1974 for Arab and foreign investment and free zone
(amended by law 32 in 1977) which was issued during the infitah period to encourage Arab and foreign
investment and then allowed Egyptian investors to work under the same law if investments were undertaken
with foreign currency.
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concessions available under the investment law. This preference does not continue
in the later period starting in the mid-eighties.
Capital size in the sample seemed to increase in the period of infitah when
more companies were established as Joint Stock ventures under the investment law.
Where it allows local capital to share with international capital, 37.5 percent of them
had foreign partners. Companies established in the period of SAP had little capital
compared with the period of infitah. This may relate to the type of activities and the
characteristics of the new investors of that period.
Investors' characteristics; Most investors were concentrated in the 40-50 age
group. Access to investment needs time to accumulate the needed capital, the
youngest of our group was the son of a well-known investor, where the whole family
worked in this kind of business, and the young investor helped the father. He did not
have his own business. However, we have an example of two young partners one of
whom left his government job and the other left his work in the private sector and
used their experience as agricultural engineers and sales managers to acquire their
own business with the help of an SFD loan.
Nearly all the sample had received higher education except one who had 20
years' experience in his career in the private sector 7. Most of them had the relevant
education as 44.4 percent of them studied agricultural science, while about a quarter
studied business, commerce and economics. They were in other words formally
qualified to run this business technically as they studied agricultural science and
some of them were senior officials of the MALR. They expected to be able to
identify the problems of the agricultural sector, to help select and provide suitable
technology or to improve the existing provision.
•About half of the sample used to work in the private sector and a few others
were university professors or university staff and all except one still kept their jobs.
Two used to be senior officials of the MALR and there was another who was a
university professor and used to be a senior official in the MALR as well. The
others used to work as PE managers, bank managers, and officers. However, the
latter group had some family ties with people experienced in agricultural activities in
one way or another or had partners with agricultural experience, thus combining
agricultural with market experience.
7 He is not Egyptian, there are two cases of non-Egyptian investors.
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University professors and those with a PhD in agricultural science are more
likely to participate in activities with advanced technology especially in bio-
plantation, bio-fertilisers and pesticides, and plant growth regulators. There is no
specific time horizon for their participation, nor for the MALR officials whose time
horizon covers the eighties and the nineties.
Although a previous study about the private sector in Egypt revealed that
most firms in the sample were dominated by individuals and families even those
which were registered as joint stock companies so as to maximise autonomy and
achieve control over management (Shafik, 1989 as cited in Shafik, 1992:71). In our
case it should be noted that large firms whose activities were not limited to
agricultural production, that is those managed by what may be called professional
businessmen, as opposed to technocrats who lately entered the field, were managed
by families. New investors in the era of reform were technocrats who obtained their
experience in universities and the MALR, who in management rely on elements
from the private sector's managers and sales managers, former MALR officials, and
in one case family-based management was also evident. It was clear that
government officials received benefits from the liberalisation policy by establishing
their own businesses or through working in private companies. It was plain that they
represented urban interests more than rural. As my study focused on the formal
sector of the agribusiness, its image is quite different from Sadowski's describtion of
the traditional rural businessmen wearing the galabya who emerged during the
period of infitah. They are still represented in cattle-breeding activities, or working
as middlemen, small distributors and merchants in rural areas.
6.3. Barriers to Entry
Routine issues and bureaucracy were always blamed for distracting investors. This
study tries to distinguish between the effect of rules and regulations and that of the
bureaucrats who implement them. One third of the sample believed that the steps
for establishing new activities were lengthy and complicated and half of this
percentage believed that government bureaucrats add extra routine and obstacles for
investors. See table 6.2. below.
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bureaucratic procedures. These complaints were combined with complaints about
government officials being obstructive and access to funding was also identified as a
similarly difficult problem.
Companies founded after 1991, when the economic reforms became official
in all sectors of the economy, seemed to have major problems with funding, as 80
percent of them complained about it, this was in spite of the decline in the capital
size of these companies. The next problem in this period was that some producers
sought to use illegal methods as 60 percent complained about it.
In general the most prominent constraint was the complicated and lengthy
procedures for establishing new business activities. In addition investors were
frustrated by the attitudes of government officials. Complaints about lengthy and
complicated practices were joined most of the time by additional routines and
difficulties from the executives. This meant that both the regulations and
performance of government officials had to be improved and developed.
This complaint was confirmed by investors who set up their companies at
different times, which meant that this problem was deeply rooted in Egyptian
bureaucracy, and which made it a far from easy task to overcome. Even in the era
of infitah when fewer obstacles were experienced (half of the sample recorded no
obstacles at all) this problem was there. The problem underwent a slight
improvement in the SAP period, as it scored only 20 percent of investor complaints
at that time.
In general, funding was the second notable problem, but it was the first
during the period of SAP. While the infitah era encountered no funding obstacles at
all, the following periods underwent increasing difficulties. This could be due to
various causes, among them the nature of new investors during this era. Most of
them were technocrats who had the required experience but lacked finance, or
people who used to work for the private sector, and the new environment encouraged
them to have their own businesses after they had gained the needed experience, or
sometimes young ambitious graduates, who worked for government for short
periods, who found governmental work unrewarding or had no chance to find work
at all. The second cause, but not in terms of importance, is that appropriate credit
facilities were unavailable. This will become clearer in the following analysis.
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Investors tried to overcome the problem of funding through a combination
of people with technical experience and those with capital. About half the investors
obtained loans when they started their activities, and one fourth attracted foreign
investors to join with them.
Investors in the SAP period encountered new types of obstacles. The
problem was that some companies in the private sector practised illegal ways to
dominate the market. Complaints shifted from government regulations and the
performance of their employees, to the complaints about other private producers.
This refers to the new important role of the government in the market economy,
which was to provide the legal framework for private transactions and to be applied
effectively. This is not an easy task. It needed a great deal of effort from
government to restore its prestige and ability to enforce the law and its regulations,
to move from a soft to a hard state, and to control corruption and patronage networks
in order to enforce the law.
6.4. Agribusiness Activity Profile
6.4.1. Agro-Machinery
The use of mechanisation in Egyptian agriculture has grown steadily since the 1970s.
The shortage of labour due to emigration starting from the mid-1970s, in addition to
the policy of subsidisation of machines, fuel and credit encouraged this trend. The
increased demand encouraged importation rather than domestic manufacturing. This
was partly because of the overvalued exchange rate and technical difficulties, such as
lack Of materials. The majority of the machines used were imported. Domestic
manufacturing provided mainly tractor attachments such as wagons, scrapers, simple
plotighs and threshers. Public companies dominated local industry and were able to
manufacture some machines in addition to assembling imports. They were relatively
larger in size compared with private ones. There were private dealers which were
also able to manufacture, in addition to small workshops who gained experience
from repairing and were eventually able to copy simple machines (Kerr, 1994:878-
79).
Public sector agricultural machinery has been operating in Egypt since the
1950s. Private dealers criticised it for using advanced high technology capital-
intensive equipment to manufacture simple products which the private sector built in
its workshops.. However, public companies were able to provide tractors and small
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machines, but could not compete in price with the cheap imports from the Eastern
bloc. The private sector had also relatively large, with 20-50 workers, well-
established firms located in Delta towns particularly in Tanta city (ibid). It seems
that the private sector is as old as the public sector or even older, as two of the
sample located in Tanta City were established in 1936 and 1952 respectively, which
means that the agricultural machinery industry was less restricted by public
regulations compared with other agribusiness activities. The two companies
managed to expand their size and activity during the latter period. Both can be
categorised as big companies if we consider the number of workers, more than one
hundred, or the amount of capital, LE 300,000 for one and more than LE 4 million
for the other. This large amount of capital was essential for the types of activity and
the products of the companies which were not limited to importing and trading. It
also encompassed manufacturing. Both companies managed to export their products
although their exports were limited to various Arab and African countries. Finance
and marketing were the main two constraints limiting this activity. The large capital
sum needed for such companies was one of the barriers to entry and the high value of
the products compared with individual capabilities drew attention to the need to
provide adequate credit for both producers and consumers. The PBDAC played an
important role, especially as regards distribution.
Although these were specific barriers to entry, our sample includes two
companies which were set up during the reform, in 1992 and 1994 respectively. One
of them complained about a market monopoly while both complained about the
manipulation of other competing companies. The two companies represent different
cases- one with limited capital, LE 30,000 and three workers- found difficulties in
providing finance and obtained a loan from the SFD. In spite of its small size it was
based mainly in manufacturing. The second was large in size- LE 4 million and 50
workers- and managed to share with a foreign investor in the provision of finance,
new technology and at the same time in opening new markets for export, however,
up until then its export was limited to Arab countries. This type of activity is capital
intensive as the average CapitalTabour ratio among the four companies in our
sample was LE 26,047. The smaller company which was established according to
the private sector law complained about the extended and slow procedures of
establishments, the bureaucracy and the routine. The other was set up under the
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investment law and while not suffering from administrative obstacles complained
about high fees.
Production in such activities was competitive, as most of them experienced
high competition in marketing and admitted that they found high degree of
competition from local producers when marketing their imports. In contrast, a local
producer complained that consumers preferred the imported machinery. Another
complained about the general sales tax that increased its cost, which did not apply to
small workshops. In spite of intense competition half of them were optimistic about
the local market as they expect demand to expand due to the expansion of land
reclamation. Half the investors complained about the heavy duties of imports, on
inputs and about the complicated import procedures. Two out of our four sample
companies found the interest rate very high and one thought it was appropriate.
The companies however, could not agree in their views about the general
assessment of the SAP. One found it had limited utility. Another considered it did
limited harm and another believed that it had no effect, while the fourth did not
express a view. In general, we cannot say that investors in this subsector were in
favour of the reform. However, as reviewed by one of them, the reform could
overcome some of their problems. The reform facilitated some procedures by
abolishing the need for permission from the armed production to import agricultural
machinery or its components. It also stabilised the exchange rate and facilitated its
availability by allowing private exchange companies. On the other hand, the
stabilisation of the exchange rate was achieved mainly for the US dollar while other
currencies which are needed for imports did not enjoy the same advantage, raised
and destabilised production costs. While customs duties were revised, a need for
more revision was still considered important by them, in addition to complicated
import procedures. The general tax on sales was subject to many complaints
especially because it was imposed suddenly. Hastily introduced procedures were
also criticised for destabilising the market.
It seems that this sub-sector still relies heavily on importation both of raw
materials for manufacturing or machinery parts for assembly. Manufacturing is still
limited to simple machinery and equipment. Finance is not the main problem for it
as some companies have already managed to work on a large scale. But it is still a
barrier to entry for some new companies, and credit facilities for manufacturing
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firms should be made easier. The main constraint to the expansion of local
manufacturing is the availability of materials as it relies heavily on imported inputs.
For agricultural machinery manufacture to expand, it is important to develop other
activities with vertical links to it. The emphasis on the land reclamation project in
the South provides a good opportunity to further expanding this industry and there is
an opportunity for new activities or outlets in upper Egypt to be made more
accessible for land reclamation projects.
The members following this activity have an association to unite them: The
Businessmen's Association for Agricultural Machinery Development. Two of the
sample were members. The association does not seem to play an active role as one
of them overlooked its activities. The other believed it provided technical assistance
and discussed economic policies with the government. The new investors were not
members, but one of them who practices various economic activities is a member of
the Egyptian Businessmen's Association, so it seems that he is satisfied with its
activities and has no need to joint small associations.
6.4.2. New Irrigation Systems Industry
The industry providing new irrigation systems is relatively new and is related to the
revival of land reclamation in the 1980s. It is related to the new technology of
water-saving irrigation, using sprinklers and drip-pipe irrigation, which is relevant to
sandy soil. It is set up independently or as an extension of the plastic industry.
However, this industry is relatively simple compared to the agro-machinery industry
and it mainly manufactures pipes with drips, and fittings. Our sample included three
manuflictuting companies and one trader in agricultural materials who is a designer
of irrigation networks and used to produce its materials until he stopped. Most of
producers complaints about the manipulation of some other producers. One of the
three companies was founded in the second half of the 1980s while two others were
established in the 1990s. This industry requires a relatively smaller amount of
capital compared with the agro-machinery sector. The size of companies in the
sample varied between LE 20,000 and LE 1.5 million. The number of employees
ranged from 20 to 122 employees with an average Capital/Labour of 16,689 or
15,366 if we consider temporary employment. The reforms have been useful to
investors in this type of activity. The most useful measures concerned the availability
of foreign currencies and stability of their prices. However, their have been some
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problems with custom duties as they do not take into consideration company receipts
for the price of imported inputs. Most producers' complaints were about the
manipulation of other producers. Some producers used cheap, low-quality or
recycled materials and were then able to compete with low prices. These caused one
of the sample to cease production and to focus on other activities.
6.4.3. Poultry
The poultry industry gained momentum during the infitah in the mid-1970s which
encouraged food security projects by both the public and private sectors. The
industry enjoyed concessions in the form of low interest and tax rates, and direct
subsidies for animal feed and medicine. The industry relied heavily on imports for
chicken feed (85 percent) and veterinary products and failed to build strong
backward linkages for local industry. The industry made considerable progress and
was able to achieve self-sufficiency in eggs and to cover a high proportion of the
domestic needs of chickens. Between 1975 and 1987 the invested capital increased
from LE 200 million to nearly LE 3 billion (Hank, 1997: 79-80).
However, it was vulnerable to changes in economic policy or circumstances
due to its reliance on subsidies and imported inputs. Unavailability of foreign
exchange in the early 1980s affected the ability to import chicken feed and the local
market suffered severe shortages which more strikingly affected the private sector.
The public sector had priority in accessing the feed but it had to deliver a certain
quota from its production to the MOS. The private sector was the more affected and
in 1987 it suffered another blow when the corn subsidy was suddenly removed while
the public sector continued to enjoy it. As a result, about 80 percent of the farms
suspended their operations. The effect on the industry was enormous if we recognise
that the private sector constituted 90 percent of the poultry farms and produced about
75 percent of the poultry products. However, the closure of private farms was also
due to several internal factors of inefficiency and lack of managerial skills. Low-
interest loans were diverted to other uses (ibid,:80-82). In spite of the favourable
treatment of public sector companies compared with private ones they suffered huge
deficits. The mandatory prices for selling products and the shortages of corn, as well
as the MOS policy to import cheap chickens in 1987, were blamed for this deficit
(Hafez, 1992:31); while the policy of importing cheap chickens indicated a lack of
co-ordination and a government competing with itself, Hank (1991:81) points that
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the effect was mainly on the private sector as the public sector already had to deliver
its products to the MOS at control prices and its share of the market was very small.
At the micro level, the public sector also lacked efficiency, enjoyed soft budget
constraints concerning loans, and corruption and patronage where networks were
spread among public sector managers and private importers. Hank quotes the case
of provincial officials of some public sector farms discriminating against private
local producers of baby chickens by making tenders available only to importers.
Public officials were accused by private producers of corruption and the gaining of
commission.
Our study sample includes two private companies working in the poultry
industry and two others working in poultry and animal feed production at the same
time. They were founded between 1978 and 1985 and none was established during
the reform period. The industry in general was characterised by large-scale
operations; capital was relatively small in one partnership company -£E 250,000-; in
the three other companies capital accounted for between 7 and 10 million and was
established on the basis of investment law as joint stock companies, where
commercial banks were the main share holders in two of them.
The liberalisation policy for this industry started in 1987 by removing the
corn subsidy. While this policy greatly damaged the industry at the time and had far-
reaching effects on the industry as a whole, as we have seen, the liberalisation of
feed imports in 1988 improved the availability of feed, and the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound in 1991 increased the cost burden on the imported inputs. However,
the stabilisation achieved in the exchange rate provided greater stability in the
availability of inputs. Poultry producers were satisfied by overcoming the bottleneck
in the supply of imported feed. However, the government still controlled some
elements of the feeds, and producers still experience difficulties in obtaining the
local component Wukhala' from local mills. While the rapid increase in the price of
imports before the SAP -estimated by one producer as a five-fold increase between
1982-1990- was controlled due to the exchange rate stability, importers enjoyed
more freedom to manipulate prices. The benefit achieved from exchange rate
stability was offset by the deregulation of the local market. Producers complained
that interest rates for operational loans were high and some of them suffered from
being in arrears. The total debt owed to banks by poultry producers was estimated at
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vertical integration between the poultry and feed industry, in order to overcome the
problem of shortages of feeds it still relied heavily on imported ingredients.
Furthermore, the market for feed imports is a monopoly with a few importers who
control the prices. There is a need to promote feed components of domestic origin
such as new varieties of corn to be used as fodder, as noted in the new agricultural
strategy, in which steps for real implementation should be taken. There is also a
need to promote industries with forward linkages for processing and marketing, such
.as slaughter houses and refrigerating and packing plants to shorten the marketing
chain and to overcome the oligopoly of the wholesalers and to improve prices for
producers to be able to compete. Vertical expansion will facilitate horizontal
expansion by utilising full capacity and encouraging new investments. Vertical
expansion will also help to promote exports, as seen in the sample. None of the
companies was able to compete in the international market. In this respect the Arab
countries could provide a suitable market. Finally, the study revealed the weak legal
infrastructure of the market where oligopolistic powers prevailed in both input and
output markets.
6.4.4. The Animal Feed Industry
The animal feed industry has relied heavily on imported ingredients. Before reform,
the government used to control importation quotas for feed mills, pricing and
distribution, and feed prices were subsidised. This price control, in addition to
foreign exchange shortages, created supply bottlenecks in certain foodstuffs. New
entrants into commercial animal and poultry production, preferred to build their own
feed mills to ensure adequate and reliable supplies of mixed feed meeting nutritional
standards. Earlier capacity subsidies, particularly for poultry and veal production,
encouraged this trend (De Boer et al, 1996:120). Most controls over the industry
have now been abolished, subsidies cut, and trade liberalised. However, the PBDAC
is still involved in the allocation of inputs and the distribution of outputs. At the
moment, the vast majority of the annual production of 2.0 million tonnes of
manufactured livestock feedstuffs are produced by public sector mills (Smith,
1994:154). Over the past five years their capacity utilisation never exceeded 50
percent and in 1993 it dropped to 31 percent.
There are 39 feed mills for the production of poultry feed. Of these, 11 are
joint public/private, 4 are publicly owned, and 24 are under private ownership.
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Private sector annual production is in the range of 1 million tonnes of poultry feed.
Furthermore, it has its own distributional system and does not rely on the PBDAC
(ibid). In 1989, capacity utilisation was 37.6 percent. Since then, it has increased, as
the industry has started to recover, following the removal of subsidies on feeds. Still,
both poultry feed mills and livestock feed mills have considerable excess capacity
(De Boer, 1996:120).
Our sample included two companies specialised in all kinds of animal feed,
in addition to the two previously mentioned who combine the feed with the poultry
industry. All companies were created in the 1980s. Just like the poultry industry,
companies operating in the feed industry were large-scale companies with capital
ranging from 2-3.5 million and labour from 150 to 300, with a relatively high ratio of
labour/capital. As in the case of poultry, feed industry producers were satisfied that
the market was relatively free now that imported ingredients were more accessible,
however, they complained about the unavailability of some local ingredients, such as
nukhala and that drived from cotton straw, which was still monopolised by the
public sector. Producers related its unavailability to public management difficulties.
Privatisation policy was inconsistent as they also complained about the irregular
interference of the PBDAC in its distribution. They asked for privatisation to be
completed, the hesitation of the government to abandon the distribution of local
ingredients reduced its credibility as regards its intentions towards the private sector.
From their point of view, one of the negative aspects of the reform was the massive
increase in electricity prices . and the general sales tax that they had to pay on
imported spare parts for their factories. The general view of the impact of the reform
varied. from the idea of limited usefulness to the acceptance that some aspects were
useful while others were harmful.
Producers of feeds face several obstacles in the local market with regards to
taxes; the availability of inputs, feed ingredients and spare parts for the factories
because the high sales tax on imports which led them to shift to local products; and
some MALR regulations. In general, unlike most producers, they were pessimistic
concerning future demand for their products. The reason for this was related to the
stagnation of livestock production, as they claimed that many producers had to
abandon the market and that the importation of cattle for slaughtering was harmful to
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local production in livestock and animal feeds. Only one producer was able to
export his poultry and animal feeds to Arab countries. He complained that the high
prices of inputs raised the price of the final product and reduced his ability to
compete in the external markets. The attitude of the producers toward the PBDAC
was negative. One businessman required transactions to be conformed to Islamic
norms. Another producer accused the staff of being ignorant concerning banking
transactions, which meant that it needed to upgrade its staff's capabilities in order to
compete on a commercial basis.
6.4.5. Fertilisers and Insecticides
The use of modern inputs in Egyptian agriculture is well established. Nitrates were
introduced from Chile in 1902, while domestic production of Phosphate fertiliser
and nitrogen fertiliser began in 1936 and 1951, respectively. Egyptian farmers use
high concentrations of fertilisers compared with the rest of the world. Nitrogen
fertilisers represent about 80 percent of total fertiliser use in Egypt. The use of
potash has increased since the 1980s. Domestic production supplies about 90
percent of the nitrogen and 96 percent of the phosphate used, whereas potash is
entirely imported (Goletti, 1996:167). The GOE used to control fertiliser production,
importation and distribution. Distribution of fertilisers and other input was
monopolised by the PBDAC. When the liberalisation policy was introduced in the
agricultural sector, subsidies on inputs were eliminated and the private sector was
allowed to trade in agricultural inputs including fertilisers, (See previous chapter for
details). The Private sector was allowed to import up to 30 percent of total domestic
demand but had to hand over 60 percent of the imported amount for the PBDAC to
distribute (Khedr, 1992:51). Moreover, since 1990 the private sector has been
allowed to work in fertiliser distribution with the idea that the PBDAC would
gradually be eliminated from providing finance. Private sector participation
increased rapidly to reach 80 percent in 1993. However, this increasing contribution
came to an end because of severe shortages of fertilisers which led to a massive
increase in prices and created a crisis in Egyptian agriculture.
Our sample includes ten companies that deal with fertilisers and insecticides
either as producers and traders (four companies) or as traders only (six companies).
Fertilisers and insecticides produced and used in Egypt are usually chemical
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products. However, there is an evolving slowly growing trend towards using
biological products as being more healthy and environmentally clean. Our sample
includes one company that produces biological growth regulators and pest-fighting
materials. Those companies that are engaged only in trade usually deal in other
agricultural materials -inputs- as well, such as seeds and agricultural equipment.
Few of them, two companies, also design and assemble modern irrigation systems.
In spite of the PBDAC monopoly of the input trade and distribution, the business of
dealing in agricultural materials is old. One of our examples was originally
established in 1958 where it used to trade in agricultural equipment and a number of
types of fertilisers and insecticides. The trader explained that the private sector was
completely forbidden to import only between 1964-74 when he used to deal in some
domestic products. Now he is able to manufacture, import and export. Another
company started its activity in 1977, while the other eight companies began their
operations during the period of reform, half of them were founded in the second half
of the 1980s and the other half set up in the 1990s. This was the most popular type of
undertaking in the agribusiness during the period of the reform and it was supported
by PBDAC loans which were biased towards large companies. (This will be
developed in the analysis below.) This type of activity allows for companies with
different amounts of capital, varying between LE 20 thousand and LE 10 million.
The capital of five companies was between LE 25 and 50 thousand, four between LE
100 and 800 thousand and one with LE 10 million. However, if we consider the
number of employees, most of them were small as only -three had 100 or more
employees, one had 50 and others had less than 50. This was an intensive capital
activity as the Capital\Labour ratio was LE 23,383.
Producers of fertilisers and insecticides suffered from the delayed payments
of middlemen and merchants. They also experienced the more serious problem of
commercial cheating, where other producers provided cheap and poor quality
products and were able to compete in the market. The ability of committed
producers to overcome the latter problem was limited. They had to explain the
quality of the product and exert more effort in marketing, however, the end
consumers -farmers- were not qualified to discern the difference immediately and a
time lag of one season at least was needed. This problem required an effective legal •
framework and control by the government. Imports of agricultural materials suffered
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as well from the MALR's complicated and lengthy procedures for admitting new
types of fertilisers or seeds, in addition to the high fees.
The PBDAC and the Fertiliser Crisis
One of the main actors in the agricultural sector liberalisation policy wrote that the
problem of input shortage was one of the main difficulties in this sector in recent
years. He added that domestic production was insufficient and that the gap was filled
by imports. The deficit was not restricted to fertilisers but it included high-quality
seeds, chemical pesticides, animal feed and especially concentrated additives. This
was the reason for the GOE allowing the private sector to import fertilisers,
pesticides and other inputs. The import quota allowed for the private sector was
raised to 30 percent of total market needs and 60 percent of the imported inputs
allowed were to be delivered to the PBDAC (Khedr, 1992:51). The pYivate sector
share in fertiliser production was limited as regards quantity, yet it helped to
introduce the new bio-fertiliser technologies in the early 1990s. Three PE
companies still controlled the production of fertilisers in the market. These three
companies controlled the available amounts of fertilisers in the local market.
From October 1994 onwards signs of shortage in fertilisers appeared in the
domestic market. Later, in the summer of 1995, the shortage became a crisis and the
domestic market suffered severe shortages which led to a massive increase in prices
and threatened agricultural production. Three issues were responsible for this crisis.
First the technical problems in the three big production companies, (which were
subsidiaries of the Ministry of Public Business Sector) which reduced production. In
order to keep there records clean and to keep there production value they increased
exports. The export price was much higher than the local price. A head of one of
these main producing companies blamed senior officials in the agricultural sector for
not providing him with data about annual consumption, its rates throughout the year,
and the anticipated increases. This lack of information, in his opinion, was one of
the causes of his company not having specific policies for the local and external
markets (El-Ahram 7/11/95). Although he had not been provided with this
information officially he was able to analyse the causes of increased consumption
and gave a good explanation for the shortage. He thought that the increase in
consumption was due to a change in the crop structure and an increase in crop prices,
as well as an increase in the cultivated area (ibid. These three production
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companies were accused of gradually reducing the PBDAC share in inputs and
preferring to sell to the private sector distributors.
The second issue involves private distributors, who were accused of
exporting fertilisers to other markets rather than selling them in the local markets.
This was of course to realise greater and easier profits. This was clear from the
growing exports, as revealed in the empirical study. Most exports were growing
steadily and only decreased in 1995 because of the ban on fertiliser exports. Some
traders refrained from giving information about their exports.
And finally the PBDAC had the task of providing policies to maintain a
balance in the market so as to avoid bottlenecks. In fact, it was the responsibility of
the GOE as a whole, as there were several ministries responsible for regulating the
market: the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which became
one Ministry in the government of 1996. It is the responsibility of the PBDAC to
help co-ordination between the MOPBS, MOS and MOFT and to keep them
informed about market needs so as to regulate production and trade. It is the role of
the PBDAC to regulate distribution, to maintain balance for emergencies and to
interfere when the signs of crisis already are evident. PBDAC inactivity was a
contributing cause of the fertilise' ,;risis.
Response to the crisis
After months of shortage, it was declared that the PBDAC had been given control of
50 percent of fertiliser production. Later on, this was increased to 100 percent which
represented total control of production. This control of fertiliser distribution was
intend'ed to continue in the hands of the PBDAC, which meant a step back in the
liberalisation policy. The fertiliser distributors who had organised an association
headed by a reputable ex-senior official in the MALR, a member of the NDP, an ex-
head of the agriculture and irrigation committee in the People's Assembly. The
association's members protested against the decision and published an appeal in the
newspapers. After negotiations and a meeting with the *government they were
allowed to return partly to the field. On the one hand, the power of the fertiliser
traders' association was limited, and on the other, the crisis was sufficiently severe
to threaten agricultural sector production, that the decision was not subject to
negotiation. The full return of the private sector to trading in fertilisers was only
achieved in 1998.. At an interview with the head of the PBDAC Dr. Khedr in June
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1997, he stated that he lacked exact information about the end of the PBDAC
monopoly over fertiliser distribution. In a discussion with one of the PBDAC staff,
he revealed his conviction that the bank had an important role to play in the fertiliser
distribution and he criticised the manipulation of private merchants. While what
was mentioned was true it also reflected the unwillingness of the Bank staff to
surrender their power to the private sector.
Private sector companies responded to the unavailability of local fertilisers
by trading in imported fertilisers. In the long-term, this can have a negative effect on
the domestic product, as it can shift demand from domestic to imported products.
The second part of the solution was to import 1 million tons of fertiliser. The
private sector was asked to do the job for the PBDAC. The imported fertiliser was
exempted from customs duties to grant a fair price for the farmers, and the
government budget lost a considerable amount of money which could have been
saved if this crisis had been dealt with differently. The rush of private sector
companies to buy from the international market at the same time, caused prices to
rise drastically. When the fertilisers arrived in those Egyptian ports which had low
capacity, ships had to wait there and to pay fees into the bargain. All these extra
costs were passed on to the end consumers -farmers- and the exemption from
customs had not done much good.
6.5. The Role of the PBDAC in Financing the Agribusiness
Community
Since 1987, the agricultural strategy has aimed at limiting the PBDAC's role to
providing finance for agricultural services. To help increase the economic
effectiveness of the banks and to expand non-subsidised credit, the PBDAC was
supported by an American team of specialised bankers. They worked under long-
term contracts to increase credit effectiveness, reduce costs and facilitate loans
(Khedr, 1992). Here I provide an assessment of the performance and the role of the
banks based on the investors' views concerning the PBDAC.
The PBDAC loans
In October 1995, shortly before conducting the field work, the PBDAC advertised in
the Ahram newspaper, in order to promote the credit available for the agribusiness
sector. The fund was introduced under the title of the Agriculture Modernisation
Project and was supported by the World Bank at a subsidised interest rate. 60
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percent of the project fund was introduced by the IDA with an interest rate of 4.3
percent (El-Ahram newspaper 5/7/95), the PBDAC added its commission and
administrative fees. The total available finance for the project was $100 million (El-
Ahram newspaper .9/12/95). It covered four main areas; Marketing activities, Agro-
industries, Agro-machinery and Agro-inputs (Dr. Wali statement at a meeting with
investors, El-Ahram 15/7/95). The study aimed to assess the PBDAC's ability to
reach the business community and provide it with finance. Surprisingly about 36.1
percent of them knew nothing about it. And one quarter of the sample did not need
loans at that time. One received a loan from the SFD and at the moment can not
seek any other loans. However, he did not know about it at that time. One of the
sample mentioned that he did not want to deal with the PBDAC at all and accused
his staff of ignorance and lack of banking experience. This reflected the low
credibility of the Bank's efficiency. Another investor accused the PBDAC officials
of being secretive concerning these special offers, and accused them of awarding
them to clients who were part of their patronage networks. When it was pointed out
to him that it was advertised in the newspaper, he seemed unconvinced. This
reflected badly on the credibility of the bank and raised the question of the lack of
transparency of the PBDAC policy and about its advertisement as an effective way
to promote for such services. It should have been supplemented by other approaches,
like contacting the various business associations and organisations which represent
the agribusiness community and which already exist. Nevertheless, this project was
discussed at a meeting between Dr. Wali and 21 investors in agricultural activities
(El-Ahram 15/7/95). From the names mentioned in the report few represented
agricultural machinery, one was from the Chamber of Commerce, another, the head
of the agricultural syndicate, and others. On the one hand, the members mentioned
did not represent the whole range of the agribusiness community, on the other, it
seems that there is a lack of communication within the agribusiness community as a
whole. It seems that the well-connected agribusiness elite work for their own
interests and do not represent agribusiness associations. They were the ones who
received the best offers and at the same time were able to use their political influence
and connections to facilitate and overcome bureaucratic obstacles.
13.9 percent said that the terms for loans were not suitable for them. This
was because of the collateral that the bank asked for, which they considered
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excessive. Others stated that the kind of activity the bank offered was not
compatible with their needs. One remarked that it provided finance for
manufacturing cartons for handling eggs, while they did not finance the production
of eggs itself. Businessmen usually choose activities which they consider profitable
for themselves, and after a market study, they select one activity because there is a
demand on it, and the market needs it. This is the main hypothesis of the free market
introduced by the World Bank. In this instance it is not clear who set the priorities
for investment, the World Bank, which participates in finance, or the PBDAC
officials, and who benefits from it.
Two of the sample stated that they were negotiating a loan. One provided no
details about which activity it was for or how much. The other needed a loan of one
million to set up a new operation, a flour mill. The investor was asked to provide
land or estate as a grantee. He insisted on examining the machines and the project as
a grantee and was ready to pay 10 percent in advance. This did not seem convincing
for the officials of the PBDAC. The investor found the other terms ideally suitable
for him, a 10.5 percent interest rate, a 6 months' allowance with no repayment and
repayment of the loan within four years. However, at the meeting of Dr. Wali with
the investors a question about the grantees was raised, and Dr. Wali assured them
that the development banks did not set commercial pre-conditions. He added that
the project itself, its anticipated revenues and its ability to cover the project's
obligations should be the grantee. In this respect he referred to the project's
appraisal study and the client's creditworthiness (El-Ahram 15/7/95). It seems that
there is big difference between what is said at a high level of policy-making and the
execution of these policies. Even client creditworthiness did not seem to be useful,
since one of the interviewed complained that he had dealt with the PBDAC for over
twenty years with clean slate and no arrears and they still insisted on asking him for
unreasonable collateral. It seems that this client enjoyed preferential treatment under
the former bank regime, which he praised, now there will probably be bias against
him.
Three mentioned that they had already obtained a loan from the PBDAC.
One received it for the importing of agricultural inputs and outputs. Others gave no
details concerning activities. It seems that they are related to the same fields they are
working in (one, agro-machinery, another, land reclamation and agro-industries).
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The loans came to millions of pounds. There were no comments about grantees and
terms on loans. The three companies were large, well-known and reputable. another
company mentioned that it did not know about the project, but it secured a short-
term loan for one year from the PBDAC. Again it was large reputable company.
Assessment to the Role of the PBDAC
Official figures shows that the PBDAC provides the bulk of agricultural credit,
which was 74.6 percent in 1986 and rose to 78.8 percent in 1996 (CBE as cited in
Khedr, 1997: table 1). The PBDAC figures show that the total credit from the
PBDAC increased during the reform from LE 2,369 million in 1986/87 to LE 4,504
million in 1992/93, reaching LE 6,430 million in 1995/96. Calculating the real
value, using the wholesale price index 8 , the real figures for 1992/93 and 1995/96
were only LE 1,680 and 1,981.5 million respectively, which means that the bank
credit was decreased in real terms during the reform programme. Table 6.3 shows
that most PBDAC loans were directed to short-term lending, 14 months. These were
followed by medium-term loans, up to 5 years, then long-term of more than 5 years.
For medium-term advances it is to be noted that Agricultural machinery received the
highest percentage. This is because the banks financed both producers and
consumers. Livestock occupied the second rank, while poultry loans increased
massively during the early 1990s then decreased again. Since 1992/93 the PBDAC
has introduced new types of loans, that is commercial loans to finance input trading.
In that year, loans were LE 447.7 million and increased to LE 921.5 million in
1995/96 (Khedr, 1997:29). From 1/2/1996, PBDAC Interest rates on different kinds
of loatrs have been reduced by 3 percent from 16, 15, 14 percent for the long-,
medium-, and short-term, respectively, to reach 13, 12, 11 percent respectively,
however, there is still an extra 2 percent for administrative fees. The decrease in the
interest rate could increase the demand on loans.
Nevertheless, the PBDAC was not very popular among the investors in our
sample. When asked for their opinion of the role of the PBDAC, one fourth of the
sample gave no answer or stated that they had never dealt with it. Two showed
indifference and one believed that it was not bad. Another remarked that it as like
any other commercial bank.
8 Index number published by CAPMAS, 1996, Statistical Year Book. 1986/87 = 100, figures used are for
1992=268.0, 1995=324.5.
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A quarter of the sample thought it played a useful role. In fact, one found it
very good. Some of them thought of it as having a good co-operative role for
farmers, especially small ones. Others found it helpful in providing inputs and asked
for it to return to distributing high-quality seeds and bio-fertilisers for the private
sector, however without interfering with prices, admitting their failure to reach all
the governorates, as it was very costly.
Table 6. 3 Distribution of the PBDAC Loans during 1982/8 - 1995/96
	 (Million LE)
1982/83 1986/87 1990/91 1992/93 1995/96
Short-term Loans
Crops 310.3 .	 676.6 1515.6 1687.2 2204.9
Livestock 92.9 781.6 1321.3 1047.3 1076.1
Poultry 72.3 168.0 161.7 123.0 156.9
Fishing 2.5 1.9
Cultivation related activities - - 29.8 609.7 1430.7
Youth
- - 1.8 2.2 0.6
Others 13.2 17.8 16.9 2.4 79.1
Sub-total 178.5 967.5 1534.1 1784.7 2745.5
Medium-term Loans
Livestock 63.8 284.3 225.1 177.4 442.2
Poultry 39.7 60.6 265.7 53.5 66.1
Fishing 1.8 0.6 6.9 6.7 4.3
Machinery 42.1 203.3 267.9 279.9 277.7
Crop production - 9.2 12.8
Covered plantations - 12.3 16.6 6.5
Cultivation related activities - - 315.6 411.4 516.7
Youth - - 32.9
Others 18.0 167.1 85.9 56.2 108.4
Sub-total 165.3 715.9 1179.4 1010.9 1467.4
Long-term loans
Land reclamation & 0.6 5.1 22.9 16.5 5.1
Plantation
Irrigation systems - _	 - 3.9 5.4
Horticulture 2.6* 3.9 0.7 0.9 2.1
Sub-total 3.2 9.0 23.6 21.3 12.6
Total 657.4 2369.0 4252.8 4505.0 6430.5
Source: PBDAC unpublished data.
About 16.7 percent of the sample supported the bank's role and added a few
comments. Some asked for a reduction in interest rates, others complained about the
collateral, one did not believe that loans were used for their activities and asked for
more control and he pointed out that there were some activities that were not clear to
the bank and consequently it refused to finance them. Another found the bank
played a satisfactory role but should not deal in usury "Reba". The bank had already
opened a few branches for Islamic transactions.
On the other hand, 27.8 percent were completely against it. 13.9 percent
complained about its staff being bureaucratic and ignorant with regard banking
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business, the lengthy slow steps and measures and found dealing with it not as easy
or fast as commercial banks. 11.1 percent complained of the very high interest rates
and one found it completely useless.
Was the PBDAC able to develop its role, enlarge its business network, and
provide new services for new clients? If we observe PBDAC clients we will find out
that it 'covered mainly two types of activities. These were; input trade and agro-
machinery. The first was what the PBDAC thought was its role to finance and
support, that of taking over the task of input trade and distribution. The second used
to have business ties with the bank for a long time before the SAP as it used to
market their goods. Agricultural machinery in Egypt are expensive durable goods
that take a long time to produce. Because of their high price, between 50-70 percent
of machines were sold on credit. The sole source of institutional loans for
agricultural machines was the PBDAC. Only firms registered with the PBDAC were
allowed to sell their machines on institutional credit. All approved machines were
sold through village banks (branches of the PBDAC) with the bank collecting
commission on every sale (Kerr, 1994:881). These old ties between the agro-
machinery business and the bank were one of the main reasons behind this current
co-operation. The bank employees were well acquainted with the financial and
economic situation of these activities. There was no need for any new investigation
and feasibility studies. On the other hand, the companies became used to the bank's
routine and had probably developed a network inside the bank.
Meanwhile, the bank was unable to attract new clients with different types of
activities. We can say that the bank staff were short-sighted concerning other types
of operations. One of the sample mentioned that it took him a long time to convince
the PBDAC about his business which comprised tree nurseries and landscaping. The
work was not included in the list of undertakings in the bank. Another who was
trying to obtain a loan for a flour mill had the same problem of convincing the bank
to enlarge the scope of activity to consider his activity. The third example was for an
investor who could not get a loan for egg production while it was allowed to get a
loan to produce egg carriers. The question is who set priorities for activities and
how? From the answers we can state that the bank used to rely on a list of activities
which was rigid and should be reassessed according to market needs. We think that
market needs were taken into account in the investors' project feasibility studies.
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What the bank should have considered carefully was the project's anticipated
revenue and its ability to repay the loan. As the bank's employees lacked experience
they were too cautious to take responsibility for granting loans for new types of
enterprises. Moreover, their overcautiousness in insisting on a high rate of loan
repayments reflected an incorrect view concerning its effectiveness was the other
reason.
It was evident that the PBDAC maintained the highest level of loan
repayment among agricultural banks and organisations in the region, and one of the
highest international levels of loan repayments (Ali, 1993:36). This was not, or
should not be considered the main criterion for efficiency, as this could crowd out
useful investment. However, loan repayments began to diminish from 1992, which
revealed that there were other criteria for the repayment of loans, one of them was
using loans in their purposes. Some investors mentioned that this was not the case
with the PBDAC loans. The second related to changes in the economic environment
which affected the profitability of projects, as happened with activities like poultry,
as the increase in the price of inputs attendant on the monopoly enjoyed by some
merchants in the market. This forced the PBDAC to reschedule the debt on these
projects.
This caution was the reason behind what was observed with regard to most of
those who obtained loans. These were large companies in terms of capital and the
size of their transactions or had ties with the MALR and its officials because of their
previous jobs or political connections. Most of them were reputed in the business
market. However, their patronage network gave them the privilege of overcoming
bureaucratic obstacles from the bank and they had greater access to bank credit than
others. While it was announced by Dr. Wali that the concessionary loans available
for this venture was meant to support farmers and young investors (El-Ahram
9/12/95). There is no evidence that the project had achieved its objective. In an
interview, Dr. Khedr (17/6/97) stated that the bank was trying to introduce forms of
untraditional collateral: as group collateral whereby the bank provided finance to
five people, 100,000 for each, totalling half a million, and these five people were
mutually responsible for the repayment, this type was suitable for the youth; or they
used the creditworthiness of the undertaking itself and assessed it both technically
and financially. The third kind was through another person who provided someone
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or something as collateral. However, in the end Dr. Khedr pointed out that the bank
was still a government bank and they could be accused of wasting public money; so
that is why the staff was very cautious about the collateral.
As for the high overheads. Dr. Khedr justified them on the basis of its size with
regard to its branches, which was spread throughout the country (17 governorate
banks with 164 branches), the number of its staff (37,500 employees), the
seasonality of its loans and their smallness, which entailed high overheads.
6.6. The Impact of SAP upon Agribusiness
The following part assesses the effects of the SAP on the agribusiness community,
and how it responded. The study first evaluates the impact of some major measures,
then the total effect of the SAP as reflected in the views and responses of investors.
6.6.1. Interest Rate
About 44.4 percent of the sample stated that their activities had been affected one
way or another by the increase in interest rates at the beginning of the SAP. The
effect was not related to specific types of activity; within the same activity some
companies had been affected others not. It depended on the way it was managed and
the size of transactions. The effect of paying high interest rates was an increase in
the production costs which raised prices and caused problems in marketing. One
businessman compared his situation with that of other small factories where he had
to pay a sales tax in addition to the interest rate which led to a massive increase in
his costs compared with theirs. 30.6 percent saw no effect on their activities. This
was because they relied on self-finance, secured very low bank finance, avoided
borrowing during that period, or obtained loans with US $, with fixed interest. One
investor mentioned that the high-interest rate on current accounts also caused money
to accumulate in the banks which later encourage them to expand credit without
appropriate grantees. This resulted in people escaping abroad with the money.
The effect of the rise in interest rates at the beginning of the SAP seems to
have been mild, as it was for a limited period. Investors could control their credit
during that period. Those who were not engaged in these activities were adversely
affected as it crowded out new investments at that time.
In general investors were against high-interest rates as they affected their
production costs. When they asked about their views concerning the current interest
rate and if it was- acceptable to them or not, the majority found it very high, 38.9
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percent. Twenty seven percent considered it slightly too high and a quarter found it
reasonable. However, one of them found it suitable in its own right, though he
complained about the administrative fees which were very high, sometimes reaching
2-3 percent in the case of the PBDAC. The rest of the sample did not give any
answer.
6.6.2. Currency Devaluation
When investors were asked about the effects of the currency devaluation at the
beginning of the reform, it was found that 44.4 percent experienced an increase in
the price of imported raw materials, which had different impacts on them. Increased
raw material prices meant an increase in costs, something difficult in marketing, an
increase in prices in general, and a rise in wages. One investor believed that it
caused an interest rate increase and one on storage prices as well; another said his
export revenues had decreased; a third, that his foreign partner's share was paid in
US dollars at the official rate, which affected his obligations towards him; a fourth
suggested that it was a good idea to fix the rate, as he received loans in US dollars.
Other investors provided no answer or assured that it had not affected them, as some
of them had started after the reform. A few suffered some mild effects as their
obligations in US $ were not large. One pointed out quite correctly that the private
sector never relied on the official price.
As can be gleaned from data about agribusiness imports, there were some
activities that relied on imported inputs and raw materials. Others traded in
imported goods. For these activities devaluation should have had a cost-push effect.
In a study which relied on the estimated total requirements (direct and indirect) of
imported intermediate inputs in Egyptian industries, chemicals, except oil, and
machinery came third and sixth in the pecking order of industries using imported
intermediate inputs. These activities, which included agro-chemicals and agro-
machinery, had more important cost-push effects than others (Abdel-Khalek,
1993:107).
As we have seen Some investors blamed devaluation not only for affecting
their cost, but also for an increase in prices in general (general price level) and the
wages they paid. This generalisation is true for the whole economy because for
Egypt the propensity to import is high. The share of imports from the GDP is
224
around 0.3, so the impact of devaluation on the general price luvel can not be
ignored (ibid,:109)
6.6.3. Trade Liberalisation
The question of the effect of trade liberalisation on business was open. No
specification concerning local or international trade was given to find out about
businessmen's concerns. However, specific questions were asked about the local
and external markets. Few took this as the end of the government monopoly of the
agricultural input trade. Many took it as free international trade and for others it
meant the GATT. The answer to the question also reflected a low awareness of the
effects of trade liberalisation on the business community's activities or the economy.
13.9 percent of the sample gave no answer and 19.4 percent found it had no effect.
One of them believed that it would not affect his operation: agricultural machinery!
meanwhile it would affect textile industry, which meant that there was no
international competition in his area which in our belief is not true. Another thought
there would be no effect as he produced for the local market. He did not realise that
foreign products could compete with him in the local market. A third thought that
he would not be affected because his work was technical. He forgot that he relied of
imported inputs and that the technology in his area of specialisation was developing .
very fast and that he could experience fierce competition, as others put it. One was
frank and said that he did not know. In total 36.1 percent of the sample were not
aware of the effect of trade liberalisation on them. In short there are some investors
who are still not aware of the new era they will face.
e On the other hand, 11.1 percent thought that it would have a positive effect
without giving any explanation. One was in favour of free trade because only the
strong would survive. 8.3 percent thought that it might improve the quality of the
raw material and input and the price would be cheaper. Another believed that it
might have good features if it encouraged imported raw materials for his activity,
while it could have negative elements if it encouraged imported end products which
would compete with his. Even this opinion overlooked the effect on other national
producers of these raw materials. Those who saw the negative side were 8.3 percent.
They thought they would encounter fierce and unfair competition. The same
percentage thought it would affect local industry.
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8.3 percent cared about free trade in the local market and considered it timely
that they were able to compete with the government in local tenders, and they
thought it best to leave price-determination and profits to market forces.
The majority of investors seemed unaware of the challenge they had to face
in a free market era, especially after the full application of the GATT. They lacked
knowledge about their new role not only in exerting more effort to improve their
quality and produce efficiently, but also in developing their own technologies
especially in bio-plantation and fertilisers. They also lacked an understanding of
their obligation to encourage other national producers.
Local markets
Investors' problems with the market reflect unregulated market problems:
difficulties of access to the markets, oligopoly, and cheating with products. 13.9
percent found difficulty in accessing the marketing points all over the country. This
was the problem of those working in the production of inputs -seeds, fertilisers, and
insecticides. Some of them called for a role for the PBDAC in distribution but not in
pricing. In the meantime 19.4 percent of the sample complained about dealing with
their clients, merchants, middlemen and retail traders. They were not committed to
payment times and some investors accused them of being greedy, trying to buy at the
lowest price and sell at the highest. Another 8.3 percent complained specifically
about the oligopoly of a few merchants with regard to the prices. These complaints
came from the poultry and agro-industries. Another 11.1 percent complained , about
other producers who cheated the products and did not follow quality control
directibns and who were able to sell their products at low prices and compete with
them.. Those with forward linkages with other activities, as in the case of producers
of animal feed, their operation was affected by the prosperity or stagnation of other
activities. In our case animal feed producers complained about the deterioration of
national livestock resources due to the importation of cattle for slaughtering.
The majority of investors were not able to overcome local market problems.
A few of them tried. However, their strategies were not very successful. As for
commercial cheating, two producers of agro-chemicals tried to explain the quality of
the product on the bottle and exerted more marketing effort, yet one of them thought
he could not overcome the problem. Another producer of irrigation systems had to
abandon them completely and only work in commerce. Challenging the competition
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was accomplished by reducing the price, as it appeared earlier that quality
competition was not effective, so they had to use price competition. One of those
who suffered from sale and retail traders stated that he tried to reach the consumer
directly and failed. Another tried to diversify his activities. Traders in inputs tried
to overcome the problem of local factories ceasing to deliver fertilisers to them,
through importation. Those who suffered from the oligopolistic power of traders in
imposing prices for their essential inputs gave no answer, as they could find no
solution. One asked the government to intervene.
In spite of earlier drawbacks, about half of the investors were optimistic
about future demand and expected it to increase. This was not justified by some,
16.7 percent related it to an increase in the population, 11.1 percent to progress in
land reclamation and the same percentage to their marketing policy. One associated
it with the advantage of being located outside the big cities. He was thus able to
offer better quality and lower prices. Two input traders expected an increase in their
demand. One saw that his business was less complicated and more efficient than
that of the PBDAC. Another subject increased demand so as to receive all the
produce of the local factories. Only one investor related it to an external factor
which was the decrease in importation due to decreased demand on frozen meat
because of BSE. On the other hand, only 5.6 percent of the total sample expected
their demand to decrease. One arose from international competition, the other was
because of an increase in domestic competition, as the local producers increased in
number. 8.3 percent expected the demand to remain the same. The rest of the
sample did not provide any clear answer.
Exports
About 61.1 percent of the sample were engaged in export activities 9 . 9.1 percent of
them produced only for exportation, while 36.4 percent exported 10 percent or less
and 27.3 percent exported between 15 and 45 percent of their goods. Only 50
percent exported their output, 9.1 percent produced part of it and 18.2 percent hoped
to produce it in the future.
The exports varied widely covering almost every kind of agricultural and
agro-industry product. Vegetables and/or fruits were first with 27.3 percent of the
exporters, Seeds and agricultural machinery followed with 13.6 percent for each.
9 Three cases, 13.6 percent, exported through others.
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Then came animal and chicken feed, irrigation pipes or fittings, chemical fertilisers,
bio-fertilisers, herbs and medical plants. Each of them was exported from 9.1
percent of the exporters. At the end of the list were water treatment units, pesticides
and cotton materials. Livestock and poultry production were the only products that
were not exported.
The Arab Market absorbed most of the exports as 72.7 percent of exporters
export to Arab countries, most of them exclusively to it. 27.2 percent export to
European markets; 4.5 percent to African countries, the same percentage to North
America; and 9.1 percent to different parts of the world. Most of the exports to Arab
countries were directed to the eastern part of the Arab world; Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
states, then the western bank, Syria, Jordan and at the end came Tunisia and
Morocco.
Export change; About half the investors were able to increase their exports
and 9.1 percent of them opened up new markets. On the other hand, 27.3 percent of
them experienced a decline in exports. However, some of them underwent more
than one change. Investors attributed export increases to different causes: their own
effort, government policy and external factors. 36.4 percent related this to their
efforts in manufacturing new products and/or opening new markets. One related it
to developments in production and improved quality and other attributed it to the
availability of more facilities to the company like refrigerating and packing, price
competitiveness, in Arab countries in particular. A smaller percentage gave the
credit to the government, as only 9.1 percent believed that exportation had become
easier and that there were more facilities. One was grateful that the MALR had
stopped imposing mandatory prices on agricultural exports. Those who associated it
with external factors, thought it was due to Arab conciliation, a general trend in
increasing demand and to the water problems in the region which increased the
demand for water-treatment units. Those whose exports declined said that it was a
result of the ban on fertiliser exports for input traders, of bad weather for horticulture
exports, or of production cost increases and because the products were less
competitive and faced competition from Turkey. It was difficult for another whose
domestic demand increased thus reducing his exports.
The investors' expectations about future external demand were rather
optimistic as well. Some 54.5 percent expected the demand for their goods to
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increase and only 18.2 percent to decrease. Among those in the former group 33.3
percent linked this increase to their efforts in developing their products, the facilities
they provided to deliver the product in good condition and their good reputation,
which built confidence in their products. A quarter of them thought that there was a
market for their goods, one of them relied on the Arab market, another thought that
the Chinese and Indian markets were growing, and the third thought that the demand
for bio-products, his products, was increasing. The rest of the exporters gave various
answers like; more information was available about external markets, there was an
increased awareness among Egyptian farmers which meant that the quality of goods
had improved, there were water problems in the region and one of them was aware
that there was an external market but the local demand absorbed. Of those who
expected their exports to decrease, half of them blamed the government for not being
committed to a liberalisation policy or for the lack of an effective facility or export
body to help open up new markets. The other half 'admitted that among the Arab
countries, on which Egyptian exporters heavily rely, demand had shifted to other
countries, while foreign markets were more restrictive with regard to quality control
measures.
Exports obstacles; Only 18.2 percent of the exporters made it clear that they
did not have any problems in exportation. One thought that most obstacles had been
removed in the last two years. 13.6 percent gave no answer, which encouraged the
belief that they did not have problems. The rest, 63.7 percent, complained about
various things primarily administrative problems: 27.3 percent of the exporters. The
same percentage complained about shipment difficulties, especially the high costs.
18.2 percent complained about the high price of the goods which reduced their
competitiveness. From their point of view, high prices were for reasons beyond their
control, as they related it to the high price of imported raw materials and customs
duties and/or the high cost of electricity and shipment. Other obstacles varied. Most
of them were linked to local factors, such as high fees. Two input traders
complained about the unstable export policy. One of them who had links with
government officials and the NDP did not want to criticise the government, but
blamed the factories for not being serious about delivery. The absence of good
packing facilities, bad quality, sometimes due to the use of chemicals, and corruption
were on the list,. but referred to by only one investor. The businessman who
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exported through others claimed that a few individuals monopolised the market and
accused government officials of colluding with them. He had one experience when
he tried to export on his own account but his goods were refused because of
unacceptable quality. Before he left the place an exporter bought them and was able
to export them. Obstacles linked to external factors scored low, as only one
entrepreneur complained about the competition of international companies, while
others claimed that some countries like the Lebanon placed barriers to their imports.
Imports
More investors were involved in importation than exportation, as 69.4 percent were
engaged in the former and others relied on imported inputs and spare parts. They
imported various kinds of goods for different purposes: trade, inputs, production
machines and goods, and spare-parts. Agro-chemicals (different kinds of fertilisers
and pesticides) topped the list of imports, as 30.6 percent imported them. 19.4
percent imported agro-machinery (or components) and equipment. 13.9 percent
imported seeds while the same percentage imported other kinds of inputs and raw
materials. 8.3 percent imported spare-parts. 5.6 percent imported production
machinery and the same percentage imported turbine pumps and water treatment
equipment. One imported irrigation systems, others imported cows' milk, packing
materials for exports, and fruit receptively. The sources of imported goods varied,
western Europe was at the top of the exporting countries, followed by USA, while
Asian countries and Israel came at the bottom.
When marketing their imported goods, 32 percent of importers believed that
there ivas competition from local products while 28 percent did not think so. One
trader in agricultural inputs explained that most markets relied on imported
agricultural materials, yet this was not the opinion of all of them, as a few thought
that they had encountered competition. For the rest, the question was irrelevant as
they imported spare-parts, inputs for their activities and production equipment, or
they provided no answer to the question.
Importers complained about many constraints. At the top were administrative
problems. 28 percent complained about routine and the lengthy bureaucracy.
Moreover, they suffered a lot during the licensing process. The MALR was
mentioned as adopting lengthy procedures and taking a long time to approve new
products. The same percentage complained about the high customs duties. 24
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percent complained about the sales tax. 12 percent complained about the extremely
high administrative fees. Fees collected by MALR to examine new product before
allowing in the market was extremely high as most traders in inputs mentioned. The
remaining complaints varied between lengthy steps to open credit and the
compulsory transfer of value even if it was free or granted.
The domestic market for agribusiness products and services was vast and
expanding, promising to absorb any increase in production. Although there were
many complaints about marketing in the local market, this was a result of problems
in marketing capacity not market capacity. The only product which had difficulty in
finding an adequate demand, was animal fodder. Many producers of livestock
abandoned the market because of the importation of meat or cattle. Producers also
suffered from the oligopoly of the merchants who imposed unfair prices and from
the cheating of other producers. This revealed the absence of a legal infrastructure to
protect property rights and to fight monopolies.
External markets was available especially for irrigation systems and
agricultural inputs. The Arab countries provided the main external market for
Egyptian products. These markets did not have strict quality-control conditions like
the European markets, which might mean that they overlooked some aspects of
quality-control. However, these markets are diminishing in the face of Egyptian
products, as more countries are competing. The cost of shipment was another reason
for reducing Egyptian competitiveness. Shipment to Arab countries is more
expensive than to Europe. The main challenges facing Egyptian production is -those
of competing more in the European markets and being able to continually develop its
quality. There is a need to exert more effort in external marketing. Many producers
asked the government to play a vital role in this respect but they must not forget that
they have some obligations in this matter as well.
Although it was observed that exportation was promising, especially where
some more effort was made to improve quality and open new markets, it was also
noted that most agribusiness products relied heavily on imported inputs, raw
material, spare parts and manufacturing machinery and goods. They claimed that
local products were of poor quality. This involvement in importation at the expense
of exportation meant that any advantage achieved from the latter was offset by an
even greater burden on the former.
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6.6.4. SAP Ability to Overcome Investment Obstacles
When investors were asked about the obstacles which the SAP was able to
overcome, 63 percent of those who faced problems before the programme stated that
their problems had not been overcome by the programme. One of them claimed that
his problems had become more complicated. He complained that the regulations for
owning land for reclamation were difficult and complicated. 14.8 percent agreed
that their problems were partly solved, while only 22.2 percent mentioned that their
problems had been solved.
What were the problems which the SAP succeeded in overcoming and what
were those in which it failed? The list of obstacles was lengthy and varied due to
the variety of activities. However, if we try to group them according to the most
intractable ones, we find that; when it came to government bureaucracy and
complicated procedures and regulations, only one person referred to the solving of
the problem of the slow administrative procedures, another found it partly solved,
while three considered it still there. The following obstacle, which was the subject
of many complaints, was the monopoly of the public sector and the PBDAC. The
monopoly of armed production of agro-machinery importation-licensing were the
obstacles which had been solved. As for the PBDAC, while investors expressed
their relief at its withdrawal from distributing agricultural input, they complained
about the retreat from the liberalisation of distribution of fertilisers and some local
components of animal feed, which were also publicly produced, as its policy was not
consistent. They asked for the liberalisation policy to be completely implemented.
Other ?features of the public sector monopoly were also very clear in the services
offered by Egyptian ports. The obstacles which it is evident the programme
succeeded in overcoming were the availability of foreign currencies and the stability
of the exchange rate. These were solved for those who dealt with US $ more than
for others. Some investors who dealt with other foreign currencies complained that
the price of these currencies was not sufficiently stable for them to feel secure in
their dealings.
Few complained about taxes, custom duties, and unstable prices, and said
that these problems were not overcome by the SAP. It is to be noted that there were
a few problems that became clearer after the SAP, for instance, in addition to the
problems of taxes, investors complained about the general sales tax. While some
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referred to the reduction in the customs rates, there were increases in other dues
related to importation. More complaints were directed against importation facilities
after the SAP. This may be because investors were more involved in importation.
The results of importation was also crystallised in other obstacles, as there were
increased complaints about the unstable prices of imported inputs. In some
industries they stated that inputs were more readily available compared with the
period of public sector monopoly, while prices were more unstable. There were more
complaints concerning marketing than in the period before the SAP, Some asked for
the PBDAC to come back as the only distributor of Agro-chemicals inside Egypt
without being involved in pricing or importing, but merely to work as an agent with
them as distributor.
6.7. Conclusions
My case study has revealed that the reforms encouraged a limited private sector
revival. The most common activity introduced during this period was input trading,
as a result of rolling back the PBDAC from input trading and distribution. This
period witnessed a greater involvement of university professors of agricultural
science in the private activities of the agribusiness. They usually collaborated with
private sector managers with experience in marketing. Agribusiness enterprises
benefited from their experience and they were more involved in production than
trading. They were also able to introduce the new technologies of non-chemical
plant-growth regulators and pest control. The MALR officials benefited as well,
since some of them set up their own operations and were able to persuade others to
work with them. Family ties were clear in the management of few companies,
however, this did not constitute a common pattern.
Finance was the main barrier of entry in this period of reform, while
administrative barriers to entry were relatively relaxed. Fewer numbers of investors
mentioned that they suffered from routine and the discretion of public officials.
However, these obstacles remained significant in the functioning of agribusiness
activities. It was repeatedly stated when discussing importation, exportation and
sales tax refund measures and was emphasised most strongly when there was any
deal with the MALR.
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Reforms targeting the PBDAC were meant to increase its capabilities as a
commercial financial institution. Nevertheless, these reforms were of limited
effectiveness. Most investors in the sample refrained from dealing with it and
preferred commercial banks. They described it as a government bank steeped in
routine and with its staff lacking in banking experience. Its collateral policy was
also strongly criticised as being unrealistic and inelastic. The PBDAC as a
government bank, was very cautious in its credit policy. As a result, its loans were
biased towards large companies.
The reforms were useful for those activities that used to be subject to
massive state intervention, as in the case of the input trade, animal feed and poultry.
However, the reforms lacked gradualism as happened in the cutting of the, corn
subsidy, or were inconsistent, from their point of view, regarding the irregular
interference of the PBDAC in the distribution of fertilisers and some animal feed
components. The most useful reform measure was that of allowing free transactions
in foreign exchange. This step, together with interest rate reform, also allowed for
more stability in the exchange rate of foreign currencies. This stability was useful to
those who traded in the foreign markets: exporters and importers. As agribusiness
activities were forced to rely heavily on imported components, one of the drawbacks
of this sub-sector, stability in foreign exchange were very useful. However, this
stability was achieved more for the US dollars, while other currencies were less
stable. This hurt investors who used other currencies in their transactions.
The potential for the expansion of agribusiness activity was high due to
heavy I demand. However, administrative and institutional obstacles impeded this
potential. Internal demand showed an increasing trend and investors were also
optimistic about the external demand. However, some investors seemed to lack
knowledge about the international and regional agreements. Both the fertiliser and
poultry industries had high potential. Fertilisers had high internal and external
demand. The poultry industry provided good expansion potential for complementary
activities such as slaughter houses, and packing and refrigerating as there was a
severe shortage of these complementary activities. This shortage was one of the
reasons which paved the way for merchants of live chickens to monopolies the
market and influence prices. This led to new problems which arose from the free
markets.
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Investors in the period of the reform not only suffered from administrative
obstacles from public officials but they also suffered new problems in the market
economy. Commercial cheating was one of the main difficulties which faced
producers of fertilisers, insecticides, and new irrigation systems. They failed to face
up to this problem completely and needed an effective legal system to protect them.
Some producers of input also failed to reach consumers all over the country and
asked the PBDAC to help but without interfering with prices as it had outlets
available in every village which were not being used at that moment. They also
suffered from manipulation and from the irregular payments of middlemen and
merchants. Finally, the merchants enjoyed a price monopoly over some activities
which producers in the poultry industry complained about. Some of them failed to
access the external market and asked for effective help from the state to open new
markets, to provide new technologies to help investors improve the quality of their
products and to compete in the external market. Thus the study confirmed the private
sectors need for a strong and effective state to help private sector revival.
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Chapter 7 State-Agribusiness Relation
7.1. Introduction
This chapter draws on more empirical evidence concerning the effect of the reforms
on the agribusiness community. I assess the ability of the reforms to build credibility
between investors and encourage their participation. I also evaluate State-Business
relationships in the agribusiness sector under the SAP. On the one hand, I consider
how the state managed the reforms with regard to their transparency, sequencing and
consistency. I ask how successful has the state been in raising the performance of its
bureaucrats? And has state capacity been improved? On the other hand, I assess the
impact of reforms on the political behaviour of agribusiness investors. Have reforms
increased their credibility in the state? Have they encouraged more political
participation? Have the economic gains achieved by investors enhanced their
political power? Have they had any influence on the process of decision-making? I
also identify the main characteristics of the economic and political behaviour of
investors and assess their political participation and their political weight. The main
argument running through this chapter is that the agribusiness community is
politically weak and has limited effectiveness in the economic arena because it is
fragmented and its members, with the exception of a few, lack clear vision about
their role at the macro level.
7.2. Credibility of the Reform
Was the SAP able to win the credibility of investors? The credibility of the reform
programme is very important to revive the supply-side response, to enhance growth,
and to build a constituency of beneficiaries. The evidence drawn on earlier shows
that the SAP succeeded in some aspects and failed in others, but, in short, what was
the investors' view, did they find it generally useful? Were they willing to support it
politically? To answer these questions I draw on more evidence concerning their
general assessment of the usefulness of SAP measures for their activities; anticipated
expansion of their activity in future; their views concerning the new government
measures; and their willingness to participate in the privatisation programme.
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7.2.1. Investors' General Assessment of the SAP
As is clear from table 7.1, one fourth of the total sample found the SAP meaatres
very useful, while the same percentage found it of limited usefulness. Yet, even
among those who found it very useful some had reservations concerning the
inconsistency of the liberalisation policy. Overall, we can say that half the total
sample found it generally useful. This might give the impression that the percentage
of people who opposed the reform was rather high, while this was not true. Two
thought that some parts of the reform were useful and others were harmful. One
thought that he could only see some improvement in the last year. Two found the
reforms harmful and one found them very harmful. Together, those represented 16.7
percent of the sample. The rest, about one third, either found it had no effect or
gave no answer. One of the main reasons for this relatively high percentage was that
some investors did not know what the economic reforms were, They might have
been aware vf some of the measures taken, but they did not realise that this set of
reforms collectively made up the reform nor could they imagine what was the
rational and general objective beyond it.
Table 7. 1 Investors' Assessment of the SAP
Reform Usefulness	 Number of respondents	 Percentage
Very Useful
	 9	 25
With limited usefulness	 9	 25
Some useful, others harmful	 2	 5.6
Last year, limited improve 	 1	 2.8
With limited harm	 2	 5.6
Very harmful
	
1	 2.8
No effect	 8	 22.2
No answer	 4	 ,	 11.1
Total	 36	 100
Characteristics of the Reform Supporters, Who found the reform useful? What
activity benefited from the reform? We were unable to obtain a definite answer to
this. Those who found it of limited usefulness or very useful came from different
activities, where as within the same business some found it useful others did not. It
did not relate to a particular size as well.
One common characteristic we noticed among those who found the reform
very useful was that 5 out of 9, more than a half, were members of the NDP 'The
ruling party'. While those who found it of limited usefulness 2 of 9, 22.2 percent,
were also members of the NDP. Table 7.2, which shows the response of the NDP
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members reveals that about 78 percent of them found the reform useful and only one
person found it did limited harm, while another found some parts useful and others
harmful.
Table 7. 2 NDP Members' Views of the SAP
Reform effect	 Numlor of respondents 	 Percentage 
Very useful	 5	 55.6
With limited usefulness	 2	 22.2
Some parts useful, others harmful 	 1	 11.1
With limited harm	 1	 11.1
Total	 9	 100
Most of those supporting the reforms gave at least two reasons for their
opinion. The most common were those related to changes in the monetary policy,
such as the fixed exchange rate which benefited those whose business was related to
importation, either directly or indirectly, using or trading in imported inputs. One
person also referred to the facility given to credits in foreign currencies, while
another referred to the allowing of profits to be transferred abroad, which helped him
to find a foreign partner. At the same level investors supported the increased role of
the private sector and the roll-back of the state. Other reasons varied between free
prices and markets, and trade liberalisation. The main obstacles to investment
seemed to be that it was still valid as only one referred to the stability in tax laws and
regulations with no mention at all of the stable macroeconomics environment or
policies in .general, and it seems that this matter still needs more time to gain
investors' credibility. The other more crucial obstacle was routine and the
complicated procedures of government regulations and rules. Only ond case referred
to the tacility of some administrative procedures.
7.2.2. Investment Expansion
Investors anticipated an expansion in the future and the reasons behind it were
another good sign of the belief in the reform. Tbeir expansion in the past offers a
good contrasting situation to measure their anticipated response.
As for expansion in the past, investors expanded their activity in various ways, as
can be seen in table 7.3 below.
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Table 7. 3 Companies' Expansion in the Past
Type of Expansion	 Number of companies	 Percentage
Decrease Production	 1	 2.8
Expand Employment	 10	 27.8
Expand Exports	 7	 19.4
Expand Capital	 19	 52.8
Expand Production	 18	 50
Introduce new Products	 23	 63.9
Introduce new Services	 8	 22.2
Introduce new Technology	 14	 38.9
Shifting from Domestic to External Markets
	 16	 44.4
Most enterprises, 64 percent, expanded by introducing new products. This
should be viewed with caution as this could mean that the increase in demand was
merely due to an increase in population, as most answers justify their expectations of
increasing demand in another question. Others also stated that they had to diversify
their activities to overcome market problems, by introducing new products and
services. This might mean that there was increasing competition between companies
which they had to overcome by introducing new products. The next area of
expansion was in capital, 52.8 percent. Only 27.8 percent increased employment.
This means that increasing capital does not necessarily lead to an increase in
employment, that agribusiness operations are a capital-intensive activity and do not
greatly help in solving the problem of unemployment. This is clear from the ratio of
capital / labour in the companis. As far as export was concerned, 44.4 percent were
able to shift from domestic to external markets, while 19.4 percent were able to
increase their exports. This expansion in exports was possible due to the fact that
most of this sector's exports are to Arab countries where political relations improved
after the elimination of the Arab boycott against Egypt in the wake of the peace
accord. This means that they were expanding well before and during the early years
of the SAP. However, some of the expansion was due to an increase in population
or by increasing up the increased competition of the new activities which affected
their share in the market, by introducing new products and services. What about the
Future?
Anticipated expansion in the future, Most investors were optimistic. A
quarter of respondents said that they sought expansion in about four ways. Only one
employer thought of reducing his employment by expanding his production through
new technologies.
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Table 7. 4 Companies' Anticipated Expansion in Future
Type of Expansion	 Number of companies	 Percentage
Decrease of Employment	 1	 2.8
Expand Employment 	 18	 50
Expand Exports	 16	 44.4
Expand Production	 24	 66.7
Introduce new Products	 20	 55.6
Introduce new Services	 1	 2.8
Introduce new Technology	 17	 47.2
Open new External Markets	 20	 55.6
Start new Complementary Activities 	 15	 41.7
Open new Internal Markets	 1	 2.8
Establish Research Unit	 1	 2.8
Table 7.4 indicates that the majority wished to increase their production, 66.7
percent. 55.6 percent thought of introducing or marketing new products and
services and the same percentage hoped to open new external markets. Their
expectations for expanding export were high as well. It also appeared that they had
high expectations concerning improving technology and starting new complementary
activities. This optimism should be viewed by care. Respondents expectations for
the domestic market were based on an increase in population. Investors were also
optimistic concerning external demand as some of them had more information about
the external markets, or had improved the quality of their products. However, as
also appeared earlier, there was increasing competition in the external markets and
some of them started to lose the Arab market share.
7.2.3. New Government's Measures
A new government took over in 1996. It was thought to encourage investment and
improve the investment climate. At that time these measures included reducing the
customs duties on production machinery and equipment, facilitating ownership of
reclaimed land, eliminating the police inspections of the tax authorities. When
investors were asked for-their opinion l °, four provided no answer, which gave the
impression they did not know about it. Again, few of those interviewed asked what
these measures were. Three answered that they were sufficient if properly carried
out. Seven, 23.3 percent, found them to be of limited effect. And 16, 53.3 percent,
found them good. Some of them added the comment 'if properly executed', but other
steps were needed.
io This question, and related ones, was asked only in 30 cases of the sample, the remaining six were conducted
before the 1996 meaSures.
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When investors were asked about other necessary steps to encourage
investments, three provided no answers, one mentioned that he hoped that there was
more. However, the list we recovered was varied and extensive. It was interesting
that even those who had been asked about the difficulties they encountered before in
at least two different ways, had more to add every time. Most of them, 36.7 percent,
concentrated on getting rid of bureaucracy and red tape. Investors asked for
measures to be facilitated, for a reduction in the number of authorisations and
approvals they required to obtain every time. Some of them asked for a unified
authority for them to deal with. The MALR, in particular, was subject to several
complaints. Traders introducing new fertiliser, seeds and pesticides complained that
they had to wait for lengthy periods, several months, to obtain its approval, in
addition to the extremely high fees which they had to pay (thousands of $).
More than a third complained about tax rates and measures. One expressed
his delight in the abolishing of the police tax inspections and wondered whether it
would really be carried out. Many of them considered the tax rates too high and
asked for their reduction, also an increase in the tax holiday or the raising of the
exemption level to LE 5,000 per annum. Tax accountancy methods were subject to
criticism as well and was thought to crowd out the private sector. While 20 percent
requested a reduction in customs and importation fees. 16.7 percent asked for a
decrease in government monopoly, control and intervention. 10 percent wanted the
expansion of new industrial towns, facilitation of land registration and a reduction in
its price. The same percentage asked for more facilities and the expansion of land
reclamation. Some also made it clear that it was for the benefit of their business as
traders in agricultural inputs, while one asked for a drop in the price of land,
electricity and water.
Some investors put forward other requests, such as those to trust investors; to
stop or to regulate the importation of final products; to abolish obstacles facing
exporters and to encourage exporters; and to increase quality control on inputs.
When investors were specifically asked about other essential steps to
encourage exports, the list was more homogeneous and less extensive. 43.3 percent
• provided no answer; only one mentioned that there were no problems. At the head
of the requirements of the others was their demand for easier measures. 26.7 percent
asked that the necessary administrative steps for exportations should be curtailed so
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that the refund of the sales tax and the temporary allowance should be easier. Of
like importance was the request to provide information about foreign markets, as
asked for by the same percentage. They asked about the real role of Egyptian
embassies and commercial offices abroad, and for formation of exportation bodies
with effective participation in external marketing. Other asked the help of the
MOFT to send official delegations of businessmen to promote exports.
13.3 percent asked for exportation fees to be abolished or reduced. 10 percent
requested that all burdens increasing costs be abolished as well: customs, sales tax
and electricity prices. One mentioned that electricity prices had increased five times
recently. The same percentage asked for financial incentives, these incentives varied
from one investor to another. One asked for tax concessions, another for a low
interest rate on loans and a third asked for an encouraging exchange rate. Two asked
the government to increase quality control on exports and to provide good-quality
goods for exportation. Two others asked the government to support the exporter
with whatever possible and to remove all obstacles.
7.2.4. Participation in the Privatisation Programme
Investors showed little interest in participating in the privatisation programme. Only
two had already taken part in the programme. 41.7 percent refused to join in,
justifying this with their preference to expand in their own businesses, and for one it
was because he could not afford it. Another investor revealed that he could not trust
the management. If he could afford to buy, he would have bought a controlling
share. Only 8.3 percent said that they intended- to buy main shares, 19.4 percent
intended to buy some shares. Some of them placed few conditions for this; to be a
successful and profitable company, to study their budgets first, and to be in the same
business, for the Egyptian stock market to become international.
7.2.5. Credibility Assessment
From the above answers we can see that although the SAP could not create a
consensus support between investors, it was not faced with real opposition. Half of
the investors found it useful. However, most of the other half were not openly
hostile. In fact some of them gained. Investors supported the major policy of
liberalisation. In different situations they expressed their satisfaction with the
market system, free prices, and the end of government monopoly. Although they
sometimes had complaints about negative aspects of the market, they resisted the
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return of government control over the markets. The lack of credibility was directed
towards the government's ability to carry out the needed reforms, towards the pace
of reform and sometimes its sustainability.
There is a lack of credibility in some government institutions and in
government officials. This was clear from investors' views about PBDAC officials
and employees and the reluctance of the majority to deal with the bank. It was clear
as well from their attitudes towards MALR officials. Some seemed suspicious
concerning the application of what was said by the new government about the
reforms. They preferred to wait and see. They believed that there was a gap between
policy-making at the ministerial level and at the implementation level.
Investors thought of the government as the last resort for their problems.
They were used to government intervention, now they asked for it on their own
terms, to help in distribution and markets, but without interfering with prices. They
also needed government help against commercial cheating, market monopoly, and in
opening up the external markets.
In the end they were generally optimistic about future internal and external
demand for their products and services. However, most of the time they related it to
the natural growth of the market or their own efforts, at least they were convinced
that their efforts would not be interrupted by government intervention.
7.3. Political Participation
This section assesses the behaviour of investors' participation in formal politics. As
we have seen they did little to face up to market problems as they believed they
could not. Did they try to influence government decisions? And if so, how and what
were the results?
Membership of political parties: One fourth of investors in the sample were
members of the ruling party the NDP. None was a member of any other party. This
highlights the fact that a growing number of businessmen are joining the ruling party
on mean to become more involved in decision-making process and to gain more
benefits.
Members of the party were engaged in different kinds of activities, like agro-
chemicals, producing high-quality seeds, poultry, land reclamation, and bio-
fertilisers. Capital size differed as well and was not related to a particular amount of
capital. The largest amount was LE 8 m, while the smallest was LE 50,000.
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Investors who joined the NDP came from both Cairo the capital and from other
governorates as well. More than half of them their activities located in the greater
Cairo district, while the others were located in Dakahlia, Behiera and Sharkia. Some
of them were university professors others were purely businessmen. They were
highly educated, but this was the case for most of our sample. The majority of them,
77.8 percent believed in the importance of democracy to enforce the programme.
The People's Assembly: The number of businessmen nominating themselves
in the Peoples' Assembly elections is increasing. Many businessmen nominated
themselves in the last election of the People's Assembly which took place shortly
before of the fieldwork (November 1995). According to press reports' these
businessmen paid millions of pounds during their campaigns, which reflects their
seek of power and participation in the decision-making process two of the sample
nominated themselves in the election. For one of them it was the second time that
he had put himself forward. However neither of them won. Both of them were
members of the NDP and were nominated by the party. The estimated number of
businessmen who were able to join the assembly was ten. One of them was a
prominent agribusinessman. In addition, the ten appointed members included one
businessman. The same happened in the Shoura Assembly, as another prominent
businessman was appointed. This reflects not only the ambition of the businessmen
to participate in political life but the interest of government to have them represented
in her legislative authority. Yet we should mention that the Peoples' Assembly
enjoyed greater popularity for businessmen than the Shoura. Assembly, as it provided
them with more power and privileges.
Voting in the election: About one half of the sample voted in the elections of
the last People's Assembly. One third of the sample admitted that they did not vote,
while the remaining percentage provided no answer to the question.
Here, we face two different attitudes. One group seems to have tried to
increase its representation and power by joining the ruling party and nomination in
the parliament. On the other hand, the majority, on the contrary, did not even
exercise its right as normal citizens. This might relate to the crises of political
participation in Egypt in general and the low level of credence in the voting process.
Ability to organise: The question that arises here is; does this negative
attitude towards elections and voting apply to the participation of civil society
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organisations where they enjoy relative autonomy? A considerable number of the
sample were members of more than one organisation. If we exclude the Chamber of
Commerce as a semi-governmental organisation supervised by the Ministry of
Supply where membership is compulsory, and if we exclude the Industrial
Federation as its situation is virtually the same, we find out that 17 members of the
sample, about a half, are members of 13 different kinds of Business Associations, as
some of them were members of more than one association. While two investors
were members of two `Gamayat Ahlya'. We define Business Association as those
associations whose activities are effectively to the business of the companies, while
the other `Gamyat Ahlya' engage in activities in a wider context, which is more
related to society as a whole or other groups not strictly related to the business of the
company. Both kinds of organisation were established under the regulations of the
Ministry of Social Affairs.
There have been two types of business organisations, those that are not
restricted to a particular activity, and specialised organisations. Three of the sample
were members of the Egyptian Businessmen's Association, one of the most
prominent business Associations in Egypt. A further reason for joining which all of
the three agreed upon was the ability of the association to open new external
markets. A further reason for one, of them was consultation with government
concerning economic policy, for another, it also provides technical consultation.
The Arab-German Chamber of Commerce gained the membership of two of the
sample. The reasons investors gave for joining it were the same as in the previous
case. t
Table 7. 5 Business Associations and Number of Members
Organisation	 No. of Members
Animal Feed producers Association	 1
Arab-German Chamber of Commerce 	 2
BAPAM	 2
Businessmen Association for Agricultural Development 	 1
Cooperative for Fisheries Plantation 	 1
Cooperative for livestock development	 1
Egyptian Association for Agrochemical for producers and Affiliates (EAAPA) 	 2
Egg Producers Association	 1
Egyptian Association for Fertilisers Merchants & Distributors 	 2
Egyptian Businessmen Association 	 3
Friends of Environment and Desert Association (FEDA) 	 1
Federation of Producers and Exporters of horticulture	 1
Sadat City Investors Association
	
1
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The second type of Business Association comprised the specialised business
associations that varied in type as shown in table 7.5. The reasons for joining them
varied widely. The strongest reason in relative terms was consultation with the
government concerning economic policies. There were variety of other reasons
which differed from one organisation to another. Some gave general reasons, such
as maintaining the interests of the members in every respect, others were more
specific like; providing loans and funding facilities, technical consultations,
exhibitions to provide information about new technologies and solving
administrative problems. We were unable to distinguish between the important ones
as they provided similar, limited services. Nevertheless, one of the organisations
provided an outstanding service compared with the others and that was the EAAPA,
which engaged in environmental activities and was working on awareness
concerning the use of chemicals and safe ways of handling them.
Specialised associations usually contain homogenous groups with
homogeneous interests. However, in our case it was rather fragmenting and created
power conflicts. On the one hand, this was because of the overlapping activities of
some associations which competed with each other, and on the other, the lack of a
general association or federation which worked as a gathering and coordinating
body. In the case of those working in the agrochemicals, there were two associations
the first was the Egyptian Association of Agrochemicals for Producers and Affiliates
(EAAPA). The second was the Egyptian Association for Fertiliser Merchants and
Distributors. We noticed that the producers had their own association which was
separate from the distributors although they experienced difficulties in distributing
and there was a need for them to unit their efforts. Signs of competition were
noticed between one of the sample and another outside it. The one belonging to the
sample who founded an association and used to organise annual exhibitions of
agricultural machinery and materials. Then another organisation competed and
organised bigger exhibitions with better capabilities. However, for some time the
competition tended to favour the industry.
The limited activity of the organisations might be due to the lack of real
participation of their members. It was evident that some members were unable to
state some of the activities of their organisations. This could have been due to lack
of communication or participation in the organisation's activities as they might have
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expected different types of service. For example, the researcher visited one
organisation, the EAAPA, the main purpose being to gain access to those who were
involved in their operations. However, it was apparent that the organisation engaged
in manifest activity related to the environment and it had arranged some seminars in
this area with the help of an international organisation, about safe ways to handle
and deal with agrochemicals. When investors were asked about the work of the
organisation none referred to it. Although one did mention it in an answer to a
different question. This raises questions about their general participation and about
the type of involvement? Was the reason for low participation the fact that it did not
provide a direct benefit for them, but rather cared about the health of the employees?
Although about half the sample were members in one or more business
organisations or in the Gambia Ahlya, the kinds of services they received were still
very limited. The common activity they gave was consultation with the government
concerning economic policy. How effective was this consultation? When they were
asked about the effectiveness of the business association in shaping economic policy,
nearly half of them thought that it had limited effectiveness, while 13.9 percent
thought it exerted no influence at all. The same percentage provided no answer. This
could mean, either they in no way believed in its effectiveness or they did not have
enough information to judge, which means that they were isolated from the business
community and politics. Those who thought that it had an effective influence were
less than a quarter. One case related the matter to the power of the members of the
association, their previous role and status in government or their relations and
conneetions with empowered government officials. This was true to a large extent
and we stress here that it also depended on how much it was in favour of certain
policies and what kind of support it could obtain from domestic and sometimes
external forces. It is worth mentioning here that between what we ask about its
effectiveness was the Egyptian American Chamber of Commerce and we received
no answer at all, except from one person who thought that it was effective and it
drew its effectiveness from its name, to which here we can add no comment.
Another investor mentioned a prominent name, pointing out that he knew him and
he asked him to join, so it seems that it was really true that some associations gain
from its name, power and then are influenced by its figures. Our question about this
specific association to this businessman, together with the starring name he
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mentioned proudly, seemed to incline him to consider joining so as to gain a more
prestigious position and to benefit from a more extended network. So it really seems
that this was one more advantage in joining these association:
Investors' views concerning democracy, As we discussed in the first chapter,
there have been conflicting views concerning the relationship between democracy
and the success of the SAPs. Some have seen democracy as an obstacle to the
programme as it allows conflicting and competing views and goals. The experience
of developing countries has shown that there is no relationship between the political
system and the success of a programme. Reforms have been successful in
authoritarian regimes and in democratic ones as well. However, there is more
consensus about the importance of democracy for the sustaining of the programme.
This study explored the views of agribusiness investors concerning the relationship
between economic reform and democracy, trying at the same time to clarify whether
or not they were in favour of democracy. Three of those questioned answered that it
depended on the way democracy was practised. This meant an implicit protest about
what was called democratisation in Egypt. Only one businessman found democracy
an obstacle to the reform programme. This was because he believed that the
majority of people did not benefit from it and investors were the only beneficiaries
and more democracy would mean more protest. Apart from this very frank investor,
at least in expressing his opinion, the rest of the sample were in favour of democracy
as a support for the programme. For a high percentage of them the reasons for this
were purely economic. They saw democracy as a means to communicate their views
on the, economic problems and issues. This was a purely personal attitude, only one
related it to development in general. He gave an example of the developed countries
and related the practice of democracy to achieved economic development. Although
the first view can help in achieving economic development, this comprehensive view
was not meant for their argument. The most developed views were for those that
looked at democracy as providing equal rights for all citizens and as a means to
control corruption and the patronage network.
Investors' views concerning the role of the state, Investors' views concerning
privatisation reflect, to a large extent, their views on the role of the state. More than
a quarter of the sample thought that all PEs should be sold, while 41.7 percent
thought that large strategic companies should be kept in the public sector. This
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could reflect the national feelings of the investors. They may also have thought that
they could not afford it. This appears from their answers to the question about their
participation in the programme. They might prefer government monopoly in this
case rather than the monopoly of foreign investors or even a national one. Only one
businessman thought that companies dealing with people's basic needs should be
kept. This reflected a strong sympathy for the poor however, with a very low
percentage. Less than a quarter thought that failing, loss-making companies should
be phased out. The same percentage refrained from giving an opinion. Few of them
were not able to give an opinion concerning privatisation or to answer this and the
following question. They thought it was the work of economists and responsible
people.
When asking about the best way to privatise the PEs, a third of investors
preferred to sell shares on the stock market, more than a quarter preferred a total sale
for national investors, while only three preferred a total sale of the PEs and they did
not mind selling to foreign investors. Their view was that the companies would still
be in Egypt and that the people would benefit from its activities, they did not
distinguish between different activities. They did not think of foreign banks and the
risks of controlling sources of finance or of introducing foreign employment. 13.9
percent preferred private-sector management and the same percentage preferred
selling to employees. It should be noted that some investors gave more than one
answer with different alternatives. However they did not specify for each type of
company.
7.4. State Performance during the SAP
Sequencing of Reform
Gradualism was the slogan of the programme when the GOE first agreed to adopt
the SAP. Protecting the poor was the reason behind it. Gradualism was to be applied
to policies which affected the cost of living and peoples' ability to generate income
such as; phasing out subsidies or privatising the PEs. Phasing out agricultural
subsidies seemed to be done suddenly, as in the case of cutting the corn subsidy for
the poultry industry or the fertiliser subsidy for farmers, as seen in chapter 5. While
institutional reforms seemed to be lagging behind, they should have been given
priority and pushed forward more rapidly. This would have enforced the programme
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implementation and enhanced the private sector response. Meanwhile it could have
helped to remedy the negative effects of the programme.
Dealing with the fertiliser problem reflected the slow response to deal with
an old problem before it turned into a crisis. This slow response reflected weak
capacity and performance which in turn affected the pace of reform. The
government solution to the problem represented a step back for the liberalisation
policy. Again, this affected credibility in the reform and affected the pace and
sequence of the reform.
The legal framework needed for the market economy was absent. Laws to
protect consumers and producers from commercial cheating and market monopoly
were delayed. After more than eight years of official approval of the SAP the laws
were still under consideration. The last period of the free market proved its need not
only for consumers but for producers as well. As it was mentioned above, producers
experienced commercial cheating and asked for a law to protect them. The
government should have done everything to gain credibility in developing the
programme.
Administrative performance
Complaints about complicated administrative measures, in addition to the poor
performance of the government bureaucracy, lack of flexibility and competition for
power were frequently cited. These complaints were repeated at the various stages
of operating their business. As a result, the administrative reform was one of the
investors' main concerns for reform. Investors were confronted with routine and
administrative obstructions from their first moves to establish their companies. It
was their first complaint about establishment measures. The period of the SAP
showed a slight improvement. It was observed that bureaucratic measures prompted
the first complaints, even for those companies which were set-up in 1936 and later,
and we were aware that this problem was deeply rooted in the Egyptian
administration. It should also be noted that most agribusiness companies created
during the SAP were instituted under private sector law and not under investment
law, which achieved better progress in facilitating establishment steps. This drew
attention to providing greater consideration for companies established under this law
or to provide a unified law for investment.
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the free markets. Dealing with the crisis reflected a slow response and lack of
experience. The state failed to cooperate together with the private sector and to find
indirect ways of regulating the market.
Solutions introduced by government were short-term, and long-term
solutions were not on the agenda. While the prohibition of export and import of
fertilisers solved the crisis in the short-term, no extra concessions were given to
encourage private sector participation in the production of fertilisers. Increasing the
production capacity of commodities for high and expanding, internal and external
demand should have been given the first priority.
The government's ability to undertake its task in the free market economy
was under question. It failed to regulate the market and to envisage its role in the
free market economy. Different types of monopoly and oligopoly were complained
about, while investors were happy to dispose of the government monopoly in some
areas, complaints were directed to merchants in the private sector. There were three
major market crises in cotton, sugar, and fertilisers.
State Role and Private Sector failure
The role of the state from the private sector point of view reflected' to a large extent,
private sector failure to deal with certain problems or even to run some parts of their
business. Whenever the private sector failed it called for gOvernment intervention.
One major failure of the private sector was in marketing, either in the internal
or external markets. Producers of agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilisers) either
failed to gain far-reaching marketing points and/or suffered from non-obliged private
distributors and merchants. They suffered as well from unfair competition from
cheating producers, who provided poor products. The complaints about the
commercial cheating of other producers was not restricted to producers of seeds and
fertilisers, producers of irrigation systems parts were the main perpetrators. They
complained about other producers using recycled bad-quality materials and then
competing with low prices. The difference between the two products could not be
distinguished easily before use. One of the businessmen had to stop manufacturing
and only work as a trader because of the loss to his business. In all these problems
they seek government intervention and the chance to enjoy the benefits of the empty
warehouses of the PBDAC and they asked for the PBDAC to return to distributing
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agricultural materials provided it did not interfere with prices. Others requested a
law for regulating the market and prohibiting monopolies.
In the external markets, investors' views about the encouraging of exports
showed a great dependence on the government. Many investors asked the
government to provide specialised companies for exportation. These companies,
according to them, should have a real role in marketing to foreign countries, in
addition to providing information about foreign markets. Others found it the
responsibility of the government to provide high-quality commodities for
exportation, forgetting that it is the role of private producers to improve production
and provide competitive goods. Another individual considered the government
responsible for providing information about new technologies to be able to compete
in the free trade era.
These views of the private sector concerning the role of the state are the
legacy of an old economic policy where the government used to play the role of
producer, distributor, and regulator of the market. If we review the three areas of
intervention requested by the private sector, dealing in the local markets, dealing in
the external markets and market monitoring, we find that the first two jobs are not
usually adopted by governments in free market economies. However, if we look at
the case of the PBDAC, the available slack capacity of warehouses and the huge
number of workers which the bank cannot dismiss, it might be reasonable for it to
play some role in introducing these new products to remote areas. The bank could
encourage and finance the setting up of a private marketing company. This private
company should encompass members mainly of producers to prevent merchant
monopoly. The loan could be conditional on the company rent or the buying of the
bank warehouses and hire percentage of the manpower which the bank could not get
rid of it.
State policy transparency and private sector participation in the decision-making
process
Although private sector participation in the decision-making process has increased
recently, it seems that agribusiness participation is not at the same level as with other
business. Recently it became normal to hear about meetings between businessmen
and high officials of the government, beginning from the prime minister, economic,
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finance, and supply ministers and so on. Businessmen representatives accompany
official delegations or even arrive first, especially in the case of the USA. But it also
became usual to hear the word of 'big' used of businessmen when referring to the
type of businessmen who were able to attend meetings or join the delegation. In this
respect only the name of a few businessmen's associations were mentioned. At their
head is The Egyptian Businessmen's Association, The Egyptian American Council,
The American Chamber of Commerce, and to a less extent the Alexandria
Businessmen's Association. The importance of these associations derived from their
autonomy from the government as they relied on self-finance, and from the members
it embraced as most of them were previous ministers and big businessmen so they
did not lack power or connections inside the government, as in the case of the first
mentioned association or from its links with the USA. Although most in our sample
were members in Businessmen's Associations, they were small specialised•
associations compared with these mentioned earlier. And although they stated that
the most important activity of these associations was to negotiate with the
government concerning economic policy, they seemed to lack much important
information concerning that very policy. They were ignorant about the meaning of
the SAP or economic reform as it was known in Egypt, about the GATT and its
effect on their business and about obstacles to signing new partnership agreement
with the EC and the subsequent effects on their activity. They were also short of
information about available funds, as we saw in the case of the PBDAC fund, and
about the new measures taken .by the new government. These referred to a great
weakness in the relationship between their associations and the government. It
seems that they were absent from the discussions on major economic policies and
their associations were only concerned with minor problems related to their
activities. Representative of these small specialised associations were not integrated
into the policy-making process in a proper way. The members themselves find their
associations of limited effectiveness. Finally we should mention that this dearth of
basic information about economic policy, while reflecting a lack of transparency in
government policy, also reflects, at the same time, the nature of Egyptian investors
and their limited interest in their restricted areas of activity and their lack of a broad
view of the economy and its dynamics.
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The Private Sector and the Development Effort
In the following section the study assesses the capability of the agribusiness private
sector to enforce development. The study only provides qualitative clues which
together with official statistics can clarify the following issues:
Awareness of needed reforms
Investors in the agribusiness showed little awareness of the needs of the economy.
One third of our sample did not have any view concerning the essential reforms
needed for the Egyptian economy to accelerate development and increase the welfare
of the people. This reflected either a negative attitude towards participating in
reform efforts, even with opinions, or an unawareness of the needs of the economy
and the society.
The need for a clear, stable economic policy and system came as the first
requirement. However, it was recognised by only 16.7 percent of them. The
removal of bureaucratic obstacles and the facilitation of measures for introducing
new projects and to own land was the second request of 13.9 percent of investors.
8.3% of investors asked for free markets and for an end to the government monopoly
and for the treatment of the private sector on an equal basis with the public sector.
While we note that some investors referred to important issues, their views were
limited to direct problems, which they mentioned before. Only a few raised the
national issues needed to advance the reform. Only two referred to democracy as an
important need. The same number alluded to the importance of cultural elements to
create an awareness of the reform and to create an acceptable image for good
investors. Another investor said that they should be treated with respect and not like
thieves. Only one person mentioned the need to reform the educational system and
to improve vocational training. Only one cited the problem of terrorism and only
one who asked the government to encourage young investors, because he was young
himself. So only a few investors obtained a comprehensive view of the reform and
realised that it should be combined with cultural and political aspects. The main
concern was directed towards issues with a direct impact on their activities.
The Private sector's awareness of the agricultural sector's need for reforms*
Investors in the private agribusiness sector reflected a greater awareness of what the
agricultural sector needed in terms of general reform than in terms of national
reform. Only six, 16.7 percent, gave no answer, compared with twelve in the
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previous case. Land reclamation was at the top of their interests, as 27.8 percent
gave it as their concern. The issues they discussed varied and covered different
aspects of the situation. They asked for land reclamation to be facilitated by ease of
access to land and by providing an infrastructure and needed inputs. Some asked for
reduced custom dues for reclamation machinery, others for regulations to halt
speculation on reclaimed land and to assure the seriousness of the investors. The
following concern was directed to inputs. A quarter of investors raised the issues of
input availability, quality and prices. They were worried about the availability of
good-quality seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides, yet more concern was directed to
seeds. One encouraged the use of plant-growth regulators instead of traditional
fertilisers, other asked for more facilities to register bio-products. As for prices, the
high price of machinery was their main anxiety as they asked for subsidies and
reduced excise duties especially for machinery for reclamation.
Agriculture extension and technology, and exportation were the next areas of
a concern, with the attention of 19.4 percent of investors for the two of them.
Investors asked for an active role in agricultural extension. To achieve this,
extension workers' conditions and quality would have to be improved. Paralleled to
this, more attention should be directed to R&D and its applications. For
exportation, investors asked for a specialised authority or company in external
marketing. They considered this the responsibility of government. They also asked
for the encouraging of non-traditional crops for exportation, in addition to the
regulation of the cultivation of crops for exportation.
13.9 percent of investors requested more effort in selling to the domestic
market and asked for marketing companies. Some of them thought it the
responsibility of the government. One asked for a private marketing company.
Other concerns were directed to providing credits and reducing the interest rate,
increasing the capacity of Egyptian ports and finding new sources of irrigation.
Investors showed considerable awareness of agricultural sector's needs.
They were able to identify one of the main constraints on the agricultural sector,
which was the limited cultivated area. However, they failed to identify the second
major curb which
was water availability; only one of them mentioned it. Another major check, not
only on agriculture but on other industries as well, was the low capacity of Egyptian
256
ports. This problem has a great impact as it affects the cost and the quality of
products in addition to its effect on market clearing. The issues they raised were
essential to the agricultural sector's development and competitiveness. Nevertheless
they still thought that most of these reforms were the responsibility of the
government. Expressions like 'sincerity' and 'commitment' were not mentioned
here as they were used before when they were directed to the government. One said
that youth should exert more effort to increase production. Nothing at all was said
about encouraging young investors or providing more facilities and credit to achieve
better participation.
Improving technologies
With the high percentage of University professors in the sample, one would expect
considerable concern about introducing new technologies and following new
developments in this area, which is growing fast in the agricultural sector. When
businessmen were asked about investing in R&D, we discovered that seven
members, 19.4 percent, of the sample did not invest in R&D at all. Most of the
others invested in more than one way. More than a third consulted the government
research unit. This percentage was high because they were obliged to do this. Every
new input product, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides, introduced onto the market had
to be examined in the MALR laboratories. This was the process which investors
complained about, especially its high fees and the long time that it took to obtain
final MALR approval. Seven persons, 19.4 percent of the sample, had their own
R&D departments, while two did their own independent experiments. Six, 16.7
percent, consulted private sector research units. 44.1 percent used specialised
magazines to improve their knowledge. 36.1 percent travelled abroad to be learn
about new developments. 22.2 percent sought the help of foreign experts. Only one
attended domestic and international exhibitions. This percentage is much higher, at
least at the domestic level, as more than one exhibition was organised during the
field work period. They probably regarded it as a marketing event and did not realise
that it was a form of investment in the development of the company's products
especially when there were foreign companies participating and offering different
type of technologies.
The private sector played a vital role in developing the use of technology in
agriculture. It was able to introduce new bio-plantation technologies as early as
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1979. Activities for producing bio-fertilisers and pesticides were in operation as
well. The efforts they were making were quite good if we consider the relatively
recent involvement of the private sector. In this respect, thanks were due to
technocrats, university professors and PhD holders. Other studies referred to the
increasing contribution to agricultural research of the private sector, particularly in
relation to seeds, tissue culture and agro-chemicals (Gomaa, 1995:3). However,
knowledge of changes in the international market seemed to be beyond their reach.
As we observed in their discussions concerning trade liberalisation, they lacked an
awareness of the GATT effect on technological transfer, concerning bio-technology,
which meant that they had to exert greater efforts of their own to develop an
adequate technology.
Awareness of environmental dimensions
Does the pattern of investors' use of resources enhance their sustainability and
protect the environment? When investors were asked about the effects of their
operation on the environment and how they managed to remedy the negative effects,
they showed little concern about the environment, as more than one third gave no
answer. Approximately one third thought that their activities had no effect on the
environment. Nearly half of them gave an explanation for this belief, as two
mentioned that they regulated their production and followed quality-control
instructions. One stated that he provided green areas and rationalised the use of
water, another created public awareness of the better use and handling of chemicals
through his -active membership of the EAAPA, and a third said that he travelled
abroad for exhibitions. Two asserted that their activity could have a bad effect.
However, there was no alternative, from their point of view, to the use of chemicals
in agriculture and they asked the government to provide alternatives through
research.
few were even more aware, since two said that they tried to limit their
adverse effect, one by reducing the amount of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, the
other claimed that he did not deposit petroleum waste in drainage pipes. The same
number insisted that they produced no negative effect and one of them explained that
he invested the waste from his poultry project in land reclamation. One admitted
that in the long run the accumulation of plastic pipes for irrigation could have a bad
outcome. Only . four maintained that their activity had a good effect on the
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environment. One of them gave no explanation; another declared that his business
involved the planting of trees and plants in streets and gardens. A third asserted that
he reduced the use of chemicals, while the last one explained that his manufacture of
balanced growth-regulators helped plants resist diseases so there was no need to use
chemicals.
Competitiveness in the foreign markets
We noticed that more investors were involved in importation (69.4 percent) than in
exportation (61.1 percent), and that about 52.8 percent were involved in both. This
means that the advantage they gain by exportation is more than offset by
importation. If we consider the type of imported and exported goods, we notice that
only a half of exporters export their own products, and 9.1 percent partly produce
them. These exporters relied on imported goods like water treatment units, agro-
chemicals and agricultural machinery or its components. Most imports were inputs,
spare parts or goods to re-export, and final consumer goods. Fruit imports ranked
low, while exports of fruit and vegetables ranked first. This partly explains the
continuing deficit in the balance of payments, in spite of the notable increase in
agricultural exports, as most of the used inputs, raw materials, and spare-parts used
were imported.
Job creation
One of the main challenges facing the private sector in Egypt is that of creating new
jobs for growing number in the new labour force which enters the labour market
every year. Estimations of new jobs needed is about 500 thousand per year. Large
capitalowas the characteristic of most companies in the agribusiness sector. This was
because of the nature of some activities like land-reclamation and industries like;
agro-chemicals, agro-machinery and food. Some of these enterprises relied on new
technologies which needed a large amount of capital. The good aspect about large
capital was its ability to spend on R&D and to adopt advanced technologies.
However, its ability to create jobs was low especially if we consider
permanent jobs. Its competence in creating temporary jobs were better. As for
permanent jobs, we found out that the Capital/Labour Ratio was LE. 51.1 thousand.
This is much higher than the average for the country as a whole which is 27.8
thousand, and higher than the ratio of industries in the Tenth of Ramadan city which
was 31.8 thousand (Fawzi, 1994:77). This was due to the reliance on temporary
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labour in the productive activity. If we take into account temporary labour the ratio
is lower.
Their skill in providing trained labour was poor as well. An executive in the
agrochemical industry maintained that he did not need trained labour at all. All he
asked his workers to do was to mix things together. It is not in his interest for them
to know because he wanted to protect his product.
Only one company complained about lack of trained labour, which is one of
the main problems in Egyptian industry, and he claimed that he trained the labour
within his company. He asked the government to pay more attention to vocational
training.
The problem of the availability of skilled workers or the quality of the labour
force was not on the agenda for the agribusinessmen. Only one referred to it, as we
stated earlier, although it was a pressing problem. There were many explanations for
this. Either they did not need trained labour, as one investor mentioned earlier, or
they paid little attention to quality aspects.
Changes in state capacity and the state role and their effects on state-business
relations
The private sector showed the need for effective role for the state. While the private
sector showed weaknesses concerning its autonomy, the state showed a weakness in
the performance of its role in the market economy. If we look at changes in state
capacity during the reform path, we cannot see any notable changes in the 4 areas of
institutional, technical, administrative _and political capacity as determined by
Grindle (Grindle, 1996:8). The state failed to provide the effective legal
infrastructure for the market economy where laws to prevent monopoly and
commercial cheating were delayed. The state also showed little effectiveness in
applying the available laws, as in the case of the environment law. Investors
considered the state with little effectiveness concerning the protecting of the
environment.
At the administrative level there was limited progress with regard to
facilitating administrative measures. The problem of an over-staffed bureaucracy
which is one of the main causes of the embedded routine procedures and the power
conflict between the different authorities can hardly dealt with. In this respect we
find that two related indirect measures were taken. The first was to stop new
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recruitment in the bureaucratic administrative staff, and rely on early retirement to
gradually reduce the excess labour-force. This was, of course, a time-consuming
strategy and not very effective. It could not cope with the necessary pace of reform.
Another solution of direct cuts in the labour-force was considered to be politically
costly. However, triggering the reform was able to provide another solution for the
government which was private-sector absorption of government bureaucrats, either
through their direct involvement in private-sector activities, (some might prefer to
keep their jobs to benefit from their position), or through better recruitment
opportunities available in the private sector.
The second method was to reorganise the ministries so as to restructure the
administration while reducing the labour-force. The last reshuffling of the
government at the beginning of 1996 tried to overcome this problem by reorganising
and regrouping some ministries. This reorganisation or regrouping of the function of
different ministries was welcomed by commentators and academics. The first of
three main changes was the merging of foreign trade with the ministry of supply to
ensure complete control or regulation of the availability of goods in the local market.
International Co-operation was joined to the Ministry of Economics. Both Foreign
Trade and International Co-operation were handicapped by a conflict between
various ministries, such as; the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Economics.
The Ministry of International Co-operation was claimed by that of Foreign Affairs
but never came under its control. The third merger was between the Ministries of
Agriculture and Land Reclamation. Although they were under the supervision of the
same minister for a while, they were formerly two different ministries at the
administrative level. In the past, the Ministry of Land Reclamation used to be
subject to claims and under the supervision of other ministries, such as the Ministry
of Housing and Construction. The claiming of jurisdiction was one of the main
reasons for the unstable and conflicting policies, laws and regulations.
The reorganisation of the ministries was meant to achieve better stability and
co-ordination in the decision-making process. It was also meant to restructure the
over-staffed bureaucracy in such a way as to facilitate administrative measures and
to provide greater smoothness in the decision-making process. In agriculture there
were four ministries with direct responsibility for agricultural production. These
were the Ministries of Agriculture, Land Reclamation, Public Works and Water
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Resources, and Construction and the New Communities. There were four other
ministries related to agricultural products. These were the Ministries of Supply,
Economics and Foreign Trade, Planning, and Finance, in addition to the other
ministries, which were responsible for providing the necessary services (Gouili,
1992). Under each ministry there were groups of authorities which were set up with
different names; apparatus, centre or authority, each of them was over-staffed. One
study revealed the administrative fragmentation and the weak ties between the
different authorities responsible for planning and implementing agriculture policy.
However, co-ordination between ministries on issues of policy-making was easier
than that concerned the authorities and the division of power. While co-operation
was possible in the first case through the Ministry of Planning, the Cabinet and then
the People's Assembly. The horizontal ties between different authorities in the
ministries involved was not enough to frame sound policy at programme level. The
study linked this to four reasons; a-Sharing authorisation and co-ordination with
their counterparts in other ministries, b-The surplus manpower which made each
authority a semi-independent authority did not welcome interference, c-The
duplication of authorities working in the same area of concern or in the same
geographic area, which made duplication very difficult, d-The unsuitable criteria for
evaluating performance. The main criterion used was how much was spent on
investment regardless of its effectiveness or efficiency (ibid,).
One of the main requests of our sample was the merging of authorities that to
be dealt with. One of the sample complained that for two years since he started his
business he was unable to obtain final registration of land for his project. He was
told secure the permission of different authorities and the last was the general
authority for archaeology. The question is, if it was an industrial area and the
investors were encouraged to locate their projects their, why did not the Ministry of
New Communities arrange and co-ordinate with the various ministries and
authorities involved and produce the necessary permission for the whole area and
then allocate it to the investors? Why did it leave it to the individual efforts of the
investors? Why did it invite them to invest in an area that might be of archaeological
interest? It is not clear.
In the question of the fertiliser crisis, one of the main reasons for the crisis
was the lack of co-ordination between the different elements responsible for
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production and distribution. There were no indications in the answers of the sample
members for improvements in performance of the Ministry of Agriculture in
particular, as it was the subject of many complaints.
As for institutional capacity, which means 'the ability of the state to set and
enforce the broad sets of rules governing economic and political interactions'
(Grindle 1996:9), we could not detect any substantial improvement in its
institutional capacity during the SAP. Many important laws were delayed such as the
united law of investment; laws to regulate the market, to prevent a market monopoly
and to protect consumers. The government's competence in collecting taxes did not
improve. Any increase in revenues was related to fresh imposition of indirect taxes,
fees, and stamps, while the efficiency of the tax authority to follow those who did
not pay did not improve either. The judicial authority experienced greater
independence. While this could imply respect for the law, it had a negative effect on
the state's prestigious position with the public. The abolition of many state decrees,
laws and election results revealed a weakness in state power, as discussed in chapter
four. However, this independence of the judicial authority seems to be subject of
many encroachments recently.
As regards technical capacity, defined here as the ability to manage
macroeconomic policy and analyse economic policy options more generally
(Grindle, 1996:9), on the subject of agricultural policy in particular, as a part of
macroeconomic policy, it was successful in promoting policies to increase
agricultural production. yet, it failed to improve the situation of the poor or even to
help them maintain their relative position. This goal was not included in the ends of
the set of policies related to reform, especially for the rural poor, the SFD
programme was more concerned with the unemployed graduates of universities, and
this was left as a long-term remedy.
It is difficult to examine the changes in the other part of the relationship
between the state and business, and the relative strength of agribusiness power, or
influence on the policy-making process. Indeed definitions of power are problematic
but we can offer some criteria or approximations. The following criteria might give
some indication; the quality or main characteristics of investors in general, investors'
previous and present links with the bureaucratic system and government officials,
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and/or the amount of political power they enjoy due to their links with the ruling
party.
The investors in our sample referred to consultation with the government
concerning its policies as one of the tasks that their organisations were involved in.
They, nevertheless, thought that their influence was limited. Our study suggests that
the only clear situation where investors practised some limited leverage on the
government was in the fertiliser crisis and the fight to recover the right to distribute
fertilisers.
The GOE might review the investment laws and regulations and try to
improve and simplify the performance of its officials. One empowered investor who
was a member of the Egyptian Businessmen's Association and had open channels
and connections with some ministers and senior officials complained about red tape
and claimed that about 90 percent of his time was devoted to solving administrative
problems with government officials. He believed that high-level officials like the
President and the Ministers had good intentions and worked hard to iron out any
difficulties for investors. However, when he solved one problem there was another
waiting. He said that he could not call on the minister at every step in his work and
in his analysis of the characters of those officials at the lower levels or the executives
of the investment laws and regulations. He believed that they enjoyed using their
power and they resisted any transfer of power out of their hands. This meant that his
connections were sometimes useless or not empowered to help in overcoming
certain problems. So it seems that it was a kind of power struggle between the two
groups and the investor should be convinced in the end that government officials
were more powerful than he. The message was "we have more power, and you can
not beat us". All the above poses the question of whether it is possible to have a real
improvement in state performance and to get rid of the bureaucracy. Can reducing
the overstuffed bureaucrats solve the problem? Does it mean that if power is
distributed among less people it means more for those working? or the problem is
different and you have to create a new mentality and new attitudes. Cutting the
number of bureaucrats at least means that monitoring their activities might be easier.
The weakness of the state affected private sector performance. The state showed
weak capacity not only with regard to providing the needed legal framework but also
concurring its administrative and political capacity. In turn it does not help this
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sector to extend its power relative to the state. Sadowski refers to the private
sector's need for a strong state. At present time, many examples can be found of the
important functions of the state, without which the private sector can not survive.
Markets are not self-regulators or have invisible hands, as Adam Smith claimed.
Markets require a vast institutional underpinning. Without courts to interpret and
enforce agreements, for example, commercial life would be chaotic. Without laws
to define, and police to enforce them, property rights would be non-existent (Wilson,
1990:4). The government should act as a mediator between business and labour in
order to promote consensus on the measures needed to achieve growth, including
measures that regulate their relations. Modern industries need better trained or
educated labour-force; the state can provide them by improving education and
training (ib id,: 3-4).
7.5. Conclusions
The reform was unable to create a strong feeling of credibility among investors, at
the same time it was not faced by a great deal of opposition. Half the investors
found it useful, while most of the other half refrained from giving an opinion.
Investors who found the reforms useful joined the others in their complaints or
comment about some aspects of economic policy and about the performance of the
state. They received announcements about new reform measures with some
suspicion and followed the "wait-and-see" model. Although they were optimistic
about future demand and were excited concerning the expansion of their businesses
in the future, this was related more to the trend effect, an increase in population or to
e
their own effort to improve the quality of products or open new markets. They were
too politically inactive to form a strong support base. The gains achieved from the
economic reform could not change the attitude of political indifference which was
part of Egyptian culture, because of a variety of historical and contemporary reasons.
This was because the gains were relatively limited due to an incomplete and
sometimes inconsistent liberalisation policy that created low levels of credibility.
The absence of real democratic life was one of the reasons for the low participation
rate of investors. Investors showed interest in developing democratisation process
and believed in its ability to enhance economic reform, although one of them felt
worried about losing his gains in case "real democracy" was applied. This investor
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saw private entrepreneurs as the only beneficiaries of reforms. His view confirms
the idea that democracy could contribute to a more equal distribution of the benefits.
The study revealed the need for a strong capable state for the market to
operate efficiently. Private investors did not show an independent ability to increase
and develop and prosper their activity without relying on state regulations and
facilities. The rolling back of the Egyptian government was supposed to improve its
performance and capacity in other arenas. This was the promise of the World Bank
that the government should concentrate on tasks it could perform effectively to have
a chance to improve its potential, then to be able to expand its tasks. This did not
happen in the Egyptian case as, while the government withdrew from different
activities, it was unable to develop its competence in others. This was the case of the
PBDAC and the MALR, as they were subject to many critics for their poor
performance. That was also the case for the government as a whole, where it failed
to provide the legal infrastructure to protect investors against monopolies and to
protect their property rights.
Agribusiness investors proved that they were politically weak and could not
lobby or influence government decisions. Investors showed a poor ability to
organise. Their organisations were fragmented and lacked effectiveness. They
lacked interest in political participation, however they could be persuaded to, if the
government became more credible and more democratisation was allowed.
In conclusion, the state could not expand its capacity during the reform and
could not change from a "soft" to a "strong" state. At the same time, the
agribusiness sector could not increase its economic or political power to challenge
the state. Private agribusiness realised its need for the state. In fact it needed a
strong state to protect it from other uncommitted private actors. Investors showed
little ability to influence the economic policy, and their organisations remained
ineffective and fragmented. They could not change the balance of power from the
government to their favour.
My case study has helped to emphasise themes about the risks involved in
free markets and the anticipated role of the state. It also helped correct some wrong
conclusions about the increasing influence of businessmen. The study stressed that
businessmen were not a homogeneous group and that it is only the well-connected
266
elite was able to enjoy the benefits of reform. Nevertheless they even enjoy limited
political influence.
e
i
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Chapter 8	 Conclusion
This thesis has critically examined the changing nature of the agricultural sector in
Egypt during the period of economic reform. It has particularly focused on the
position of agribusiness within that sector and situated this discussion within a small
survey of agricultural investors. In many respects this thesis confirms much of the
experience undergone throughout Africa and the Near East. The thesis has also
contributed to assembling new material for the Egyptian case.
The experience of developing countries with structural adjustment has shown
an uneven outcome. African countries which were the most affected with the crisis
of the late 1970s and early 1980s performed badly under adjustment programmes.
Their performance during the crisis was affected by the nature of their economies
with low diversification levels of economic activity and single commodity exports.
The poor performance during adjustment was often related to the social and political
structures, the political systems and the weak administrative and technical
capabilities of the state. The experience of African countries was the main impetus
that directed the IFIs' concern to the issue of good governance and its linkage to
economic reform. The poor performance of adjusting economies led to a negative
distributional impact of the economic reform and the need for social safety nets to
protect the poor. It also led to greater consideration for long-term growth and the
environment. Both the IMF and the World Bank have tried to integrate such issues
intp their programmes although the effectiveness is still debatable.
The World Bank has nevertheless managed to develop its views concerning
one of the most debatable issues of liberalisation and that is the role of the state in
economic activity. While neo-liberal thought was in favour of a minimal role for
the state and saw the state as the cause of the economic crisis and decline, the
implementation of the programme revealed the need for an effective and capable
state to carry out the reforms. The World Bank realised that it was not the size of the
state that matters but rather its capacity and effectiveness. This issue was recognised
by Egyptian academics and formed part of their views concerning the role of the
state. Egyptian commentators also realised the importance of an effective role for
the state in the process of long-term development, which reliance solely on market
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forces failed to consider. Among the issues of importance here are the need to
provide a legal and regulatory framework for market forces to work; the need to
support and encourage technological change and innovation; and the need for a
sound industrial policy. This realisation stemmed from the recognition to the
increasing gap between the developing and the developed countries and the
importance of the necessary 'catching up process'.
Experience with Egypt's economic reform since 1991 has revealed little
success for the GOE in enhancing its capacity and effectiveness or in providing an
appropriate institutional framework for market forces to work. Administrative
obstacles have remained, as this thesis has demonstrated. The necessary legal and
regulatory framework remains weak and incomplete and the GOE has failed to
provide a law against monopoly or a unified law to regulate private sector activities.
The new investment incentive law is fragile with little claim of legitimacy
constitutionality. The technical capacity to manage the privatisation programme has
also been limited. This has been reflected in difficulties regarding privatisation
relating to the scale of sale and questions about pricing and conditions of sale. The
pricing of shares in the stock market and the regulation of the stock market is subject
to frequent fluctuations.
The GOE has confronted criticism of adjustment very strongly. It has used
the police force, when dealing with labour demonstrations, and they imposed new
restrictive legislation and regulations limiting the ability of civil society to
participate in decision-making.
I There has also emerged a consensus on the need for political reform to
complement and support economic reform. While academics and political parties
have different views concerning the needed economic reforms they all agreed on the
need for political reform; to respect human rights; to encourage an active role for
civil society and to expand the space for democratisation. The argument in favour of
an active role for society and more political liberalisation in order to sustain
economic reforms was based on many reasons.
In the long-term the distribution of gains and losses is likely to lead to a
redistribution of power among the different groups. The balance of power between
the state and different socio-economic groups is another aspects to consider in
managing the reform. In order to maintain the balance of power in Egyptian society,
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it is important that the amount of power abandoned by the government should not to
be given to one group, such as Business Associations, for instance. It should rather
be distributed among a wider range of groups. This also raises the issue of
democratisation and the need for a vibrant civil society to check state power in order
to defend the interests especially of different vulnerable groups.
The government, under a state-led growth model used to replace or to limit
public preferences of goods and services by controlling the availability, the quality
and the prices of such goods and services. The public were then more willing to
accept it as they traded their preferences for subsidies. In a free market economy
while prices are supposedly determined by market forces, the public have the right to
set their preferences and protect them through wider political and economic
participation. Although the economically stronger groups also tend to be the most
powerful politically.
Democratisation is also needed to monitor and enhance state performance,
where the state failed to reform itself concerning some aspects of corruption,
cronyism and prevailing patronage. In this respect there was a need to encourage
public participation in Egypt, which has been very weak among different strata, and
to change the culture of silence which grew for generations because of the practice
of coercive power which reduced confidence in the state. There is also a need to
raise patriotic feelings to encourage people to participate politically. While Nasser
did this artificially through ideology it is now needed through a national project
unifying peoples' efforts. There remains the situation of a lack of national projects
and the continuing deliberalisation process that limits the opportunity to participate
and reduces the available channels to express free opinion, so there is greater
likelihood of the emergence of extremist views and practices.
In the economic arena, what is needed to build sustainable growth is
productive investment. Investment that enhanced the productive capacity of the
country as the high rates of growth of the 1970s proved fragile because these were
achieved through the services sectors. A recent World Bank Report (1997) revealed
that the increase in the productive assets of the Egyptian economy was zero during
the 1990s if resource depletion is also calculated. The fact that oil reserves, one of
the main sources of foreign currency, may to be depleted within fifteen years, which
seems to be forgotten or ignored, shows the size of the challenge facing the Egyptian
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economy, which looks immense. There is an urgent need to expand the productive
capacity of the country, especially with its growing population. The privatisation
programme is unlikely to contribute seriously to investment and growth. Such
investment should also be able to create high employment opportunities to reduce
the problem of unemployment.
None of Egypt's main challenges has yet been faced. Unemployment and
poverty continue to be high and little has been achieved to improve the quality of
human resources. The gap in science and technology with developed countries is
widening. Stabilisation and restoring internal and external balances, albeit still
fragile with increasing internal debt and unstable export performance, is not useful to
the real economy. In such a case one would not dare to call for a minimal role for
the state, waiting for private initiative to slowly revive. There is a role for the state
to encourage domestic savings and to provide appropriate channels through which
such savings are directed to productive activities. This could be mainly through
providing the appropriate legal and regulatory framework, creating differentiated
incentives to direct investments towards the targeted activities and by increasing
credibility in its policies through stability, consistency, transparency and
accountability. Political stability, democratic practices and availability of equal
opportunities are also important elements for building credibility. The GOE needs to
increase credibility in its capabilities and to improve the administrative performance
of its apparatus. It is too late to be told, after eight years or more of reform efforts,
that the IMF would provide technical assistance to improve the technical abilities of
the Egyptian executive to carry out the reform programme.
Economic reform in the agricultural sector, which has focused on price
reform, resulted in some improvement at sector level by increasing production.
These increases did not meet targets. Expansion in the production of wheat, cotton
and horticulture were targeted. Yet, only wheat has managed to expand together
with cereal crops. Free market mechanisms were used by farmers to improve the
production of self- provisioning crops rather than reviving the internal and external
markets. This was due to the low living standards in rural areas and where the
market economy seemed to threaten fanners' access to food in the markets.
The growth achieved in Egypt's agricultural sector has not been sustained nor
equitably distributed. Focusing on price reform in the agricultural sector created
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gains from the 'once for all' format. Even these gains were not fairly distributed
between farmers. Big farmers were more likely to gain while very small farmers and
the landless were likely to lose. Institutional reforms in that sector seem to have
lagged behind. Cooperatives have been neglected and rendered jobless. Their role
in extension work is nearly absent. After the complete withdrawal of the PBDAC,
merchants seem to be the only source of information about new varieties of inputs
and prices and are more likely to adopt monopoly prices. Cooperatives seem more
suitable to take initiatives to provide farmers with information and know-how. The
absence of the PBDAC is more likely to create asymmetric information where big
farmers have better access to the market, market information, technology and to have
better chances to bargain for better prices for their inputs and products.
Other conditions for sustaining growth in rural areas also seem to be absent.
For long-term development a number of issues need to be considered. These are
environmental dimensions; the issue of increasing investment and improving its
efficiency; technological progress; and political participation. Rural areas have been
marginalised from political participation at the national level. Farmers seats in the
People's Assembly are only cosmetic and have lacked effective influence over the
decision-making process, and they fail to eliminate the bias against farmers in crop
pricing and availability of services. Big landlords who won the seats benefited
personally and have used parliamentary membership to consolidate their power in
their villages. At the local level they also dominate cooperatives and local councils.
However, farmers representation in the People's Assembly is threatened to be
elimirtated or marginalised during the "liberal" transformation. As a result, rural
civil organisations need to be initiated and consolidated in order to enhance the
political weight of a historically neglected sector. Because small farmers with less
than five feddan are the majority of farmers in Egypt and because the five feddan
represents the frontier for poverty, these groups have to be fairly represented in any
association or public organisation.
Investment is the other source for maintaining high production rates.
Increasing poverty in rural areas reduces the farmers' ability to invest in maintaining
their resources. Public investment is also low and little is directed to maintain the
old agricultural land which is the main source of agricultural production. It seems
that a high proportion of agricultural investment is directed to the projects of
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horizontal expansion especially in the southern part of Egypt like Toshka where the
outcome is uncertain. There is a great need to balance the allocation of resources
between the old and new lands. The encouragement to apply new technologies
across all categories of land holders is also needed but so too is adequate and flexible
extension services.
Due to the competing uses of public investment in agriculture and because of
the new policy of encouraging private sector initiatives, the agribusiness sector has
been assigned an increased role. The field work study conducted on this sector
exposed its limited competence and emphasised its need for a strong state to
improve its effectiveness. The sector's response after the SAP was weak in terms of
the number of companies, their size and the type of activities chosen. The majority
of them were working in input trading. The main market entry barriers were a lack of
finance, administrative obstacles, and market monopoly by some private units. The
PBDAC seemed an irrelevant source of finance for most of them. It was not able to
improve its performance in attracting more clients and was accused by investors of
cronyism and favouritism, in addition to providing a lack of technical capabilities.
The credibility of its staff is low. The PBDAC's policy to provide credit seemed
biased towards big companies because of its credit policy which was based on the
holding of collateral. It performed as a governmental bank which aimed to reduce
its risks to a minimum not through project appraisal criteria but by depending on
customers' asset holdings.
Because privatisation was a result of fiscal crisis, it was taken as a goal not a
means to improve efficiency and productivity. However, it does not provide a
sustainable source for public finance. Equity issues have been neglected in selecting
such sources. As financial incentives for investment proved ineffective, a shift from
financial incentives to policy incentives is likely to be more rewarding. Incentives
should differentiated and target oriented to specific activities. It would also
encourage environment-friendly projects. For agribusiness incentives could be by
providing low cost credit as finance proved to be one of the main barriers to entry in
the reform era, or in form of support services and legislation. By low cost finance I
mean not only low interest-rate, but also easy procedures and lending conditions.
PBDAC seemed to have no clear priorities for lending to agribusiness apart from
low interest rate for land reclamation. However, this type of lending was not tested
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in our sample as none of it enjoyed such credit. Food security projects, such as
poultry and its complementary industries and services, need greater concern.
Incentives to improve technology in the area of providing environmentally safe
agricultural inputs is most recommended. Industries providing non-chemical inputs,
bio-fcrtilisers, should encouraged to expand by providing every necessary support.
Some of them suffer problems to access final consumers- farmers- in this respect the
PBDAC distributing points might be of great help. The absence of an effective legal
framework was another impediment to agricultural investment. Illegal practices of
some private investors in the form of commercial cheating and oligopolistic
practices crowded out real entrepreneurs. Appropriate legislation and its effective
implementation are necessary conditions for sustaining investment revival.
Investors in the agribusiness sector seemed to lack concern about
macroeconomic issues as they were short of information about some economic
policies and measures, had no clear vision about the dynamics of the economy and
showed a low ability to participate in the decision-making process. Their views and
policies towards the expansion of their activities were built on their experience in the
market in its narrow sense, where changes at the national and international level
were not fully considered. Some of them lacked awareness about the effects of the
GATT and free international trade on their activities. Exports were mainly directed
to Arab countries, followed by European countries and they were likely to face
increasing competition even in the Arab countries' markets. The failure to include
agricultural products in the partnership agreement with the European Union in the
late 1990s did not seem to bother them. In general they were optimistic about the
future demand in the local markets and external markets as well. This optimism was
built mostly on the effect of trend and an increase in the population. Those who
produced for the local market were not aware that free international trade could
create more competition with imported goods. There was also the opposite situation,
where local market absorption could depress exports. One producer of new
irrigation systems was satisfied that his products were absorbed by the domestic
markets thus reducing his exports. Fertilisers also showed a high external demand.
'While shortages of fertilisers threatened agricultural production, such industries did
not receive any favourable incentives to increase local production in order to satisfy
the local market and retain the external market which was difficult to restore if lost.
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Agribusiness investors showed moderate belief in the reform programme
with little inclination to oppose it openly. The reform succeeded in solving part of
their problems especially the monopoly of the public sector in input trading,
however some of these monopolies remained. Investors suffered from the
imposition of the new general sales tax which affected large companies more that
small ones and which caused them difficulties in refunding. Administrative
constraints remained especially concerning import and export measures and the
MALR services.
The political participation of investors in this sector was very low. And
while they showed some ability to organise, their organisations were weak and
ineffective. They did not support the view that businessmen in Egypt were gaining
more power and influence over the decision-making process. They could not be
considered as an active coalition of beneficiaries or as an opposition or lobbying
group. Their political weakness stemmed from their lack of interest in political
participation and from weak and fragmented, sometimes competing, organisations.
However, few of them showed political ambition by joining the ruling party and by
nominating themselves in the People's Assembly elections. And in spite of their
political indifference they were in favour of democracy and asked for more political
liberalisation which encouraged the belief that they are willing to participate more in
a favourable environment.
The empirical study in this thesis emphasised the needs for a strong state to
promote the private. sector revival. It also highlighted the problems of the market
economy where public monopoly were sometimes replaced by private monopoly.
Oligopolistic practices of merchants and their control over prices were very clear in
the poultry industry. Complaints from merchants and middlemen were also frequent
from producers of agricultural inputs. Commercial cheating was also evident. In all
these cases private investors asked for government protection from such practices
and admitted their failure to solve such problems. Producers of inputs also failed to
provide geographical coverage in distributing their products and requested seek the
help of the PBDAC. All this highlighted the need for the state to strengthen its
ability to provide the necessary law to fight monopoly and to impose existing
legislation concerning commercial cheating.
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In Ethort, any review to the reform programme should consider to eliminating
the negative effects of unequal distribution of gains and losses between various
socio-economic groups; to enhance the positive outcomes and to consider long-term
issues.
Further research might examine the relationship between agribusiness
associations and the state. Investors response revealed that the main task of
agribusiness associations was to negotiate economic policy with the government.
However, they express the view that these associations were weak. More
investigation is necessary to the kind of policies or measures negotiated with the
government and the reason for the relative weakness of these associations. My
empirical study has not covered middlemen and merchants who work in districts and
villages, yet this strata plays a pivotal role in influencing availability and prices of
input. Their relation with agribusiness and farmers needs to be examined.
Furthermore, there is a need for periodical assessment to investment obstacles and
changes in the investment envirotunent through research and meeting between
government officials and businessman. Finally greater transparency in state policies
would facilitate, among other things, opportunities for an improved policy debate.
t
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Appendix 1 Questionnaire on the Agribusiness
Community in Egypt
Name of Company:
Name of Investor
Address
Date
This information is confidential and will only be used for the purpose of
scientific research. Confidentiality of respondents will be maintained at all
times
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This questionnaire is to be answered by one of the owners of the company as it represents the views of
investors who risk their money and their participation in the decision-making process.
Name
Education
Age
previous job
1- When was your company established? year
	
- When did you start your actual activity? year
	
2- what is the legal status of your company?
-Joint stock
-Partnership
-Ltd. Partnership
-Ltd. Liabilities
-Individual Enterprise
-Other
3- Under which investment law was your company established?
-Investment law no. 230 for the year 1989
-Private sector law no. 159
-Other
4- What is the size of the company's capital?
-Authorised Capital
-Paid up Capital
5- Do you have non-Egyptian partner?
-Yes (
	 )ask no. 6	 -No	 )ask no. 8
6- What is his nationality? 	
7- Why do you need a foreigth Partner?
-To provide finance
-To provide new technology
-To open new markets
8- Did you obtain a loan to establish your company?
-Yes (
	 -No (
9- What is the number of your employees? Total
	
-Permanent 	
-Temporary	
- Seasonal 	
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10-What are the company's main activities?
1- 	
2- 	
3- 	
11- By which of the following methods did you manage to expand your activity in
the previous period :
-Increasing Capital
-Increasing production
-Introducing new products
-Introducing new services
-Introducing new technology
-Expanding employment
-Shifting from domestic to external markets
-Expanding exports
-Others
12- What were the main obstacles which faced you when you founded your
company?
-Funding
-Lengthy and complicated steps
-Government officials increasing beaurocracy more rutted and difficulties
-High fees
-Some companies practise market monopoly
-Other producers seek illegal ways in operating
-No enough information about market
-Terms for loans difficult
-Others
13- What were the main obstacles which faced your company in its operations before
1991? and how did you manage to overcome them ?
	
1- 	
	
t 2- 	
	
3- 	
14- Which of the obove obstacles were overcome after 1991 through economic
reform policy? how?
1 	
2- 	
3- 	
15- What other obstacles faced your company after 1991? how did you manage to
overcome them?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
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16- To what extent was the economic reform useful to your company?
-Very useful
-Limited usefulness
-Some parts are useful others are harmful
-No effect
-Limited harm
-Very harmful
17- Which parts of the economic reform were useful? why?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
18- which parts of the economic reform were harmful? why?
1 	
2- 	
3- 	
19- Does your company engage in export?
-Yes (	 ) ask 20	 -No (	 ) ask 28
20- What is the proportion of exports relative to the company's total production
(operations)?
21- Do you make your own products?
-Yes (	 )ask 23	 -No (	 ) ask 22
22- Do you intend to produce them in the near future?
-Yes (	 -No (
23- What are the main markets for your exports ?
Product
	
Country
24- Have any of the following changes happened to your exports during the last five
years?
-Increase in exports	 ) Year 	
-Decrease in exports	 ) Year 	
-Opening new markets 	 ) Year 	
-Exporting new products	 ) Year 	
25- What are the main causes for these changes?
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1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
26- What are the main obstacles which face you in export? how do you try to over
come them'?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
3 	
27- Do you expect the demand on your products to increase or decrease in the
future? why ?
28- What are the main obstacles in the local market? how do you try to overcome it?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
29- What do you expect concerning domestic demand? why?
30- Is your company engaged in import?
-Yes (
	 ) ask 31	 -No (	 ) ask 34
31- What are your main imports and from where?
Product	 Country
32- Wbat are the main obstacles which face you when importing? how do you try to
overcome them?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
33- Do you find competition from local products when you market your own?
-Yes (	 -No (
34- Did the rise in the interest rate in 1991 and 1992 affect your activities? how?
35- How suitable is the interest rate for loans now?
- Very high (
	 )
- Suitable
	 (	 )
- High
- Do not know
295
36- Have you tried to obtain a loan from the PBDAC project for Agricultural
modernity backed by the World Bank?
-I do not know about it
	 ) ask 40
-I do not need loans now
	 ) ask 40
-I obtained a loan	 ) ask 37,38,40
-I am trying to secure a loan (
	 ) ask 37,38,40
-Terms are not suitable	 ) ask 39
-Other	 ) ask 40
37- How much? for what activity?
38- What are the main terms?
-Interest rate.
-Repayment period.
	
-Other	
39- Why?
40- What do you think of the PBDAC role in finance?
41- Do you think that the devaluation of the Egyptian pound at the beginning of the
reform affected your activity? how?
42- Do you think that the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound is suitable now? why?
43- Hqw will trade liberalisation affect your activity?
44- Do you intend to achieve any of the following goals in the near future:
-Increase production	 . ( )
-Introduce new products ( )
-Increase exports ( )
-Open new external markets ( )
-Modernise technology. ( )
-Expand employment ( )
-Start new complimentary activities ( )
-Other ( )
45- Do you invest.
 in R&D? how ?
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-I do not invest in R&D
-I have my own R&D department
-I consult the government research unit
-I consult the private research unit
-I seek the help of foreign experts
-I use specialised magazines
-I travel abroad to keep informed about new changes
-Other
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
)
)
)
)
)
)
(
)
)
46- What is the percentage of your expenditure on R&D in relation to your total
expenditure? 	 %
47- What are the main countries whose technology you seek to learn?
48- Do you think that the main steps taken by thc- new government to promote
investment and exports are sufficient ?
-Very adequate	 ) ask 51
-Good, but there are other steps needed
	 ) ask 49
-With limited effect
	 ) ask 49
49- What are the other main steps needed to promote investment?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
3- 	
50- What are the other main steps needed to promote exports?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
3- 	
51- What are the main countries in the region that compete with Egypt to attract
investment capital?
52- Why does Egyptian capital seek to invest abroad? what might be the main effects
on the Egyptian economy?
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
53- What do you think of selling public enterprises (privatisation)?
-All PE should be sold
-Big strategic companies should be kept
-Only failing companies should be sold
-Failing companies should be phased out
-Other
•
(
(
(
)
)
)
)
)
54- Which privatisation method do you prefer?
297
-Total sale for national investor ( )
-Total sale for national or foreign investor ( )
-Selling shares on stock market ( )
-Selling for employees ( )
-Private sector management ( )
-Other ( )
55- How can selling of shares be encouraged and made easier?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
56- Did you participate or intend to participate in the privatisation programme?
-I bought some shares
	 ) ask 58
-I intend to buy some shares (
	 ) ask 58
-I intend to buy amain share ( 	 ) ask 58
-I do not intend to participate ( 	 ) ask 57
-Other	 ) ask 58
57- Why?
58- Are you a member of the Chamber of Commerce?
-Yes (	 ) ask 59	 -No (	 ) ask 63
59- How do you benefit from it?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
60- Are you a leading member?
-Yes (
	 ) ask 61	 -No (	 ) ask 63
61- Where? 	
62- What are your main goals?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
63- Are you a member of any businessmen association?
-Yes (	 ) ask 64	 -No (	 ) ask 66
64- Which one?
	
65- In what way do you benefit from it?
-Loans and funding facilities ( )
-Technical consultation ( )
-Opening new external markets ( )
-Access to land facilities ( )
-Consulting with government concerning economic policy ( )
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-Other
66- Do you think that business associations can influence government policy?
-Have effective influence
-Have limited influence
-Have no influence at all
-Other
67- In what ways?
68- How can its effectiveness be increased?
69- Are you a member of the Egyptian-American Chamber of Commerce or the
Presidential Board? What are its main activities?
70- Do you think that any of them can influence economic policy? how? •
71- Are you a member of the industrial federation?
-Yes (	 ) ask 72	 -No (	 ) ask 73
72- How do you benefit from it?
1 	
2- 	
73- Arp you a member Of any other civil association?
-Yes (	 ) ask 74	 -No (	 ) ask 76
74- What is its name? 	
-What is its main activity? 	
75- How do you participate in its activities?
76- Are you a member of any political party?
-Yes (	 ) ask 77	 -No (	 ) ask 80
77- Which party? 	
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78- What kind of activity do you practise inside the party?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
79- How do you express your opinion inside the party?
80- Did you nominate yourself in the last People's Assembly election?
-Yes (
	 )	 -No (
81- Did you vote in the last election?
-Yes (	 -No (
82- Do you think that a greater degree of democracy can enhance the economic
reform programme?
-Yes	 (	 ) ask 83
-works against the programme ( 	 ) ask 83
-There is no relationship	 ) ask 84
83- How?
84- Do you think that the partnership agreement with the European Union or the
USA will affect your activity? how?
85- Do you think that the Middle East co-operation can expand your company's
activities?
-Yes (	 -No (
86- Ave there any agricultural projects that can be implemented through Middle
Eastern co-operation and introduced in the coming Cairo economic summit? Which
are the main countries that can participate?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
87- What are the main steps you adopt to limit the negative effect of your activity on
the environment?
88- How effective are the government initiatives to reduce pollution by companies?
89- What are the main reforms that the agricultural sector needs?
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	1-	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
90- What are the main points for the government to consider to grantee the
sustainability of the policy?
	
1- 	
	
2- 	
	
3- 	
91- Do you have any other comment?
e
